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Editorial  
 
We are delighted to present the fourteenth volume of the Irish Student Law 
Review. In the tradition of previous volumes, this Review maintains a high 
level of scholarly legal analysis of pertinent and diverse issues. Useful for 
the practitioner, academic and student, it delves into an array of topics, a 
number of which constitute developing areas of law in this jurisdiction.  
 
The Editorial Board this year benefited from huge interest from potential 
authors from many legal institutions, granting us a wealth of material from 
which to choose. The arduous task of selecting a small proportion of 
articles from some sixty submissions fell to a dedicated and enthusiastic 
Editorial Board. The first-rate choices they made are illustrated by the 
richness of the current volume. Covering a wide spectrum of legal 
discourse, from commercial law to human rights, environmental, 
criminology and public interest law, the reader has an invaluable key into 
contemporary Irish law.   
 
There have been many people involved in this year’s publication. We 
would like to thank the Friends of the Irish Student Law Review who 
provided not only the vital financial assistance for this year’s Review, but 
also welcome encouragement. The administrative back-up of the Honorable 
Society of the King’s Inns has considerably assisted us in the practicalities 
of publishing a scholarly journal. In particular, warm thanks are due to the 
Under Treasurer of the King’s Inns, Camilla McAleese, whose support has 
been unfailing. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the 
Honourable Mrs Catherine McGuinness for launching this volume and 
devoting her time to the particularly challenging task of judging the best 
article. Finally, the Review would not be the quality publication it is 
without the members of the Editorial Board. Their dedication, hard work 
and expertise willingly volunteered over the past nine months has ensured 
the publication of this Review. 
 
 
Claire Bruton and Patricia Sheehy Skeffington 
Co-Editors 
DEATH’S DWINDLING DOMAIN: TAMING 
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 
 
 
GERARD H. KELL* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The death penalty is one of the most divisive political and constitutional 
issues in the United States today. In a famous statement, unrelated to 
capital punishment, but appropriate in a very true sense, the 3rd President 
of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, remarked of the institution of 
slavery, that: 
 
We have the wolf by the ears; and we can neither hold him, nor 
safely let him go. Justice is on one scale and self-preservation is on 
the other.1 
 
The Civil War demonstrated that Jefferson’s concerns of the difficulties of 
abolishing slavery were well justified. However, 21st century America is 
riven by the same contradictions in connection with the death penalty. As 
Karl Wedekind observes: 
 
We suffer it to exist because we are anxious about our own lives in 
tumultuous times, and we want something to be done about crime. 
We are told to be tough on crime, we must execute murderers.2 
 
The death penalty remains, as Justice Arthur Goldberg once described it, “a 
kind of tribal rite, a symbolic palliative for the fear of crime”.3 Middle 
America continues to be somewhat sceptical of the death penalty, but to 
abolish it, would be a step into the unknown, a Russian roulette-style 
                                                     
*LLB. (Dub), BCL Candidate, Lincoln College, University of Oxford. The author would like to 
thank Prof. Gerry Whyte for his advice in the preparation of an earlier draft of this paper and the 
Hon. Terry J. Hatter Jr., Senior United States District Judge, for his engaging reflections on the 
death penalty. 
1 Partington ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (4th ed., Oxford University Press, 1996), 
at 364. 
2 Wedekind, The Second Grave: A Case for the Abolition of the Death Penalty (The Kentucky 
Coalition for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 2000), at 149. 
3 Goldberg and Dershowitz, “Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional” (1970) 83 HarvLR 
1773. 
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gamble with law and order.4 Nonetheless, recent years, in particular, have 
resulted in a significant reduction in the scope of death penalty statutes, 
which will later be discussed in depth. 
In 1972, following the landmark judgment in Furman v. Georgia, 
which held that the death penalty, as then administered, was 
unconstitutional, death penalty statutes were reformed.5 Many abolitionists 
believed the judgment represented the penultimate step on the journey 
towards abolition.6 The Supreme Court ruled that the prevailing pattern of 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty violated the Constitution. “These 
death sentences”, Justice Potter Stewart elaborated, “are cruel and unusual 
in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual”.7 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court commuted the sentences of all 629 people 
on death row. However, such predictions that the death penalty was nearing 
its end did not come to pass and it soon became clear that Furman 
condemned only death penalty statutes as then drafted, but not the death 
penalty per se. This interpretation was confirmed in Gregg v. Georgia 
when the Supreme Court revisited the matter and accepted that the 
modifications which Georgia’s State Legislature crafted were sufficient to 
correct the Supreme Court’s concerns that the death penalty was being 
administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner.8 Georgia had 
introduced a guided discretion scheme, outlining mitigating and 
aggravating factors for the benefit of the jury. The Georgian scheme further 
provided for a bifurcated trial, whereby a jury determine first whether the 
accused is guilty, before a separate jury decide whether the death penalty is 
appropriate. A similar statutory framework has now been adopted by all 
retentionist states. Moreover, the Supreme Court, whilst emphasising that 
aggravating factors must be specifically stated in statute, has also held that 
the jury cannot be “precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any 
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of 
                                                     
4 Middle America remains somewhat sceptical of the advantages of the death penalty. As Scott 
Turow, a lawyer and writer who served as a member of the Illinois Governor’s Commission on 
Capital Punishment, notes, “Public support for capital punishment has waxed and waned 
throughout our history”, Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing With 
the Death Penalty (Picador, 2004), at 20-24. 
5 408 US 238 (1972), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=408&invol =238>. Hereafter 
referred to as Furman. Immediate analysis of this judgment varied as to its long-term impact. 
6 Indeed, prominent abolitionist, Jack Greenberg, remarked that, “There will no longer be any 
more capital punishment in the United States”. See Sarat, “Recapturing the Spirit of Furman: 
The American Bar Association and the New Abolitionist Politics” (1998) 61 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 5, at 7. 
7 408 US 238 (1972). 
8 428 US 153 (1976), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=428&invol =153>. Turow, op. 
cit., at 20-24. 
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the offence that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.”9 
Since the death penalty gained constitutional imprimatur in Gregg 
almost 750 people have been put to death. In 1999 the execution rate in the 
United States reached a peak at 98 executions and has declined slightly 
since then. As has been accepted by many legal scholars in the United 
States, and indeed abolitionists: 
 
Polls consistently indicate that a substantial majority of Americans 
advocate executions of felons convicted of egregious crimes. Results 
of a 1981 Gallup Poll indicated that two-thirds of Americans 
approved the death penalty. In 1985, the approval rate rose to 72%; 
in 1991, to 76%; and in 1994, to 80%.10 
 
However, in 2000, opinion polls registered a significant decline to 
67% in support for the death penalty, which by 2004 had only partially 
recovered to 71%.11 Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that irrespective of 
fluctuations in the polls, most Americans remain supportive of the death 
penalty. Austin Sarat has perceptively noted the political effect of such 
popular demands for harsh justice, remarking that, “[p]oliticians of every 
stripe do not want to be caught on the “wrong side” of the death penalty 
debate”.12 Profound ethical, religious, legal and constitutional issues are 
raised by the existence of the death penalty and the processes by which it is 
implemented. Indeed, many ardent supporters of the death penalty have 
resigned themselves to the reality that, however desirable it may be, it is 
impossible for capital punishment to meet the standards of fairness and 
consistency required by the Constitution.13 Very real and genuine fears 
over the execution of innocent individuals,14 and the contested deterrent 
                                                     
9Lockett v. Ohio 438 US 604 (1978), See < 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=438&page=604>. 
Hereafter referred to as Lockett. 
10 Rasnic, “The US Constitution, the Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: Should the USA 
Put the Death Penalty to Death” (1999) 50 NILQ. 50, at 51. 
11 Clark County, Indiana, Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty 
<http:// www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/opinion.htm> (visited 15 June 2006). 
12 Sarat, loc. cit., at 7. 
13 Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun is perhaps the best example of this perspective. 
Having authored the leading opinion in Gregg, Justice Blackmun accepted shortly before 
retiring from the bench in Callins v. Collins 510 US 1141 (1994), at 1151-1152 that he “no 
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death”. He further added, “I feel morally and 
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed”. 
14 Such fears over the execution of innocents are disturbingly valid and have a sound basis. 
“Since 1973, 117 wrongfully convicted people have been freed from death row in the US, some 
after spending more than 20 years in solitary confinement”. See “Sister of Mercy”, Irish Times 
Magazine, 18 June 2005, at 18-19. The article discussed the abolitionist crusade of Sr. Helen 
Prejean, author of Dead Man Walking (Vintage, 1994). Taryn Simon has put the number of 
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effect of the death penalty15 has also ensured that, in spite of the seemingly 
secure position of America’s modern death penalty statutes, a voice of 
compassion and change remains.16 
However, the last 10 years have witnessed huge strides forward 
towards the final abolition of the death penalty in a number of countries. 
Many have abolished the death penalty entirely,17 many more have 
implemented a de facto abolition, banning the death penalty for all but 
2006] America’s Death Penalty  7 
Pressure for the abolition of capital punishment, it would seem, is 
operating on two levels, both internally and externally. Internally, insofar 
as the death penalty is no longer available for the expansive range of 
offences for which it was imposed only half a century ago. Furthermore, 
the global trend towards abolitionism has accelerated with each passing 
year and it is submitted that this can be said to represent a significant 
external pressure on the United States. Life-long abolitionist, Hugo Adam 
Bedau, has commented, “Progress in abolishing the death penalty has 
proved to be very slow, intermittent and fragmentary”.21 However, whilst 
progress on the road to abolition is painfully slow, it now seems clear that 
at least it is no longer static. Indeed, Prof. J.R. Broughton has gone so far as 
to remark that “capital punishment in America is withering towards its 
death - slowly, gradually, incrementally, but surely nonetheless”.22 
Indeed, where once the death penalty was meted out with relative 
ease for a wide range of offences, the evolving nature of the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has today restricted the use of 
the death penalty to the crime of murder.23 Whilst theoretically capital 
punishment is available for an ever-expanding range of homicide offences, 
in truth the death penalty is imposed in only a confined number of cases. In 
fact, there is a murder in the United States every 32.6 minutes, which 
calculates to over 16,000 murders every year.24 However, as Hugo Bedau 
has observed: 
 
Of the 8,000 or so persons convicted [of murder every year], a small 
number, perhaps as many as 250, will be sentenced to death. Of 
these few, an unknown number will eventually be executed 
sometime during the next decade. This year perhaps two or three a 
month will enter the execution chamber. With more than 15,000 
murders, there will be fewer than 100 executions.25 
 
                                                     
21 Bedau, Killing as Punishment: Reflections on the Death Penalty in America (Northeastern 
University Press, 2004), xi. 
22 Broughton, “The Second Death of Capital Punishment” (Social Science Research Network, 
2006), at 3. See Social Science Research Network, The Second Death of Capital Punishment 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=878244> (visited 16 March 2006). 
23
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958). In this case the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society”. Hereafter referred to as Trop. In Weems v. United States, 217 
US 349 (1910), the Supreme Court had already ruled that the Eighth Amendment was of an 
“expansive and vital character”. 
24 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2004 
<http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/ summary/crime_clock/index.html> (visited 21 June 2006). 
25 Bedau, Killing as Punishment: Reflections on the Death Penalty in America, op. cit., at 21. 
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Whilst the death penalty is still on the statute books of 36 states, it is the 
exception rather than the norm, even for the ultimate crime of murder.26 
The oft-cited “eye for an eye” mantra seems quite hollow, when considered 
in light of Bedau’s factual account. When it is also observed that “the 
leading cause of death on death row is actually natural causes”,27 it 
becomes apparent that the death penalty system is failing, even by its own 
standards as an efficient and effective form of punishment.28 Indeed, the 
recent trial of Zacarias Moussaoui has also served to focus further attention 
on the death penalty. In May of this year, a federal jury deadlocked over 
whether Moussaoui, a French citizen and the so-called 20th hijacker in the 
terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, should receive 
the death penalty.29 The jury instead recommended sentencing Moussaoui 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.30 Some scholars 
reacted furiously to the decision; Prof. John Eastman, observing that “[i]f a 
terrorist involved in the most heinous attack in the US history doesn’t 
deserve the death penalty, who does?”31 However, the particular facts of 
the case are of great significance. Moussaoui had been arrested prior to the 
attacks and the Federal government had sought to contend that by lying and 
not exposing the plot while being interrogated, he was responsible for the 
bombings. Under Federal law, three of the six counts with which 
Moussaoui was charged are death-eligible, though, not mandatory.32 It 
would seem that had Moussaoui been more proximately involved in the 
actual hijacking, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the jury might well 
have concluded differently. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26 It should be noted that until recently the death penalty was legally available in 38 states. 
However, death penalty statutes in New York and Kansas were declared unconstitutional by the 
respective states’ Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in 2004. Since then legislation 
reactivating the death penalty has not been pursued with any great vigour. 
27 Bryson, Notes From a Big Country (Doubleday, 1998), at 284. 
28 It is relevant to note that as of 1 November 2005, there were 3,415 inmates on death row. See 
Death Penalty Information Centre, Fact Sheet <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf> 
(visited 11 November 2005). 
29 Demleitner, “The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead” (2002) 
81(1) Oregon Law Review 131, at 147. Moussaoui’s trail further strained relations with France, 
when Attorney General, John Ashcroft refused a request by the French Government asking the 
United States not to seek the death penalty. 
30 The death penalty in the United States is administered through a mechanism referred to as the 
“bifurcated trial”. In essence, a determination of guilt is first made, and then a jury decides 
whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment. 
31 Editorial, “Life for Moussaoui: A Justifiable Verdict” Orange County Register, 4 May 2006. 
32 In Woodson v. North Carolina 428 US 280 (1976), the mandatory death penalty was deemed 
unconstitutional. See infra 9. 
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Restricting the “Machinery of Death”33 
 
Since reauthorising the death penalty in Gregg, the United States Supreme 
Court has endeavoured to craft a framework for capital punishment which 
satisfies the demands of the Constitution. The twin requirements of 
consistency across cases and attention to the unique characteristics of each 
case have created a morass of conflicting opinions and rules. Indeed Justice 
Blackmun expressed serious reservations whether the competing demands 
of consistency and fairness can ever be reconciled.34 In Callins v. Collins, 
Justice Blackmun emphasised that: 
 
[O]ver the past two decades, efforts to balance these competing 
constitutional commands have been to no avail. Experience has 
shown that the consistency and rationality promised in Furman are 
inversely related to the fairness owed the individual when 
considering a sentence of death. A step toward consistency is a step 
away from fairness.35 
 
He further added that “the decision whether a human being should live or 
die is so inherently subjective - rife with all of life’s understandings, 
experiences, prejudices, and passions - that it inevitably defies the 
rationality and consistency required by the Constitution”.36 Since the Gregg 
decision, a bitterly divided Supreme Court has issued a barrage of lengthy 
concurring and dissenting opinions rife with casuistry and contradiction. 
Little coherence is evident from what Justice Scalia has described as “the 
fog of confusion that is our annually improvised Eighth Amendment, 
‘death is different’ jurisprudence”.37 Other commentators have succinctly 
concluded that “the Eighth Amendment is a jurisprudential train wreck”.38 
However, as Robert Burt has observed, “the unremitting internal conflict 
that has characterised the Court’s death penalty adjudication mirrors 
concerns about polarised hostility in American society generally”.39 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has 
heavily restricted the use of the death penalty. Only a matter of decades 
                                                     
33
 Callins v. Collins 510 US 1141 (1994), at 1151-1152, per Justice Blackmun. 
34 Prejean, The Death of Innocence: An Eyewitness Account of Wrongful Executions (Random 
House 2005), at 219-21, where the author provides a comprehensive overview of Justice 
Blackmun’s growing disillusionment with the Supreme Court’s capital punishment 
jurisprudence. This disillusionment culminated in his decision in Callins v. Collins. 
35 510 US 1141 (1994), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&inv ol=U10343>. 
Hereafter referred to as Callins. 
36
 Ibid. 
37 Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History (Harvard University Press, 2002), at 304. 
38 Wittes, “What is ‘Cruel and Unusual’?” Policy Review, January 2006. 
39 Burt, “Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution” in Sarat ed., Capital 
Punishment: Volume II (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005) 1741, at 1742. 
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ago, the death penalty was available for a range of various offences, today 
it is restricted purely to homicide, albeit within an expansive range of 
factual circumstances. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court concluded that the 
death penalty was not a constitutionally permissible punishment for rape.40 
In a 7-2 decision, Justice White writing for the majority conceded that rape 
is a serious and reprehensible crime which deserves a serious punishment. 
However, he concluded that to execute the defendant would be too severe a 
punishment because the victim had not lost her life. He explained that: 
 
Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life 
may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally 
is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death 
penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and irrevocability’, is an 
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human 
life.41 
 
Interestingly, Justice Powell, who sided with the majority, concurred 
only on the facts of the present case. He observed that: 
 
In a proper case a more discriminating inquiry than the plurality 
undertakes might well discover that both juries and legislatures have 
reserved the ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape 
resulting in serious, lasting harm to the victim.42 
 
However, Justice Powell’s opinion is something of a curiosity, given the 
particular facts of this case: the defendant, Ehrlich Coker, had brutally 
raped three women in as many years, killing one and seriously injuring 
another, and had a long list of felony convictions, ranging from kidnapping 
to armed robbery. It is difficult to envisage a more heinous factual matrix. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that Justice Powell’s qualification and 
the dissent of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in the case could 
well provide fresh impetus to reviving the death penalty for serious non-
homicidal felonies in an appropriate case. It is to be observed that a number 
of states retain statutes authorising the death penalty for the rape of a child. 
Indeed, Louisiana has recently enacted such a statute.43 In June 2005, 
revelations relating to child sex abuse by a Satanic sect in Louisiana raised 
the serious possibility that the local District Attorney would feel compelled 
                                                     
40 433 US 584 (1977), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=433&invol =584>. Hereafter 
referred to as Coker. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 
43 Prejean, op. cit., at 228. 
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to seek the death penalty.44 Of course, whether the United States Supreme 
Court would feel inclined to authorise such a dramatic expansion in the use 
of the death penalty is quite another matter. However, in theory at least, it 
is entirely possible that the particular mode of constitutional interpretation, 
the originalist perspective, favoured by a number of justices but advocated 
most strongly by Justice Scalia would not prevent such an expansion in the 
application of the death penalty.45 
Whilst some residual doubt may remain as to the status of the death 
penalty for rape in particularly heinous circumstances, it seems more 
assured that the imposition of a mandatory death penalty is beyond all 
constitutional redemption. In Woodson v. North Carolina a narrowly 
divided Supreme Court determined that laws mandating the death penalty 
for specific crimes failed to take into account the character and record of 
the individual and the circumstances of the particular offence, both of 
which were “a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death”.46 Delivered on the same day as the Court’s 
judgment in Gregg, the majority’s reasoning reveals a desire to retain some 
degree of individualised sentencing. In Furman, the particular defect in 
12  Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
Unfortunately, all this experimentation and ingenuity yielded little of 
what Furman demanded. It soon became apparent that discretion 
could not be eliminated from capital sentencing without threatening 
the fundamental fairness due a defendant when life is at stake. Just as 
contemporary society was no longer tolerant of the random or 
discriminatory infliction of the penalty of death, evolving standards 
of decency required due consideration of the uniqueness of each 
individual defendant when imposing society’s ultimate penalty.47 
 
 
The Eight Amendment and Evolving Standards of Decency  
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Supreme Court’s restriction of 
capital punishment since the turn of the century has been its willingness to 
remove certain categories of persons from the scope of death penalty 
statutes. Under the Eighth Amendment, “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted”. However, the Supreme Court has determined that this 
Amendment is of an “expansive and vital character”.48 Furthermore, in 
Trop v. Dulles, the plurality opinion of the Court, written by Chief Justice 
Warren, elaborated that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”.49 This doctrine allows the concept of cruel and unusual 
punishment to evolve over time, depending upon what “civilized society 
may accept or reject.”50 Furthermore, this assessment clearly leaves open 
the possibility that capital punishment may well be considered 
unconstitutional at some point in the future and it is on the basis of this 
yardstick that the execution of the mentally retarded and the execution of 
juveniles have both been abolished. 
Whilst such an interpretation may initially seem strange given the 
fixed nature of the text of the Constitution and particularly so with the 
American Constitution, John P. Conrad has emphasised that given such 
great social change, the understanding of the Eighth Amendment cannot 
remain static, defined solely by the standards of the American Republic in 
its infancy.51 Moreover, if the Eighth Amendment were to be interpreted 
                                                     
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Weems v. United States, 217 US 349 (1910), See < 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=217&invol=349>. Hereafter 
referred to as Weems. 
49 356 US 86 (1958), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=356&invol =86>. Hereafter 
referred to as Trop. The Supreme Court accepted that modifications made by the State 
legislatures 
50 487 US 815 (1988), per Justice Stevens. Hereafter referred to as Thompson. 
51 Conrad and van den Haag, The Death Penalty: A Debate (Plenum Press, 1983), at 162. 
2006] America’s Death Penalty  13 
solely by reference to the norms prevalent in late Eighteenth Century 
America, such logic could be applied to justify the reintroduction of ear-
cropping, branding and nose splitting, all of which were popular and 
acceptable forms of punishment during that period and which survived the 
enactment of the Constitution. Yet today, in the 21st century, such sanctions 
clearly could not be tolerated. Furthermore, as David Richards has 
explained: 
 
Matters of constitutionally relevant and controlling fact and value 
may evolve so that applications unimaginable earlier may become 
reasonable, and earlier applications may become unreasonable. To 
bind interpretation to historic referents would impute to the 
constitutional design the unreasonable intent to apply abstract 
language counterfactually, by ignoring changes in relevant factors 
which would lead reasonable persons to apply the relevant language 
differently.52 
 
 
The Abolition of the Death Penalty for the Mentally Retarded 
 
Since the turn of the century, two leading Supreme Court judgments based 
on the United State’s evolving standards of decency have dramatically 
reduced the scope of the death penalty.53 Debate for some time had focused 
on the sensitive issue of executing vulnerable adults such as the mentally 
retarded and the decision of then presidential nominee, Bill Clinton, to 
return to Arkansas during campaigning in 1991 to personally oversee the 
execution of convicted murderer Ricky Ray Rector further brought this 
issue to the fore.54  
However, in Penry v. Lynaugh the Supreme Court narrowly 
determined that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of a 
mentally retarded person.55 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority held 
that “there was insufficient evidence of a national consensus against 
executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offences for us to 
conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment”.56 
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Furthermore, Justice O’Connor determined that the prisoner’s mental 
retardation was irrelevant, since he had been afforded constitutional 
protections through the availability of the modern insanity defence. The 
opinion also observed that only one state, Georgia, had in fact prohibited 
the death penalty for the mentally retarded.57 Nonetheless, the minority 
judgment raised significant constitutional questions as to the 
appropriateness of capital punishment for a mentally retarded offender. 
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall concurred, emphasised that: 
 
The impairment of a mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities, 
control over impulsive behavior, and moral development in my view 
limits his or her culpability so that, whatever other punishment might 
be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is always and 
necessarily disproportionate to his or her blameworthiness and hence 
is unconstitutional.58 
 
Justice Brennan further highlighted that “killing mentally retarded 
offenders does not measurably further the penal goals of either retribution 
or deterrence”.59  
Nonetheless, the reasoning of the Penry majority held sway in 
constitutional law for a further thirteen years before the Supreme Court 
revisited the matter in Atkins v. Virginia.60 The judgment of Justice 
O’Connor in Penry was suggestive that she might well revise her position 
on the execution of the mentally retarded if a sea change in American 
opinion on the matter were presented to her. Justice Scalia and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, however, who even dissented in the more moderate parts 
of Justice O’Connor’s judgment, were unlikely to embark on the Road to 
Damascus. 
Atkins v. Virginia represented a landmark decision and effectively 
signalled the beginning of a new abolitionist campaign which focused on 
achieving the incremental prohibition of the death penalty. The majority 
decision in Atkins reflected growing unease with the death penalty in the 
United States and more specifically the application of the death penalty to 
the mentally retarded. Justice Stevens, who delivered the majority opinion, 
provided a revealing account of the pace of this change: 
 
Much has changed since [Penry]... Given the well-known fact that 
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing 
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protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of 
States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and 
the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the 
power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that 
today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically 
less culpable than the average criminal. The evidence carries even 
greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed 
the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.61 
 
American society’s evolving standards of decency, the yardstick set in Trop 
for interpreting “cruel and unusual punishments” under the Eighth 
Amendment, were deemed to have evolved sufficiently to hold that the 
execution of a mentally retarded individual was repugnant to the 
Constitution. Justice O’Connor joined with the majority, leaving only Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Clarence in dissent. Justice 
Scalia was exceptionally candid in his criticism of the reasoning of the 
majority, commenting: 
 
Today’s decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-
different jurisprudence. Not only does it, like all of that 
jurisprudence, find no support in the text or history of the Eighth 
Amendment; it does not even have support in current social attitudes 
regarding the conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty 
inappropriate. Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so 
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members.62 
 
Justice Scalia’s remarks reveal the passionate nature of the ongoing 
question of the death penalty in the United States and show that the 
Supreme Court, rather than being immune from such passion, is in fact 
often the forum for the most intensive debate on the matter. Robert Burt 
has suggested that this “disorder” within the Court is not conducive to a 
permanent resolution of the issue of capital punishment.  Indeed, it is fair to 
remark that it has in fact resulted in the patchwork of complicated 
judgments which now form the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Burt has commented that: 
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Only one lesson can be drawn from the Supreme Court’s prolonged 
experience with capital punishment. The Justices have provided this 
lesson, though unwittingly, by embodying their conception of 
American society: In conflicts among implacably opposed 
adversaries, nothing is ever sensibly resolved or learned.63 
 
Professor Burt’s observation is apposite and the discord about which he 
writes was also a feature which characterised the Court’s protracted tussle 
over the constitutionality of juvenile executions. 
 
 
The Abolition of the Death Penalty for Juveniles 
 
Whilst the American public have remained supportive of the death penalty 
itself, successive polls have revealed great public unease over the execution 
of juveniles.64 The fact that a person had not attained their majority at the 
time of the offence was held to be a mitigating factor in Eddings v. 
Oklahoma. However, this is merely one consideration which can be 
counterbalanced by other aggravating factors, such as the egregious nature 
of the crime or the recidivism of the offender.65 In Thompson v. Oklahoma 
the Supreme Court determined that the execution of minors below the age 
of 16 at the time of commission of the offence was prohibited by the 
Constitution.66 Nonetheless, the selection of 16 was considered an arbitrary 
choice and the continued application of death penalty statutes to 16 and 17 
year olds remained a focus for abolitionist activity. 
In 2003 Oklahoma executed Scott Allen Hain who was only 17 at the 
time of committing double murder.67 The execution brought a wave of 
international condemnation, with the European Union expressing its 
“deepest regret” that the United States chose to proceed with the 
execution.68 Furthermore domestic and international news coverage 
exposed the United States as one of only a handful of countries which 
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continued to execute minors.69 Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Yemen were not 
the usual company in which the United States expected to find itself. 
However, more serious and substantial arguments were also raised against 
the continued constitutionality of juveniles’ executions. Scientific research 
has indicated that the decision-making area of the brain, the frontal lobe, 
can often only fully develop late in adolescence. Neuropsychologist Ruben 
Gur of the University of Pennsylvania supports such analysis and has stated 
that the last parts of the brain to develop are those controlling “impulsivity, 
judgement, planning... and other characteristics that make people morally 
culpable”.70 His comments echo similar observations by members of the 
Supreme Court. In Thompson, Justice Stevens asserted that: 
 
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager 
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at 
the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere 
emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles 
are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult 
also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.71 
 
Indeed it is true of Justice Stevens to note that society does not trust 
juveniles with many privileges and responsibilities which are 
constitutionally endowed upon adults. The right to vote is only extended to 
those above 18 years old. Furthermore, juveniles can neither purchase 
alcohol or tobacco products, nor can they join the military.72 In most states 
restrictions exist on access to pornographic material, driving and gambling. 
It is therefore unsurprising that even the retentionist Governor of Arkansas, 
Mike Huckabee, termed such blatantly unjust double-standards 
“inconceivable” and “inconsistent”.73 Nonetheless, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 
where a narrow Supreme Court majority upheld the constitutionality of 
juvenile executions, Justice Scalia delivered a cutting rebuke to those who 
sought to draw comparisons between the minimum age set for the 
imposition of the death penalty and the minimum age for drinking, voting 
and other social privileges and responsibilities. 
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It is, to being with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough 
to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in 
order to be mature enough to understand that murdering another 
human being is profoundly wrong, and to conform one’s conduct to 
that most minimal of all civilized standards.74 
 
In March 2005, the Supreme Court delivered its much anticipated 
judgment in Roper v. Simmons declaring that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional for persons under 18 years of age at the time of the 
commission of the offence.75 This case, regarding Christopher Simmons, 
who was only 17 when he committed felony murder, had presented the 
Court with a fresh opportunity to examine the issue of juvenile executions. 
The similarities with the execution of the mentally retarded were striking 
and Justice Kennedy, writing the majority opinion observed that “[j]ust as 
the Atkins Court reconsidered the issue decided in Penry, we now 
reconsider the issue decided in Stanford”, adding that, “[t]he beginning 
point is a review of objective indicia of consensus”.76 Whilst Justice 
Kennedy considered the pace of change in abolishing juvenile executions 
as “less dramatic” than that regarding the execution of the mentally 
retarded, he nonetheless, deemed it “significant” and determined that the 
“consistent direction of the change” was an influential factor. Furthermore, 
Justice Kennedy proffered a simple, though convincing, explanation for the 
seemingly slower rate of change: 
 
When we heard Penry, only two death penalty States had already 
prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded. When we heard 
Stanford, by contrast, 12 death penalty States had already prohibited 
the execution of any juvenile under 18, and 15 had prohibited the 
execution of any juvenile under 17. If anything, this shows that the 
impropriety of executing juveniles between 16 and 18 years of age 
gained wide recognition earlier than the impropriety of executing the 
mentally retarded.77 
 
Justice Kennedy reiterated the findings made in Thompson that juveniles 
are, by nature, less developed than adults and less capable of controlling 
their emotions and surroundings. Thus, “[t]heir own lack of vulnerability 
                                                     
74 492 US 361 (1989), at 374. Hereafter referred to as Stanford. The Court declined to extend 
the scope of Thompson which had been decided the previous Term to all minors thereby 
ensuring that the threshold for death eligibility would remain 16 years of age. As with so much 
of the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, the decision was by majority, 5-4. 
75 553 US 551 (2005), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000& invol=03-633>. 
Hereafter referred to as Roper. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid. 
2006] America’s Death Penalty  19 
and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean 
that juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven”.78 In an 
unusually explicit reference to foreign case law, Justice Kennedy accepted 
that “[i]t is proper to acknowledge the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”. 
The dissent of Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Clarence concurred, questioned the heart of the reasoning of the 
majority’s opinion. Justice Scalia, reverting to a truly originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution, challenged the “evolving standards of 
decency” yardstick for the Eighth Amendment and questioned in particular 
the determination that “a national consensus which could not be perceived 
in our People’s laws only 15 years ago now solidly exists”. He further 
elaborated that it was inappropriate to consider the views of abolitionist 
states when determining what constitutes a national consensus, as this “is 
rather like including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on 
the electric car.”79 This reasoning, however, is open to challenge at the 
most elementary level. To understand what truly represents a national 
consensus, surely it is relevant to have regard to considerations from across 
all fifty states. Indeed, it seems rather disingenuous to raise concerns 
relating to the majority’s method of arriving at a national consensus, when 
Justice Scalia’s own proposition only includes the views of retentionist 
states. 
In any event, Roper has considerably moved the abolitionist agenda 
forward onto new terrain. However, having achieved the abolition of the 
death penalty in the more questionable of cases, it now remains to be seen 
what effect this may have on the wider abolitionist movement. It could 
provide renewed vigour to constitutional efforts to persuade the Supreme 
Court to rule that the entire death penalty apparatus is unconstitutional, 
since the current Court has proven amenable to overrule quite recent Eighth 
Amendment case law. Prof. J.R. Broughton has suggested that Atkins and 
Roper “are helping to incrementally erode capital punishment, though in a 
manner distinct from the Furman-era dismantling”.80  
Nonetheless, Atkins and Roper could equally result in reinforcing the 
death penalty’s place in the criminal justice system, by removing those 
aspects of it which were most reprehensible and open to criticism. In much 
the same way in which the ongoing sanitation of capital punishment has 
served to shield the public from many of the most brutal aspects of it and 
thereby contribute to the maintenance of popular support, prohibiting the 
applicability of death penalty statutes to the mentally retarded and juveniles 
                                                     
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Ibid. 
80 Broughton, “The Second Death of Capital Punishment” (Social Science Research Network, 
2006), at 8. See Social Science Research Network, The Second Death of Capital Punishment 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=878244> (visited 16 March 2006). 
20  Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
may steal the abolitionist movement’s thunder. However, with countries 
across the world embracing abolition and some members of the Supreme 
Court showing an increasing interest in foreign case law, it is open to 
debate whether the United States can insulate itself entirely from these 
international influences. Indeed, Prof. Daniel Givelber has suggested that 
prevailing international standards may well develop a more central role in 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
As the Supreme Court of the United States continues to undertake 
Eighth Amendment analysis under the rubric of evolving standards 
of decency, an emerging consensus among nations with mature legal 
systems that capital punishment offends basic norms of human rights 
may, at some future point, become a significant consideration in this 
analysis.81 
 
Furthermore, some commentators have emphasised that the relevance of 
international considerations to Eighth Amendment analysis is in fact self-
evident from the concepts underlying the doctrine. Corina Gerety has aptly 
observed that: 
 
Civilized society does not begin and end at the US border. Nor does 
the United States have a monopoly on decency. Likewise, human 
justice and human dignity are universal concepts. In determining 
whether it is constitutionally permissible to kill a juvenile, the 
majority of the Court in Roper v. Simmons was legally correct in 
looking outside this country for guidance.82 
 
 
International Trends Towards Abolition: The Way Forward? 
 
In recent years, there has been a creeping, though discernible, tendency 
amongst some members of the Supreme Court to give greater prominence 
to foreign jurisprudence; particularly it would seem, in the realm of capital 
cases. For example, in Roper, Justice Kennedy referred to the growing 
international consensus against executing juveniles. In 1999, in Knight v. 
Florida, Justice Breyer protested at the Court’s refusal to hear the appeal of 
a prisoner who argued that spending more than two decades on death row 
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth 
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Amendment.83 Quoting legal opinions from Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe and 
the European Court of Human Rights, Justice Breyer observed in a 
dissenting opinion that “a growing number of courts outside the United 
States... have held that a lengthy delay in administering a lawful death 
penalty renders ultimate execution inhuman, degrading or unusually 
cruel”.84 However, referring to foreign precedent as an interpretative aid, 
tentatively referred to as cosmopolitanism in some quarters, has been 
subject to trenchant criticism by other members of the Supreme Court and 
leading American scholars.85 Failed Supreme Court nominee, Judge Robert 
Bork, has remarked: 
 
Our judges are said to be involved in a worldwide constitutional 
conversation. It more closely resembles a worldwide constitutional 
convention.86 
 
Justice Scalia has also rejected as irrelevant the notion that foreign laws 
may provide some guidance in interpreting the American Constitution.87 
Nonetheless, the growing interest of a minority of the Supreme Court in 
having regard to foreign case law and the fact that most recently a majority 
of the Court (in Roper) was persuaded by this reasoning, raises the question 
of what the United States can learn from the recent experiences of other 
Western democracies with capital punishment? 
 
A. Europe 
In Europe, the only blemish on an otherwise death penalty-free continent is 
Belarus, where 5 people were put to death in 2004. The republic has 
continued to execute its citizens regularly, unlike many of the former 
Soviet bloc states.88 It is perhaps also no mere coincidence that Belarus has 
been described as “Europe’s last dictatorship”.89 In the 21st century, 
however, the European Union has established itself as the vanguard of the 
global abolitionist movement. The abolition of the death penalty is now a 
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prerequisite for countries seeking EU membership.90 Furthermore, the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights, adopted at Nice in 2000, categorically 
states that “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed”.91 
In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights approved, for the ninth 
consecutive year, a resolution proposed by the EU calling for a worldwide 
moratorium on executions.92 A new record of 81 co-sponsors was reached, 
reinforcing the case for the presentation of a similar resolution at the UN 
General Assembly in New York.93 The ongoing efforts of the EU to 
actively canvass for the abolition of capital punishment present a 
considerable challenge to the United States.94 The repeal of death penalty 
laws in Europe, however, was also a painstakingly long process. Portugal 
led the way in 1867, immediately followed by the Netherlands.95 Sweden 
and Denmark joined this movement after the First World War, whilst after 
the Second World War, Italy, Austria and Finland did likewise.  
Ireland’s abolition of the death penalty was an equally gradual 
process. In 1954, Michael Manning was executed for the murder by 
asphyxiation of Catherine Cooper, an elderly nurse. Manning had a low IQ 
bordering on mental disability and was extremely drunk when his assault 
turned into murder.96 By 1964, however, the death penalty had been 
abolished for all but capital murders. The death penalty was removed from 
the statute books in 1990 and replaced by a mandatory 40-year sentence for 
capital murder. In the Seventies and Eighties, two instances had arisen 
where defendants were convicted of the capital murder of a member of An 
Garda Síochána.97 However, in both cases the capital sentences were 
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replaced with a sentence of life and 40 years respectively. As Eamon Leahy 
SC has explained: 
 
There was at that time and I think throughout the Seventies, a feeling 
that where there was an unarmed Garda force in particular, that 
society had to be seen to stand strongly behind them. I don’t think 
that feeling has particularly changed, but I think the public in general 
would feel that it’s appropriate that a significant prison sentence as 
opposed to death be the deterrent that’s used to protect Gardaí.98 
 
All references to the death penalty in the Irish Constitution were finally 
removed by the Twenty-First Amendment in 2001 ensuring that capital 
punishment cannot be reactivated in Ireland without the approval of the 
Irish people by referendum. By removing the references to the death 
penalty which remained in the Constitution, the Irish State has 
demonstrated that the country values all human life. Furthermore, it allows 
Ireland to sincerely promote moves for the abolition of the death penalty 
worldwide. 
By the early 1990s few European countries had retained the death 
penalty and most had not applied it in decades. Furthermore, many 
European countries, such as West Germany, abolished capital punishment 
against the grain of popular opinion.99 However, as Sangmin Bae has 
noted: 
 
The experience of Western Europe suggests that once the abolitionist 
policy becomes embedded in the national consciousness, public 
sentiment in favour of the death penalty gradually diminishes in the 
general population and pressure to reinstate it weakens.100 
 
Whilst periodically agitation to reinstate the death penalty may occur, this 
tends to be a direct response to a specific crisis or event.101 Indeed, as Judge 
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Nygaard has observed, “Among people who don’t grow up with it, capital 
punishment comes to be seen as a barbaric relic, like slavery or 
branding”.102 
In 2003, Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms came into force. 
This protocol is the first international treaty that bans the death penalty in 
all circumstances and has already been ratified by 32 countries.103 Prior to 
this, the Sixth Protocol to the Convention prohibited the death penalty, save 
“in time of war or imminent threat of war”.104 The jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights has further developed the abolitionist 
spirit of the Convention. In Soering v. United Kingdom, the applicant, a 
German national, was accused of murdering his girlfriend’s parents in 
Virginia.105 After he was arrested in Britain, the US government requested 
his extradition to stand trial for the killings, for which he faced the 
possibility of the death penalty. The European Court of Human Rights 
ruled that prolonged detention on death row violates the prohibition against 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and that the United Kingdom would 
violate the European Convention if it extradited Soering to Virginia 
because he would suffer from what it termed the “death row phenomenon”. 
Whilst ultimately Soering was extradited to the United States, it was only 
after Virginia gave an undertaking not to seek the death penalty.106 Long 
ago European countries, either in practice or in law, made a choice for 
humanity, abolishing the death penalty and thus fostering respect for 
human dignity. It is also a path which Europe’s leaders have frequently 
invited the United States to tread.107 
 
B. South Africa 
Whilst the European experience with capital punishment is instructive, 
perhaps the most important and recent abolitionist example is that of South 
Africa, where the Constitutional Court struck down the death penalty as 
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incompatible with the country’s new Constitution. This bold move ensured 
that a culture of life would permeate the Constitution from its birth. It is 
also noteworthy to observe that the Court chose capital punishment as the 
subject of its first major judgment. Furthermore, South Africa’s long 
struggle with racism perhaps makes the South African experience more 
directly relevant to the United States. 
In State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, the Constitutional Court 
considered the sentence of death imposed on two individuals who, with 
four others, had attempted to rob a bank security vehicle in Johannesburg in 
1990.108 During the robbery, two occupants of the vehicle were killed and a 
third seriously injured. In a subsequent exchange of fire with police three 
members of the gang and two police officers were killed. A further member 
of the gang escaped and Thembo Makwanyane and Mavusa Mchunu were 
the only two defendants at the subsequent murder trial. The two were 
sentenced to death and the Appellate Division later considered that death 
“was the only proper sentence”. However, the Appellate Division referred 
the case to the Constitutional Court for a determination of whether the 
death penalty was consistent with the Constitution. 
The newly constituted eleven member court determined that the right 
to life and dignity is the most basic of all human rights and the source of all 
other personal rights in the Bill of Rights.109 Sachs J. declared, “Everyone, 
including the most abominable of human beings, has a right to life, and 
capital punishment is therefore unconstitutional”.110 In a strong show of 
support for the ruling, each of the court’s justices issued a written opinion 
backing the decision. The Court was adamant to emphasise that the issue of 
the death penalty was not one which rested on democratic majorities. 
Indeed, Chaskalson P. conceded “the majority of South Africans agree that 
the death sentence should be imposed in extreme cases of murder”.111 
However, Chaskalson P. further explained the importance of the rights of 
minorities and the role of the Constitutional Court in protecting these 
rights: 
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[T]he issue of the constitutionality of capital punishment cannot be 
referred to a referendum, in which a majority view would prevail 
over the wishes of any minority. The very reason for establishing the 
new legal order, and for vesting the power of judicial review of all 
legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities and 
others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the 
democratic process. Those who are entitled to claim this protection 
include the social outcasts and marginalised people of our society. It 
is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest 
amongst us, that all of us can be secure that our own rights will be 
protected.112 
 
Several other members of the Court also specifically addressed the 
relevance of public opinion in determining such constitutional matters, and 
whilst some accepted that regard could be had to public opinion, all eleven 
justices rejected any notion that public opinion should be the decisive or 
predominant factor. It is, at this point, appropriate to recall that American 
jurisprudence dictates that the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment 
should reflect “evolving standards of decency”. This would seem to 
necessitate some inquiry into the vox populi, though the relative 
constitutional weight given to the outcome of such an inquiry is a matter 
for judicial determination. 
The Constitutional Court also specifically rejected the argument that 
the death penalty possessed a greater deterrence value.113 O’Regan J. stated 
“the deterrent effect of the death penalty remains unproven, perhaps 
unprovable”,114 whilst Kriegler J. further emphasised that “no empirical 
study, no statistical exercise and no theoretical analysis has been able to 
demonstrate that capital punishment has any deterrent force greater than 
that of a really heavy sentence of imprisonment”.115 
Makwanyane, however, also drew heavily on international 
experiences of capital punishment. The approach adopted by the Court 
embraced comparative constitutionalism, examining case law from several 
continents to assist the Court in its interpretation of the South African 
Constitution. American death penalty jurisprudence, in particular, was 
highly influential. Sachs J., who charted with great detail the historical 
experience of capital punishment in South Africa, observed: 
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Germany after Nazism, Italy after Fascism, and Portugal, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina, the Philippines and Spain all abolished 
capital punishment for peacetime offences after emerging from 
periods of severe repression. They did so mostly through 
constitutional provisions.... It is not unreasonable to think that 
similar considerations influenced the framers of our Constitution as 
well.116 
 
The “New York Times” recognised the importance of the Makwanyane 
judgment for the United States and commented: 
 
[This] courageous decision leaves the United States in a dwindling 
company of democratic countries with the dubious distinction of 
executing their citizens.... The opinion of the Court’s President, 
Arthur Chaskalson, and ten concurring opinions owe much to the 
writings of American liberal justices, but they also have much to 
teach the United States.117 
 
Tellingly, a decade later the United States has made substantial 
progress towards abolition. The death penalty is now considerably more 
restrictive: both in terms of those who may be subjected to it, and the 
crimes for which it is available. Recent years have also witnessed a sharp 
decline in the overall usage of the death penalty. As Zamparutti and 
Zammit have highlighted: 
 
The 2004 data relative to the United States alone confirms the trend 
towards a diminished use of the death penalty. There were fewer 
executions, less death sentences and less people on death row. 
Executions were down from 65 in 2003 to 59. The 2004 total is a 
remarkable 40% less than the 1999 total, which was the record year 
for executions since the reintroduction of the death penalty in 1976. 
As has been mostly the case since 1976, executions took place 
prevalently in Southern states: 85% of the total.118 
 
It is clear, however, that the United States can learn much from the South 
African experience. The fact that both countries have a long and bitter 
history of segregation and racial tension makes Makwanyane all the more 
relevant to the United States today. Chaskalson P. noted, “It cannot be 
gainsaid that poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital 
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cases”.119 It also cannot be denied that this remains the case in the United 
States. As Hugo Bedau has observed: 
 
Injustice in punishment, which for our purposes is injustice in 
sentencing, is an injustice to the guilty offender only when the 
sentencing disparities are explained by factors that have nothing to 
do with the desert of the offender. Clearly, sentencing disparities 
based on gender, race, color, or nationality of the offender, as well as 
the arbitrary outcomes of a fair lottery, are irrelevant to the 
offender’s desert. Every guilty offender has a right that his sentence 
not be determined by factors irrelevant to his desert.120 
 
The South African Constitutional Court recognised this reality in 
Makwanyane. However, the continued striking disparities within America’s 
capital punishment system must lead one to wonder whether the United 
States has fully embraced this truth. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the earliest recorded American execution in 1608, more than 16,000 
people have been executed in the United States.121 It is difficult to predict 
whether this long experience with capital punishment is now finally 
drawing to a close. Certainly the death knell has sounded for mandatory 
executions, juvenile executions and the execution of the mentally retarded. 
It would seem also that the death penalty is beyond resurrection for the 
crime of rape. Prof. J.R. Broughton has referred to this as the “modern 
incrementalist strategy for killing capital punishment”.122 Whereas “per se 
challenges to capital punishment are unlikely to succeed, death penalty 
opponents today instead target narrow and discrete death penalty practices 
primarily through litigation, creating seemingly small but significant court 
victories that, over time, slowly erode the scope and availability of death 
sentencing.”123 Increasingly, it appears “America’s seeming infatuation 
with the death penalty looks about an inch deep and a good deal less than a 
mile wide.”124  
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As Justice Blackmun accepted in Callins, three decades of 
experimentation with the death penalty has not produced the requirements 
of consistency and individual fairness, demanded by successive Supreme 
Court decisions. Importantly, Justice Blackmun did not object to the death 
penalty on the moral or ethical grounds often evident in the writings of 
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. He rather simply concluded that 
procedural irregularities meant “the death penalty could not be 
administered in accord with our Constitution”.125 It is clear also that the 
death penalty is riven with all the shortcomings of a system which 
represents the worst of human frailties. As President Abdoualaye Wade of 
Senegal has observed: 
 
The death penalty often smites the people who are without defences, 
without resources and without resorts. It is sometimes pronounced at 
the end of procedures that do not present guarantees of a fair trial, 
with possible legal errors which have irreparable consequences for 
the family and for society.126 
 
Moreover, the international community is swiftly abandoning 
support for capital punishment. As Connie de la Vega has highlighted, the 
United States’ “failure to follow the trend toward abolition has begun to 
affect America's influence in the international arena”.127 For example, in 
2001 the United States was voted off the Commission on Human Rights for 
the first time in that body's 54-year history. Whilst that action may be 
blamed on many factors, America’s record on the death penalty was at least 
one point of contention among the nations that failed to support the United 
States’ re-election. Furthermore, the United States is one of only two 
countries, the other being Somalia, which has failed to ratify the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the most widely ratified human 
rights treaty in history.128 The Convention prohibits juvenile executions, 
and the commitment of some US states to this practice, until the landmark 
Roper decision banned such executions, represented a significant 
impediment to full compliance with the Convention. In 2004, the United 
States was ranked sixth in the world having executed 59 people.129 North 
Korea ranked just above it, Uzbekistan below it. By its continued use of the 
death penalty, the United States has found itself within the ranks of a 
dwindling number of countries, most of which are governed by 
authoritarian regimes.  
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However, it is to be hoped that the United States may soon join the 
rest of the liberal democratic world by moving decisively towards 
abolition. As Elizabeth Linehan has explained, capital punishment is no 
longer a necessity: 
 
Nations could probably not do without a system of criminal 
punishments; however, most Western nations manage without the 
institution of capital punishment. I believe the United States could as 
well and that, therefore, the risk of executing the innocent is an 
avoidable one.130 
 
Moreover, uncertainty over the necessity of capital punishment has existed 
since the First Congress debated the Bill of Rights. Mr. Livermore spoke of 
the importance of ensuring that existing punishments were not prohibited 
by the Eighth Amendment. However, revealingly, he also added: 
 
If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from 
the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in 
the Legislature to adopt it.131 
 
Indeed, as John P. Conrad has noted, when the Bill of Rights was adopted 
“[t]he modern police department had yet to be organised [and] there were 
no prisons”.132 Furthermore, as Scott Turow has noted, “retaining the death 
penalty seems to be a road to breeding disrespect for the law, because it 
exposes so many of its shortcomings”.133 In view of the manifold flaws of 
capital punishment, the time has now surely come for the death penalty to 
be recognised as a relic of the past and finally consigned to history, 
unnecessary in the United States in the 21st century. 
 
 
                                                     
130 Linehan, "Executing the Innocent" in Brinkmann ed., Ethics, Volume 1: The Proceedings of 
the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Bowling Green State University, 1999). The text 
of the paper available online at, Boston University: Paedia Project Online, Human Rights  
<http://www.bu. edu/wcp /Papers/Huma/HumaLine.htm> (visited 7 March 2006). 
131
 See Furman v. Georgia 408 US 238 (1972), See 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl? court=us&vol=408&invol=238>, per Justice 
Marshall. Original reporting is contained in 1 Annals of Congress 754 (1789). 
132 Conrad and van den Haag, op. cit., at 162. 
133 Turow, op. cit., at 115. 
THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE IN EU LAW: TAKING A 
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH? 
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Introduction 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the European Union’s constantly 
evolving political and legal identity has been the progressive development 
of its human rights and social dimension, thus creating a Europe of citizens 
rather than a Europe of States. The precise scope and impact of the Union’s 
involvement in human rights requires ongoing assessment, given the 
unique legal experiment which it entails. One fundamental right, the right 
to equality, has longstanding roots in Community law, and has undergone 
significant changes and expansion in recent years.1 This article aims to 
assess some of these developments in equality law, focusing on the 
importance of the Article 13 Directives in advancing the Community vision 
of equality; first, as a fundamental social right and secondly, as embodying 
a commitment to substantive, and not merely formal, equality. Formal 
equality is largely content with prohibiting unlawful discrimination, in 
accordance with the Aristotelian maxim that “justice demands that equals 
be treated equally and unequals be treated unequally.” In contrast, 
substantive equality requires a proactive approach, taking positive steps to 
promote equality, based on the recognition that identical treatment may fall 
short of what true equality in fact requires. The latter approach would have 
far-reaching consequences for the interpretation and application of EU 
equality Directives. Moreover, such a development can be viewed as part 
of a wider emerging concept of European social citizenship, with attendant 
human rights protections.2  
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This article aims to consider the evidence marshalled in favour of the 
view that a shift to a more substantive approach to equality has emerged in 
the Community legal order. Part I briefly sets out the concepts of formal 
and substantive equality. Part II discusses the status of equality as a 
fundamental right in Community law, considering whether the principle of 
equality, originally premised on economic considerations, has evolved into 
a free-standing human right. The impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
particularly Article 13, and more recent developments concerning the 
European Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights are 
discussed here. Part III considers particular legislative and Treaty 
provisions which incorporate elements of substantive equality, namely 
Article 141(4) EC, the Article 13 Directives, and the Constitution’s 
provisions on positive obligations. The aim of this discussion is to discern 
if, overall, a new approach to equality, premised on human rights rather 
than market concerns, has emerged in the Community legal order. The final 
Part considers the potential impact of a substantive approach to equality. 
We ask what, in effect, a human rights-based vision of equality demands 
that a market-based understanding does not? Furthermore, what is the 
scope for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to actively advocate 
substantive equality? Two recent sets of proceedings concerning the 
application of the Framework Directive are analysed as evidence of the 
possible (even competing) approaches that may be taken to the new 
generation of Community equality legislation.  
 
 
I. Formal and substantive equality 
 
Before assessing whether Community law has shifted from a formal to a 
substantive understanding of equality, it is necessary to discuss the 
meaning of these concepts. There are a variety of different (and frequently 
overlapping) concepts of equality which have been identified by 
commentators.3  This analysis shall sketch the broad contours of these 
concepts, which lie at the heart of the current debate on whether European 
equality law has in fact evolved.  
 
Formal equality 
Formal equality is focused on justice for the individual and requires that 
persons in a similar situation should be treated equally, and persons in 
unalike situations should be treated in an unalike manner, unless there is 
objective justification for not doing so. This vision of equality was 
concisely expressed by the Court of Justice in A v Commission: “the 
principle of equal treatment is breached when two categories of persons 
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whose factual and legal circumstances disclose no essential difference are 
treated differently or where situations which are different are treated in an 
identical manner.”4 The essential premise of this model of equality is that 
considerations such as race and gender should play no role in decision-
making. Consequently, this principle is diametrically opposed to forms of 
positive action which entail the use of such criteria as a basis for 
preferential treatment.5 This model of individual justice formed the 
cornerstone of the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive, which relied on 
individual women bringing litigation to challenge unlawful discrimination.6 
The formal equality principle has been frequently attacked for its 
inherent limitations, particularly its failure to adequately tackle institutional 
and structural forms of discrimination, which are not directed at specific 
individuals but disadvantage certain groups.7 Briefly, its principal 
shortcomings are the following: 
 
(i) the choice of a comparator8 is frequently determinative of the claim that 
inconsistent treatment has in fact occurred, and is by no means 
uncontroversial. Fredman comments that, in this respect, formal equality is 
“based on an assumption of conformity to a given norm, and therefore of 
assimilation.”9 
  
(ii) formal equality creates only negative obligations of non-discrimination, 
and does not involve any obligations to adjust structures to accommodate 
diversity. The principle is a static one, and fails to recognise that the 
circumstances may merit proportionately better treatment.10 
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(iii) formal equality is overly reliant on individual justice as a means of 
enforcing the right to equality. A remedy is only provided to the individual 
victim of discrimination who succeeds in a claim; there is no attempt to 
address embedded discrimination. 
 
A symmetrical or formal approach to equality was markedly evident in 
much of the ECJ’s gender equality jurisprudence. One example is the 
much-criticised decision of Stadt Lengerich v Helmig,11 a case brought by  
part-time (predominantly female) workers who did not receive the higher 
rate of overtime pay until they worked in excess of the normal working 
hours for full-time workers. The Court held that no discrimination 
occurred, as workers were treated equally hour for hour. This decision 
ignored substantial differences in reality between the position of full-time 
and part-time workers – working more than the agreed part-time hours was 
likely to be especially disruptive of the family arrangements of the latter. 
 
Substantive equality 
While formal equality is best understood as a procedural guarantee of 
fairness in decision-making (i.e. arbitrary factors such as sex and race are 
impermissible considerations), substantive equality moves beyond a 
concern with the process to address the outcomes of the decision-making 
process itself. This model, also described as the group justice model, seeks 
to redress structural causes of discrimination and entrenched forms of 
disadvantage which affect individuals as members of a group.12 Two forms 
of substantive equality may be distinguished: equality of opportunity, and 
equality of results.  
Equality of opportunity is less controversial than equality of results, 
as it is less subversive of the requirement of consistent treatment of 
individuals embodied in the formal equality principle. Fredman describes it 
in the following terms: “It is maintained that true equality cannot be 
achieved if individuals begin the race from different starting points. An 
equal opportunities approach therefore aims to equalise the starting point, 
accepting that this might necessitate special measures for the disadvantaged 
group.”13 In theory, this approach does not seek to guarantee a particular 
outcome. It merely allows all competitors to compete on equal footing, 
unimpeded by disadvantages linked to membership of a particular group. 
The Opinion of AG Tesauro in Kalanke is typical of an equal opportunities 
focus. He suggested that the achievement of gender equality in employment 
required measures to remove barriers to women’s participation in the 
workforce, such as flexible working time and access to adequate childcare 
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facilities.14 This approach was adopted by the Court in Lommers.15 It 
upheld an employer’s scheme providing subsidised nursery places to 
female employees in a workplace where women were heavily under-
represented, stating “an insufficiency of suitable and affordable nursery 
facilities is likely to induce more particularly female employees to give up 
their jobs.”16 
Equality of results entails a redistributive approach to equal 
treatment, focusing not only on guaranteeing equal starting points, but in 
equalising the outcome of the process. The extent of this equalisation varies 
according to the type of instrument adopted. In its weaker form, it may 
involve obligations to monitor the composition and diversity of a 
workforce,17 or a positive duty to promote equality.18 More explicitly 
results-oriented (and more controversial) measures may entail the setting of 
goals or quotas to change the composition of the workforce, or a preference 
for minority-owned businesses in granting contracts.19 This approach 
presents particular difficulties for a legal system which accords high status 
to the right of individuals to equal treatment. It involves a challenge to the 
notion of consistent treatment, based on factors which are usually 
considered to be arbitrary considerations.20 
In practice, the theoretical distinction between equality of results and 
equality of opportunity may be an illusory one – most substantive equality 
model will contain elements of both.21 Despite this difficulty, the 
permissibility of positive action in Community law was previously 
delineated by this distinction. Article 2(4) of the original Equal Treatment 
Directive stated the Directive is “without prejudice to the right of Member 
States to adopt or maintain in force measures to promote equal opportunity 
for men and women.”22 (This is amended by the Second Equal Treatment 
Directive, which inserts a new provision Article 2(8), allowing Member 
States to maintain or adopt measures within the meaning of Article 141(4) 
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Devins and Douglas eds., Redefining Equality (Oxford University Press, 1998) 51, at 61.  
22 Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40. Emphasis added. 
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EC).23 The current state of the Community law provisions on positive 
action is discussed below. 
 
 
II. Equality as a fundamental human right  
 
Gender equality and fundamental rights 
It may seem anomalous to speak of equality now emerging as a 
fundamental human right in the Community legal order, given that the 
European Court of Justice has long regarded the principle of equality as a 
fundamental right which serves a social as well as an economic function.24 
This was, however, confined to equality between men and women, on the 
basis of Article 119 of the founding Treaty, which enshrined the principle 
of equal pay for equal work. Article 119’s inclusion was not due to a 
concern for fundamental rights, but was intended to prevent distortions of 
competition in the internal market which might have resulted from wage 
differentials in men and women’s labour.25 Through a process of judicial 
transformation and an expanding body of legislation on sex equality, 
Article 119 eclipsed its modest beginnings to become “an integral part of 
one of the most fundamental principles of the Union’s constitutional 
code.”26 
However, this principle of equality served a largely rhetorical 
function. Due to the limited competences of the European Community, 
equality was not available as a free-standing, directly effective right but 
required another Community legal basis to latch onto e.g. a specific legally 
enforceable right conferred by a directive. The Court adopted an expansive 
interpretation of sex equality in P v S, where it held that the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women enshrined in the Equal Treatment 
Directive applied to transsexuals.27 However, the limitations of the Court’s 
willingness, and indeed its ability, to extend equality protections on the 
basis of fundamental rights were illustrated by the subsequent case of 
Grant, where the Court held that the principle of non-discrimination did not 
apply to differences of treatment based on a person’s sexual orientation.28 It 
                                                     
23 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002, 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions, [2002] OJ L269/15.  
24 Case C-43/75, Defrenne v SABENA II (1976) ECR 455. 
25 See Barnard, “The Economic Objectives of Article 119” in Hervey and O’Keeffe eds., Sex 
Equality Law in the European Union (Wiley & Sons, 1996) 321. 
26 Mancini and O’Leary, “The New Frontiers of Sex Equality Law in the European Union” 
(1999) 24 European Law Review 331, at 333. 
27 Case C-13/94, P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143.  
28 Case C-249/96 Grant v Southwest Trains [1998] Industrial Relations Law Reports 165. See 
Barnard, “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and 
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was clear that legislative action would be necessary to extend equality 
guarantees to other grounds.  
Fundamental rights: the impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
Human rights had long been recognised by the ECJ as ‘general principles’ 
of Community law, despite the absence of any express reference to human 
rights in the Treaty of Rome.29 This development was intended to offset the 
conflict between the pursuit of European economic integration, and 
domestic constitutional protections which were threatened by the 
Community principles of direct effect and supremacy. Thus, human rights 
originally functioned as a catalogue of negative and unwritten rights, 
imposing normative limits on EC institutions when they acted and on 
Member States acting in the field of EC law.30 A ‘hard law’ reference was 
first made to human rights by the Treaty of Maastricht, which committed 
the Union to respect human rights as general principles of Community 
law.31 This was coupled with the first appearance of the concept of 
European citizenship in Article 8 EC. 
The adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 conferred actual 
powers and competences on the European Union in the field of human 
rights. This was part of a broader shift in the European project from 
negative to positive integration in achieving its goals.32 Recognition of the 
relevance of human rights to the Union followed upon a more sophisticated 
understanding of the measures necessary to achieve deeper integration and 
a truly unified single market. It was gradually realised that freedom from 
discrimination was central to ensuring effective enjoyment of rights of free 
movement, and to ensure Europe’s competitiveness by removing barriers to 
labour market participation.33 
                                                                                                                                                           
Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?” (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 352. 
29 See Case 29/69, Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419 and Case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125.  
30 De Búrca, Human Rights: The Charter and Beyond, New York University, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 10/01, at 9. 
31 Article F, Treaty on European Union. 
32 Alston and Weiler,  An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights, New York Univeristy, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
1/99, at 7. Several expert reports in the late 1990’s have greatly influenced the development of 
the European Union’s human rights agenda: For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights: Report by 
the Comité des Sages (1996), Leading By Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the European 
Union for the Year 2000: Agenda of the Comité des Sages and Final Project Report (1998), and 
Affirming Fundamental Rights in the European Union: Report of the Expert Group on 
Fundamental Rights (1999). 
33 Shaw, “Constitutional Settlements and the Citizen after the Treaty of Amsterdam” in 
Neunreither and Wiener eds., European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics 
and Prospects for Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000) 290, at 311. See also European 
Commission, European Social Policy: A Way Forward for the Union, COM (94)333, 27th July 
1994. 
38  Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
The keystone of the Treaty of Amsterdam’s engagement with a 
rights agenda is Article 6 TEU, which states that the EU is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law. This commitment is strengthened by Article 
6(2), which pledges the Union to respect fundamental human rights as 
guaranteed by the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States as ‘general principles of Community law.”34 The reference to the 
ECHR is significant here, as it allows litigants to invoke the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on equality and non-discrimination in proceedings before the 
ECJ. Moreover, Community acts and acts of the Member States when they 
are implementing EU law may be reviewed by the ECJ for non-compliance 
with the provisions of the ECHR, thus widening the body of constitutional 
protection available to EU citizens. Article 14 of the Convention confers a 
general right of non-discrimination in the exercise of other substantive 
Convention rights, and expressly mentions some grounds not covered by 
Article 13: language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.35 This may complement the specific equality 
protections conferred by the EU’s own acquis.36  
Article 6 is a fitting counterpart to the development of the EU’s 
social dimension by the Treaty, through the introduction of a Title on 
Employment (Article 125-130 EC) and a Title on Social Policy (Articles 
136-145 EC).37 Several other provisions of the Treaty contain principles 
and mechanisms designed to enhance the status and efficacy of protection 
of fundamental rights as a constitutional principle of the Union.38 These are 
not within the scope of the present discussion, which will concentrate on 
those provisions of the Treaty which broadened and deepened the reach of 
the equality principle.  
 
 
 
                                                     
34 This codifies the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on protection of fundamental 
rights in the Community legal order. See Case C-260/89, ERT (1991) ECR I-1759. 
35 Protocol 12 to the Convention will transform Article 14 ECHR into a free-standing equality 
right, once ratified by ten Member States. 
36 See Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) 315 on the 
significance of the general principles of Community law, particularly the ECHR, for anti-
discrimination protection. 
37 The coincidence of Europe’s social and economic objectives in the area of equality can be 
seen in the extension of the principle of equal treatment to part-time and fixed-term work by 
Council Directives 97/81/EC and 99/70/EC respectively. However, Fredman questions whether 
these Directives reflect a genuine synthesis of social and economic concerns, pointing that the 
Directives do not confer substantive rights on the non-standard worker, merely the right not to 
be treated in a less favourable manner than the comparable standard worker. Fredman,  
“Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space” (2006) 12 European 
Law Journal 41, at 48.  
38 See Lenaerts, “Respect for Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Principle of the European 
Union” (2000) 6 Columbia Journal of European Law 1. 
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Gender equality provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty 
First, Article 119 EC, now Article 141 EC (guaranteeing equal pay for 
equal work), was revised: (i) it guaranteed equal pay for work of equal 
value in the Treaty for the first time, (ii) it conferred a broad power on the 
Council to adopt legislation guaranteeing sex equality in the employment 
field, and (iii) it gave a Treaty basis to the adoption of positive action 
measures aimed at achieving “full equality in practice” between men and 
women.  
Article 2 EC specified that the task of the Community includes, inter 
alia, the promotion of “a high level of employment and social protection, 
equality between men and women...and economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member States.” Furthermore, Article 3(2) was inserted 
to require the Community to eliminate inequalities, and to promote 
equality, between men and women in all its activities referred to in Article 
3. This was a unique inclusion of a commitment to gender mainstreaming 
among the “agenda-setting” provisions of the Treaty.39 Article 137 EC 
specified that the Community should support and complement (including 
by the adoption of directives) activities of the Member States aimed at, 
among other fields, the integration of persons excluded from the labour 
market and equality between men and women with regard to labour market 
opportunities and treatment at work. 
 
Article 13 EC – combating discrimination on new grounds 
The most dynamic provision in the field of equality was undoubtedly 
Article 13 EC, which shifted the focus of Community anti-discrimination 
law beyond gender equality to other grounds for the first time. It conferred 
a power on the Council to “take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, 
disability and sexual orientation.”40 This is not confined to the employment 
sphere, unlike Article 141. The Council has adopted three Directives on the 
basis of Article 13: the Racial Equality Directive,41 the Framework 
Employment Directive, 42 and the new Gender Equal Treatment Directive.43  
                                                     
39 Waddington, The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law, op. cit., 
at 13. Mainstreaming as an equality strategy is discussed further infra. 
40 It is important to bear in mind that Article 13 is not a fundamental rights provision and does 
not enjoy direct effect in Community law. (See, however, the later discussion in this article of 
the ECJ’s decision in Mangold). Furthermore, it is subject to the requirement of unanimity in 
the Council and is expressly stated to be “without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty 
and within the limits of the powers conferred [on the Council] by this Treaty.” Bell comments 
that this dependency of Article 13 on the limits of Community competence draws it back to a 
market integration rationale, rather than a social policy one. Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and 
the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2002), at 144. 
41 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L180/22. 
42 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L303/16. 
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Article 13’s adoption can be linked to the development of a ‘thicker’ 
concept of European citizenship in the Treaty of Amsterdam, based around 
the principles of democracy, individual rights, solidarity and equal 
opportunity contained in the European social model.44 This followed a 
gradual recognition that the solidarity and integrity of European integration 
would be threatened by the alienation of other sub-groups of citizens (not 
just EU citizens resident outside their own Member State) from the process. 
Article 13 can therefore be read as part of a wider attempt to guarantee the 
viability of European integration through a model of social citizenship 
conferring a portable set of rights.  
The Article 13 Directives signal the advancement of Community 
equality law beyond concerns with marketplace integration to a more 
fundamental social policy in several respects.45 One of their most striking 
features (with the exception of the Framework Directive) is their widened 
material scope – the Race Directive encompasses not only employment, but 
also social protection, social advantages, education and access to and 
supply of goods and services.46 The new Gender Equal Treatment Directive 
extends the principle of equality between men and women to the supply of 
goods and services. Waddington suggests that “[t]his sweeping material 
scope…is more reminiscent of constitutional equality provisions which are 
not restricted to specific fields, such as employment, but permeate all 
policy areas.”47 
This new departure, into areas traditionally the preserve of Member 
States’ social policy, can be seen as enhancing the concept of European 
citizenship, by offering guarantees of economic and social rights in the 
horizontal, and not merely the vertical, sphere. In this manner, it aims at the 
human rights ‘goal’ of an inclusive society. 
 
The European Constitution and Charter of Fundamental Rights 
In addition to the flurry of legislative activity in the area of non-
discrimination, the European Union’s proposed Constitution, incorporating 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, offers another broader basis for a 
possible human rights approach to equality issues.48 At the time of writing 
(July 2006), the intended ratification by all Member States of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
43 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, [2004] OJ 
L373/37. 
44 Shaw, “Constitutional Settlements and the Citizen after the Treaty of Amsterdam”, loc. cit., at 
311. 
45 See Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, op. cit., above at 193. 
46 Article 3 of the Race Directive. 
47 Waddington, The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law, op. cit., 
at 14. 
48 Treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union, [2004] OJ C310/1, 16th December 
2004. The Treaty was signed in Rome on 29th October 2004. 
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Constitution by November 2006 had been derailed by referenda in France 
and the Netherlands resulting in a negative vote on the Constitution. The 
European Council decided upon a period of reflection in the immediate 
aftermath of these negative results.49 The Council also called for the 
continuation of the ratification process, while accepting that the original 
timetable may require alteration as appropriate to each Member State. 
Fifteen Member States have now ratified the Constitution. The EU’s 
“period of reflection” was recently extended at its June 2006 summit. 
Following extensive consultations with the Member States, a report will be 
delivered by the Presidency of the Union in the first half of 2007.50 This 
means that, for the time being, the Constitution has been effectively 
shelved and any eventual formal adoption of the document is unlikely to 
occur before 2008 at the earliest. 
This places a shadow of uncertainty over the eventual form and 
substance in which the European treaties will be amended.51 Nevertheless, 
it is likely that the equality provisions of the Constitution and the Charter 
will largely survive in their present form, so they receive comprehensive 
discussion here.  
 
The status of the Charter prior to incorporation 
Before embarking on that discussion, it is useful to revisit the Charter’s 
current status while it awaits legal incorporation.52  In formal terms, the 
Charter is not yet a legally binding document and merely enjoys the status 
of a political declaration, having been ‘proclaimed’ at the Nice European 
Council in December 2000.53 However, it already enjoys significant 
political, legal and constitutional force. In March 2001, the Commission 
decided that all proposed Community legislative and regulatory provisions 
should be examined for compliance with the Charter.54 Nor has the judicial 
sphere been immune to the pre-incorporation spread of the Charter. Several 
Advocates General of the European Court of Justice, as well as the Court of 
First Instance itself, have expressly referred to provisions of the Charter in 
                                                     
49 SN 117/05, Declaration of the Heads of State or Heads of Government of the Member States 
of the European Union on the Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
European Council 16 and 17 June 2005. 
50 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 15/16 June 2006. 
51 Some countries have called for a complete renegotiation of the Constitutional Treaty, while 
others suggest modification of the existing text. See www.euobserver.com for recent 
information. 
52 For detailed background and analysis of the Charter, see the following: De Búrca, “The 
Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights” (2001) 26 European Law 
Review 126; Goldsmith, “A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles” (2001) 38 Common 
Market Law Review 1201; Peers, and Ward eds., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart 
Publishing, 2004). 
53 [2000] OJ C364/8. 
54 Communication, SEC (2001) 380/3. 
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identifying fundamental rights to be protected.55 A frequently cited 
example is the Opinion in BECTU, a case concerning the working time 
Directive and the right to paid annual leave. Advocate General Tizzano 
attached enormous significance to the express inclusion of this right in the 
EU Charter, and stated: 
 
[I]n proceedings concerned with the nature and scope of a 
fundamental right, the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be 
ignored; in particular, we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving, 
where its provisions so allow, as a substantive point of reference for 
all those involved - Member States, institutions, natural and legal 
persons - in the Community context. Accordingly, I consider that the 
Charter provides us with the most reliable and definitive 
confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitutes 
a fundamental right.56 
 
The Charter’s relevance in determining the scope of EU human rights was 
summarised by one Advocate-General in the following terms: “I know that 
the Charter is not legally binding, but it is worthwhile referring to it given 
that it constitutes the expression, at the highest level, of a democratically 
established political consensus on what must today be considered as the 
catalogue of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal 
order.”57 
The European Court of Justice has yet to pronounce on the Charter, 
and it is possible that the Court may refrain from making substantive use of 
the Charter until its status is definitively settled. 
However, it is evident that, in practical terms, the absence of formal 
incorporation of the Charter’s provisions into the Union’s founding treaties 
has not prevented its legal diffusion. The Charter is increasingly viewed as 
a source of guidance on the scope of fundamental rights protection in the 
European Union.58 Its likely incorporation as a formal legal source of 
Community law will codify this task, and add greater weight to the rights 
guaranteed. 
 
 
                                                     
55 These instances are usefully summarised by the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, Report on the Future Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Stationery Office, 2003), 13-14. 
56 Case C-173/99, Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) 
v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, 8 February 
2001, at para. 28. 
57 Case C-20/00, Booker v Aquaculture (2003) ECR-I 7411, Opinion of Advocate-General 
Mischo, 20th September 2001, at para. 126. 
58 Jacobs, “Human Rights in the European Union : the role of the Court of Justice” (2001) 26 
European Law Review 331.  
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The equality provisions of the Constitution  
To return to the substantive provisions for discussion in this section, Article 
I-2 of the Constitution states the Union’s values as “respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to a minority.” This 
express statement of equality as a founding value of the Union enhances its 
status as a constitutional principle underlying the European integration 
process. This is also reflected in the Constitution’s statement of the Union’s 
objectives in Article I-3, which include combating social exclusion and 
discrimination, and the promotion of social justice and protection and 
equality between men and women. The promotion of equality between men 
and women has been an objective of the Union (Article 2 EC) since the 
Amsterdam Treaty. However, the general reference to combating 
discrimination is new. While no specific grounds are listed, it is reasonable 
to assume that the grounds set out in Article 13 EC would fall within its 
scope. Two other objectives set out in Article I-3(3) of the Constitutional 
Treaty are also relevant, namely the “promotion of solidarity between 
generations” (may require combating age discrimination)59 and respect for 
the Union’s “cultural and linguistic diversity.” However, the generality of 
these provisions and their extensive scope may undermine the potential 
strength of their contribution to the EU’s policy and legislative agenda. 
 
The equality provisions of the Charter 
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights constitutes Part Two of the 
Constitution. It includes a chapter on equality,60 reflecting its status as a 
key fundamental right in the European Union. However, it is difficult to 
draw any settled conclusions regarding whether the Charter in fact 
strengthens the right to equality in formal legal terms. The difficulty lies in 
the differing approaches taken to various grounds of discrimination. At the 
outset, the equality chapter contains two horizontal provisions of general 
application. Article II-80 states that “everyone is equal before the law” and 
Article II-81 contains a general principle of non-discrimination “based on 
any ground.” This includes a list of seventeen grounds. However, freedom 
from nationality-based discrimination does not appear to fall within this 
general prohibition, as it receives separate treatment in the subsequent 
paragraph of Article II-81: “Within the scope of application of the 
Constitution and without prejudice to any of its specific provisions, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” This highly 
ambiguous provision is addressed by the explanatory memorandum, which 
                                                     
59 McCrudden and Kountouros, Human Rights and European Equality Law, University of 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 8/2006, at 15. 
60 See Bell, “Equality and the European Union Constitution” (2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal 
242. 
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states that it is restricted to Community nationals.61 This undermines the 
Charter’s attempt to establish a general right to equality.  
In addition to the two horizontal provisions, the Charter contains five 
vertical articles addressing specific grounds (cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity, equality between men and women, rights of the child 
and elderly people; and the integration of disabled people). With the 
exception of gender equality, these articles seem to embody merely vague, 
aspirational commitments on the part of the Union. In several instances, the 
language of the Charter steps away from directly conferring individual 
rights, employing instead the formulation that the Union should ‘recognise 
and respect’ particular rights.  
Waddington consequently assesses the Articles of the Charter as 
reflecting a diverse approach to equality, with some rights being cast in 
traditional terms while others are more aspirational. “The Charter’s failure 
to embrace a single concept of equality, covering all individuals and 
groups, could be regarded as arguing against a movement towards the 
constitutionalisation of the equality principle.”62 This is probably a result of 
the consensus-driven approach to drafting the Charter: dilution of 
potentially controversial rights, particularly those which impact on social 
policy, was most likely inevitable to secure agreement on their inclusion. 
Nonetheless, the Charter may have a significant symbolic (and even 
interpretative) resonance in recognising the right to equality as a core right 
of the person, expressed in the constitutional document of the Union. 
McCrudden suggests that “European equality is in the course of being 
subsumed within a broader human rights discourse.”63 There is certainly 
increasing scope for human rights principles to permeate the Community 
law concept of equality. 
 
 
III. New elements of substantive equality in Community law 
 
New provisions on positive action –Article 141(4) EC and the Article 13 
Directives 
The most striking examples that the Community legislator has embraced a 
concept of substantive equality in the anti-discrimination regime are the 
new provisions governing positive action in the European Union. As stated 
above, the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty involved a new clause on 
positive action in the field of gender equality, Article 141(4). As well as 
conferring a Treaty basis for positive action measures, this provision is 
                                                     
61 Praesidium, “Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set out in 
CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50’, CHARTE 4473/00 CONVENT 49, Brussels, 11 October 
2000, 23. 
62 Waddington, The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law, op. cit., 
at 23. 
63 McCrudden, , loc. cit., at 9. 
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significant in its wording, which departs significantly from the Equal 
Treatment Directive: 
 
With a view to achieving full equality in practice between men and 
women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures 
providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the 
under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages in professional careers. 
 
The Race and Framework Directives contain similar provisions on positive 
action: 
 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of 
equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages [linked to any of the discriminatory grounds 
covered by the Directives].  
 
This wording has also been adopted by the recent Directive on gender 
equality in access to goods and services.64 These provisions are regarded as 
conferring greater freedom on Member States in the field of positive 
action.65 First, positive action is no longer expressed as a derogation from 
equal treatment but forms part of the overall aim of achieving full equality. 
In reconceptualising positive action in this manner, Community law has 
arguably moved beyond the pursuance of individual equality as an abstract 
end in itself, without reference to its social and economic context.  The 
reference to “full equality in practice” recognises that mere consistency of 
treatment may be insufficient to remove inequalities. Secondly, the 
reference to preventing or compensating for disadvantages clarifies that 
persons other than identified victims of past discrimination may be the 
subject of preferential treatment. Thirdly, the removal of any reference to 
“equal opportunities” arguably allows some scope for results-oriented 
measures. Furthermore, the new provisions implicitly accept that inequality 
and disadvantage is a group experience. McCrudden states that these 
relatively open-ended provisions “clearly [incorporate] a collective 
conception of group disadvantage dispensing with a requirement of actual 
or direct harm and allowing for both retrospective and prophylactic 
measures.”66 
                                                     
64 Article 6 of Directive 2004/113/EC. 
65 Chalmers, “The Mistakes of the Good European” in Fredman ed., Discrimination and Human 
Rights: The Case of Racism, op. cit., 193, at 213. 
66 McCrudden, loc. cit., at 24, quoting McInerney, Equal Treatment Between Persons 
Irrespectvive of Racial or Ethnic Origin : A Comment” (2000) 25 European Law Review 317, at 
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Other aspects of substantive
 
equality in the Article 13 Directives: 
Reasonable accommodation
 
An asymmetrical approach to equality can also be identified in the 
provision of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities67 
contained in Article 5 of the Framework Employment Directive. It imposes 
a positive duty on employers to take steps to reasonably accommodate 
disabled persons, unless this would result in a “disproportionate burden” to 
the employer.  Reasonable accommodation is not phrased in terms of an 
exception, but as central to “guaranteeing compliance with the principle of 
equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities.”  This affirms the 
Directive’s commitment to substantive equality: reasonable 
accommodation is required to ensure that persons with disabilities are not 
disadvantaged by ‘equal’ treatment with non-disabled persons. 
‘Appropriate measures’ are defined as measures which are ‘effective and 
practical to adapt the workplace to the disability.’68 The reasonable 
accommodation provision is context-specific, requiring the employer to 
accommodate the particular characteristics and circumstances of an 
individual disabled person.69 In judging whether the accommodation is 
reasonable, the effectiveness of a measure in adapting the workplace to the 
disabled person’s needs will be an important consideration. 
The Directive does not specify in detail what the duty of reasonable 
accommodation entails.  The experience of other jurisdictions may provide 
guidance. The United States, Canada and Australia have all imposed duties 
of reasonable accommodation on employers. In the US, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 1990 (ADA) provides that a failure of an employer to 
make reasonable accommodation for an otherwise qualified person with a 
disability constitutes discrimination. The US Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) regards reasonable accommodation as 
“a means by which barriers to the equal employment opportunity of an 
individual with a disability are removed or alleviated.”70 Specific examples 
of reasonable accommodation are set out in s.101(9), ADA and include: 
making facilities available to disabled users, job restructuring, modified 
work schedules, reassignment, provision of readers or interpreters and 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. Recital 20 of the 
Framework Directive takes a similar approach, referring to adapting 
premises and equipment, patterns of working time, the distribution of tasks 
                                                                                                                                                           
320. 
67 This involves taking special measures to accommodate disabled persons, by adapting the 
workplace to their needs e.g. providing interpretative aids, adjusting working hours, making 
premises accessible to disabled persons. 
68 Recital 20 of the Preamble to the Directive. 
69 Wells, “The Impact of the Framework Employment Directive on UK Disability 
Discrimination Law” (2003) 32 Industrial Law Journal 253, at 264. 
70 Cited in Smith, “Disability, Discrimination and Employment: A Never-Ending Legal Story?” 
(2001) 23 Dublin University Law Journal 148, at 153. 
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or the provision of training or integration resources, as examples of 
reasonable accommodation. Recital 21 establishes a relative test in 
determining if the reasonable accommodation sought would impose a 
disproportionate burden on the employer.71 The factors to be considered 
are: the financial or other costs entailed, the scale and financial resources of 
the organisation or undertaking, and the possibility of obtaining public 
funding or any other assistance. 
Reasonable accommodation, essential to ensuring true equality for 
persons with disabilities, is not a specialised form of positive action.  
Rather, it exists to ensure that uniform assumptions about the needs of the 
population as a whole are not blindly applied to disabled persons, resulting 
(though unintentionally) in continued marginalisation and disadvantage. 
This is illustrated by the Canadian case of Eldridge v British Columbia 
(Attorney General).72 The plaintiffs challenged the failure of provincial 
hospital legislation to provide medical interpretation services to deaf 
patients as a violation of the equality guarantee in s.15 of the Canadian 
Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously found that s.15 
required the hospital legislation to ensure effective communication with 
deaf persons, in order for them to receive equal advantage from their 
healthcare. This decision, viewing interpretative services for deaf persons 
as an essential part of healthcare and not an ancillary service, is noteworthy 
for refusing to privilege able-bodied methods of delivering healthcare in its 
assessment.73 This is precisely the aim of reasonable accommodation 
provisions: ensuring substantive equality for persons with disabilities by 
accommodating their needs, rather than adhering to norms favouring the 
dominant group. 
The Framework Directive’s provisions on reasonable 
accommodation, linking this concept to the achievement of real equality for 
disabled persons, illustrate the shift in European law from formal to 
substantive equality. Employers are now obliged to accommodate 
disability-based differences in order to avoid discrimination. This leveling-
up approach, focused on individual dignity and worth, is consistent with an 
underlying human rights rationale.74 Nevertheless, the Directive’s 
limitations on the duty, in particular the threshold of disproportionate 
burden, may undermine its impact. There is also the danger that the general 
derogation in Article 2(5) for “[national] measures… necessary for [inter 
                                                     
71 This mirrors the approach taken in several other jurisdictions, and decision-makers may 
benefit from examining comparative jurisprudence on the relative test. See Quinn, McDonagh 
and Kimber, Disability Discrimination Law in the United States, Australia and Canada (Oak 
Tree Press, 1993). 
72 (1997) 151 DLR (4th) 577. 
73 See Mayerson and Yee The ADA and Models of Equality, paper published by the US 
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, 2000. 
74 See Apostolopoulou, Equal Treatment of People with Disabilities in the EC: What does 
‘Equal’ mean? New York University Jean Monnet Working Paper 09/04, 2004. 
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alia] the protection of health and for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others” may be abused at national level as a convenient escape 
clause to avoid making reasonable accommodation. Wells suggests that 
“the lack of detail in the Directive leaves scope for judicial development of 
the concept of reasonable accommodation, and the destiny of this concept 
lies to a great extent in the hands of the European Court of Justice. A 
proactive Court…may choose to push forward the boundaries of disability 
equality law and reject far-reaching national restrictions on the duty of 
reasonable accommodation.”75 
 
Enforcement 
The Directives’ provisions on enforcement, while remaining within the 
paradigm of individual enforcement, reflect a deeper understanding of the 
complexities of discrimination, in particular the difficulties faced by 
individuals in challenging structural discrimination. In this respect, the 
Directives introduce: a less strict test for indirect discrimination; a 
provision for the burden of proof to shift to the respondent where the 
complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination; 
protection against victimisation as a result of having brought an equality 
claim, and a requirement on Member States to allow representative 
organisations with a legitimate interest to bring an action either on behalf 
of, or in support of, a complainant.76 Similar definitions of concepts and 
provisions on remedies and enforcement have been adopted by the two 
recent gender equality Directives.77  Some of these provisions codify 
judicially developed principles on effective protection of Community 
gender equality rights, others are new measures aimed at addressing the 
weaknesses of an adversarial system of individual enforcement. Overall, 
they confer more substantive equality obligations on the Member States. 
In addition, Article 13 of the Race Directive mandates the creation of 
a body for the promotion of equal treatment on this ground in the Member 
States. These bodies must be capable of assisting individuals in bringing 
claims of discrimination, as well as serving a broader societal function of 
conducting independent surveys, publishing independent reports, and 
making recommendations concerning discrimination.78 This requirement is 
replicated by the new gender equality Directives,79 but not in the 
Framework Directive, though Member States may of course choose to 
create equality bodies covering the latter’s grounds. Equality bodies may 
play a vital role in securing effective implementation of the equality 
                                                     
75 Wells, loc. cit., at 266. 
76 See Higgins, “Enforcement and the New Equality Directives” in Costello and Barry eds., op. 
cit., 391. 
77 Directives 2002/73/EC and 2004/113/EC.  
78 Article 13, Race Directive. 
79 Article 8a of Directive 76/207/EC, as inserted by Directive 2002/73/EC and Article 12 of 
Directive 2004/113/EC.  
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legislation, by promoting knowledge of its provisions, supporting 
claimants, and encouraging systematic responses to the legislation.80 
 
Mainstreaming 
Mainstreaming is a strategy that seeks to promote equality by including 
equality considerations in formulating mainstream policies, programmes, 
practices and decision-making at all stages of their development and 
implementation.81 This obligation requires that government and public 
authorities include considerations of equality and non-discrimination in 
decision-making across all spheres of government. It involves both a focus 
on the side-effect of ordinary policies on particular groups, their 
participation in decision-making processes, and consideration of the 
implications of policies for equality.  
Gender mainstreaming was adopted at EU level as a policy tool for 
ensuring equality between men and women, and was given constitutional 
footing in Article 3(2) EC. The amended Equal Treatment Directive 
extends this strategy to national level, requiring Member States to “actively 
take into account the objective of equality between men and women when 
formulating and implementing laws, regulations, administrative provision, 
policies and activities” in the areas covered by the Directive.82 While the 
EU has begun to extend its mainstreaming strategies to other grounds, such 
as race and disability, gender remains its predominant focus.83 This is 
reflected in the existing equality Directives, and it is regrettable the 
opportunity was not taken to extend a mainstreaming duty to the other 
protected grounds. 
Mainstreaming has potentially far-reaching implications for the 
pursuit of equality. This strategy is unique in that it applies to both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ forms of regulation, regardless of the domain in which the 
Member State is acting. It signals a clear concern for substantive equality, 
as it seeks to ensure the participation of groups in determining laws and 
policies that affect them.  
                                                     
80 Crowley, “Engaging in Change: The Equality Authority’s Approach to Promoting Equality 
and Combating Discrimination”, Irish EU Presidency Conference, Closing the Gap: Systematic 
Approaches to Promoting Equality and Diversity in Europe, 27-28 May 2004, Limerick, 
Ireland. 
81 It is difficult to provide a comprehensive working definition of mainstreaming, given its 
cross-cutting nature. It should also be noted that while the current legislative and analytical 
focus is mainly on public authorities and government, who have pioneered this approach, a 
modified version may be suitable for operation as a private sector duty. 
82 Article 1, Directive 2002/73/EC [OJ L 269/15]. 
83 See European Commission, Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into all 
Community Policies and Activities (COM (96) final); Pollack and Hafner-Burton,  
“Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union” (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 
432; Shaw, Mainstreaming Equality in European Union and Policy-Making, European Network 
Against Racism, April 2004. 
50  Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
Despite this laudable objective, mainstreaming strategies have 
several limitations. The most obvious and remediable flaw is the ad hoc 
nature of many mainstreaming initiatives, particularly those undertaken in 
fields other than gender. “Soft law” mainstreaming policies lack 
enforcement mechanisms, are unclear in what mainstreaming requires and 
are dependent on political will for their implementation. Even where a 
statutory mainstreaming duty is adopted, these may be insufficiently 
specific, leaving a broad margin of discretion to public bodies as to the 
method of consultation and implementation. O’Cinnéide points out the 
danger that the model of consultation adopted may be an “expert-
bureaucratic” one, relying on specialist units to incorporate equality 
perspectives into decision-making.84 This is a poor substitute for a 
“participative-democratic” model of consultation with community and civic 
groups.85 Furthermore, mainstreaming obligations are frequently uncertain 
in their goals and the extent of a public authority’s duties. The cornerstone 
of this strategy is the integration of equality matters into ongoing policy-
making, without any concurrent obligation to eliminate existing structures 
of discrimination. Consequently, institutionalised discrimination may 
escape the net of equality duties. 
 
Substantive equality in the Constitution  
As noted above, the Constitution does not embrace a single vision of 
equality, but employs varying and divergent provisions on equality in 
different contexts. Consequently, the Constitution cannot be said to rest on 
either a purely formal or a purely substantive equality model; it contains 
elements of both. This is inevitable, given that equality appears as 
“simultaneously a value, an objective, a fundamental right, a positive duty 
and a legal competence.”86 The Constitution emphasises the broad nature of 
equality as a general constitutional principle of neutral equal treatment, by 
prohibiting discrimination on a long list of non-exhaustive grounds. 
Nevertheless, a more substantive vision of equality is clearly evident in the 
Constitution’s approach to positive obligations aimed at securing equal 
treatment. As noted above, Article I-3 specifies that the Union shall combat 
social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote equality between 
                                                     
84 O’Cinnéide, “Beyond the Limits of Equal Treatment: The Use of Positive Duties in Equality 
Law”, paper delivered to Equality Authority of Ireland Conference, Mainstreaming Equality: 
Models for a Statutory Duty, Dublin, 27 February 2003. 
85 A ‘participative-democratic’ model of mainstreaming has emerged in Northern Ireland under 
s.75 of the Northern Ireland Act, 1998. In placing a statutory duty on public authorities to 
mainstream equality of opportunity, the legislation specifies that there shall be a consultation 
process between public authorities and the wider community. The adoption of this model largely 
reflects the origins of s.75, namely the mobilisation of civic groups around the need for a 
statutory mainstreaming duty. See Donaghy, “Mainstreaming: Northern Ireland’s participative-
democratic approach” (2004) 32 Policy and Politics 49, and McCrudden, “Mainstreaming 
Equality” (1999) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 1696. 
86 Bell, “Equality and the European Union Constitution”, loc.. cit., at 244. 
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men and women. This relatively strong language represents a clear shift in 
the Union’s focus from purely negative prohibitions of discrimination to a 
more active equality agenda. 
This is reinforced by two provisions which appear in Part III of the 
Constitution concerning the policies and functions of the Union. Article III-
116 is modelled on the existing Article 3(2) EC, and states “In all the 
activities referred to in this Part, the Union shall aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.” A similar, 
though slightly weaker, commitment in respect of the other grounds is 
contained in Article III-118 which states “In defining and implementing the 
policies and activities referred to in this Part, the Union shall aim to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.” These provisions create a 
commitment on the part of the Union to a mainstreaming approach to 
equality issues. This will hopefully entail building on existing initiatives, 
mainly undertaken in the field of gender.87 
The Constitution’s provisions on positive action are less favourable 
to the development of substantive equality in the Community legal order. 
Gender is the only ground which benefits from a specific authorisation of 
positive action. This occurs in Article III-214(4), which replicates the 
existing Article 141(4) EC, and in Article II-83 (the Charter). The former is 
constrained to “working life”, while the latter provision (possessing a 
broader material scope) refers only to “measures providing for specific 
advantages in favour of the under-represented sex” and jettisons any 
reference to the objective of securing full equality in practice. None of the 
other enumerated grounds of prohibited discrimination receive a similar 
constitutional basis for positive action. This is surprising, given that the 
Article 13 Directives allow for positive action on all of the grounds. 
Bell suggests that “overall, the formal equality concept tends to 
dominate the equality provisions of the Constitution…[which] presents a 
diluted commitment to substantive equality concepts.”88 The positive 
aspects of the Constitution’s equality provisions are unfortunately largely 
premised on a ‘soft law’ approach, which fails to challenge the traditional 
concept of equality as formal identical treatment. Moreover, its 
differentiation between gender and other grounds, with higher levels of 
protection being afforded to gender, reinforces a fragmented vision of 
equality at the EU level. This is hard to reconcile with a constitutionalised 
principle of equal treatment, especially where there is little apparent basis 
for distinguishing the grounds in this manner. 
                                                     
87 See Communication from the Commission, “Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women 
and Men into all Community Policies and Activities”, COM (1996)007 FINAL. See also 
Council Decision 2000/750/EC of 27th November 2000 establishing a Community action 
program to combat discrimination (2001-2006), [2000] OJ L303/23. 
88 Bell, “Equality and the European Union Constitution”, loc.. cit., at 250. 
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IV. The Way Forward: The Impact of a Human Rights Approach 
 
What
 
does a human rights approach to equality entail? 
The objective of this article was to assess whether the principle of equality 
has shifted from its original market underpinnings to enjoy the status of a 
fully-fledged human right at EU level. In light of the evidence presented 
above, we see that the concept of equality is now located within a broader 
EU human rights culture. Equal treatment is no longer guaranteed merely 
in order to facilitate the functioning of the internal market: it has new 
foundations based on the Union’s respect for human rights and democracy, 
which necessarily involves combating discrimination. It is thus appropriate 
to consider what the implications of such a shift might be. What does a 
human rights approach require from equality that a market-based vision 
does not? 
First, viewing equality through the lens of human rights has 
implications for the meaning of ‘equal treatment.’ Formal identical 
treatment of individuals, the Aristotelian notion of equality, is unlikely to 
suffice. Schiek suggests that “From a human rights perspective, non-
discrimination has to serve more (and more ambitious) goals than from the 
internal market perspective. As human rights, equality and non-
discrimination are not restrained to some technical comparative right, but 
are instituted to sustain an inclusive society.”89 The Article 13 Directives 
reflect this alternative rationale of equality, by employing the language of 
positive rights and emphasising values of individual dignity and social 
inclusiveness. However, Fredman points out that the human rights standard 
is itself “compatible with a range of different approaches to equality.”90 
Nevertheless, it provides an opportunity for advancing beyond a formalistic 
vision of equality. First, it demands a real equality of treatment and not 
merely “equally bad” treatment.91 Secondly, equality can then be 
permeated by other human rights considerations so that it is not viewed as 
an end in itself, but linked to its social, political and economic context.  
The human rights approach thus involves a substantive vision of 
equality, rather than a formal one. This holds particular promise for the 
interpretation and application of the Directives’ provisions on indirect 
discrimination, positive action and reasonable accommodation.92  However, 
as pointed out earlier, the difficulty is that there is no single vision of 
                                                     
89 Schiek, “A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?” (2002) 8 European 
Law Journal 290, at 293. 
90 Fredman, “Equality: A New Generation?” (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 145, at 155. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Though outside the scope of this article, it will be interesting to see how these positive 
equality duties interact in practice, and the implications that each will have for both negative 
and positive parallel duties. See for example, Stratigaki, “Gender Mainstreaming vs. Positive 
Action: An Ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy” (2005) 12 European Journal of 
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equality reflected in the Community treaties and legislation. The ECJ could 
greatly contribute to the EC equality framework by articulating a standard 
of substantive equality to inform the provisions of the Directives, 
particularly with respect to positive obligations.  
Here, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (once its status is certain) 
may play an important role. A constitutionalised equality principle, 
enjoying political consensus, in a document which sets socio-economic 
rights alongside civil and political ones and makes specific reference to the 
rights of the most vulnerable groups in society, may be invoked as the 
anchor of a common vision of equality. Moreover, Costello suggests that 
the Charter ‘lets the cat out of the bag’ by revealing the constitutional 
nature of the ECJ’s task in reviewing national practices for compatibility 
with Community law. The Court will therefore be obliged to formulate a 
clearer standard of review in its equality decisions.93 Several notes of 
caution, however, must be sounded. The first is that the Charter is but one 
source available to the ECJ in the interpretation of fundamental rights: both 
the European Convention on Human Rights and domestic constitutions 
remain valid reference points as well, and may embody diverse, and even 
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requires tailored approaches: a uniform application of existing principles is 
impossible given the diverse challenges they pose. The Court may draw on 
the broader human rights context established by the Charter (and the 
Constitutional Treaty assuming ratification), and by the progressive 
language and obligations of the Directives themselves, to give new impetus 
to European equality law. This would involve advancing beyond traditional 
concerns of market freedoms to recognise the independent value and 
importance of social rights.  
There is some evidence that the Court is already undertaking this 
shift in two recent cases concerning the new grounds. Mangold concerned 
the application of the Framework Directive’s prohibition of age 
discrimination in the (extended) period allowed for transposing the 
Directive’s provisions on age discrimination into national law.96 The ECJ 
held that the respondent Member State, Germany, was bound by the 
provisions of the Directive even before the deadline for transposition had 
passed. It based its decision upon two considerations (i) the duty of 
Member States under Article 18 of the Directive to report to the 
Commission on progress made before the extended period of transposition 
expired would be rendered redundant if Member States could act contrary 
to the provisions of the Directive before that deadline and (ii) the principle 
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general Community principle of non-discrimination applied in the absence 
of specific support for it in the Treaties. 
Moreover, a reminder of the restrictions militating against Article 
13’s effect as support for a broad principle of equality was urged by 
Advocate General Geelhoed in his recent Opinion in Chacón Navas.98 This 
case concerned whether a worker, dismissed while on sick leave for an 
illness, fell within the scope of the Framework Directive’s prohibition of 
disability. (The meaning of disability is not defined by the Directive.) The 
Advocate General’s Opinion, while reaching a reasonable conclusion, will 
offer little comfort to those seeking to tap Article 13’s potential to give 
constitutional effect to the principle of equality. Pointing to Article 13’s 
role as the juridical basis for the Framework Directive, the Advocate 
General stressed the need to interpret the provisions of the Directive “in 
light of the letter and spirit of that Article.”99 He continued by setting out 
the various textual limitations of Article 13: its reference to ‘measures 
necessary’, the exhaustive list of grounds promulgated, its curtailment by 
the principle of subsidiarity and the restriction to acting within the 
competences of the Community. He also pointed to the exceptions in 
Articles 4 (genuine and determining occupational requirements) and 5 
(threshold of disproportionate burden for reasonable accommodation) as 
evidence that the Community legislator considered the “potentially very 
heavy economic and financial consequences” of an overly extensive 
application of the Directive.100 Emphasising the need for the Court to have 
due deference both to the choices of the Community legislator in restricting 
the scope of the Directive, and to the national margin of appreciation in 
determining questions of social policy which will necessarily arise in 
implementing the Directive, (i) the Advocate General concluded that there 
is little scope to extend the material application of Article 13 EC under the 
cover of a general principle of equality and (ii) he expressly urged a more 
circumspect interpretation and application of the Framework Directive than 
that adopted by the ECJ in Mangold.101  
The Advocate General’s conclusions on the substantive questions 
raised were more encouraging, however. He accepted the need for a 
Community definition of disability to ensure the necessary level of unity 
and uniformity in applying the principle of non-discrimination. Pointing to 
ongoing developments in medical and social understandings of disability, 
the Advocate General wisely counseled against seeking to impose an 
exhaustive or definitive definition: rather, the ECJ should provide the 
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necessary criteria to allow national courts to determine if a particular 
situation falls within the personal scope of the Directive. According to him, 
a person would be ‘disabled’ for the purposes of the Directive if his or her 
abilities were seriously limited by physical, mental or psychological 
difficulties.102 The disability need not be permanent, but must be 
sufficiently long in duration. An illness is not a disability within this 
definition, unless the complainant can establish that the discriminatory 
treatment complained of was not attributable to the illness itself, but to 
permanent or long-term limitations on capacity which are a consequence of 
the illness.103 
The Advocate General’s comments on Article 13 signalled a 
discomfort with attempts to broaden the scope of the EU equality principle 
as a generalised human right. The distinction lies in how one chooses to 
approach the equality principle: Advocate General Geelhoed has 
approached it in a formal and isolated manner, examining Article 13 
against the background of Community competences without any reference 
to other sources (international conventions, the Charter, the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States) which support a general 
principle of non-discrimination. The limitations on Article 13 which he 
mentions do undeniably exist: the mistake he makes is in choosing to read 
the Directive solely against this background, without any reference to its 
broader human rights rationale.104 Reading the Community provisions on 
equality in this manner risks emptying many of these protections, 
particularly the positive obligations, of their potential to contribute to an 
understanding of equality based on human dignity rather than the dictates 
of the common market.  
The Court reached the same conclusion as the Advocate General on 
the substantive issue.105 It accepted the need for an “autonomous and 
uniform interpretation” of the concept of disability throughout the 
Community, having regard to the context and objectives of the Framework 
Directive. It stated that “the concept of ‘disability must be understood as 
referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or 
psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the 
person concerned in professional life.” Referring to the Directive’s 
provisions on reasonable accommodation, the Court inferred that the 
Community legislature had in mind situations in which such participation is 
hindered over a long period of time. Thus, it must be probable that a 
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limitation will last for a long time in order for it to fall within the scope of 
the Directive. “Sickness” cannot therefore be treated as a “disability” for 
the purposes of the Directive.106  
The Court went on to address the protection of disabled persons as 
regards dismissal. Emphasising an employer’s obligation of reasonable 
accommodation under Article 5, the Court stated that an employer cannot 
rely on the “essential functions” exception (whereby an employer is not 
required to maintain in employment a person who is not competent, 
capable and available to perform the essential functions of the job) in order 
to dismiss an employee, unless this obligation has first been fulfilled.107 
Regarding Article 13, the Court’s remarks were much sparser that the 
Opinion. In considering whether “sickness” could be regarded as an 
identifying attribute which is a prohibited ground of discrimination in 
addition to those listed in the Framework Directive, the Court recalled that 
the general principle of non-discrimination is one of the fundamental rights 
which form part of the general principles of Community law, and is thus 
binding on the Member States where the national situation falls within the 
scope of Community law. (This brings to mind the Mangold decision, 
discussed above). However, it pointed out that there is no established 
Community competence to combat discrimination on grounds of 
“sickness”, and thus the scope of the Framework Directive (whose list of 
grounds is exhaustive) should not be extended by analogy with this 
principle of non-discrimination.108  
The Chacón Navas decision reaches an unsurprising conclusion on 
the issue raised. It is certainly desirable, from the point of view of both 
uniformity and flexibility in implementing Directives, that there are 
Community-wide criteria to determine to what constitutes disability, while 
leaving necessary judicial discretion to assess diverse individual situations. 
Moreover, it would have been contrary to the spirit and purpose of the 
Framework Directive to allow illnesses which are temporary in nature, 
without more, to attract its protections. Such a development would have 
rendered the Directive’s aim to provide special protection for disabled 
persons in employment meaningless.  
The Court attached significant weight to the reasonable 
accommodation provision in interpreting both the concept of disability and 
the scope of the employer’s obligation not to discriminate. This is 
encouraging, as it illustrates the Court’s willingness to engage with the 
positive obligations of the equality framework. Furthermore, its comments 
regarding dismissal of disabled persons clarify that the onus rests on an 
employer to show that he has satisfied the duty of reasonable 
accommodation before the “essential functions” provision can be invoked 
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as justification for such dismissal. This interpretation ensures a harmonious 
interplay between reasonable accommodation and the general principle of 
non-discrimination which the Directive gives effect to, and provides 
important protection in employment for disabled workers. The judgment 
makes it clear, however, that the “general principles of Community law” 
remain the only existing source of a generalised non-discrimination 
principle in the Community legal order, and any attempt to widen the scope 
of the Community’s “hard law” equality guarantees beyond the 
competences conferred by Article 13 will be strongly resisted.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is axiomatic that the principle of equality is in a state of flux in the 
European Union. The principle of non-discrimination on the grounds listed 
in Article 13 has emerged as a general principle of Community law. With 
the adoption of the Directives giving effect to that principle, a fundamental 
and wide-ranging right of equality has emerged in the Community legal 
order. This is likely to be strengthened by the ‘constitutionalisation’ of such 
rights in the Charter. Equality has evolved from being a market-based 
guarantee of gender equality in employment, to a free-standing right of 
equality on several grounds which benefits from human rights 
considerations of protecting individual dignity and ensuring social 
inclusiveness. Consequently, equality must serve new aims and objectives 
to fulfil its function as a human right of EU citizens. 
Moreover, the traditional distinctions of formal and substantive 
equality have become blurred. While the individual right to equal treatment 
remains prominent in the Community legal order, there is a new emphasis 
on addressing structural forms of discrimination and achieving “full 
equality in practice.” This is reflected in the language of the Article 13 
Directives and in the positive duties they impose, namely greater scope for 
positive action, a duty on employers to reasonably accommodate persons 
with disabilities, and the imposition of a gender mainstreaming obligation. 
These legislative developments could be reinforced by the adoption of the 
Constitution, giving Treaty support for an active equality agenda. 
The constitutional and legislative developments discussed above 
fluctuate between formal and substantive equality, varying according to 
both the ground of discrimination and the legal context of the provision. 
We cannot conclude that one approach has triumphed: both formal and 
substantive equality now have relevant roles to play in Community law. 
However, the Union’s recognition of the limitations of an individualistic 
method is a highly welcome development. Overall, a new approach based 
on human rights and individual dignity, rather than market concerns, has 
2006] The Equality Principle  59 
 
objective of combating discrimination. This is in keeping with the Union’s 
wider commitments to respect human rights, and is given concrete 
expression in Community equality law’s new generation of positive duties. 
Much of the impact of these positive obligations will be determined 
by the manner in which the Court of Justice chooses to interpret and apply 
them. There is wide scope for the Court to adopt a more substantive vision 
of equality, based on the wider context of EU human rights protection and 
the specific developments in anti-discrimination law that were outlined in 
this article. The recent decisions in Mangold and Chacón Navas suggest 
that the ECJ is willing to interpret and apply the new Directives in light of 
their human rights-based rationales and the positive obligations which they 
establish. The Court’s articulation of a more nuanced principle of equality 
would be valuable in introducing a necessary counterweight to formal 
equality principles, and allowing substantive equality to play a meaningful 
role in guaranteeing human rights in Europe. 
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Introduction 
 
On June 30th, 2005, the House of Lords gave judgment in In re Spectrum 
Ltd (in liquidation)1 (hereafter Spectrum) and brought to a close the long-
running debate concerning charges over present and future book debts by 
overruling the highly criticised case of Siebe Gorman v. Barclays Bank Ltd. 
(hereafter Siebe Gorman).2 The House of Lords held that a charge over 
book debts where the chargor remains free to remove the charged assets 
from the chargee’s security without its consent should, in law, be 
categorised as floating. This article will initially consider the concepts of 
fixed and floating charges and their application to book debts. It will then 
analyse the diverging body of case law that led from 
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assets is established although title in the property is not transferred from the 
debtor to the creditor.4  
  There are two principal categories of company charge, fixed and 
floating charges. A fixed charge connotes an immediate proprietary interest 
in a company’s fixed assets, such as land or business premises, or, to a 
lesser extent, fixed plant and machinery, which may be transferred by the 
chargor-company to the chargee-bank so as to secure the repayment of a 
loan. A floating charge, by contrast, connotes an immediate, although 
unattached,5 proprietary interest in a company’s circulating assets6, such as 
raw materials or stock-in-trade, which are replaced in the normal course of 
business and constantly changing. The hallmark of a floating charge, which 
distinguishes it from a fixed charge, is that the chargor-company may 
continue to use the charged assets and may even dispose of them in the 
ordinary course of its business until the occurrence of some particular 
future event, whereupon the charge will crystallise and attach itself to the 
charged assets. The chargee-bank may then exercise its enforceable interest 
in such assets for the same reason mentioned above, to secure the 
repayment of a debt. The clearest distinction between fixed or ‘specific’ 
and floating charges was, it is submitted, made by Lord MacNaghten in 
Illingworth v. Houldsworth7: 
 
A specific charge, I think, is one that without more fastens on 
ascertained and  definite property or property capable of being 
ascertained and defined; a floating  charge, on the other hand, is 
ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and so to speak 
floating with the property which it is intended to affect until some 
event occurs or some act is done which causes it to settle and fasten 
on the subject of the charge within its reach and grasp. 
 
 
Charges over Book Debts 
 
A book debt may be described as an uncollected debt owed to a company 
and the realised proceeds of such a debt (i.e. the debt itself and the money 
once collected).8 It should be borne in mind that book debts are often the 
largest asset owned by a company, and this is why banks may endeavour to 
                                                     
4
 See In Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No.8) [1998] AC 214, at 226, 
where Lord Hoffmann observes that a charge is a security interest created without any transfer 
of title. 
5See Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd. [1910] 2 KB 979, at 999, per Buckley L.J. 
6 The early case of Holroyd v. Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191 opened the way to the grant by 
companies of security over any class of circulating assets that they might possess. 
7 [1904] AC 355, at 358. 
8 See Hanlon and Heywood, “Spectrum Plus and Book Debts: The Final Chapter?” [2006] 1 
Web Journal of Current Legal Issues. Available at http://www. webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/. 
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take, and companies may wish to grant, a charge over such debts.9 Whereas 
companies may prefer to grant a floating charge over book debts because of 
the obvious freedom such a charge confers upon them to continue to use 
the proceeds in the normal course of their business, the banks may prefer to 
take a fixed charge over such debts because it is a stronger form of security. 
It must be noted that often the bank will be in the better bargaining position 
and the company will have no choice but to grant a fixed charge, rather 
than a floating charge, over all of its book debts. The benefits of a fixed 
charge to creditors are numerous. In the unfortunate event of insolvency, a 
fixed charge holder has priority over all preferential creditors.10 
Furthermore, unlike a floating charge, a fixed charge is not liable to be set 
aside where the company goes into liquidation within 12 months of its 
creation.11 For these reasons, the issue of whether a charge over book debts 
is fixed or floating is clearly of major importance for creditors.  
 At this point it may be asked whether it is indeed feasible for a 
company to create a fixed charge over a fluctuating class of assets such as 
its present and future book debts? This question may be answered in the 
affirmative, for it is conceptually possible for a company to create a fixed 
charge over its present and future book debts.12 In Spectrum, Lord Scott 
observes that there “was never any doubt that it was possible to create a 
fixed charge over a specific, ascertained book debt”13 and for well over a 
century it has also been accepted that “an assignment of future book debts 
would be effective to vest in the assignee an equitable interest in the future 
debts at the moment they became owing to the assignor”.14 This is because, 
as soon as a book debt is incurred and becomes owing to the chargor-
company it constitutes an item of ‘ascertained and definite property or 
property capable of being ascertained and defined’ and qualifies as an 
object of a fixed charge. Therefore, as Lord Scott points out in Spectrum, a 
debenture15 expressed to grant a fixed charge over present and future book 
                                                     
9
 Ibid. 
10 In Ireland, see the Companies Act 1963, s.285 (2). In England, see the Insolvency Act 1986, 
sections 107, 115, 175 and 386. Floating charge holders will only be paid after preferential 
creditors. A fixed charge holder once enjoyed priority over the Revenue Commissioners. 
However, in Ireland, as we shall see, statute law (The Finance Act 1986, as amended by the 
Finance Act 1995) has in recent times given the Revenue Commissioners priority over fixed 
charge holders. 
11 In Ireland, see the Companies Act 1963, s.285 (7)(b). In England, see the Insolvency Act 
1986, s.245. See also Courtney, The Law of Private Companies (2nd ed., Butterworths, 2002), at 
1175. 
12 See Siebe Gorman v. Barclays Bank [1979] 2 Ll. Rep. 142, at 158, per Slade J. In the Irish 
case of Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. [1985] BCLC 302, Keane J. in the High Court accepted that it is 
possible to create a fixed charge over a company’s present and future book debts. 
13 [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 92, per Lord Scott. 
14
 See Tailby v. The Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523. 
15 The term debenture signifies an instrument or document creating or acknowledging 
indebtedness of some permanence. See Levy v. Abercorris Slate and Slab Corporation (1887) 
37 Ch D 260, per Lord Chitty. 
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debts is indeed capable of creating a fixed charge over such debts as and 
when they accrue due to the chargor-company. Slade J. so held in Siebe 
Gorman and “no-one has suggested that in that respect he was wrong”.16 
 However, the fact that a valid fixed charge over present and future 
book debts is capable of being created does not mean that such a charge 
will be held to have been created in each and every case. As Lord Hope 
observes in Spectrum, “if [the assignment of present and future book debts] 
is to be effective as a fixed security everything depends on the way the 
security agreement ensures that the charge over the book debts is fixed.”17 
A debenture that purports to grant a fixed charge over present and future 
book debts and prohibits the chargor-company from disposing of or 
charging such debts, yet allows it to collect the debts, pay the proceeds into 
its account with the chargee-bank, and draw as it wishes on that account 
will, in law, grant merely a floating charge over the book debts. This is 
because the charged book debts would be ‘ascertained and definite’ but 
their status as a security would be ‘ambulatory and shifting in its nature’, 
and therefore floating, unless and until the right of the chargor-company to 
collect and deal with the proceeds was effectively inhibited by the 
intervention of the chargee-bank.  
 The debenture in Spectrum, as we shall see, created but a floating 
charge over the book debts because it permitted the chargor-company to 
freely remove the proceeds from the account for its own business purposes 
until the chargee-bank intervened to prevent it from so doing, thereby 
causing the charge to crystallise. This is the essence of a floating charge. It 
will be ‘hovering over and floating’ with the proceeds, which the company 
is free to use in the ordinary course of its business, until the bank intervenes 
and seeks to exercise control over them, whereupon it will crystallise or 
‘settle and fasten’ on the proceeds. Farrar,18 it is submitted, ably describes 
crystallisation as: 
 
The process whereby the charge attaches specifically to all the items 
of the class of mortgaged assets which the company owns at that date 
or subsequently acquires if future assets are within the scope of this 
particular charge. The latter assets become subject to a fixed charge 
as they come into existence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 See National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 92, per 
Lord Scott. 
17
 Ibid., at 75, per Lord Hope. 
18 Farrar, “The Crystallisation of a Floating Charge”  (1976) 40 Conv NS 397 at 398. 
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From Siebe Gorman to Spectrum 
 
In the early case of 
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to collect such debts, pay the proceeds into its normal bank current account 
and draw as it wished on such account. Accordingly, Hoffmann J. held that 
the charge was, in law, a floating charge. He distinguished Siebe Gorman 
on the ground that the chargee in that case was a bank and the debenture 
had required the company to pay the proceeds of the book debts into a 
designated account with the chargee-bank. The chargee in Re Brightlife 
Ltd. was not a bank and the debenture lacked the requirement that the 
company was to pay the proceeds of the book debts into a separate bank 
account. Thus, the company was free to collect the proceeds and pay them 
into its own normal bank current account. Hoffmann J. observes that28: 
 
Once in the account, [the proceeds] would be outside the charge over 
debts and at  the free disposal of the company. In my judgment 
a right to deal in this way with the charged assets is a badge of a 
floating charge and is inconsistent with a fixed charge. 
 
It has also been noted that29, in New Zealand, the High Court declined to 
follow Siebe Gorman. In Supercool Refrigeration and Air Conditioning v. 
Hoverd Industries Ltd.30  (hereafter Supercool Refrigeration) Tompkins J. 
observed that “the relevant provisions of the securities in Siebe Gorman 
and the present case are, for practical purposes, the same” but he held that 
the charge over the company’s present and future book debts which, 
contrary to that in Re Brightlife Ltd., yet akin to that in Siebe Gorman, was 
in favour of a bank, was a floating charge31:  
 
It is my conclusion that a requirement to pay the proceeds of the 
book debts into the company’s account without any restriction on 
how the company may use  those proceeds does not give 
effective possession of those proceeds to the bank. It  does not, 
without more, fasten the charge onto those proceeds. 
 
Furthermore, in clear contrast to Slade J. in Siebe Gorman, 
Tompkins J. in Supercool Refrigeration held that a bank’s right, if it 
chose,32 to assert its lien under the charge on the proceeds was insufficient 
to create a fixed charge over a company’s present and future book debts.33 
 A number of years after the High Court’s decision in Supercool 
Refrigeration a most significant case was appealed to the Privy Council 
                                                     
28
 Ibid., at 209. This passage was cited with approval by Lord Millett in Agnew v. Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710, at 723, a case more commonly known as “Re Brumark”. 
29
 National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 87, per Lord 
Scott. 
30
 Supercool Refrigeration and Air Conditioning v. Hoverd Industries Ltd. [1994] 3 NZLR 300. 
31
 Ibid., at 321, per Tompkins J. 
32 Emphasis added. 
33 [1994] 3 NZLR 300, at 321, per Tompkins J. 
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from the New Zealand Court of Appeal; the infamous In Re Brumark 
Investments Ltd; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Agnew34 (hereafter Re 
Brumark) which involved the controversial ‘hybrid charge’ that we now 
turn to discuss. 
 
 
Hybrid Charges – The Best of Both Worlds? 
 
It is undeniable that “credit is the lifeblood of the modern industrialised 
economy”.35 However, as Lord Scott observes in Spectrum, it is in the 
nature of commercial lenders to want the most effective security that they 
can get.36 Nevertheless, it is in the nature of commercial borrowers to want 
to be able to carry on the business for the purposes of which they are 
borrowing the money with as much freedom as possible.  It is submitted 
that ‘the best of both worlds’ can, in theory, be achieved by the creation of 
a ‘hybrid charge’, i.e. a fixed charge whilst the book debts are uncollected 
and a floating charge when the proceeds of such debts have been collected 
and/or deposited in the designated bank account.37 The ‘hybrid charge’ 
benefits both the chargor-company and the chargee-bank because, once 
collected and/or deposited in the designated bank account, the company is 
free to use the proceeds of the book debts, now subject to a floating charge, 
in the ordinary course of its business and, if the company becomes 
insolvent while the book debts remain uncollected, the bank’s fixed charge 
over such debts will have priority over any claim by the Revenue 
Commissioners and other preferential creditors.38   
 In the groundbreaking case of Re New Bullas Trading Ltd39, Nourse 
L.J. in the Court of Appeal, held that it was possible to create such a 
‘hybrid charge’ over a company’s present and future book debts. Nourse 
L.J. believed that the contracting parties, of full age and competent 
understanding, could provide for a fixed charge on uncollected book debts 
and a floating charge on the proceeds of those debts.40  
                                                     
34 [2001] 2 AC 710. 
35 See the Report of the Cork Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, (HMSO, Cmnd 
8558, 1982) para.10. See also Ali, “Developments in Fixed and Floating Charges: Legal 
Principles, Policy Issues and Implications for Structured Financing” (2006) 13 (2) CLP 46. 
36 [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 91, per Lord Scott. 
37 Courtney, op. cit., at 1182. 
38 Although in Ireland, as we shall see, statute law (The Finance Act 1986, as amended by the 
Finance Act 1995) has in recent times diluted the priority position traditionally enjoyed by fixed 
charge holders. 
39
 Re New Bullas Trading Ltd. [1994] 1 BCLC 485. 
40 Nourse L.J., at 492, noted the question posed by Lord MacNaghten in Tailby v. The Official 
Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523, at 545, “Between men of full age and competent 
understanding ought there to be any limit to the freedom of contract but that imposed by 
positive law or dictated by considerations of morality or public policy?” 
2006] Charges Over Book Debts 67 
 
 Although it was the subject of significant criticism41, the ‘hybrid 
charge’ proved popular with both lenders and borrowers, for obvious 
reasons and it came to be used in “innovatively drafted”42 debentures the 
world over.43 However, Smart44 is correct to point out that the Privy 
Council’s decision in Re Brumark:   
 
[C]onclusively determined the fate of the drafting technique 
employed in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd, while reasserting the basic 
principle that the fixed/floating dichotomy must be resolved by 
ascertaining the freedom conferred upon the chargor to deal with the 
charged assets without the consent of the chargee. 
 
As previously stated, the case of Re Brumark was on appeal from the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal, which had held that the ‘hybrid charge’, by 
providing for a fixed charge over book debts, yet excluding a fixed charge 
over the proceeds, thus enabling the company to use them in the normal 
course of its business, was in law a floating charge.45  
 Lord Millett, giving the judgment of the Privy Council and 
upholding the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision, held that Re New 
Bullas Trading Ltd. had been wrongly decided.46 The charge in Re 
Brumark was virtually identical to that in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd. in 
that it provided that as long as the book debts remained uncollected they 
were subject to a fixed charge, but as soon as they were paid into the 
designated bank account they became the subject of a floating charge. His 
Lordship commented on how the ‘hybrid charge’ distinguished between 
book debts and their proceeds, with the former being subject to a fixed 
charge and the latter a floating charge. In every previous case the debenture 
had treated book debts and their proceeds indivisibly.  
 Lord Millett engaged in a two-stage process to determine whether the 
charge was fixed or floating. Initially, he construed the charge, not to 
ascertain the intentions of the contracting parties, but to determine what 
rights and obligations they had conferred upon each other in respect of the 
charged assets. Once these rights and obligations were established, as a 
                                                     
41 Goode, “Charges Over Book Debts: A Missed Opportunity” (1994) 10 LQR 592 was, it is 
submitted, rightly concerned about the propriety of  treating charges over book debts as being 
divisible from charges on the proceeds of book debts. See also Courtney, op. cit., at 1183, who 
was justly concerned by the chargor’s ability to end the chargee’s fixed charge by collecting 
and/or depositing the proceeds of the book debts into a bank account. 
42 Breslin and Smith, “The House of Lords Decision in Spectrum Plus – The Implications for 
Irish Banking Law” (2005) 12 (9) CLP 228, at 231. 
43 Courtney, op. cit., at 1183. 
44 Smart, loc. cit., at 331. 
45
 In Re Brumark Investments Ltd; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Agnew [2000] 1 BCLC 
354 at 364i, para [34] per Gault J. 
46
 Agnew v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue; In Re Brumark Investments Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 
710, at 730, per Lord Millett. 
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matter of law, he categorised the charge according to them. While the 
‘hybrid charge’ may have prohibited the company from alienating its book 
debts, it nevertheless permitted it to deal with the proceeds in a manner that 
was inconsistent with the essence of a fixed charge. His Lordship, treating 
book debts and their proceeds indivisibly, said that47: 
 
A restriction on disposition [of a company’s book debts] which 
nevertheless allows collection and free use of the proceeds is 
inconsistent with the fixed nature of the charge; it allows the debt 
and its proceeds to be withdrawn from the security by the act of the 
company in collecting it. 
 
Given that the company was free to deal with the proceeds and so withdraw 
them from the ambit of the charge without the bank’s consent, his Lordship 
felt that the charged assets were not sufficiently under the chargee’s 
control, and accordingly he held that the ‘hybrid charge’ actually created, 
in law, a floating charge over the chargor’s book debts.48 
 
 
Freedom of Contract 
 
It should be noted that, in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd Nourse L.J. laid 
considerable emphasis on the labels that the parties to the debenture had 
chosen to attribute to the charge over book debts. Nourse L.J.49 opined that 
it was incorrect to say that the charged assets ceased to be subject to a fixed 
charge at the chargor-company’s will, but rather that they ceased to be 
subject to a fixed charge because this was what the chargor-company and 
the chargee-bank, the contracting parties, had intended to happen in the 
debenture. Courtney believes that, objectively, there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with Nourse L.J’s reasoning and that in Re Brumark, Lord Millett, in 
finding that the intention of the parties as gleaned from the terms of the 
debenture contract should not prevail, was “primarily motivated by the 
policy considerations in the pecking order of priorities in an insolvency 
rather than the pursuit of conceptual possibility”.50 Indeed, in the Spectrum 
case, Lord Walker points out that “there is a public interest which overrides 
unrestrained freedom of contract”. On the fixed/floating issue “it is 
ensuring that preferential creditors obtain the measure of protection which 
Parliament intended them to have”.51   
                                                     
47
 Ibid., at 726, per Lord Millett. 
48
 Ibid., at 730, per Lord Millett. 
49
 Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 485, at 492, per Nourse L.J. 
50 Courtney, op.cit., at 1185. 
51
 National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 103, per Lord 
Walker. 
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 It is arguable that this may indeed be a sufficient public policy 
justification for undermining the parties’ freedom of contract. After all, the 
largest class of preferential creditors in insolvency is usually the company’s 
employees, because the company may have deferred payments to them in 
order to create liquidity by preserving cash flows.52 However, in Re 
Brumark, it is the opinion of this author that Lord Millett’s apparent 
subversion of the freedom of contract doctrine in favour of “an orthodox 
application of the law”53 does seem entirely logical. It is submitted that the 
intention of the parties to the debenture contract, to provide for a fixed 
charge whilst the book debts were uncollected and a floating charge when 
the proceeds of such debts were collected and/or deposited in the 
designated bank account really could not have triumphed. This is not 
because, on public policy grounds it would have defeated the claims of the 
preferential creditors, but because it was an intention based on the incorrect 
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 It is submitted that Lord Scott is correct, and that Lord Millett, in 
construing and categorising the ‘hybrid charge’ in Re Brumark as a floating 
security, did not unduly infringe on the parties’ freedom of contract, since 
their intention in formulating such a charge was in any event founded on 
the abovementioned erroneous belief. 
 
 
The Spectrum Case 
 
The Facts 
In the autumn of 1997 Spectrum Plus Ltd (hereafter Spectrum) opened a 
current account with National Westminster Bank (hereafter the bank) on 
which it obtained an overdraft facility of £250,000. On the 30th of 
September 1997 Spectrum, in order to secure its indebtedness to the bank, 
executed a debenture which was expressed to grant a fixed charge over its 
present and future book debts. The debenture, which “was on all fours” 
with the debenture in Siebe Gorman, provided that:  
 
[Spectrum] shall pay into [Spectrum’s] account with the bank all 
moneys which it  may receive in respect of [book debts] and shall 
not without the prior consent in writing of the bank sell factor 
discount or otherwise charge or assign the same in favour of any 
other person or purport to do so and [Spectrum] shall if called upon 
to do so by the bank from time to time execute legal assignments of 
such book debts and other debts to the bank.  
 
The debenture prevented Spectrum from disposing of or charging its 
uncollected book debts but left it free to deal with its debtors and to collect 
the debts from them. Although it obliged Spectrum to pay the debts, once 
collected, into its account with the bank, the debenture nevertheless left 
Spectrum free to draw on that account for its own business purposes 
provided that the overdraft limit of £250,000 was not exceeded, which in 
practice it was not.59  
 
The Decision 
Following first instance60 and Court of Appeal61 judgments, the House of 
Lords, comprising of seven judges62, was called on to decide whether such 
                                                     
59 Indeed, as Lord Scott observes in Spectrum, at 85, there was no evidence in this case that any 
instructions regarding Spectrum’s drawings from the account or how the account could be used 
by Spectrum were ever given by the bank, or that the bank ever sought to exercise any control 
over the use made by Spectrum of its withdrawals from the account. 
60 [2004] 2 WLR 783. 
61 [2004] Ch 337. 
62 Lord Nicholls, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope, Lord Scott, Lord Walker, Lord Brown, Baroness Hale. 
The short judgments of Lord Steyn, Lord Brown and Baroness Hale will not be considered in 
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a charge over a company’s present and future book debts was capable in 
law of being a fixed charge.  
 
Lord Hope  
Lord Hope believed that the following question was indeed crucial. Was 
the account into which the book debt proceeds were paid one which 
allowed the company to continue to use such proceeds as a source of its 
cash flow, or was it a blocked account which preserved the proceeds intact 
for the benefit of the bank’s security?63 His Lordship answered this 
question by re-evaluating Slade J’s findings in Siebe Gorman, and by 
analysing the contractual relationship between the bank and the company. 
In Siebe Gorman Slade J. had concluded that the company was free to 
collect the proceeds, but it was not free to use them as it saw fit. His 
Lordship observed that Slade J. had reached this conclusion in two stages.64 
First, Slade J. held that the effect of the debenture was to prevent the 
company from doing anything with the proceeds once collected other than 
paying them into its account with the bank. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, Slade J. held that, during the continuance of the security, the 
bank would have the right, if it chose65, to assert its lien under the charge 
on the proceeds of the book debts. 
 Lord Hope was in full agreement with Slade J. as to the first point. 
However, with respect, his Lordship felt that the second point made by 
Slade J. overlooked what is the ordinary contractual relationship between a 
bank and its customer. This relationship does not permit the bank, without 
notice66, to refuse to allow its customer to freely operate a current account 
while it is within the limits of any agreed overdraft. His Lordship argued 
that the debenture in Siebe Gorman, which provided for the payment of the 
proceeds into an account of this kind, must be viewed in the light of that 
relationship. After all, the debenture in Siebe Gorman lacked any provision 
which qualified that relationship.67 His Lordship made it clear that an 
account from which the company is entitled to withdraw funds whenever it 
wishes within the limits of any agreed overdraft is not a blocked account. 
Therefore, Lord Hope concluded that because the company had a 
continuing contractual right to draw out sums equivalent to those paid in, 
this was “wholly destructive” of the argument that there was a fixed charge 
                                                                                                                                                           
this article. 
63
 National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 76-77, per 
Lord Hope. 
64
 Ibid., at 77. 
65 Emphasis added. 
66 Emphasis added. 
67
 National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 78, per Lord 
Hope. 
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over the book debt proceeds because the account into which they were paid 
was blocked.68 
 
Lord Scott 
Lord Scott reviewed the body of case law from Siebe Gorman to Spectrum, 
all of which has been discussed earlier in this article. His Lordship also 
analysed the history of the floating charge and the emergence of the statute 
law that sought to curtail its effectiveness somewhat.69 Lord Scott held that 
while a fixed charge over book debts is capable of being created, a charge 
that is expressed in a debenture to be a fixed charge, as in this case, but 
where the chargor is permitted to remove the charged assets from the 
chargee’s security should, in principle, be categorised as a floating charge. 
The assets, he said, “would have the circulating, ambulatory character 
distinctive of a floating charge.”70 
 Lord Scott concluded that because Spectrum was free to draw on its 
account with the bank, this was inconsistent with the charge being labelled 
a fixed charge because the money paid in was not being appropriated to the 
repayment of the debt. Therefore the debenture, although purporting to 
grant a fixed charge, in law, granted only a floating charge over the book 
debts.71  
 A unanimous House of Lords held, albeit a little reluctantly because 
of its respect for his other judgments, that Slade J’s decision in Siebe 
Gorman, where, as abovementioned, he found that an identical debenture 
created a fixed charge over the book debts, was wrong, and accordingly the 
25 year old case was overruled with the usual retrospective effect. 
 
The Result 
In the light of this decision it would appear that, under English law, the key 
to realising a valid fixed charge over present and future book debts is 
control. In Spectrum, the House of Lords cited with approval the Irish 
Supreme Court’s decision in Re Keenan Bros. Ltd.72 Although, perhaps 
somewhat unfortunately, no actual ‘control test’ was established, it is 
submitted that the tenor of their Lordships’ judgments in Spectrum strongly 
approves of the ‘blocked account’ provided for in the Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. 
debenture, which will be discussed further below. 
 Lord Hope appears to “respectfully agree” that the critical feature73 
which led the Irish Supreme Court in Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. to characterise 
the charge on book debts in that case as a fixed charge was the ‘blocked 
                                                     
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Ibid., at 85-88, per Lord Scott. 
70
 Ibid., at 95, per Lord Scott. 
71
 Ibid., at 98, per Lord Scott. 
72
 Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. [1985] IR 401. This decision was followed by Morritt J. in William 
Gaskell Group Ltd. v. Highley and another Nos. 1,2,3  [1994] 1 BCLC 197. 
73 Emphasis added. 
2006] Charges Over Book Debts 73 
 
account’ provided for in the debenture.74    As Lord Walker observes, such 
an account allows “a charge on debts, described as a fixed or specific 
charge” to “take effect as such”.75 His Lordship points out that “in [the Re 
Keenan Bros. Ltd.] circumstances the chargee would be in control…and the 
trader would be unable to trade in the ordinary way without the chargee’s 
positive concurrence.”76 This level of control, as Worthington points out, 
effectively ensures that a charge over book debts is fixed.77 It prevents all 
dealings by the chargor-company with the book debts other than their 
collection, and it requires the collected proceeds to be paid into an account 
with the chargee-bank. This account is then blocked so that the chargor-
company cannot use the proceeds as a source of its cash flow. Instead, the 
proceeds are preserved intact for the benefit of the chargee-bank’s security. 
So long as the charge remains unredeemed, the proceeds can be released 
from the charge and made available to the chargor-company as a source of 
its cash flow only with the active concurrence of the chargee-bank.  
 This is the essential difference between a fixed charge and a floating 
charge. Whereas a fixed charge enables the chargee to effectively control 
the security for its own benefit, a floating charge, by contrast, enables the 
chargor, unless and until the chargee intervenes and causes the charge to 
crystallise, to decide how to run its own business. 
 The Spectrum case highlights that without any provision for the 
abovementioned special blocked account restrictions in the debenture 
contract, companies that pay book debt proceeds into their bank accounts 
can draw an equivalent amount out again (provided in the case of an 
overdrawn bank account, the borrowing company is within its agreed 
limit). This means that such companies can, in practice, use their book debt 
proceeds in the ordinary course of their business, making the charge over 
them floating, not fixed, under English law.  
 
Substance over Form  
Furthermore, the Spectrum case indicates that the debenture contract must 
not only contemplate a high degree of control by the bank over the 
proceeds, but such level of control must actually be exercised by the bank 
in the operation of the account, as this is imperative to the achievement of a 
valid fixed charge over the book debts. Lord Scott scrutinised the treatment 
of the account by the bank and found that it was in fact never treated as a 
blocked account.78 His Lordship stated that the overdraft facility was there 
                                                     
74
 National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 77, per Lord 
Hope. His Lordship was respectfully agreeing with Lord Millett in Re Brumark [2001] 2 AC 
710, at 722. 
75
 Ibid., at 103, per Lord Walker. 
76
 Ibid. 
77 Worthington, “An Unsatisfactory Area of the Law-Fixed and Floating Charges Yet Again” 
(2004) 1(4) International Corporate Rescue, 175, at 182. 
78
 National Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Limited [2005] 3 WLR 58, at 97, per Lord 
74 Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
to be drawn on by Spectrum at will. His Lordship, taking cognisance of the 
ordinary contractual relationship between the bank and Spectrum, stated 
that the bank could, by notice, have terminated the overdraft facility, and 
required an immediate repayment of the indebtedness and subsequently 
turned the account into a blocked account. It never did so in practice, and 
Spectrum was left free to draw on the account as it saw fit. Lord Scott 
concluded that, “[I]ts right to do so was inconsistent with the charge being 
a fixed charge….”79 
 It is clear from the above that, in Spectrum Lord Scott not only 
implicitly approves of Lord Millett’s remark in Re Brumark that formal 
provisions for a blocked account are insufficient if the account is not 
operated as one in substance80, but, by analysing the actual treatment of the 
account and holding such treatment relevant to the categorisation of the 
charge, his Lordship did in fact expand on such reasoning, although his 
precise legal basis for doing so is unclear. 
 It would appear that a three-tier approach to the 
construction/categorisation of charges, which clearly favours substance 
over form, has now developed under English law. The courts, in view of 
Spectrum, are likely to consider; the label attached to the charge in the 
debenture and the intention of the parties as expressed therein; the rights 
and obligations actually created/granted by the debenture; and the operation 
of the account in practice.  
 
Practical Consequences  
It is indisputable that the House of Lords’ decision in Spectrum is of 
significant legal and commercial importance. It not only brings a degree of 
certainty to this much debated area of the law, but it also allows the several 
hundred receiverships, administrations and liquidations that have long been 
held up pending the resolution of the fixed/floating issue to finally be 
closed. However, an unfortunate outcome of the Spectrum decision, for the 
banking sector at least, is that it has significantly weakened a banking 
practice relied upon by clearing banks in England, who have drafted their 
standard form debentures in reliance on the Siebe Gorman decision for over 
a quarter of a century. Such banks now have an inferior form of security 
than they supposed. On the other hand, it is arguable81 that this outcome 
could have been avoided if commercial lenders in England had listened to 
the alarm bells sounded well over a decade ago by the Irish Supreme 
Court’s decision in Re Holidair Ltd., which is discussed in detail below. 
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2006] Charges Over Book Debts 75 
 
Prospective Overruling    
 
It is worth noting that, in the Spectrum case, the bank argued that if their 
Lordships decided that the Siebe Gorman decision was erroneous and thus 
sought to overrule it, they should do so only with prospective effect82 (only 
for the future). The bank’s reason for so arguing is obvious. It wanted to 
protect lending institutions, like itself, who had drafted charges in reliance 
on the Siebe Gorman decision for many years. Such charges, which were 
considered to be fixed, would remain that way with a prospective 
overruling.  
 It is not proposed to consider in any great detail their Lordships’ 
comments on the matter of prospective overruling here, but suffice it to say 
that, in the aftermath of much deliberation, they rejected the bank’s 
argument and declined to overrule Siebe Gorman only with prospective 
effect. The House of Lords was of the opinion that a prospective over-
ruling of the Siebe Gorman case could prejudice certain preferential 
creditors by denying them the priority to which they were entitled under 
English statute law.83 However, the House of Lords considered that it could 
make a prospective over-ruling in future litigation, if the circumstances 
warranted, although, as Nolan points out, “there is very little indication [in 
Spectrum] of precisely when a ruling might be genuinely prospective 
only”.84 
 It has been observed that many receiverships, administrations and 
liquidations have long since been closed with the parties placing reliance 
on the Siebe Gorman decision, and therefore treating the charge over book 
debts as fixed.85 This would have defeated the claims of the preferential 
creditors. Since it has now been established that Siebe Gorman was 
wrongly decided, and that case was overruled with the usual retrospective 
effect, many preferential creditors may take legal action to regularise their 
treatment under English law. However, it remains to be seen whether 
anyone will bring a case.86 
 
 
The Irish Position  
 
The Irish approach to construing/categorising charges over book debts is 
somewhat stricter than the approach in England, discussed above. It is clear 
that “mere terminology” such as the attachment of the label “fixed” or 
“specific” to the charge in the debenture contract will not be determinative 
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of the nature of the charge. As in England, the Irish approach is to look 
“not at the declared intention of the parties alone, but to the effect of the 
instruments whereby they purported to carry out that intention.”87 The Irish 
approach, while substance over form, is not so to the same extent as in 
England because, as we shall see, the Irish courts, when determining the 
nature of the charge over book debts, refuse to look beyond the effect of the 
instruments in which the parties’ professed to carry out their intention to 
their subsequent conduct, i.e. their actual treatment of the account.  
 
1. Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. – On Solid Ground 
A “far stronger case” than Siebe Gorman is the Supreme Court’s influential 
judgment in Re Keenan Bros. Ltd.88 The charge created by the debenture in 
this case was undoubtedly fixed. This is because there was no mere 
potential for the bank to intervene; the special account into which the 
proceeds were paid by the company was blocked. 
  The debenture was similar to that in Siebe Gorman as it required the 
company to pay the proceeds into a designated account with the bank. 
However, the debenture went further by stipulating that the company could 
not make any withdrawals from this account or direct any payment from it 
without the prior consent of the bank in writing. The requirement in the 
debenture that the proceeds be segregated in a special account where they 
would be rendered frozen and unusable without the bank’s consent meant 
that the charged assets were unavailable to the company as a source of its 
cash flow. The commercial effect of this stipulation was to ‘cut off’ the 
company from the charged assets from the moment they were placed in the 
designated account with the bank.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held 
that this arrangement was incompatible with the essence of a floating 
charge and that a fixed charge had been created by the terms of the 
debenture. 89 As Henchy J. opines:90 
  
It seems to me that such a degree of sequestration of the book debts 
when  collected made [the proceeds] incapable of being used in the 
ordinary course of  business…assets thus withdrawn from 
ordinary trade use, put in the keeping of the debenture holder, 
and…made undisposable save at the absolute discretion of the 
debenture holder, have the distinguishing feature of a fixed charge. 
The charge  was not intended to float in the future on the book debts; 
it was affixed forthwith and without further ado to those debts as 
they were collected…. 
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Thus, in Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. the terms of the debenture indubitably 
prevented the proceeds from freely mingling with the rest of the company’s 
cash flow, whereas in Siebe Gorman the terms of the debenture allowed 
this channel to remain open unless and until such time as the bank chose to 
intervene and effectively ‘close the sluice’.91    
 
2. Re Wogan’s (Drogheda) Ltd. – Veering off Course 
In Re Wogan’s (Drogheda) Ltd.92 a company purported to give a non-
clearing bank a fixed charge over its present and future book debts. The 
debenture provided that the chargee-bank could designate a separate 
blocked bank account, identical to that in the earlier case of Re Keenan 
Bros. Ltd., into which the proceeds would be paid by the chargor-company. 
Although no such account was ever designated, Finlay C.J. held that93: 
 
If a lender, having availed of a debenture in these terms, as a 
concession delays the designation of a bank account or suspends for 
some period the operation of direct control over the bank account 
into which the proceeds of book debts are paid, thus  permitting 
the company issuing the debenture to carry on trading in a more  
normal fashion than strict compliance with the terms of a fixed 
charge would permit, there does not appear to be any principle of law 
or of justice which would  deprive such a lender of the rights 
agreed by the debtor company of a fixed charge over the assets…. 
 
Thus, it would appear that in Ireland a chargee can have a fixed charge over 
book debts where the terms of the debenture place him in a position to 
bring about a state of affairs which will allow him to control the use of the 
proceeds, even though he is not presently exercising that control in reality 
because he has not yet designated a separate blocked bank account into 
which the charged assets will be deposited by the chargor.94 A fixed charge 
has been created by the terms of the debenture but, as a concession, the 
chargee is permitting the chargor to deal with the charged assets for the 
time being as if they were the subject of a floating charge.95 Thus, a fixed 
charge may be permitted to operate for an unspecified period of time as a 
floating charge and yet remain a fixed charge.96  
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 Finlay C.J. adopted the “strict contractual approach”97 and held that 
the requirement in the debenture contract to have a separate blocked bank 
account was decisive in determining that it created a fixed charge over the 
book debts and the subsequent conduct of the parties was irrelevant in 
construing the terms of the debenture.98 Breslin and Smith are right to point 
out that this reasoning makes “perfect sense” indeed, because it is well 
established that the contractual characteristics of a debenture contract 
cannot fluctuate depending on the subsequent conduct of the parties.99 The 
strict contractual approach was explained by Lord Reid in Whitworth Street 
Estates (Manchester) Ltd v. Miller100: 
 
[I]t is not legitimate to use as an aid in the construction of the 
contract anything which the parties said or did after it was made. 
Otherwise one might have the result that a contract meant one thing 
the day it was signed, but by reason of subsequent events meant 
something different a month or a year later. 
 
Finlay C.J. felt that this was “a principle which, in my view, must be 
adhered to in our law and the mischief created by departing from it 
would…be considerable.”101 However, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
courts may depart from the “strict contractual approach” in a number of 
instances. First, where the apparent agreement between the parties is a 
‘sham’; secondly, where the parties have subsequently varied the terms of 
their original agreement; and finally, where, as in this case, the facts clearly 
give rise to an estoppel.102 It is suggested that although the debenture in Re 
Wogans (Drogheda) Ltd. effectively provided for a fixed charge over the 
company’s book debts, the bank should nevertheless, by virtue of the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, have been estopped from asserting that it 
had such a charge because its subsequent conduct was in fact entirely 
inconsistent with the existence of a fixed charge over book debts.  
 Indeed, the words of Lord Millett in Re Brumark103, which were 
approved of in Spectrum104, that “it is not enough to provide in the 
debenture that the account is a blocked account when it is not operated as 
one in fact”, seem particularly apt here. In Re Wogans (Drogheda) Ltd., 
there was, in fact, over the course of a year, no actual operation of the 
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blocked account provided for in the debenture. Instead, all of the proceeds 
were paid into the chargor-company’s current account with its clearing 
bank, over which the non-clearing chargee-bank had no control other than 
via a general floating charge.105 
 The chargor-company was free to draw on its current account while 
it was in credit or within the limits of any overdraft agreed with its clearing 
bank.106 This is because, as we have seen, the relationship between a bank 
and a customer, in this case the clearing bank and the chargor-company, is 
founded in contract.107 The chargor-company enjoyed a continuing 
contractual right to draw on its current account with its clearing bank, and 
it was therefore free to use the proceeds in the ordinary course of its 
business, a “freedom which is intrinsic to a floating charge, but anathema 
to a fixed charge.”108 
 Thus, the proceeds paid into this account were not, in practice, being 
appropriated to the repayment of the debt owing to the chargee-bank. 
Instead, the proceeds were being made available for drawings on the 
account by the chargor-company. It is arguable that the chargee-bank, by 
permitting the company to pay the proceeds into its normal bank current 
account alone, and by failing to even designate, let alone operate the 
separate blocked bank account provided for in the debenture contract over 
the course of a year, made by its conduct a clear and unambiguous 
representation to the chargor-company which could have led such company 
to believe that the bank would not enforce a particular clause in the contract 
between them, i.e. the blocked account clause. Therefore, it could be 
argued here that the bank should have been estopped from enforcing this 
clause against the company and taking a fixed charge over book debts. 
 Furthermore, it is apparent from the reasoning of Lord Millett in Re 
Brumark that if, as in this case, the charged assets are not under the 
chargee’s control “so that it can prevent their dissipation without its 
consent” then the charge is incapable of being a fixed charge.109 The 
charged assets in Re Wogan’s (Drogheda) Ltd. were paid into the chargor-
company’s current account with its clearing bank, and not into the separate 
blocked bank account provided for in the debenture. As a result they were, 
in practice, not under the non-clearing chargee-bank’s control.  
 Following Spectrum, a court in England may now take this post-
contractual conduct into account and might characterise the charge as 
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floating. However, in Ireland, the law remains the same; the 
characterisation of charges must be based on the debenture contract alone 
at the time it was created, subsequent behaviour is irrelevant. Thus, when 
construing/categorising charges over book debts, “Irish and English law 
part company.”110 
 
3. Re Holidair Ltd. – Coming Around Again 
A debenture “in the Siebe Gorman form” was considered by the Supreme 
Court in Re Holidair Ltd.111, a case where Blayney J. reached a conclusion 
opposite to that of Slade J. The reasoning of Blayney J. in this case was 
recently described as “compelling”112. Blayney J. held that, although the 
debenture provided that the chargee could designate a separate bank 
account into which the proceeds would be paid, it nevertheless created a 
floating charge over the chargor’s present and future book debts. This was 
because the terms of the debenture failed to prevent the chargor from 
drawing the proceeds out of the designated account and using them in the 
normal way for the purpose of carrying on its business. In short, the 
debenture did not provide for a ‘blocked account’. Blayney J.113 found that 
the charge created by the debenture contained the third characteristic of a 
floating charge, as described by Romer J. in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers’ 
Association114: 
 
…if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until some 
future step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in the charge, 
the company may carry on  its business in the ordinary way as far 
as concerns the particular class of assets… 
 
Breslin and Smith rightly argue that Re Holidair Ltd. “sterilised the Siebe 
Gorman precedent for the creation of a fixed charge in Ireland.”115 Some 
commentators116 believe that Re Holidair Ltd. is difficult to reconcile with 
Re Wogan’s (Drogheda) Ltd. It appears, to this author at least, that if one 
applies the abovementioned strict contractual approach, the cases can easily 
be reconciled. It is clear that in the former case the debenture contract, 
which was in the Siebe Gorman form, created a floating charge over the 
book debts because it enabled the chargor to withdraw the charged assets 
from the security without the chargee’s consent. However, in the latter case 
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the debenture contract, which was in the Re Keenan Bros. Ltd. form, 
created a fixed charge over the book debts because it specifically prohibited 
the chargor from withdrawing the charged assets from the security without 
the chargee’s prior consent in writing. Thus, in Re Holidair Ltd. Blayney J. 
was able to distinguish the earlier case of Re Wogan’s (Drogheda) Ltd., 
and, it is submitted, he was correct in doing so. This is because the 
debenture in that case, unlike that in the present case, specifically 
prohibited the chargor from withdrawing the money from the designated 
account without the prior consent of the chargee in writing. Therefore it 
created a fixed charge, not a floating charge, over the present and future 
book debts.117  
 
 
Fixed Charges and Irish Statute Law 
 
Whatever future impact the House of Lords’ decision in Spectrum might 
have in this jurisdiction, it is submitted that it will, in any event, be far less 
significant than that in England. This is not simply because of the decision 
in Re Holidair Ltd., or the Irish courts’ reluctance to take the post-
contractual conduct of the parties into account. It is due to the fact that, for 
quite some time now, there has been a variance between Irish and English 
law so far as fixed charges on book debts are concerned. In England, the 
proceeds of a fixed charge are paid to the fixed charge holder in priority to 
all other creditors, including preferential creditors. However in Ireland, the 
priority traditionally enjoyed by fixed charge holders was significantly 
undermined by section 115 of the Finance Act 1986 (as amended by 
section 174 of the Finance Act 1995). This legislation was introduced in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Re Keenan Bros. Ltd., where 
the validity of fixed charges on book debts was upheld. That decision was 
“seen as a defeat by the Revenue Commissioners”.118  As a result, the 
Revenue Commissioners were granted what is known as super-preferential 
status, which means that they now rank in priority to fixed charge holders. 
Indeed, section 1001 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 enables the 
Revenue Commissioners to demand payment from the fixed charge holder 
of certain tax liabilities, i.e. PAYE and/or VAT owed by the chargor. This 
unilateral statutory indemnity,119 whereby a fixed charge holder is, quite 
frankly, forced to stand in the chargor’s shoes, significantly diminishes the 
value of a fixed charge over a company’s present and future book debts in 
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Ireland, and makes such a charge “much less attractive as a security in the 
eyes of a lender.”120 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The fixed/floating issue has not been dealt with by the Irish Supreme Court 
in over a decade. While the case law, with its adherence to the strict 
contractual approach, does provide a sound legal basis for deciding the 
matter, “it remains to be seen whether the Irish courts will take into account 
post-contractual conduct of the parties, despite having ruled against it 
previously”.121 It is submitted that the courts should indeed be willing to 
invoke the established qualifications to the contractual principle if 
necessary to do justice.  However, post-contractual conduct of the parties 
should not be considered lightly, as it was by Lord Scott122 in Spectrum. 
With respect, Lord Scott not only launches into a consideration of the 
treatment of the account by the contracting parties, but his Lordship allows 
such treatment to determine the nature of the charge, without a sound legal 
basis for so doing. First, the debenture in Spectrum was in the Siebe 
Gorman form, therefore it was unnecessary for his Lordship to look beyond 
its contractual makeup to decide that the charge was floating. Second, none 
of the established qualifications to the contractual principle were 
considered in Spectrum, so it was illogical, and indeed contrary to the 
principle, for Lord Scott to analyse any post-contractual treatment of the 
account, although, with respect, it is submitted that it was commonsensical. 
 It is the opinion of this author that Lord Millett’s comment in Re 
Brumark123, regarding formal provision for and124 actual operation of the 
account as relevant to the categorisation of a charge, although approved of 
by Lord Walker125 and indeed built upon by Lord Scott126, is unsound, not 
from a purely rational point of view, but from a strictly legal perspective. 
This remark of Lord Millett’s does, in the absence of conventional 
qualifications, conflict with the established principle that it is not legitimate 
to use as an aid, in the construction of a contract, anything which the 
parties said or did after it was made, and it is submitted that it is unlikely to 
hold any weight in an Irish court.  
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 Although, as seen, the House of Lords’ decision in Spectrum is of 
significant legal and commercial importance in England, it is likely to be of 
limited impact in Ireland. It could be of some persuasive value in future 
fixed/floating litigation because, in this author’s opinion it adequately puts 
the fallacy of the ‘hybrid charge’ to bed by highlighting that the security 
rights over the book debts cannot be any greater than those over the 
proceeds. However, it is unlikely to affect the courts’ observance of the 
strict contractual approach because it is unclear from the judgment of Lord 
Scott as to when exactly post-contractual conduct of the parties may be 
relevant to the categorisation of a charge over book debts. It is submitted 
that Spectrum, while no doubt a landmark case in England, does little more 
than fortify the existing body of case law in this jurisdiction.   In 
conclusion, taken as a whole the Irish cases, and Re Brumark and 
Spectrum, hammer home the message that there is only one way to create a 
valid fixed charge over present and future book debts, provide in the 
debenture for the requisite level of control via a blocked account.  
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FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A RE-
EVALUATION OF THE REFUGEE DETERMINATION 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decade there has been a greater focus on the influence of gender 
in refugee status determinations under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention,1 
and the significant problems women face in obtaining protection from a 
system originally designed to protect males fleeing from totalitarianism.2 
While gender-specific claims have been accepted as falling within the 
Convention grounds for persecution,3 women still face greater obstacles to 
the grant of refugee status than their male counterparts. In particular, 
women confront numerous hurdles in establishing their credibility in 
determination hearings. Refugee law has at its core the humanitarian belief 
that the international community must offer protection to victims of serious 
human rights violations, no matter what their nationality or gender.4 
Viewed in this light, it is clear that credibility assessment must err on the 
side of protection, refrain from discrimination and maintain as a priority the 
well-being of the applicant. This essay seeks to examine the importance of 
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credibility in asylum hearings5 and the problems associated with its 
evaluation. In particular, the position of women claiming on the grounds of 
female genital mutilation will be considered, as such women face specific 
difficulties that may have an adverse effect on their credibility. Finally, it is 
hoped to outline brief alternatives to the current method of credibility 
evaluation, which may be more suited to gender-specific claims and may 
therefore result in a more accurate determination process.      
 
 
Definition Of Refugee 
 
The international definition of a refugee is found in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by its 1967 
protocol.6 Article 1 of the Convention defines a refugee as any person who 
 
… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.7 
 
There are a number of elements to this definition. First, the applicant must 
have a ‘well-founded fear’. This comprises both a subjective and objective 
element, involving a consideration of the applicant’s state of mind and a 
consideration of whether that state of mind is reasonable in all the 
circumstances.8 Second, that fear must be of persecution. Hathaway posits 
the test of persecution as ‘a sustained and systematic violation of basic 
human rights demonstrative of a failure of State protection.’9 Third, the 
well-founded fear of persecution must relate to the applicant’s race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. Fear of persecution on alternative grounds will not qualify the 
                                                     
5 The essay will not deal with the appeal/review process, as it varies greatly from country to 
country, although some appeal/review decisions will be referred to as examples.   
6 The Convention loc. cit. 
7 There are certain conditions in Article 1 that may disqualify a person from refugee status. 
However, they are not relevant to this article and will not be dealt with here. 
8 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
HCR/IP/4/Rev.1, 1979, at para 35-50. (UNHCR Handbook, 1979).  
9 Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths Toronto: 1991) at 101. There is no 
definition of persecution in the Convention. There is considerable literature on the matter, but an 
examination of such is beyond the scope of this article. 
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applicant for refugee status, but it may warrant other remedies.10 Fourth, 
the applicant must be outside the borders of his/her country of nationality. 
Fifth, the applicant must be unable to avail of state protection in his/her 
country of origin, or alternatively, unwilling to avail of such due to their 
fear of persecution. Refugee law is intended to meet the needs of only those 
who have no alternative to seeking international protection; as such, 
primary recourse should always be to one’s own State.11 Those who are 
recognised as coming within the 1951 Convention are entitled to the 
specific protections of the Convention and also to such additional 
protection as is available under the law of the country where their status is 
recognised.12  
The 1951 Convention was ratified by Ireland in 1956 and the 
Protocol in 1968, although until recently there was no Irish legislation on 
the matter. The Refugee Act 199613 incorporated elements of the 
Convention into Irish law, creating a statutory mechanism by which to 
examine the claims of asylum seekers.14 This has been amended by section 
9 of the Immigration Act 1999, the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act 
2000, the Immigration Act 2003 and the Immigration Act 2004.15 Section 2 
of the 1996 Act follows the definition in Article 1 of the Convention almost 
word for word, although it goes somewhat further in its definition by 
providing that membership of a particular social group includes 
membership of a trade union and membership of a group of persons whose 
defining characteristic is their belonging to the female or the male sex or 
having a particular sexual orientation.16 Accordingly, international 
materials based on the Convention are particularly helpful in interpreting 
the Irish law relating to the status of refugees.  
                                                     
10 For example, an applicant may be granted humanitarian leave to remain by the authorities of a 
State. Under Irish law, asylum seekers may apply to the Minister for Justice for leave to remain 
under section 9 of the Refugee Act, 1996. However, this is granted on an ad hoc basis and there 
are no formal guidelines laying down the circumstances in which leave to remain will be 
granted.   
11 Hathway, op. cit., at 124. 
12 The Convention does not provide for any international tribunal to enforce compliance or to 
interpret its terms. As such, the Convention relies on States to implement it. However, the 
UNHCR, the body charged with overseeing the application of the Convention, works to 
promote refugee protection and provides a number of guidelines, recommendations and 
conclusions, which are accepted by most States as correct guidance. See further, Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), reviewed by 
Lynn, Hathaway and the Rights of Refugees under International Law, 11(2) Bar Review 69.  
13 Hereafter known as the 1996 Act. The 1996 Act did not become effective until 2000, with 
some provisions becoming effective in 2001. 
14 See further, commentary on the 1996 Act: Byrne, At the Cross-Roads: Refugee Protection in 
Ireland under the 1996 Refugee Act, and Egan, The Refugee Act 1996, both in Driscoll ed. Irish 
Human Rights Review 2000 (Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell 2000).  
15 An unofficial but useful, consolidated version of the Act is available at 
http://www.orac.ie/pages/CorpOff/publications.htm (visited 7th August, 2006).   
16 Section 1, Refugee Act 1996. 
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Under Irish law, an applicant may make an application for a 
declaration of refugee status on arrival at the frontier of the State, at a 
Garda station or at the Refugee Application Centre. The applicant must 
complete an asylum questionnaire and will be interviewed initially by an 
authorised officer or immigration officer. The independent Office of the 
Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) is responsible for the 
investigation of asylum claims and makes recommendations at the first 
instance. If the application is refused, the applicant has a right of appeal to 
the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT).17 If the application is refused by the 
RAT, there is no further right of appeal. However, the applicant may apply 
to the High Court for judicial review of the decision of the RAT.   
 
 
Relevance Of Credibility 
 
The UNHCR Handbook states that an assessment of credibility is 
indispensable where the case is not sufficiently clear from the facts on 
record,18 and in practice it has been found that credibility is a crucial 
element in the process of refugee status determination.  
First, the assessment of well-founded fear may be based largely, or 
even primarily, on the applicant’s own credible testimony, as it will often 
constitute the best evidence of risk.19 The definition of ‘refugee’ places a 
focus on the forward-looking fear of the person, involving the applicant’s 
own assessment of his/her situation upon return.20 In this context, an 
assessment of credibility is crucial to the evaluation of whether the 
applicant is really afraid (the subjective element) and whether the 
applicant’s assessment of the situation in his/her country of origin is 
accurate (the objective element).21  
Second, applicants can rarely corroborate their accounts with specific 
independent evidence, thus success in application will rest on being granted 
                                                     
17 According to the Refugee Act 1996 (as amended), section.16(3),), the default appeal 
procedure is that of an oral hearing. However, if the case is one in which a finding was made 
pursuant to sections.13(5) or 13(8), the appeal will be determined without an oral hearing.  
18 UNHCR Handbook, 1979, at para 41. 
19 The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear: Third Colloquium on Challenges in 
International Refugee Law, Convened by The Program in Refugee and Asylum Law, University 
of Michigan Law School, March 26-28, 2004, para 9. Accessible at 
http://www.refugeecaselaw.org/fear.pdf (last visited 7th August, 2006).  
20 Noll, Evidentiary Assessment under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the 
Intersubjectivity of Fear, in Noll ed., Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum 
Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005), at 143. 
21 See the comments of Finlay Geoghegan J. in N.K. (Kramarenko) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal 
[2004] 2 ILRM 550 (application for leave), that “credibility potentially comes into play in two 
aspects of the assessment of a claim. Firstly, in the assessment of the subjective element of the 
applicant’s claim, that he/she has a fear of persecution for a Convention reason if returned to 
his/her own country and secondly, in assessing the objective facts relied upon by the applicant, 
to establish if the fear is well founded.” 
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the benefit of the doubt. The UNHCR Handbook states that the applicant 
will be accorded the benefit of the doubt if ‘the account appears credible’22 
or where the decision-maker is “satisfied as to the applicant’s general 
credibility”.23 Although the latter statement relates primarily to the account 
given by the applicant, it may also allow for assessments of credibility 
outside the parameters of the basic account given, suggesting that non-
verbal behaviour, delay in providing information and inconsistencies with 
independent information may be considered in an assessment of “general 
credibility”.24  
Third, and more generally, credibility will feed into the interpretation 
of all other elements in the refugee determination process, as a finding of 
lack of credibility may render other evidence provided by the applicant less 
reliable in the eyes of the decision-maker.25  
Kagan asserts that negative credibility assessments are a leading 
reason for rejections in most refugee status determination systems. For 
example, 77% of rejections reviewed from the UNHCR Regional Office in 
Cairo in Spring 2002 were attributed to applicants’ lack of credibility.26 
Similarly, it has been found that determination processes in the 
Netherlands27, Canada28, Australia29, the United Kingdom30 rely heavily on 
assessments of the credibility of applicants, and an examination of the Irish 
case-law relating to refugee applications suggests that it is similarly 
important in Ireland.31   
                                                     
22 UNHCR Handbook 1979, para 196. 
23 UNHCR Handbook 1979, para 204.  
24 This is borne out in the Irish context where decision makers are required to take into account 
the matters outined in section 11B of the Immigration Act 2003 (amending the 1996 Act), which 
relate to matters peripheral to the applicant’s account of his/her persecution. 
25 Hathaway and Hicks, Is There a Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention’s Requirement 
of “Well-Founded Fear”? (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 505, at 531-532.   
26 Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee 
Status Determination (2003) 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 367, at 368-369. 
27 Spijkerboer, Stereotyping and Acceleration – Gender, Procedural Acceleration and 
Marginalised Judicial Review in the Dutch Asylum System, in Noll ed., op. cit. Also TP 
Spijkerboer Gender and Refugee Status (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000). 
28 Rousseau, Crepeau, Foxen and Houle, The Compexity of Determining Refugeehood: A 
Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-making Process Of the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board (2002) 15(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 43. 
29 Commonwealth of Australia: Senate and Constitutional References Committee A Sanctuary 
Under Review: An Examination of Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Determination 
Processes June 2000, 
158.<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-
02/refugees/report/contents.htm> (26 March 2006). The report acknowledges that credibility is 
an important factor in refugee determination and recommends that it continue to be so.  
30 Refugee Women’s Resource Project, Asylum Aid Women asylum seekers in the UK: A 
Gender Perspective:  Some Facts and Figures February 2003, at 71. This study found that 54% 
of the refusals reviewed were based on findings of a lack of credibility relating to the facts of 
the case. 
31 This issue is examined later in this article under ‘Credibility Determinations in Ireland’. 
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The evaluation of an applicant’s credibility is indispensable in 
circumstances of a paucity of evidence. It follows that where there is 
independent evidence to support the applicant’s claim, credibility should 
lose some of its sway. However, in some studies it was found that negative 
credibility determinations were the deciding factor in cases, despite the 
presence of documentary evidence to the contrary.32 It should be recalled 
that credibility is not an explicit part of the refugee definition. A person is a 
refugee if she has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one of 
the five Convention grounds, and does not cease to be deserving of 
Convention protection because s/he has been less than completely honest.33 
Care must be taken, therefore, to ensure that credibility evaluation in 
refugee status determinations remains secondary to the refugee definition 
and remains consistent and forgiving in its application.34   
 
 
The Reliability Of Credibility Assessment 
 
Assessments of credibility look for the personal and situational facts, from 
the point of view of the decision-maker, which may influence assumptions 
on the believability of an individual.35 Although credibility is a crucial part 
of the asylum process, it has traditionally been subject to little research. 
However, recent studies have discovered a number of recurrent elements in 
the evaluation process and the problems associated with them in practice. 
Kagan identifies the positive and negative factors that are given probative 
weight in this assessment.36 The positive criteria are detail and specificity, 
consistency, providing all the facts early and plausibility of the account. 
The negative criteria are vagueness, contradictions, delayed revelation of 
key facts and implausibility. In addition, corroborative evidence may have 
a positive bearing on credibility and the general demeanour of the applicant 
may have a significant impact on the evaluation as a whole.37 It is proposed 
in this section to examine these factors in turn and to outline the particular 
difficulties they present for asylum applicants.  
                                                     
32 Rousseau et al, loc. cit. and Asylum Aid Still No Reason At All: Home Office Decisions on 
Asylum Claims (Asylum Aid, London, 1999), 
<http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/New%20RWRP/RWRP_RRP_Publicationslist.htm> (26 March 
2006). 
33 Re SA Refugee Appeal No. 1/92 (N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals Authority 1992), citing IRB, 
Re Sittam Palam, 13 Immigr. L. Rep. 2D 287 (1990), cited in Kagan, loc. cit., at 370. 
34 Gorlick, Common Burdens and Standards: Legal Elements in Assessing Claims to Refugee 
Status (2003) 15 Intl J Refugee L 357, at 360. 
35 Zahle, Competing Patterns for Evidentiary Assessments, in Noll ed., loc. cit., at 15. 
36 Kagan, loc. Cit at 384.; cited in Byrne, Credibility in Changing Contexts: International 
Justice and International Protection, in Noll ed., op. cit.   
37 The UNHCR Handbook 1979 acknowledges this fact at para. 202, and adds that, since the 
decision will affect human lives, the criteria must be applied in a spirit of justice and 
understanding and not influenced by the personal consideration that the applicant may be an 
“undeserving case”. 
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 Demeanour 
 
Decisions as to credibility are often based on matters of impression, 
and an unfavourable view taken upon an otherwise minor issue may 
be decisive.  
- Gleeson C.J., High Court of Australia38  
 
A decision-maker may form an impression of an applicant from their 
manner of responding to questions - verbal behaviour - or from their non-
verbal behaviour. A positive impression may be established by a readiness 
to answer questions in a detailed manner, the display of appropriate 
emotions or making eye-contact. Alternatively, a negative impression may 
be established by inconsistent, vague or tentative answers, the display of 
too much or too little emotion, or disinterest and avoidance of eye 
contact.39 Goodwin-Gill has remarked that decision-makers commonly rely 
on instinct and a feel for credibility to the detriment of other factors, such 
as identification of material facts, the weight of the evidence and the 
standard of proof.40 It is submitted that this overall assessment of the 
credibility of an applicant is fundamentally defective as it disregards the 
extensive influence of cultural factors on perceptions of credible behaviour.  
Numerous communication failures occur when people do not share 
the same cultural references, rules and codes.41 These notions of 
appropriate communication are seen as universal, and their cultural 
embeddedness is not always acknowledged.42 This can result in a number 
of errors, ranging from misinterpretations about minute non-verbal cues to 
different understandings as to the essential meaning of concepts. 
Misunderstanding is heightened by the linguistic barrier that often exists in 
the refugee context.43 Even minor distortion of the applicant’s statement by 
an interpreter may reflect negatively on his/her credibility. The resulting 
impression of the general demeanour of the applicant may then be 
                                                     
38 Re Refugee Review Tribunal, ex parte Aala (2000) 176 ALR 219, at 221. 
39 Coffey, The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the Refugee Review Tribunal (2003) 15 Intl 
J Refugee L 377, at 386-8.  
40 Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in International Law at 350 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed., 1996). 
41 Rousseau et al, loc. cit, at 50. 
42 Muller-Hoff,  Representations of Refugee Women – Legal Discourse in Europe (2001) Law, 
Social Justice & Global Development Journal, 10, <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issue/2001-
1/mullerhoff1.html> (26 March 2006). 
43 For example, an adverse finding on credibility was made because the applicant said at 
interview that he would met a man in a Mosque, but later said at the appeal hearing that he met 
a man outside a Mosque. When asked to explain the inconsistecy, the applicant replied that in 
the Nigerian language meeting a man in a Mosque and meeting him outside the Mosque mean 
the same thing. The Tribunal Member ‘did not find this explanation to be credible’, apparently 
without investigation of the colloquial use of language in the area. Reference 17: (Nigeria), 
Refugee Appeals Tribunal Published Decisions, Volume 1.  
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essentially indeterminate and misguided. Similarly, the cultural relativity of 
the concepts of ‘lie’ and ‘truth’ are often disregarded by decision-makers, 
who assess the truthfulness of a statement on the basis of their own 
political, cultural and moral discourse.44  
Even without such cultural barriers, there is little empirical evidence 
to show that assessors of any description are capable of reliably assessing 
the truthfulness of an individual’s claims on the basis of demeanour and 
manner of presentation alone. Kapardis remarks that humans, including 
trained and experienced law-enforcement personnel, ‘turn out to be as good 
as chance in detecting deception.’45 Judgments based on demeanour, rather 
than articulated logic, are not susceptible to review, leaving the applicant 
with little recourse. Such unstructured and unreviewable credibility 
assessments lead to inconsistent decision-making and a great risk of 
mistaken refusal of persons in danger of serious human rights violations. 
To allow such a central part of refugee status determination as credibility 
assessment to be essentially subjective invokes serious doubts about the 
fairness and effectiveness of the refugee adjudication system. 
 
Consistency, Plausibility and Attention to Detail: 
An evaluation of the plausibility of an account involves a consideration of 
the internal consistency of the account, the reasonableness of the assertions 
made and their consonance with generally known facts.46 Disbelief of 
evidence based on its intrinsic implausibility is a disbelief that the 
particular applicant would have followed a particular course of action or 
that a particular event would have transpired, a belief that will be subjective 
at best. Further, plausibility is decreased by internal inconsistency.   
Minor inconsistencies or incorrect statements as to peripheral matters 
have often been decisive in rejecting an application.47 Inconsistency may be 
an inconsistency of facts between two hearings or mutually inconsistent 
                                                     
44 For example, Rousseau et al. point out that in many cultures, a strong identification with a 
collective identity, whether based on family, lineage, clan, language group or a broader sense of 
ethnicity, often blurs the boundaries between the individual and the community. Descriptions of 
traumatic events are then narrated in the context of one’s broader community or ethnic loyalties. 
This blurring of I and We – absent in a Western western style of discourse which stresses the 
boundaries of individualism – reflects not only a cultural narrative style but also the manner in 
which many persecuted persons experience and interpret the violence against them: loc. cit., at 
63.  
45  Kapardis Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
at 257. 
46 UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims 16 Dec 1998, para. 11 
(UNCHR 1998); UNHCR Handbook 1979, para 204. 
47Eg, in an Austrian case, the tribunal rejected the application for lack of credibility based on the 
incredibility of peripheral issues such as the route of travel and the unlikelihood that a Muslim 
man would give wine as a dowry gift. Re Cameroonian Citizen, Independent Federal Asylum 
Senate, Decision of 21 March 2002, 
<http://www.refugeelawreader.org/index.d2?target=getpdf&id=118> (8 August 2006). 
92 Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
statements made within one hearing.48 However, due to time lapse or the 
intensity of past events, an applicant may not be able to remember or 
recount accurately all factual details, and thus s/he may be vague or 
inaccurate in providing detailed facts.49 Further, communication in asylum 
processes takes place within a strictly organised, often bureaucratic context. 
For the decision-makers this is familiar and easy to control, but for 
applicants it is a one-off experience for which they do not know the 
procedures.50 The applicant may be ill-prepared for the procedure, 
intimidated by the unfamiliar surroundings or fearful of the outcome, 
resulting in confusion and disorientation.51  
Evidence of dishonesty can irreparably damage the credibility of the 
account. Dishonesty is, however, often explicable in the context of 
refugees. Refugees may have received bad advice from traffickers, they 
may have a fear of being returned home or a misguided conviction that 
matters like the legitimacy of the travel route will bear heavily on the 
application.52 Hathaway and Hicks53 go further to argue that lies or 
exaggeration may actually, paradoxically, be evidence of a genuine 
refugee. As the Australian Federal Court observed,  
 
[G]enuine refugees are often at a dire disadvantage as to their 
capacity to bring their cases and are … engaged in an often desperate 
battle for freedom, if not life itself. Exaggeration and lies are 
accordingly to be expected from some of them.54  
 
Out of desperation to avoid being returned to a situation of risk, even truly 
fearful applicants may lie and exaggerate in order to conform to the 
perception of the ‘successful applicant’.  
 
Delay 
Delay in making the claim or in furnishing particular information relevant 
to a claim, can have a disastrous effect on the credibility of an applicant. 
Indeed, in many countries, delay in making a claim is explicitly stated in 
national regulations to be damaging to credibility and is cited as a reason 
                                                     
48 Coffey, loc. cit., at 388. 
49 UNHCR 1998, para. 9. 
50 Doornbos, On Being Heard in Asylum Cases – Evidentiary Assessment through Asylum 
Interviews, in Noll ed., op. cit., at 108. 
51 Pelosi Intercultural Communication in the Refugee Determination Hearing (1996, Montreal: 
School of Social Work, McGill University). 
<http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ29855.pdf>  (26 March 2006).  
52 Strictly, the legitimacy of the travel route should not have a bearing on the determination of 
refugee status, as the definition of refugee focuses on the fear of the applicant of returning 
home, rather than how they arrived away from home. However, dishonesty about the route of 
travel may have an effect on the appplicant’s credibility as it indicates a propensity to lie.  
53 Hathaway & Hicks, loc. cit., at 533.  
54 Kalala v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] F.C.A. 1594, at 3  
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for accelerated procedure or even refusal to hear the claim.55 Yet there are a 
number of reasons why delay can occur in the context of refugees. 
Refugees, by definition, have a well-founded fear of persecution, 
persecution that has been condoned, if not sanctioned by the State in which 
they lived. It is entirely understandable that they may feel a degree of 
mistrust, or at least a marked ambivalence of feeling, vis-à-vis any 
authority. This may explain a delay in application or the provision of 
crucial information to the authorities.56 Further, the interview may not be 
sufficiently long to gather all of the relevant information. While it is 
generally assumed that genuine refugees are able to present all relevant 
information at once, Crawley’s study found that many refugees lack the 
knowledge about the relevance of details for the decision.57  
  
Corroboration 
Consistency with independent evidence is an important positive criterion, 
as evidence which corroborates the account of the applicant bolsters the 
credibility of that account considerably.58 The converse does not strictly 
apply, as recognition of refugee status is not dependent on the production 
of any particular formal evidence.59 However, a lack of documentation to 
support the claim might have some bearing in circumstances where the 
decision-maker considers that such documentation might easily have been 
obtained by the applicant, or where there is a suspicion that such 
documentation may have been destroyed. 
 
The Decision-maker 
The UNHCR guidelines state: 
 
Since the decision-maker’s conclusion on the facts of the 
case and his personal impression of the applicant will lead to 
a decision that affects human lives, he must apply the criteria 
in a spirit of justice and understanding and his judgement 
should not, of course, be influenced by the personal 
                                                     
55 Reception Standards For Asylum Seekers In the European Union UNHCR, Geneva, July 
2000.  The report states that Finland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden will view delay in making a 
claim as damaging an applicant’s credibility unless the applicant can provide good reasons to 
the contrary. Portugal lists as valid reasons for delay illness, detention or incorrect information, 
but in practice only a strong case will be accepted after the given limitation (at 134 of the 
report).  
56 UNHCR Handbook 1979, para 198. 
57 Crawley Breaking Down the Barriers, a Report on the Conduct of Asylum Interviews at Ports 
(Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, London, 1999), at 59-82, available as a PDF from 
ILPA, email info@ilpa.org.uk; cited in Doornbos, loc. cit. 
58 UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof 1998, para. 11. 
59 Resolution for Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Procedures , adopted by the EU Council of 
Ministers, 1995. Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum 
procedures, T.12 Official Journal C274, 19/09/1996 at 0013-0017 (EUDOR) 396Y0919(05) 
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consideration that the applicant may be an “undeserving 
case”.60 
 
Despite this requirement, particular difficulties may arise relating to the 
decision-maker.61 First, the type of questions asked by a decision-maker 
may have an effect on the resulting coherence and detail of the account. 
Traumatic events may reduce a person’s capacity to independently recall 
peripheral detail.62 Open-ended and specific questioning can produce 
different levels of recall so both should be used. Without specific 
questioning peripheral details may be incapable of recall.  
Secondly, the juxtaposition of the right to asylum with the growing 
fear of uncontrolled migration has often served to perpetuate popular and 
institutional negative characterisations of refugees as cheats, ‘spongers’ and 
economic migrants, fostering in decision-makers a pre-existing negative 
view of the credibility of applicants.63 
Thirdly, decision-makers may suffer from a phenomenon known as 
vicarious traumatisation. The recounting of traumatic events can indirectly 
transmit trauma from the claimant to the decision-maker. The decision-
maker may empathise with a victim, but s/he cannot use the usual defences 
of avoidance or denial to protect against the images associated with the 
story that has been told.64 Vicarious traumatisation can provoke the 
development of typical symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, but can 
also evoke voyeuristic and sadistic impulses in the listener.65 Overexposure 
traumatic accounts often triggers defensive reactions that lead to 
trivialisation of horror, cynicism and lack of empathy. Decision-makers 
studied by Rousseau et al displayed direct avoidance and denial, through 
refusal to hear the story, or a focus on peripheral events/neutral information 
while ignoring the traumatic event, followed by rejection of the applicant 
for lack of credibility. Similarly, trivialisation of traumatic events was 
observed, manifesting itself as cynicism. Decision-makers established a 
                                                     
60 UNHCR Handbook 1979, para. 202. 
61 For a stark critique of the practice of decision-makers, interpreters and decision-makers in the 
refugee determination process, see further, Asylum Aid, loc. cit.; Rousseau et al, loc. cit. 
62 Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman & Loftus, Eye fixations and memory for emotional events 
(1991) 17 Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning, Memory and Cognition 693. 
63 Silove, Steel, & Watters, Policies of Deterrence and the Mental Health of Asylum Seekers, 
(2000) 284 Journal of the American Medical Association 604. A classic example may be seen in 
the recent comments by Mr. Sean Aylward, Secretary General of the Department of Justice, 
during an appearance before the Public Accounts Committee that all asylum seekers are 
invariably prepared to “lie through their teeth”. These comments were subsequently disapproved 
of by the UN Assistant High Commissioner, Erica Feller: see “Politicians urged to mind 
language on asylum seekers” Irish Times 24th June, 2006.   
64 Mollica, The Trauma Story: The Psychiatric Care of Refugee Survivors of Violence and 
Torture, in Ochberg ed., Post Traumatic Therapy and Victims of Violence (Brunner/Mazel, New 
York, 1988) 
65 Cohen, Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of Recall in the 
Testimony of  Asylum Seekers (2001) 13 Intl J Refugee L 293. 
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nexus between an everyday activity and the torture in order to render the 
torture innocuous.66 The need for one to distance oneself as far as possible 
from ‘evil’ was manifested in confrontational and aggressive reactions to 
applicants, blame of applicants, sarcasm, scornful laughter and provocative 
questioning. This may indirectly damage the applicant’s credibility, with 
the manifested effects of vicarious traumatisation offending, upsetting and 
confusing the applicant, rendering them unable to provide a coherent 
account.  
 
Trauma related difficulties 
Most refugees are by definition likely to have had experiences that would 
be defined as traumatic. Refugees who have experienced traumatic events 
may suffer post-traumatic psychological reactions, which have a significant 
impact on their ability to accurately and consistently recall the traumatic 
events and their surrounding details. Herlihy67 explains that, while normal 
memories can be recalled in chronological order, traumatic memories are 
held as fragments, usually sensory impressions, such as images, sensations, 
smells or emotional states. They do not seem to carry a time stamp and are 
not evoked at will, but provoked by triggers or reminders of the event. 
Thus, when a person who has suffered a traumatic experience is 
interviewed, they are unlikely to be able to produce a coherent verbal 
narrative, quite simply because no complete verbal narrative of their 
experience exists. S/he will only have fragments or impressions, which are 
likely, incidentally, to evoke the feelings that were felt at the time of the 
original experience, such as fear, distress, shame, humiliation, guilt or 
anger.  
  The most severe result of this psychological phenomenon is Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD is an extreme result of the 
fragmentary way in which memories of traumatic events are processed. 
Symptoms include recurrent and intrusive recollections, avoidance of 
revisiting the event, difficulty sleeping and concentrating and augmented 
fearful reactions. The practical effects of PTSD in the refugee context can 
include avoidance: the focus of the applicant on issues other than the 
trauma or delay in making a claim; dissociation from the process of the 
hearing, giving the impression of disinterest or evasiveness; confusion and 
inconsistency in recounting peripheral details or the time frame of events; 
and fatigue-induced behaviour such as excessive emotion or despair. 
                                                     
66 A good example given was that of an applicant whose body was covered in cigarette burns. 
The decision-maker disregarded the medical reports and made comments about how she herself 
was a smoker, implying that she did not give much weight to the cigarette burn marks. Such 
apparent cynicism was indicative of a traumatic situation being treated as normal:  Rousseau et 
al, loc. cit. at 55 and 59. 
67 Herlihy, Evidentiary Assessment and Psychological Difficulties, in Noll (ed), op. cit., at 126 
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Where it goes unrecognised, these symptoms can have a seriously 
damaging effect on an applicant’s credibility.68  
  Refugees falling below the diagnostic criteria for PTSD may also 
bear psychological difficulties that impact negatively on their credibility, 
resulting in inconsistencies. Depression is relatively common in refugees, 
linked to post-migration factors such as isolation from friends and family 
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Credibility Determinations In Ireland 
 
While there is a notable absence of statistics on the reasons for acceptance 
or refusal of an application for refugee status in Ireland, it is clear that 
credibility determinations play an important part in the process. In 
Traore75, Finlay Geoghegan J. stated that “[t]he assessment of the 
credibility of an applicant and/or his/her story is often crucial to the 
determination of his or her entitlement to a Declaration of Refugee Status.” 
There are a significant number of judicial review cases dealing with 
negative credibility determinations by the RAT, and a number of the 
decisions recently published by the RAT place significant emphasis on the 
credibility of an applicant, whether positive or negative, in determining a 
claim.76 Further, section 11B of the Immigration Act 2003 requires 
decision-makers to take a number of matters into account in determining 
the credibility of the applicant, placing further emphasis on this element of 
the assessment. It is proposed in this section to briefly examine Irish case-
law77 to determine whether the problems with the reliability of credibility 
assessment outlined above appear in the context of asylum application in 
Ireland.  
The positive and negative factors identified by Kagan78 as those 
which are given probative weight in credibility assessment are apparent in 
the Irish decision-making process. In the decisions recently published by 
the RAT, a positive conclusion on credibility was reached where the 
applicant was unhesistant in supplying information79, gave a plausible, 
reasonable and consistent account80, had an open demeanour and displayed 
appropriate emotion81. The RAT has reached a negative conclusion on 
credibility where the applicant was vague82, presented contradictions or 
                                                     
75 Traore v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 14th May 2004, Finlay 
Geoghegan J at 8.  
76 For example, references 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the Published 
Decisions of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Volume 1, place significant emphasis on the 
credibility of the applicant, with credibility forming the material basis of the decision in a 
number of those cases. 
77 As many cases do not go beyond the granting of leave to apply, it is difficult to establish any 
concrete principles in Irish law. However, as many of the leave decisions have been quoted with 
some approval in substantive decisions, it is submitted that they form the strongest basis for 
ascertaining the principles that are applicable in Irish law. As such, this article will examine 
both leave decisions and substantive decisions.  
78 Kagan, loc. cit at 384. 
79 Reference 6 (Congo Brazzaville), Refugee Appeals Tribunal Published Decisions, Volume 1. 
80 Reference 6 (Congo Brazzaville), ibid. 
81 Reference 20 (Sierra Leone), Refugee Appeals Tribunal Published Decisions, Volume 1: 
“The applicant presented as an honest person who was visibly upset when recounting events.” 
82 Reference 4 (Angola), Refugee Appeals Tribunal Published Decisions, Volume 1: a young 
and illiterate applicant, who claimed to be a low-level member of a political organisation, was 
found to be incredible because he did not know of signficant political developments within the 
party or some of the other factions of the party.  
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inconsistencies in his/her account83, delayed in the revelation of key facts84, 
provided an implausible account85 and had a generally incredible 
demeanour86. However, as outlined above, the application of these factors 
may be unreliable in the assessment of credibility.   
 
Demeanour 
The RAT may be criticised for basing credibility findings on an assessment 
of the demeanour of an applicant, a method which is unreliable at best. In 
Olatunji,87 the rejection of the applicant’s claim by the RAT was based in a 
material part of the general incredibility of the applicant.88 Similarly, in 
Kramarenko89, Finlay Geoghegan J found it was arguable that the RAT had 
failed to clearly determine the applicant’s credibility in general or in 
relation to particular factual issues in circumstances where such 
determination was clearly necessary. The Irish courts have recognised the 
inherent unreliability of findings based on demeanour. In Da Silveria90, 
Peart J. outlined the problem with assessment of demeanour as follows: 
 
                                                     
83 Ayoka v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 29th July 2005, Gilligan J. 
(application for leave). The RAT Tribunal Member found that the contradictory evidence given 
by the applicant in relation to reporting the matter to the police, on one occasion she stated that 
she called them three times but they did not answer and subsequently stated that they refused to 
intervene, tended to undermine her credibility. 
84 Bujari v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Unreported, High Court, 7th May 
2003, Finlay Geoghegan J. (application for leave): The RAT found that the applicant was not 
credible because he failed to provide information material to his claim that his father was a Serb 
collaborator. The Tribunal Member did not consider the explanation offered by the applicant in 
his decision.   
85Deogratius Mbayo Sango v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Unreported, 
High Court, 24th November 2005, Peart J. (application for leave). The RAT Tribunal Member 
found it implausible that a guard would place himself in danger to aid the applicant’s escape, or 
that the applicant could have earned the money to fund his travel working in Zambia where the 
wages are low.   
86 Zhuchkova v Minister for Justice and Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 26th 
November 2004, Clarke J. (application for leave): the RAT Tribunal Member rejected the 
evidence of the applicants as generally not credible, and on that basis concluded that their 
credibility had been undermined and he did not accept their evidence in relation to past 
persecution.  
87 Olatunji v Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Anor, Unreported, High Court, 7th April 2006, Finlay 
Geoghegan J.  
88 The Tribunal Member’s assessment was “that the applicant has not discharged the necessary 
burden of proof and has not submitted a well founded fear of being persecuted of a credible 
calibre. … As no credible evidence of persecution has been given the matter of internal 
relocation does not arise. … Credibility was central to the decision reached.” Ibid. The High 
Court criticised the RAT for taking matters into consideration in credibility assessment which 
were not put to the applicant during the hearing.  
89 N.K. (Kramarenko) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2004] 2 ILRM 550, Finlay Geoghegan J. 
This was a leave decision and it was substantively overturned by Murphy J. ex tempore. 
However, the principle in the decision has been cited and approved in a number of other cases. 
90
 Da Silveiria v The Refugee Appeals Tribunal, unreported, High Court, 9th July 2004, Peart J. 
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The assessment of credibility is one of the most difficult tasks facing 
the Commissioner and the Tribunal member. It is an unenviable task, 
and one that is fraught with possible danger. It is very easy, I 
suspect, to come to a conclusion in the light of the questionnaire 
answers and the interview and possibly the oral hearing on the appeal 
that the story as told is simply not believable. In every day life one is 
so used to simply having a feeling that all we are told is not exactly 
as someone would have us believe. One’s experience of life hones 
the instincts and there comes a point where we can feel that the truth 
can, if it exists be smelt. But reliance on what one firmly believes is 
a correct instinct or gut feeling that the truth is not being told is an 
insufficient tool for use by an administrative body such as the 
Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Conclusions must be based on correct 
findings of fact. A factual error of sufficient importance will often 
have capacity to at least cast some doubt upon the integrity of the 
decision-making process… 
 
Similary, in Zhuchova91, Clarke J accepted this statement and held that it is 
at least arguable that a finding of lack of credibility must therefore be based 
on a rational analysis which explains why, in the view of the deciding-
officer, the truth has not been told.92 Accordingly, it is recommended that 
decision-makers should not base their findings on assessments of the 
general credibility of an applicant without some outlined rational basis.  
 
Inconsistencies 
An applicant’s credibility will often be undermined due to minor 
inconsistencies or incorrect statements as to peripheral matters.93 However, 
as outlined above, there are significant difficulties with rejection on this 
basis. In Nguedjo94, White J recognised that vague or inaccurate statements 
may be explicable on the basis of the tiredness, confusion and 
disorientation of the applicant, particularly in the context of unfamiliar and 
intimidating procedures.95 Further, minor inconsistencies relating to 
                                                     
91 Zhuchkova v Minister for Justice and Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 26th 
November 2004, Clarke J. (application for leave). 
92 The RAT Tribunal Member was criticised by the High Court at the leave hearing for rejecting 
the applicants’ explanation for delay in the provision of information as incredible, without 
providing an explanation of why this was so, suggesting that he relied solely on an assessment 
of the demeanour of the applicants. 
93 For example, in Ayoka v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 29th July 2005, 
Gilligan J. (application for leave), the Tribunal Member found the applicant to be incredible 
because she provided contradictory information in relation to reporting the matter to the police, 
saying once that she called three times but they did not answer, but saying on another occasion 
that they refused to intervene.  
94 Nguedjo v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 23rd July 2003, White J. 
95 The applicant in this case was up at 5am in order to travel from Tramore to Dublin on public 
transport for the interview. White J accepted that he was tired, apprehensive and confused, 
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peripheral matters should not be determinative of a claim. Peart J outlined 
this matter clearly in Memishi96, where he stated:  
 
… a Tribunal is not entitled to make adverse credibility findings 
against an applicant without cogent reasons bearing a nexus to the 
decision, that the reasons for any such adverse finding on credibility 
must be substantial and not relating only to minor matters, that the 
fact that some important detail is not included in the application form 
completed by the applicant when he/she first arrives is not of itself 
sufficient to form the basis of an adverse credibility finding, and 
finally that the fact that the authority finds the applicant’s story 
inherently implausible or unbelievable is not sufficient. Mere 
conjecture on the part of the authority is insufficient, and that 
corroboration is not essential to establish an applicant’s credibility.97 
 
This was reiterated in Sango98, where Peart J criticised the RAT for a 
finding of incredibility based on the plausibility of peripheral issues 
without sufficient examination of the core basis of the claim.99 It is clear, 
therefore, that peripheral inconsistencies although they may have some 
bearing on the overall credibility of the applicant, should not form the 
material basis of a finding of incredibility.  
In some cases, inconsistencies are not put to the applicant at the 
hearing, depriving the applicant of the opportunity to offer an explanation. 
In Idiakheua100, the RAT was criticised for failure to put matters of concern 
and/or perceived discrepancy to an applicant and give them an opportunity 
of dealing with same. In Olatunji101, Finlay Geoghegan J. accepted that 
finding, quashing the decision of the RAT on the basis that the applicants 
                                                                                                                                                           
being interviewed in a strange country in a strange language, and that this may have affected the 
coherence of his account.  
96 Memishi v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Ors., High Court, 25th June 2003, Peart J. 
97 These principles were outlined following an examination and approval of the US cases of 
Diaz-Marroquin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2001) U.S. App. Lexis 2352 and 
Cordon-Garcia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 204 F.3d 985. 
98 Deogratius Mbayo Sango v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Unreported, 
High Court, 24th November 2005, Peart J. (application for leave). The applicant was found to be 
incredible based on his account of his escape from DR Congo, his account of his arrest in 
Zambia and his ability to fund his travel from Zambia to Ireland. At no point did the Tribunal 
Member impugn the core of the applicant’s claim, that he was allegedly persecuted in DR 
Congo because he had the physical characteristics of a Tutsi.   
99 While such criticisms were outlined only at the leave stage of the application, such comments 
relied on the principles outlined in Memishi (above) and are therefore of some value.  
100 Idiakheua v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and R.A.T., Unreported, High 
Court, 10th May 2005, Clarke J. (application for leave). 
101 Olatunji v.Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Anor, High Court, 7th April 2006, Finlay Geoghegan 
J. The Tribunal Member considered the applicant’s claim that she was forced to leave her home 
to lack credibility, based on her subsequent failure to seek state protection. However, this matter 
was not put to the applicant.  
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were not given the opportunity to deal with the country of origin 
information which was deemed to be inconsistent with their account. In 
Nguedjo102, the decision of the Tribunal Member was quashed on the basis 
that an inconsistency that was crucial to the determination was not put to 
the applicant in the course of the hearing. In a recent application 
concerning a young Ghanaian girl, the RAT found that the applicant was 
incredible because, inter alia, she did not fit the profile of an accused 
witch, based on country of origin information stating that most accused 
witches are older women, often widows. It appears that the country of 
origin information was not put to the applicant for explanation.103 It is 
submitted that this is a basic breach of fair procedures, but it appears to 
occur regularly in the refugee status determination process.  
This problem may be further augmented by accelerated procedures 
whereby an oral hearing is not conducted by the RAT104; in such cases, the 
applicant has no opportunity at all to offer an explanation to the RAT of 
inconsistencies which bear on a finding of incredibility. This problem was 
highlighted in Ayoka105, where the RAT was criticised at the leave 
hearing106 for failing to hold an oral hearing where a conflict of facts had a 
material effect on the assessment of credibility. Similarly, in Moyosola107, it 
was held that where a finding is based in material part upon lack of 
credibility due to inconsistency with country of origin information, 
applicants must be given the opportunity to deal with that country of origin 
information.  
Alternatively, where an explanation for inconsistencies is sought of 
the applicant, and provided accordingly, decision-makers may simply 
ignore the explanation. In Bujari108, the RAT was criticised at the leave 
hearing for failing to consider and assess the explanation offered by the 
applicant for inconsistency of facts between his initial interview and his 
appeal hearing. Similarly, in Traore109, the RAT was criticised for failure 
                                                     
102 Nguedjo v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal, High Court, 23rd July 2003, White J. 
103 Reference 10: (Ghana), Refugee Appeals Tribunal Published Decisions, Volume 1. 
104 Where a report of the RAC contains a finding in relation to one of the matters specified in s. 
13(6), it is not necessary for the RAT to conduct an oral hearing.    
105 Ayoka v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 29th July 2005, Gilligan J. 
(application for leave). 
106 The hearing in which the applicant applies for leave to seek judicial review of the decision of 
the RAT. In such hearings the applicant need only show that there are substantial grounds for 
arguing that the decision of the RAT should be quashed, pending a full hearing.  
107 Moyosola v The Refugee Applications Commissioner, Unreported, High Court, 24rd June 
2005, Clarke J.  
108 Bujari v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Unreported, High Court, 7th May 
2003, Finlay Geoghegan J. (application for leave). The applicant failed to state in his initial 
interview that his parents were killed in Kosovo because his father was a Serb collaborator. He 
explained this consistency by reference to his initial shame of this fact and that he only revealed 
this fact to his legal advisors when he gained their trust.   
109 Traore v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 14th May 2004, Finlay 
Geoghegan J. The Tribunal Member considered it incredible that a Muslim man would be 
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consider evidence provided by the applicant explaining the perceived 
inconsistency with country of origin information.   
It is clear, therefore, that there are considerable difficulties allied 
with assessment of credibility based on inconsistencies. It must be noted 
that in many cases inconsistencies or dishonesty may quite rightly form the 
basis of a finding of incredibility. In Imafu110, the High Court, while 
agreeing that there are difficulties with credibility determinations based on 
inconsistencies, observed that in some cases the inconsistencies will simply 
render the applicant unbelievable. As such, the primary obligation of the 
decision-maker will be to ensure fair procedures by conducting an oral 
hearing where credibility is in issue, putting inconsistencies or 
discrepancies to the applicant and seriously considering any explanation 
offered, and taking into account any factors such as confusion, 
disorientation, unfamiliarity or fear of authorities in assessing what bearing 
the inconsistencies will have on the claim.     
 
Plausibility 
The truthfulness of an applicant’s claim will often be assessed based on the 
plausibility of the account provided. While this is often the only method 
available of assessing the claim, there are inherent difficulties associated 
with it. First, assessments of plausibility may be made without reference to 
country of origin information, resulting in a decision that is arguably based 
on mere conjecture. In Traore111, the Tribunal Member considered it 
implausible that an illiterate man would be employed as a driver to a 
Secretary to top Government officials or given custody of important letters. 
This assessment was made without reference to the conditions in the 
claimant’s country of origin, the Ivory Coast. This finding was found to be 
defective, as the Tribunal Member was obliged to assess the applicant’s 
story in the context of what is known of the country of origin.112  Similarly, 
in Sango113, the Tribunal Member was criticised at the leave hearing for 
                                                                                                                                                           
employed as a driver for a Secretary to top Government officias under a regime that 
discriminated against Muslims. However, she failed to consider evidence given by the applicant 
that he was employed by the previous regime, which did not discriminate against Muslims. 
110 Imafu v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Refugee Appeals Tribunal 
Unreported, High Court, 9th December 2005, Peart J. 
111 Traore v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 14th May 2005, Finlay 
Geoghegan J. 
112 This reflects the principle outlined by Judge Pearl in Horvath v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [1999] INLR 7, that credibility findings can only really be made on the basis 
of a complete understanding of the entire picture. It is our view that one cannot assess a claim 
without placing that claim into the context of the background information of the country of 
origin information. 
113 Deogratius Mbayo Sango v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Unreported, 
High Court, 24th November 2005, Peart J. (application for leave). The Tribunal Member found it 
implausible that a guard, who was a stranger, would expose himself to such danger such as 
allowing the applicant to flee. It was also found to be implausible that the applicant could raise 
$1000 working in Zambia for one year considering the low wages there, despite evidence 
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engaging in personal conjecture in finding the applicants account of his 
escape from prison and his method of funding his travel to be implausible. 
In a recent decision involving a young Ghanaian girl114, it is submitted that 
the Tribunal Member engaged in excessive conjecture in relation to the 
plausibility of the applicant’s account. It was considered incredible that a 
wealthy, respectable man would want to marry the applicant if she was 
considered a witch by the village, despite evidence given by the applicant 
that he did not have good intentions in proposing to marry her. Further, it 
was found incredible that the applicant’s stepmother would pay for her 
education if she blamed the applicant for her father’s death and considered 
her to be cursed, a conclusion which appears to be based on mere 
conjecture. Such flawed assessments should not form the basis of a finding 
of lack of credibility. Accordingly, any consideration of the plausibility of 
an applicant’s account must not rely on mere conjecture and must be 
grounded in country of origin information. Further, it is submitted that any 
scepticism relating to the plausibility of an applicant’s account should be 
put to the applicant during the oral hearing. 
 
Delay  
Delay in making a claim or in furnishing material information may have an 
adverse effect on the credibility of an applicant if s/he cannot provide a 
reasonable explanation for such delay. Indeed, it is one of the factors a 
decision-maker is obliged by statute to take into account when assessing 
credibility.115 As outlined above, there may be a number of reasons for 
delay in making a claim. However, in many cases, the reasons provided for 
delay have not been considered. In Bujari116, the applicant’s delay in 
providing information material to his claim was a material factor in the 
tribunal-member’s assessment of the applicant’s credibility. The tribunal-
member failed to consider the explanation offered by the applicant for such 
delay, namely that he felt a deep sense of shame as a Kosovan whose father 
was a Serb collaborator. In a decision concerning a young Ghanaian girl, 
the RAT considered the applicant’s failure to mention that she was sexually 
assaulted by the police at interview to undermine her credibility, with no 
consideration of the fact that the applicant was a minor and no reference to 
the trauma and shame associated with sexual violence.117 It is submitted 
that any adverse findings based on delay must take into consideration the 
possible reasons for such delay, particularly in the case of a minor and in 
cases of torture or sexual violence.    
                                                                                                                                                           
provided by the applicant that he worked on the black market there.  
114 Reference 10: (Ghana), Refugee Appeals Tribunal Published Decisions, Volume 1. 
115 Delay in making a claim: s.11B(d); delay in furnishing information: s.11B(m), Refugee Act 
1996, as amended by s.7, Immigration Act 2003.  
116 Bujari v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Unreported, High Court, 7th May 
2005, Finlay Geoghegan J. (application for leave).  
117 Reference 10 (Ghana), Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Published Decision, Volume 1. 
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Trauma 
While there has been no research on the matter in Ireland, it is arguable that 
decision-makers in the RAT may suffer from vicarious traumatisation 
through transmission of trauma from the claimant to the tribunal-member. 
As outlined above, symptoms of vicarious traumatisation include 
trivialisation of horror, avoidance and denial, focus on peripheral issues, or 
the establishment of a nexus between everyday activity and torture in order 
to render the torture innocuous. It is arguable that the tribunal-member in a 
recent case before the RAT118 was suffering from some level of vicarious 
traumatisation. The applicant gave evidence that he suffered persecution by 
the police in Algeria on the basis of his sexual orientation and gave 
evidence of being raped by the guards, of being insulted as being a 
homosexual, of being advised to kill himself, of being tortured while under 
arrest for political activities and forced to sit on a wine bottle because of his 
homosexuality. The tribunal-member focused largely on the political 
activities of the applicant and focused only on peripheral issues when 
addressing his claim based on homosexuality. The ‘difficulties’ faced by 
the applicant were compared with those faced by homosexuals in Ireland, 
where the attitude is ‘stifling’, and there was little examination of the actual 
persecution of the applicant on the basis of his homosexuality, such as the 
rape and the wine bottle incident. This may be explained as trivialisation of 
horror and the establishment of a nexus between everyday activity in 
Ireland and the torture of the applicant. Similarly, in Edionewe119, the 
tribunal made only the briefest of references to the rape of the applicant and 
focused on peripheral details relating to her claim, rejecting her application 
on grounds of credibility, arguably a symptom of vicarious traumatisation 
in the form of avoidance of horror. It is difficult to establish without 
psychological research whether such difficulties are in fact experienced by 
tribunal-members, but it is submitted that counselling and psychological 
help should be made available to tribunal-members on a regular basis in 
order to prevent such symptoms occurring.  
The attention given to post-traumatic psychological reactions 
experienced by refugees and asylum seekers can vary widely in the Irish 
context. In a recent case, the RAT recognised that traumatic difficulties 
may have a bearing on the applicant’s ability or willingness to provide 
information.120 However, in other cases the RAT has failed to consider 
evidence of trauma when examining the credibility of the applicant. In 
Edionewe121, the decision of the RAT was quashed on the grounds that the 
                                                     
118 Reference 3 (Algeria), Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Published Decisions, Volume 1. 
119 Edionewe v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 21st October 2004, Peart J, 
reported in (2005) 23 ILT 145. 
120 Reports of torture were taken into account in assessing an application by a man from Congo 
Brazzaville: Reference 6, Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Published Decisions, Volume 1.  
121 Edionewe v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Unreported, High Court, 21st October 2004, Peart J., 
reported in (2005) 23 ILT 145. 
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tribunal-member failed to attach any significance to the evidence of a social 
worker and a medical report outlining the trauma of the applicant following 
rape in relation to the ability of the applicant to properly recount her story. 
Similarly, in a recent decision, the RAT failed to examine the possible 
effects of trauma on a young applicant who was allegedly sexually 
assaulted in the delay in furnishing that information.122 Failure to consider 
the effects of trauma on an applicant can result in defective decisions and it 
is recommended that tribunal-members should always thoroughly consider 
the possibility.    
 
Section 11B   
By virtue of section 11B of the 1996 Act123, decision-makers must take into 
account a number of factors in assessing the credibility of the applicant. 
These factors include delay in making a claim or furnishing information124, 
whether an applicant possesses identity documents or has provided a 
reasonable explanation for the absence of such documents125, whether the 
applicant has provided a reasonable explanation to substantiate the claim 
that Ireland is the first safe country s/he has reached126, whether the 
applicant has provided a true explanation of how s/he travelled to and 
arrived in the State127, whether the applicant has forged, destroyed or 
disposed of identity or other relevant documents or provided a reasonable 
explanation for doing so128, and whether the applicant has adduced 
manifestly false evidence129. A number of comments may be made in 
relation to this section.  
First, it is unclear what weight the decision-maker is required to give 
to these factors in the assessment of credibility. While much may depend 
on the facts of the case and the judgment of the decision-maker, it may 
result in inconsistent decisions if decision-makers are unclear as to how 
important these factors should be when evaluating the evidence.  
Second, it is suggested that such factors may be more appropriately 
outlined in a handbook of guidance for decision-makers rather than a 
statute. Considering the difficulties associated with assessment of 
credibility, decision-makers must retain discretion as to whether such 
issues are to be material in the final determination, and as guidance the 
criteria could be more helpfully fleshed out in a handbook rather than by 
statute.  
                                                     
122 Reference 10 (Ghana), Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Published Decisions, Volume 1. 
123 As amended by section 7, Immigration Act 2003. 
124 Delay in making a claim: s.11B(d); delay in furnishing information: s.11B(m). 
125 Section 11B(a) 
126 Section 11B(b) 
127 Section 11B(c) 
128 Section 11B(e) 
129 Section 11B(f) 
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Third, some of the criteria, such as that relating to documentation, 
travel and whether Ireland is the first safe country, are peripheral matters 
which do not relate directly to the core of the applicant’s claim of 
persecution. With reference to the possession of documents, the UNHCR 
handbook states at paragraph 196 that “cases in which an applicant can 
provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the 
rule. In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with 
the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal 
documents.” Indeed, at paragraphs 47-48, the Handbook issues a warning 
not to necessarily consider the possession of a passport as an indication of 
the absence of fear or evidence of the absence of state persecution. As such, 
the Handbook advises States that, although a genuine refugee may have 
documentation, s/he probably will not. The requirement in section 11B that 
the absence of documentation should have a bearing on the credibility of an 
applicant appears to be at odds with this advice. In addition, the 
requirement that the decision-maker consider whether the applicant has 
provided a true explanation of his/her method of travel appears to be at 
odds with the reality of the flight of refugees. Most refugees flee illegally 
with the aid of traffickers. They are likely to lie about their method of 
travel based on advice or threats from traffickers or based on a fear that 
they will be returned to their country or arrested because they travelled 
illegally. It must also be recalled that a refugee is a person who is outside 
their country of origin, regardless of how they arrived there. In addition, on 
the whole, the inclusion of such peripheral matters as these in s.11B gives 
an indication to the decision-maker that peripheral matters may be decisive 
in assessing the credibility of an applicant. This is clearly impermissible, as 
argued by Peart J in Memishi and Sango, outlined above. As such, it is 
submitted that s.11B may do more harm than good and should be 
reconsidered.    
 
Reliability of Credibility Assessment in Ireland 
Credibility is as important a factor in refugee status determinations in 
Ireland as it is internationally. At times such determinations are the only 
method available to a decision-maker in the absence of any other evidence. 
However, it is also clear that there are a number of difficulties with such 
credibility assessments. While there has been significant guidance provided 
by the High Court through judicial review, such guidance is not always 
followed by decision-makers. This situation must be resolved if the 
integrity of the system is to be maintained. 
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Credibility And Victims Of Female Genital Mutilation 
 
It is clear from the above analysis that, in certain cases, credibility 
assessments based on demeanour, plausibility, consistency and prompt 
provision of information may be fundamentally unsound, and that 
psychological difficulties resulting from traumatic experiences may 
influence the ability of the applicant to give coherent testimony. These 
factors are heightened when it comes to evaluating the credibility of 
victims of gender-based violence, in particular, female genital mutilation. 
 
What is Female Genital Mutilation? 
Female genital mutilation130 is the collective name given to traditional 
practices that involve partial or total removal of the female external 
genitalia and/or injury to the female genital organs for cultural or any other 
non-therapeutic reasons.131 Occurring predominantly in rural areas, it is 
mostly carried out in unsanitary conditions using unclean sharp instruments 
such as razor blades, scissors, kitchen knives and pieces of glass. Antiseptic 
techniques and anaesthesia are generally not used. The procedure is 
generally performed between the ages of 3 and 10 years, although it may be 
carried out during infancy, adolescence, on marriage or during first 
pregnancy.132 It is carried out by older members of the community, 
supported, condoned and assisted by families, entire communities and some 
States.133 An estimated 135 million of the world’s girls and women have 
undergone genital mutilation, and two million girls a year are at risk of 
mutilation - approximately 6,000 per day.134 It is practised extensively in 
Africa and is common in some countries in the Middle East. It also occurs, 
mainly among immigrant communities, in parts of Asia and the Pacific, 
North and Latin America and Europe. Despite modernisation, public 
education and legal prohibition, FGM continues to be prevalent in many of 
these countries, and there is even some evidence that its incidence is 
                                                     
130 For convenience, female genital mutilation will be hereafter known as ‘FGM’. 
131 Department of Women’s Health, World Health Organisation 
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increasing rather than decreasing as a result of the process of 
modernisation.135 The practice has been condemned by the international 
community as being a gross violation of the human rights of women and 
girls.136 However, it was only recognised as a ground for refugee status 
under the Convention in 1994,137 and sometimes goes unrecognised as a 
ground for refugee status, despite UNHCR documents and statements to the 
contrary.138 However, Ireland has repeatedly recognised FGM as a ground 
for refugee status, at least in principle.139  
 
Problems of Credibility for FGM Victims  
Refugees claiming on the basis of female genital mutilation face the same 
general problems in credibility assessments as other refugees, as outlined 
above. However, in many cases, their problems are augmented by a number 
of factors.  
First, the imputations cast on credibility by delay in making a claim 
are particularly problematic for female applicants. The explanations 
accepted as reasonable for such delays often do not consider gender-
specific problems like sexual violence. For example, omissions of events 
like sexual violence from the form for application are commonly 
considered evidence that it probably did not happen.140 It is submitted that 
                                                     
135 Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account (1996) 61 American 
Sociological Review 999. This reality has also been recognised by the UNHCR Guidelines on 
International Protection: Gender Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A2 of the 
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees May 2002, para 11. 
(UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002). 
136 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women G.A. res. 48/104, 48 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993), Article 2; UNHCR Gender Guidelines 
2002, para. 9; Study on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, 
Final Report by the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1991/6. 
137 Farah v. Canada (MEI) 3 July 1994; In re Kasinga Int Dec 3278 (BIA 1996). Since then, it 
has received much recognition in UNHCR documents and Gender-Guidelines of states, as well 
as some caselaw. However, it still remains a lower priority as regards refugee status. See further, 
UNHCR Guidelines 2003, Chapter 8 at 111; Guidelines, Office of International Affairs, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, regarding adjudicating asylum cases on the basis of 
gender (May 26, 1996). For academic commentary:  Kelley, The Convention Refugee Definition 
and Gender-based Persecution: A Decade’s Progress (2002) 13 Intl J Refugee L 559. 
138 Eg, in the recent UK case of Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 
WLR 3773, the Court of Appeal did not accept that FGM could be a ground of persecution 
under the Convention, as the group did not exist independently of the persecution. This is 
contrary to the UNHCR material available and may be seen as a step back in terms of the 
protection of women.   
139 See Moyosola v The Refugee Applications Commissioner, Unreported, High Court, 23rd June 
2005, Clarke J., where Clarke J noted that the RAC supported the contention that FGM could 
form the basis of a proper refugee claim.  
140 Rousseau et al at 57; Jamil v. SSHD (Unreported), 25 June 1996 (13588) IAT: the 
applicant’s claim was undermined by a failure to mention sexual violence on arrival at 
Heathrow. See also the recent decision of the RAT relating to a young Ghanaian girl, where the 
tribunal-member considered the failure of the applicant to report a sexual assault by the police at 
interview to undermine her credibility: Reference 10: (Ghana), Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 
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this constitutes discrimination against victims of FGM in refugee status 
applications. Women and girls fleeing from FGM find themselves in an 
unfamiliar culture after rejection from their own community. They may feel 
anxious about what will happen to them or they may not know the correct 
procedure and feel that it is safer to enter as a visitor.141 Further, one 
interview may not be sufficient to obtain the information about sensitive 
sexual issues such as FGM; trust may need to be established before the 
claimant will reveal such information.142 Moreover, despite UNHCR 
guidelines,143 women are still interviewed by male immigration officers, 
sometimes with the assistance of male interpreters.144 Victims of sexual 
violence are particularly reluctant to disclose their experience in the 
presence of males, due to shame or fear that information will be passed on 
to her community, or to the fact that, in many cases, the torture and trauma 
of FGM has been perpetrated by or on behalf of men.145 Combined with a 
fear and distrust of authorities, these circumstances are likely to seriously 
inhibit the capacity of an applicant to divulge details of her experiences to a 
male interviewer.146 Further, a victim of FGM may be reluctant to disclose 
their experience in the presence of an interpreter from their locality or tribe, 
a particular difficulty considering that there may only be a small number of 
people who speak a particular tribal language. Accordingly, information 
disclosed at a later stage by the applicant should not be automatically 
disregarded or considered to reflect negatively on the credibility of the 
claimant.   
Second, cultural differences may be a particularly compelling 
problem for victims of FGM. In order to be considered credible, an 
applicant must show appropriate emotions at the appropriate moments. A 
recent study by Spijkerboer demonstrated that female applicants are 
incredible if they display too much or too little emotion. In particular, he 
found that in the context of asylum applications women are normatively 
associated with emotion rather than rationality, which is a male trait. 
Further, applicants who show inappropriate behaviour towards their 
families, such as leaving their husbands behind, are considered 
                                                                                                                                                           
Published Decisions, Volume 1.  
141 Crawley, op. cit. 
142 UNHCR Guidelines 1991, para 72; UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002, para. 36; UNHCR 
Guidelines 2003 at 29. 
143 UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002, para 36; Executive Committee Conclusion No 64, 
Refugee Women and International Protection, 1990, (a)(iii); UNHCR Guidelines 2003, Chapter 
8. 
144 Herlihy, loc. cit., at 125. Note, however, that in Ireland female applicants are consistently 
interviewed by female interviewers, so this difficulty may not arise.  
145 The man may be a prospective husband, (like in Kasinga), a father, or a community leader. 
146 Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Refugee and Humanitarian 
Visa Applications: Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers 1996, para 3.13. This was 
also recognised in the US and Canadian guidelines.  
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incredible.147 This gender-specific difficulty is compounded for victims of 
FGM, whose deeply rooted traditions are the subject of the claim rather 
than a sideline issue. A woman applying for asylum who has suffered 
because of the practice of genital mutilation is demonstrating her rejection 
of the social mores of her culture that may dishonour her family and hurt 
her chances for marriage.148 The moral dilemma of divided loyalties 
between her own safety and the betrayal of her family and community can 
generate emotional difficulties for the applicant. The above problems may 
give rise to evasiveness, vagueness or inconsistency, culminating in a 
finding of lack of credibility.    
Third, applicants claiming on the basis of FGM may face particular 
difficulties relating to the consistency of their account with country of 
origin information. The available information on a country may indicate 
that FGM is illegal and politically opposed in that country, but this does not 
necessarily mean that the laws are consistently enforced or that State 
protection is available.149 However, decision-makers may make an adverse 
finding as to credibility based solely on such perceived inconsistencies. In 
Imoh150 the RAT tribunal-member was criticised at the leave hearing for a 
finding of incredibility based on information on the prevalence of FGM and 
failure to seek police protection. While there was political opposition to 
FGM in Nigeria, it was still found to be carried out, and police protection 
would not have been available in Lagos, as the practice was not unlawful in 
that state. Similarly, in a recent decision by the RAT, a negative finding 
was reached on credibility based on the failure of the girl to make further 
efforts to seek State protection over and above her initial rejected attempt, 
despite country of origin information stating that protection was 
unavailable in rural areas.151 A young girl cannot be expected to realise that 
protection may be available elsewhere in the state when she has tried and 
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implausible considering her age152 or the level of state protection,153 
without sufficient consideration of the substantive practice of FGM or an 
examination of independent information about the country of origin. The 
inherent difficulty for an applicant of producing documentary evidence to 
support her claim may require the decision-maker to pro-actively seek 
independent information. Such activism can be laborious and time-
consuming and decision-makers often do not engage in it, instead basing 
their decision on dubious assessments of plausibility of the account and 
general impression of the applicant’s credibility.154 Alternatively, the 
information provided on a country may not include information on the 
practice or prevalence of FGM, leading decision-makers to believe that 
there are no specific problems in the country, when in fact the problems 
may have escaped documentation. In some cases, where the country of 
origin information relating to FGM ostensibly contradicts the applicant’s 
claim, such information may not be put to the applicant, depriving the 
applicant of the opportunity of providing more local and specific 
information.155     
An applicant on whom FGM has already been performed will have 
physical evidence on which to base her claim, but may have difficulty in 
showing that she is at risk of further persecution on return. It is commonly 
believed that once the procedure is carried out there ceases to be a credible 
fear of future persecution.156 However, FGM has further implications than 
the initial procedure. With infibulation, cutting is necessary before first 
intercourse can take place. Some new wives are seriously damaged by 
unskilful cutting carried out by their husbands. The woman may be re-
infibulated if her husband leaves for any period of time to secure her 
fidelity. During childbirth, existing scar tissue on excised women may tear. 
Infibulated women, whose genitals have been tightly closed, have to be cut 
to allow the baby to emerge. If no attendant is present to do this, perineal 
tears or obstructed labour can occur and the baby may be born dead. After 
birth, women are often re-infibulated. The constant cutting and re-stitching 
of a woman’s genitals with each birth can result in tough scar tissue in the 
                                                     
152 In an Austrian case, it was found to be implausible that a 23 year old woman would be 
subjected to FGM and, considering much of the village knew she was not a virgin, the tribunal 
concluded that the main reason for FGM had ceased to exist. Re Cameroonian Citizen, 
Independent Federal Asylum Senate (Austria), Decision of 21 March 2002, 
<http://www.refugeelawreader.org/index.d2?target=getpdf&id=118> (8th August 2006).   
153 In a case of appeal to the Australian High Court it was found that, even where a state does 
not promote FGM, it may be unwilling in practice to protect against it. A and Another v. MIEA 
and Another [1997] 142 ALR. 
154 This was the main basis for the decision of the tribunal of first appeal in the Austrian case of 
Re Cameroonian Citizen, Independent Federal Asylum Senate (Austria), Decision of 21 March 
2002, <http://www.refugeelawreader.org/index.d2?target=getpdf&id=118> 8th August 2006).   
155 Moyosola v The Refugee Applications Commissioner, Unreported, High Court, 23rd June 
2005, Clarke J. 
156 Crawley, op. cit., at 186. 
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genital area and serious pain and infection.157 At the hearing, such applicant 
may be unable to communicate her story coherently due to psychological 
difficulties, which can have a negative effect on the assessment of 
credibility. A victim of sexual violence often desires to remain silent about 
her experience, owing in part to the wholly understandable concern about 
how she will be regarded and treated by others because of it.158 She may 
continue to fear persons in authority, or she may fear rejection or reprisals 
from her family and community for disrespect of cultural norms.159 The 
documented psychological effects of FGM include severe, recurrent 
anxiety, depression and a generalised phobic state.160 Further, as a 
consequence of FGM many women are affected by chronic pain syndrome 
and mobility impairment.161 The chronic pain may be linked directly to the 
trauma of the procedure, or be a result of the complications that ensue, such 
as infection or menstrual difficulties. As with other causes of chronic pain 
there is an increased risk of depressed mood, with reduced social 
functioning, worthlessness, guilt, and even suicidal ideation.162 Victims of 
FGM may also develop PTSD.163 PTSD is associated with flashbacks 
triggered by reminders of the traumatic event and may be accentuated by 
experiences such as sexual intercourse, gynaecological examination and 
childbirth in vulnerable persons.164 As outlined above, PTSD can have a 
significant effect on the ability of the applicant to give a coherent account, 
thereby damaging her credibility if it is not recognised as such. This 
difficulty will be particularly apposite where the applicant fears a repeat of 
the procedure or where the applicant was herself a victim but now fears that 
her daughters will be subjected to the procedure.  
Applicants claiming on the basis of FGM face considerable 
difficulties in proving their credibility. In order to avoid discriminating 
                                                     
157 Amnesty International: <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm#a3> (8th 
August 2006). 
158 Van-Velsen, Gorst-Unsworth and Turner, Survivors of Torture and Organised Violence: 
Demography and Diagnosis (1996) 9 Journal of Traumatic Stress 181. 
159 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Note on Certain Aspects of 
Sexual Violence Against Refugee Women, 12 October 1993, A/AC.96/822, para 22.; UNHCR 
2003 Guidelines, Chapter 8; Kelley, loc. cit.; O’Connor, Refugee Law: Sexual Violence as 
“Persecution” within International Refugee Law—Part II (2001) 19 ILT 101. 
160 Whitehorn, Ayonrinde & Maingay, Female Genital Mutilation: Cultural and Psychological 
Implications (2002) 17 Sexual and Relationship Therapy 161. 
161 Lightfoot-Klein, Disability in Female Immigrants with Ritually Inflicted Genital Mutilation 
(1993) 14(3-4) Women and Therapy 187–194. 
162 Lax, Socially Sanctioned Violence against Women: Female Genital Mutilation is its most 
Brutal Form (2000) 28 Clinical Social Work Journal 403–412. 
163 Jenkins, Langlais, Delis and Cohen, Learning and memory in rape victims with post 
traumatic stress disorder (1998) 155 American Journal of Psychiatry 278. This study found that 
victims of sexual violence commonly suffer from PTSD. 
164 Woolard & Edwards, Female Circumcision: An Emerging Concern in College Healthcare, 
(1997) 45(5) Journal of American College Health 230.  
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against such applicants there must be some viable alternative to the current 
approach to credibility evaluation in the refugee context.  
  
 
A Viable Alternative? 
 
A full examination of the measures necessary to remedy the significant 
obstacles facing victims of FGM in credibility assessments is beyond the 
scope of this essay. However, some basic recommendations may be made.  
At the outset of the asylum procedure, a woman’s application should 
be approached as being independent from her male associates and women 
should be advised in private of the possibility of seeking asylum in their 
own right and offered legal representation, as recommended by the 
ICCL.165 Many women are reluctant to share their experience of 
persecution in the presence of male relatives or community members, or 
they may not realise the significance of their own experience as 
persecution.  
 
Pre-Hearing 
Where it appears to be possible that a woman may claim on the grounds of 
FGM, the following procedure should be followed in preparation for a 
hearing.  
Medical and Psychological help should be provided to the applicant 
and a thorough evaluation of the applicant should be made. This will be 
crucial to the assessment in two senses: First, it will protect a victim of 
FGM from further suffering by providing necessary treatment. Second, it 
will provide interviewers with critical knowledge of possible cultural, 
psychological or medical difficulties that may have an effect on the 
interview, or, indeed, the lack of such difficulties, as the case may be.  
An evaluation of all available information relative to the case should 
be made.166 This will include an examination of the issue of FGM 
worldwide and information on the country of origin, such as an evaluation 
of the position of women, the legislation, the protection provided by 
authorities and its effectiveness, the level of access to organisations for 
women, and prevalence of tribal practices such as FGM.167 This 
information may be found in state department materials, the reports of non-
                                                     
165 ICCL Women’s Committee, loc. cit. at 19.   
166 UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002; UNHCR Guidelines 2003, Chapter 8. 
167 In a recent Austrian case, the Independent Federal Asylum Senate condemned the appeals 
tribunal for a failure to do so, and for basing their decision largely on credibility without the 
benefit of such information.  Re Cameroonian Citizen, Independent Federal Asylum Senate 
(Austria), Decision of 21 March 2002, 
<http://www.refugeelawreader.org/index.d2?target=getpdf&id=118>  (26 March 2006). 
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governmental or international organisations168 and other independent 
research or in the testimonies of other women similarly situated.169 
 
The Conduct of the Interview and Evaluation of Credibility: 
The interview should be prepared so as to ensure trust, confidence and 
gender-sensitivity. There must be female interviewers and interpreters 
available and the interview room should be laid out in a non-adversarial 
informal manner.170 The interview should not be conducted in the presence 
of members of the applicant’s family, unless the applicant specifically 
requests this.171 The interviewers should be legally capable, with training in 
cultural sensitivity and gender-senstivity, and a general knowledge of the 
difficulties faced by refugees.172 There should be psychological help 
available both for the applicant and the interviewers before and after the 
interview.173   
Interviews should be conducted in a professional and polite manner, 
without provocative questioning or inappropriate reactions such as sarcasm 
or cynicism.174 Interviewers’ body language should be open and 
unthreatening.175 Absolute confidentiality must be maintained at all times, 
and female applicants should be specifically assured confidentiality. The 
method of questioning should follow carefully the guidelines set out in 
UNHCR176 and national177 gender guidelines. Questions should be short 
and simple, and it must be ensured that the applicant understands.178 For 
victims of sexual harm, the type of questions asked must be specific. The 
applicant may not identify general questions about torture with the harm 
that she fears, such as FGM. Open, non-confrontational questions should be 
asked first, followed by more detailed questions relating to FGM.179   
The main principles of credibility assessment may be described as 
follows. First, refugee status determination begins with the presumption 
                                                     
168 Eg, Country information is available from the UN website: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rsd> and <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/research?id=3b850c744> (26 
March 2006). 
169 2003 UNHCR guidelines. 
170 UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002 para 36-37; See also, Executive Committee Conclusion No 
64 Refugee Women and International Protection 1990, (a)(iii). 
171 ICCL Women’s Committee, loc. cit., at 16. 
172 ICCL Women’s Committee, ibid. 
173 Rousseau et al, loc. cit., at 67; UNHCR Guidelines 2003. 
174 ICCL Women’s Committee, loc. cit., at 16. 
175 ICCL Women’s Committee, ibid. 
176 UNHCR Guidelines, 1991, 1995, and 2003; UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002 at para 36. 
177 Eg, Canada: Immigration Refugee Board Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution 1994; U.S.: Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims 1995; Australia: Australian 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Guidelines on Gender Issues for 
Decision-makers 1996. 
178 ICCL Women’s Committee, loc. cit., at 20. 
179 UNHCR Gender Guidelines 2002; UNHCR Guidelines 2003, Chapter 8. 
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that the applicant is telling the truth, which can be rebutted if there is 
substantial reason to reject credibility. Second, credibility assessment must 
consider positive credibility factors, not just look for flaws in an applicant’s 
testimony. Third, applicants must have the chance to explain or rebut 
alleged flaws in their testimony, and negative credibility factors must be 
evaluated in light of any circumstances that may provide an innocent 
explanation for the imperfections. Fourth, adjudicators should consider 
whether parts of an applicant’s testimony should be considered credible 
even if other parts are not.180  
Final assessment must take into account whether the flaws in an 
applicant’s testimony, or the delay in providing information, are explicable 
on grounds such as trauma, fear of authority, lack of gender sensitivity, 
cultural or linguistic misunderstandings or normal memory failure. The 
psychological and medical reports will be of some help here. In final 
determination, the decision-maker should not decide whether s/he believes 
the account to be true, but rather if it is ‘capable of being believed’, i.e. 
whether there is any reasonable basis for believing the applicant. 
Credibility assessment in borderline cases should turn on a search for a 
reasonable basis to believe, not on finding a reasonable basis to reject 
testimony. If at the end of the assessment, no confident conclusion about 
credibility can be reached, the presumption that applicants will tell the truth 
should decide the case.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Credibility assessment is an unavoidable part of refugee status 
determination, as, due to the lack of documentary evidence, a great deal 
commonly rests on the statement of the applicant. Further, credibility 
assessment is necessary, as to allow a dishonest refugee to manipulate the 
system is to undermine the integrity of the Convention and reduce public 
confidence in its application. However, credibility assessments cannot be 
so stringent as to deny genuine refugees the protection to which they are 
legally entitled and that the State is internationally bound to provide. 
Refugee determination, if viewed appropriately as an international 
obligation to protect against serious human rights violations, must offer 
effective protection to persons who are the most vulnerable. Failure by a 
state to provide a thorough, fair and effective mechanism through which 
genuine refugees can present their claim is a legal injustice and a failure of 
the State and the international community to live up to their obligations 
under the UN Charter and international human rights treaties. It has been 
demonstrated that the current approach to credibility evaluation is 
unsatisfactory, as it creates a number of difficulties for genuine refugees 
                                                     
180 Kagan, loc. cit., at 399-401. 
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who are often disadvantaged by an unfamiliar and unforgiving system. 
Further, the failure of decision-makers to follow closely the gender 
guidelines provide by the UN and national bodies has resulted in an 
effective discrimination against victims of female genital mutilation 
seeking refugee status. With the developing recognition of the rights of 
women comes the international obligation to ensure the effective protection 
of female refugees fleeing from gender-based persecution, such as female 
genital mutilation. It is clear that a more pro-active and protective system 
must be developed and maintained if the Convention is to live up to its 
promise of the international and humanitarian protection of those persons 
who most urgently require it.  
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Sustainable development has emerged over the past two decades as the 
central precept of environmental law. It has been nearly universally 
adopted as an overarching policy goal. In an era of increasing concern over 
the impacts of mankind’s activities on the natural world sustainable 
development is seen as the paradigm for enlightened and environmentally-
conscious decision-making. At the domestic level it is now mentioned as a 
core aim in virtually every new policy and legislative initiative in the 
environmental arena. In spite of all this it remains unclear what sustainable 
development means or is supposed to mean. General definitions tend to be 
vague and protean. Given its increasing incorporation into legal devices 
important questions need to be asked concerning its role in environmental 
law and protection. This essay sets out to explore some of these questions. 
The purpose here is threefold: first, to examine the definitions offered so 
far of ‘sustainable development’; secondly, to introduce some of the 
theoretical debates concerning its usefulness; and finally to address its 
justiciability. 
 
 
1. What does it all mean?: Defining Sustainable Development 
 
International Perspectives: 
The genesis of sustainable development as a policy goal is rooted in the 
international sphere. Indeed in many respects sustainable development is, 
or at least was, at its core an international concern, arising from the so-
called north-south divide, over the potential impact that developing 
countries could have on the environment. Developed nations of the world 
were anxious that, having regard to their own histories, the commensurate 
economic development of the third world could have catastrophic and 
irreversible consequences for the environment. At the same time 
developing nations did not want to have their right to economic 
development impeded. The notion of sustainable development essentially 
emerged as a compromise between the two positions. 
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 The first intimations of a movement towards a global concept of 
sustainable development came in the shape of the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference, which expressed that the need to protect and defend the 
environment for future generations was an imperative goal for mankind.1 In 
1982 similar soundings were made when the World Charter for Nature 
sought to address concerns for the resources of the world to "be managed 
[in order] to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable productivity".2 
However despite these initial rumblings, the major development in the area 
did not come until 1983 when the UN set up the Brundtland commission to 
evaluate and flesh out the factual and policy issues at the heart of 
sustainable development. Following several years of work by thousands of 
people and public hearings all around the globe the Bruntland commission 
issued its seminal report in 1987. It defined sustainable development as: 
 
To meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.3   
 
This definition has since served as the starting point for any discussion 
concerning sustainable development, but what does it mean? The 
Brundtland definition focuses on the combined issues of inter- and intra-
generational equity. This is encapsulated in its reference to present needs 
and future needs. It has since emerged that such a definition, while 
commendable and readily agreed to, offers little in the way of clear policy 
guidelines. As Fry comments it is “impossible to get to grips with on an 
administrative basis”4 and so while it remains the core definition of 
sustainable development the more recent attempts to define it have added 
various subsidiary concepts and principles in order to give it more ‘bite’. 
 The 1992 Rio Convention is perhaps that best example of this more 
detailed approach. With the adoption of Agenda 21 at that summit roughly 
ten principles were annunciated in connection with sustainable 
development. They included the following:5 
- The right to development 
- The integration of economic development and environmental 
protection 
- Inter and intra- generational equity 
                                                     
1 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nation's Conference on the Human Environment (1972) 
11 ILM 1416. 
2 G.A. Res. 7, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., No. 51, at 239, UN Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982), reprinted in 
22 ILM 455 (1983) at 4. 
3 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: OUP, 
1987) at 43. 
4 Fry ‘Can EIA deliver Sustainable Development?’ (1999) 6 IPELJ 17. 
5 Burhenne-Guilmin, Hassan and Robinson eds., Agenda 21 And The UNCED Proceedings  
(Oxford University Press, 1992) at 1xxxv. 
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- Reliance on the precautionary principle and the polluter pays 
principle 
- Greater transparency, access to information and participation in 
procedures appertaining to the environment; for example the 
planning process. 
The Johannesburg summit in 2002 reiterated the commitment to sustainable 
development and left these subsidiary principles essentially unchanged. 
However it did stress the importance of what may be termed the three-
pillared approach to sustainable development.6 Essentially this view asserts 
that the role of sustainable development is to balance three competing and 
inter-related factors: environmental, economic and social. From an 
environmental perspective this approach has been criticised for its 
marginalisation of the environmental effects of a project (this issue will be 
addressed in more depth in section 2) but it is important to bear in mind 
that in a politically viable form sustainable development will be a 
compromise as opposed to an ideal. 
 
Sustainable Development at the European Level 
The EU has taken a similar line to that proposed at the Rio summit in 
relation to sustainable development. The principle has been enshrined as 
one of the core aims of the European Community in both Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union and in Article 2 of the EC Treaty. The latter 
seeks to promote the “harmonious, balanced and sustainable development 
of economic activities”. Also Article 6 of the EC treaty (the integration 
clause) provides that environmental protection must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of Community policies and activities with a 
view to promoting sustainable development. Indeed the area of 
environmental policy integration has been earmarked as one of the key 
methods of attaining sustainable development as is indicated in the 
following extract from a report by the European Environment Agency: 
 
Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) involves a continual process 
to ensure  environmental issues are reflected in all 
policymaking…The product of EPI  should be an overall 
improvement of policy and its implementation, in line  with 
sustainable development needs.7  
  
                                                     
6 Osofsky  “Defining Sustainable Development After Earth Summit 2002” (2003) 
26 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 111 at 123. 
7 European Environment Agency Technical Report No 2/2005  Environmental Policy 
Integration in Europe: State of play and Evaluation Framework (Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005) at 7. Report available at 
<http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2005_2/en> (last visited 14th August 2006) 
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 It is important to note that at no stage is the concept defined within the 
treaties. However, when one combines the commitment to the concept with 
the various environmental principles put forward in Article 174 of the 
treaty one can perhaps gain an improved understanding of what it may 
involve. Article 174 (2) lays down the following as being the key principles 
of EC environmental policy: the precautionary principle; the principle of 
prevention; the principle of rectification at source and the polluter pays 
principle. One can clearly note the correlation between these principles and 
those put forward in the Agenda 21 statement (although it is important to 
bear in mind that the majority of the EU principles were in existence prior 
to Agenda 21). These principles can be seen as complementing the goal of 
sustainable development as well as offering a means towards its attainment. 
The EU has also issued various policy documents and official statements, 
which offer further expansion and definition of the concept. One of the 
most important methods utilised by the community for expressing its 
environmental policy comes in the shape of the Environmental Action 
Programmes (EAPs), which date back to the 1970s.8 In the Fifth Action 
Programme9 dating from 1993, the Brundtland definition was adopted. It 
was also stated that sustainable development reflected a policy of 
“continued economic and social development without detriment to the 
environment”.10 More recently the sixth EAP11 sought greater integration of 
environmental concerns into all areas of policy. There was also a greater 
emphasis placed on public-participation rights and rights of access to 
environmental information. This area of public-participation has 
increasingly been seen to be central to the concerns of sustainable 
development and may be viewed as relating to its ‘social’ pillar.12 Other 
key areas of EC legislation have the concept at their core, in particular the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) directives13 and the Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) directive.14 While neither 
expressly mentions the term in their provisions it is mentioned in the 
                                                     
8 The first EAP was adopted by the Council of Ministers on November 22nd 1973. 
9 Towards Sustainability. A European Community programme of policy and action in relation to 
the environment and sustainable development  [1993] OJ C 138/1. 
10 Ibid at 7. 
11 Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice. 6th EU Environment Action Programme 2001- 
2010 [2002] OJ L 242/1 of 10 September, 2002. 
12 For an excellent account of the importance of public participation in the environmental 
context see Steele “Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a problem-
solving approach” (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415. 
13 Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 073/5 
of 14 March 1997. 
14 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention 
and control  OJ L 257/26, 10 October 1996, amended by Council Directive 2003/35/EC, OJ L 
156/17, 25 June 2003, amended by Council Directive 2003/87/EC, OJ L 257/32, 25 October 
2003, amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003, OJ L 284/1, 31 October 2003.   
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recitals to both directives (the role of the EIA in achieving sustainable 
development will be discussed in greater detail in section 3)  
 
Ireland’s Search for a definition 
The Irish government has also sought to clarify the meaning of sustainable 
development in various policy statements and has consistently expressed a 
commitment to the concept.15 It is once again the Brundtland definition 
which is relied upon as the starting point for the discussion; however Irish 
policy documents also seek to expand on this. The two major policy 
statements on the issue are Sustainable Development: A Strategy for 
Ireland16 and Making Ireland’s Development Sustainable.17 Both 
documents endorsed the notion that sustainable development required the 
incorporation of environmental considerations into decision-making 
processes (as will be shown later, this is an example of the concept’s 
procedural nature and indeed from a legal standpoint it may well be the 
case that the only method of recognising sustainable development is as a 
procedural requirement). The latter document expressed the view that 
sustainable development is concerned with ‘breaking the link’ between 
economic growth and environmental degradation.18 It is also clear that the 
three-pillared approach is central to the Irish view of sustainable 
development, for example the National Spatial Strategy (NSS) claimed 
that: 
 
Sustainable Development is more than an environmental concept, 
although it includes that important element. It also requires a 
combination of a dynamic economy with social inclusion…the NSS 
through its focus on economic, social and environmental issues and 
on the inter-linkages between them, is a key policy instrument in the 
pursuit of Sustainable Development.19 
 
Comhar, the National Sustainable Development Partnership, have also 
published a very comprehensive study of what they feel is involved in 
sustainable development.20 They lay out a thematic framework from which 
a set of sustainable development principles are derived. Seen in this light 
the concept is no longer a principle in itself but rather an umbrella term for 
                                                     
15 See Ryall, “Sustainable Development In Ireland” (2005) 12 IPELJ 61. 
16 (Dublin, Department of the Environment and Local Government, 1997). 
17 (Dublin: Department of the Environment and Local Government, 2002). 
18 Ibid at 2. 
19 National Spatial Strategy for Ireland 2002-2020: People, Places and Potential (The 
Stationary Office, Dublin) at 13, para 1.3.  Available at <http://www.irishspatialstrategy.ie> 
(visited 9 August 2006). 
20 See Comhar, The National Sustainable Development Partnership Principles for Sustainable 
Development (2002) at 6.  Available at <http://www.comhar-
nsdp.ie/COMHARDocs/Sustain.pdf> (visited 9 August, 2006).  
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a set of principles. The ‘themes’ put forward by Comhar include the 
notions of inter and intra-generational equity, biodiversity, good decision-
making and satisfaction of needs; the ‘principles’ include encouraging 
renewable energy resources, promoting air quality, conserving habitats and 
promoting public participation. While this is certainly one of the most 
expansive ‘definitions’ offered to date its parallels with the European and 
International statements, such as Agenda 21, are clear.  Finally it is worth 
considering Comhar’s mandate in relation to the definition of sustainable 
development. Comhar’s role is to promote sustainable development 
through dialogue, in this respect it seeks to involve all sectors of society in 
decision-making and in promoting sustainable development. This 
‘participatory’ approach reinforces the social consequences of the concept. 
 It is also important at this stage to note the impact that sustainable 
development has had on law in this jurisdiction. Despite the problems with 
its definition it has gradually begun to enmesh itself into the Irish 
legislative landscape. The most obvious examples are the Planning and 
Development Act 2000 (Amendment act 2002) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) Act 1992 (as amended by the Protection of the 
Environment Act 2003) but the incorporation of sustainable development 
into law does not end there. The following Acts also contain references to 
the principle: Sustainable Energy Act 2002, Local Government Act 2001, 
the Urban Renewal Act 1998, Fisheries (Amendment) Act 2003 and the 
Dublin Docklands Act 1997. It is imperative to point out that sustainable 
development has not been defined in these acts. In the Dáil debates 
concerning the Planning and Development Act, the then minister for the 
environment, Noel Dempsey, was questioned about such a definition but 
felt that the term was so “dynamic and all-embracing” that any legal 
definition would tend to “restrict and stifle it”.21 While this comment serves 
to highlight both the strengths and the weaknesses inherent in sustainable 
development, its end result (the present lack of a statutory definition) was 
probably well-advised for reasons which will become more apparent in our 
exploration of the theoretical and justiciable aspects of the concept. Finally 
it is worth noting that, although their recommendations were not acted 
upon, a majority of the Constitution Review Group were in favour of 
giving sustainable development some type of constitutional recognition.22 
 As we can see from this brief examination the attempts to define 
sustainable development the precise meaning remains elusive. The initial 
Brundtland definition neatly encapsulates the two key temporal issues, 
namely the notions of responsibility to present and future generations (this 
temporal aspect of sustainable development is potentially circumspect, as 
will be demonstrated in the next section). Subsequent definitions have 
                                                     
21 513 Dail Debates Col. 1006, Feb. 2, 2000. 
22 Report of the Constitution Review Group (Dublin, Stationary Office, 1996) at 402. 
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sought to expand on the original through the addition of further principles 
such as the precautionary principle and rights of public-participation in 
decision-making. In this manner sustainable development has tended to 
lose any intrinsic meaning of its own and is instead beginning to be viewed 
as an umbrella term for other principles.23 This has important consequences 
for the justiciability of the concept. We shall return to this issue in due 
course but for now let us turn our attention to the theoretical debates 
surrounding the nature of sustainable development. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Problems with Sustainable Development 
 
Environmental Economics 
The previous section sought to present some of the definitions offered thus 
far for sustainable development without addressing the considerable debate 
which exists over the usefulness of the concept. This section will introduce 
some of these more fundamental concerns. While not all may have a direct 
relationship with the legal impact of sustainable development, they do 
highlight some of the problems that have been encountered in trying to 
work out just what exactly it might entail.  
 The first issue to be addressed when considering the potential 
shortcomings of sustainable development is its near-universal acceptance 
by governments around the world. While this should not normally be a 
problem it serves to highlight what many environmentalists see as the 
inherent weakness of the concept. It is so all-embracing and so dynamic 
that it has no real meaning at all or alternatively it certainly has no meaning 
from the perspective of environmental protection. Thus sustainable 
development, with its obvious economic overtones, serves as a mask for 
‘business as usual’. This sceptical view has been expressed, by Hodas, as 
follows:  
[The] universal adoption of the language of sustainable development 
[was] simply a brilliant politically expedient compromise between the 
forces of economic growth and those of environmental protection. 
Environmentalists enthused over the word sustainability, while many 
business and government leaders praised development as the final 
word.24   
The question arises whether a term which commands such universal 
support can actually mean anything or is it merely, as mentioned above, an 
expedient compromise? This argument leads into the ‘zero growth’ 
                                                     
23 Boyle and Firestone eds., International Law and Sustainable Development. Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: OUP, 1999) at 17-18. 
24 See Hodas, ‘The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsidered’ 
(1998) 3 Widener Law Symposium Journal 1 (emphasis original). 
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argument discussed ahead but at this stage it is important to note that there 
is some merit to this view. Environmentalists are correct to point out that 
environmental protection and sustainability (if such a thing can be 
achieved) will entail constraints on at least some types of economic 
activity. There is a danger that the language of sustainable development 
may lead to a tendency to gloss over the genuine conflicts that do exist. 
It has also been argued that the notion of sustainable development is 
an oxymoron; ‘development’, it is opined, can never be ‘sustained’. The 
most obvious expression of this school of thought comes from advocates of 
the ‘zero growth’ approach to environmental economics. Advocates of this 
approach would point to reports, such as the famous (or perhaps infamous) 
Club of Rome report entitled the ‘Limits to Growth’,25 which indicate that 
if present rates of growth continue then we could exhaust our supply of 
natural assets. It would follow, if that were true, that no rate of growth 
could ever be sustained. The Limits to Growth report was challenged by 
many economists for failing to take account of ‘market feedback 
mechanisms’ (i.e. when resources become scarce we will switch to 
alternatives) and many of its findings in relation to resource depletion have 
since proven to be false. However it is worth noting that a UN report in 
March 2005 reached similar conclusions concerning the scale of 
environmental resource depletion.26 The problem with sustainable 
development from the ‘zero growth’ perspective is that it presupposes the 
desirability of growth. This view, as Jacobs27 points out, is flawed. First, if 
it refers to economic growth, it is mistaken. There is no necessary link 
between economic growth and environmental degradation or resource 
depletion. After all Gross National Product (the standard measure of 
economic growth), is concerned with monetary flows and in no way does it 
seek to measure the consumption of environmental assets or the harmful 
environmental impacts of our activities (of course many argue that 
economic calculations should take account of the rate of environmental 
resource depletion; this issue is given further consideration later). So while 
it may well be historically correct that economic growth has tended to have 
negative environmental impacts, it is nonetheless theoretically possible for 
us to ‘break the link’ between economic growth and environmental 
degradation. In fact some economic activities such as recycling or 
biodiversity farming actually have beneficial results for the environment.28 
Secondly ‘zero growth’ is a flawed argument because it implies that doing 
                                                     
25 Meadows The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament 
of Mankind (London: Pan, 1972). 
26 UN Millennium Ecosystems Assessment Report, March 2005; this report presented a 
sophisticated analysis of our reliance on ecosystem services. 
27 Jacobs The Green Economy. The Environment, Sustainable Development and the Politics of 
the Future (London: Pluto Press, 1991). 
28 Ibid at 54. 
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nothing is preferable to doing something; consequently not improving our 
energy efficiency or pollution control could be advocated for when this will 
actually have negative environmental impacts.29 It is also important to note 
that ‘development’ does not necessarily equate with ‘growth’ anyway. 
Development may be a sufficiently all-embracing term that could take 
account of non-financial components of the environment. It follows that the 
‘zero growth’ argument fails to show that sustainable development is an 
undesirable policy. 
 Environmental economists such as Pearce30 have identified two 
schools of thought on what sustainability may entail from an economic 
perspective. These are the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability arguments. 
Both approaches take onboard the Brundtland definition and interpret it in 
economic terms as meaning income per capita should not decline over 
time.31 In order to achieve this society must determine how best to use its 
total capital stock today and how much of it needs to be preserved for 
future generations.  What differentiates the weak and strong sustainability 
schools of thought is their respective treatment of the relationship between 
human and physical capital, on the one hand, and natural capital on the 
other. It is widely accepted that modern forms of economic expansion are 
leading to the degradation of natural capital with corresponding increases 
in human and physical capital. The concern is that depletion of natural 
capital may be unsustainable. Weak sustainability sees no difference 
between the types of capital and thus advocates no real change in current 
economic policy (i.e. it seeks optimality of resource allocation). Strong 
sustainability on the other hand sees natural capital as being of far greater 
value and would advocate that the only sustainable approach is to maintain 
the stock of natural capital at constant levels.32  
 The economist Wilfred Beckerman33 has attacked both of these 
views. In his eyes weak sustainability is without merit as it adds nothing to 
the standard economist’s aims of optimality. Strong sustainability is, on the 
other hand, morally abhorrent, as it advocates no change at all. This would 
result in what he sees as an extreme type of conservationism.34 He adopts 
the view that sustainable development actually runs counter to the aim of 
increased environmental protection. His view is based on the use of 
Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKCs). While these may sound somewhat 
                                                     
29 Ibid at 56. 
30 See Pearce et al Blueprint for a Green Economy (London: Earthscan, 1989) and Pearce, 
Markandya and Barbier, Blueprint for a Sustainable Economy (London: Earthscan, 2000). 
31 See Pezzey Economic Analysis of Sustainable Growth and Sustainable Development (1989) 
Environment Department Working Paper, No. 15, World Bank Washington DC.  
32 Pearce Markandya and Barbier op. cit., at 24.  
33 See Beckerman A Poverty of Reason: Sustainable Development  (The Independent Institute, 
2003) and ‘Sustainable Development: Is it a Useful Concept?’ (1994) 3 Environmental Values 
191. 
34 Beckerman (2003) ibid, Chapter 1 ‘What is Sustainable Development Supposed to Mean?’ 
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daunting their underlying principle is relatively straightforward. EKCs tend 
to show that while economic development may lead to an increase in 
environmental degradation in the short-term, over time, and as society 
becomes wealthier, so does its ability to rectify environmental problems. 
Hence, in the long-term, society is better able to deal with environmental 
problems and the situation actually improves (consequently EKCs take the 
shape of an inverted-U). Taking this onboard Beckerman argues that, far 
from being the cause of environmental degradation, economic growth is in 
fact the solution to it.35  As a result he sees sustainable development, with 
its potential to restrict economic growth, as exacerbating the environmental 
crisis. Before we get too carried away with a policy of unrestricted 
economic growth we should note that Beckerman’s conclusion, as pointed 
out by Pearce, is premature. EKCs have only ever been shown to apply to 
certain short-term problems such as air pollution and do not hold true for 
long-term concerns such as carbon emissions and municipal solid waste.36 
One must also bear in mind that some types of environmental harm (e.g., 
biodiversity loss) are simply irreversible with the attendant result being that 
the downward half of the inverted-U of an EKC can never take place. In 
fact, even in situations in which EKCs do hold true it has been shown that 
economic growth on its own cannot correct negative environmental effects 
and more specific environmental policies, such as legislation on air 
pollution, are required.37 This is because law has an important effect on 
internalising costs, which the marketplace, if left to its own devices, cannot 
do.38 What has also emerged from the literature on EKCs is that the rule of 
law ideology and its associated system of rights and privileges is itself a 
necessary precondition for any meaningful sort of economic growth. Even 
Milton Friedman, the poster-boy of free market economics, acknowledged 
that his cries for former soviet bloc countries to ‘Privatize, privatize, 
privatize’ were proven redundant without a more fundamental revision of 
their legal systems.39 Finally one should also be wary of the old maxim 
‘lies, damned lies and statistics.’ For example some EKCs show that 
pollution per unit of output is decreasing over time but when coupled with 
                                                     
35 See Beckerman ‘Economic Growth and the Environment’ (1992) 20 World Development 481 
36 See Pearce, Markandya and Barbier, loc. cit., at 26-28 and also Kysar, D. ‘Some Realism 
About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical 
Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy’ (2003) 30 Ecology Law Quarterly 223 at 
250. 
37 Kysar (2003) Ibid. 
38 Hodas, loc. cit., at 6. 
39 See Anderson & Kosnik, ‘Symposium on Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist: 
Sustainable Skepticism and Sustainable Development’ (2002) 53 Case Western Reserve Law 
Review 439. At 440 the authors comment that the criticism often thrown at the World Bank and 
IMF reforms in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa is due to their failure to set 
up a proper legal system founded on the rule of law ideology prior to instituting their dramatic 
free-market policies. 
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a corresponding increase in output it is found that aggregate pollution is 
actually increasing.40 
 If sustainable development is to be tackled from the perspective of 
economics then the environment must be usefully included in economic 
cost-benefit calculations. However, as Jacobs points out,41 this has not 
historically been the case. The reality is that most environmental 
commodities are available free of charge and thus their value goes 
unrecognised. Much of modern environmental economics is concerned 
with finding workable methods of valuing the environment.42 However we 
continue to have a distinct inability to put a value on certain aspects of the 
environment. For example how do we put a value on the aesthetic 
enjoyment of natural beauty? Or, to take a potential crisis we may face, 
how do we estimate the costs of the migration of people as a result of 
global warming? Such questions are central to any cogent analysis of 
sustainable development, which is after all at least in part concerned with 
environmental protection. While economists would no doubt insist that we 
can put values on such things any such valuation is likely to be arbitrary 
and imperfect. There is also, as Jacobs argues,43 the question of who does 
the valuing? Given that several environmental problems will have their 
effects felt beyond the local arena, and indeed in the future, it is unlikely 
that we could ever get a representative sample of those affected.44 
 
Inter-generational Equity 
As previously discussed the Brundtland definition contained two important 
temporal elements, namely the notions of intra-and inter-generational 
equity. There is little denying that concern for future and present 
generations is at the very heart of sustainable development. The notion of 
intra-generational equity is essentially concerned with the question of 
distribution of wealth (in the broadest sense of that term) amongst present 
generations. As pointed out at the start of this essay this concern with 
distribution has its origins in the international north-south divide. In 
international law this is given expression in the notion of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”.45  At a more local level a national 
governmental aim of ‘balanced regional development’ may be seen to 
                                                     
40 Kysar loc. cit., at 250. 
41 Jacobs op. cit., at xv. 
42 Pearce Markandya and Barbier (2000), loc. cit., Chapter 3 ‘Valuing the Environment’. 
43 Jacobs, op. cit.,  at 67. 
44 This discussion has also ignored that there are serious inconsistencies present within any 
system of cost-benefit analysis. See for example Tomain ‘Junk Economics: Review of 
“Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing” by Frank Ackerman 
& Lisa Heinzerling’ (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 689; and also Sinden ‘Cass Sunstein's 
Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals’ (2004) 29 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 
191. 
45 This recognises the disparities between the resources available to different countries. Hence 
developed countries have greater responsibilities as regards the environment. 
128 Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
concern itself with intra-generational equity. Questions of redistribution of 
wealth within the state are relatively straightforward (albeit hotly 
contested) from a legal perspective. However the concept of inter-
generational equity has specific problems from a legal and indeed ethical 
perspective.46  
 Inter-generational equity is concerned with obligations or duties 
which we may owe to future generations. This is problematical in many 
respects, for example there is the impossibility of knowing to whom our 
obligations are owed and also the impossibility, as mentioned in the 
previous section, of knowing what future generations will value. As a result 
the principle offers little assistance to policy-makers as future generations 
will be unable to make their positions known. Is this a genuine problem? 
Some, such as Jacobs, feel that while it is true we will never know what 
people may value in the future, it is not unreasonable to speculate as to 
what they might not value.47 While this common sense approach is 
welcome it may be better served through utilisation of the precautionary 
principle as discussed further on. 
  Also duties, by implication, create rights, but how can future 
generations, who are not yet alive, have rights? Rights supposedly inhere in 
people, if the people don’t exist then surely there can be no rights?48 For 
legal obligations to arise there must be some type of relationship between 
the parties to a dispute. Inter-generational equity is flawed in this respect as 
it creates a relationship between an existing group and one that may or may 
not come into existence. We should note that not all the members of future 
generations are inexistent, after all many children alive today are arguably 
members of future generations as well and it may be possible to represent 
their position. Indeed this has already taken place in the Minors Oposa case 
in the Philippines which concerned the future impact of deforestation. 
Inter-generational equity is enshrined in the Filipino Constitution and the 
parents were given a right to represent their children.49 However that one 
example does not remove the problem, as ‘future generations’ will remain 
for the most part an indeterminate group. As Mayeda argues, from a legal 
perspective the notion of ‘equity’ is not simply an abstract concept but one 
that requires “consideration of the concrete particularity of each person’s 
                                                     
46 For an in-depth study of the incoherence of inter-generational equity see Mayeda ‘Where 
Should Johannesburg Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to Sustainable Development in 
the Context of International Environmental Law’ (2004) 15 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 29.  
47 See Jacobs op. cit., at 71-72. 
48 See Beckerman (2003) loc. cit., Ch. 7 ‘The “Ethics” of Sustainable Development’ at 65. 
49 See the Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of the Environment  (1994) 33 ILM 
173. 
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situation”,50 consequently inter-generational equity “cannot conceptualize 
the concrete nature of what is owed by whom and to whom.”51   
 Another problem which presents itself to us is that of cause and 
effect. This has important repercussions for ethics i.e., in addressing 
questions of the nature ‘what is the right thing to do?’ For the purposes of 
inter-generational equity some have argued that we should ensure that 
future generations are provided with the same ability to choose their own 
destiny as we have been provided with. However such a view could have 
absurd consequences. After all every action we undertake at present will 
affect who will come into existence in the future and so in order to not 
impact on future generations it would seem we are ethically obliged to take 
no action at all. However as Mayeda argues we can not simply do nothing 
as that too will have an effect.52 It would also be foolish to presume that our 
actions (and inactions) will not have lasting consequences as is illustrated 
by the following extract from Kramer:53 
 
The construction [in Italy] of the Via Appia some 2500 years ago has 
affected the siting of towns and villages; in the same way, any town 
siting or road construction today will affect future generations’ right to 
determine their own needs.54  
 
Finally there is also the potential that the scope of our obligations to 
future generations may be unlimited; if we constantly have to make 
sacrifices to future generations then every generation will be worse off than 
it could have been and no one generation will ever benefit.55 The result is 
that inter-generational equity is in direct conflict with intra-generational 
equity and thus the competing interests of present and future generations 
must be weighed up in any dispute. This will again raise the question of 
who can represent the interests of future generations.56 
Despite this we cannot ignore the fact that concern for the future is 
essential to our understanding of sustainable development and our 
responsibility to the environment. In its common sense meaning 
sustainability has very strong temporal connotations. It refers to the 
continuation of something over time. However Mayeda argues that the best 
method of recognising that sense of responsibility to the future is via the 
precautionary principle, as it allows us to respect our uncertainty as to the 
                                                     
50 Mayeda, loc. cit., at 42. 
51 Ibid at 43. 
52 Mayeda loc. cit., at 43-44. 
53 Krämer, L. EC Environmental Law 5th Edition (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003). 
54 Ibid at 10. 
55 Mayeda loc. cit., at 47. 
56 See the Minors Oposa Case (1994) 33 ILM 173.  
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future and the values of future generations.57 There is cogency to his 
argument; it is precisely because we do not know what future generations 
will value that we should be careful about our present actions. Nevertheless 
the precautionary principle is itself disputable. The principle would hold 
that environmental policies must seek to anticipate, prevent and attack the 
causes of environmental degradation. The result being that even in 
circumstances where there is a lack of scientific knowledge and uncertainty 
about the outcome of events, this must not stop the implementation of 
policies to prevent potential degradation. As has already been alluded to 
this is one of the core environmental principles of the EU. The problem 
with the principle, as pointed out by Beckerman,58 is that there is never full 
scientific certainty about environmental effects, even concerning the use of 
technologies often thought to be beneficial to the environment such as 
hydropower or windpower. Also the policy may be harmful as it would 
place restrictions on scientific discovery. Beckerman shows how the use of 
the principle in relation to GM crops and biotechnology is slowing progress 
on what could be beneficial to mankind; for example in the development of 
drought resistant crops.59 While there is some merit to his claims on the 
whole they suffer from a type of hyperbole. To paraphrase Bertrand 
Russell: while nothing may be certain, there are degrees of uncertainty and 
one must be very careful to emphasise that fact. The precautionary 
principle may be harmful if carried to an extreme but it could surely be 
hoped that a common sense approach, recognising the relative degrees of 
uncertainty, could be utilised in its application. 
All of the above arguments have concerned the more technical and 
economic concerns over sustainable development i.e. what exactly is 
‘sustainable’ in the developmental context? However, as will be my 
contention in this next section, much of this is irrelevant from a legal 
perspective. Given the debate that rages over sustainable development and 
its precise meaning it is highly unlikely that any ‘right’ to ‘sustainable’ 
development exists or that a development could be challenged for its 
unsustainability. It is far more likely that, if it is justiciable, it will be as a 
type of procedural requirement or safeguard. It is instructive to look at the 
views of Jacobs in this regard. Jacobs, while acknowledging the 
shortcomings and criticisms of sustainable development, feels that it does 
perform the function required of it: namely it focuses attention on the issue 
of environmental protection in decision-making and combines it with some 
measure of concern for the impacts of our decisions on future generations. 
He also refuses to adopt an extreme view of ‘environmental protection’ as 
requiring the maintenance of the environment exactly as it is now. Instead 
he sees it as an effort to make informed choices about the type of 
                                                     
57 Mayeda, loc. cit., at 50. 
58 See Beckerman (2003) loc. cit., Ch. 5 ‘The Precautionary Principle’ at 44. 
59 Ibid at 45-47. 
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environment we want to live in.60 I would suggest this to be the better view 
of what is required by sustainable development; it requires us to constantly 
give attention to the environmental impacts of what we do whether they be 
good or bad and to subsequently act in a way that respects both the 
environment itself and our intended relationship to it.  
 
 
3. The Justiciability of Sustainable Development     
 
In this section I will address the question of whether or not sustainable 
development can be a legally enforceable principle or whether it remains, 
at best, a vague policy goal. The view that has attained the greatest level of 
acceptance, and the one to which I subscribe in this section, is that it can, 
after a fashion, be legally enforceable. The key lies in considering the 
subsidiary sustainable principles as opposed to the substantive notion of 
sustainability. In this sense sustainable development will be seen as a type 
of procedural requirement in decision-making and also as a mechanism for 
reappraising our relationship to the natural world. However reaching such a 
conclusion will not necessarily serve to endorse the concept. 
  As has previously been highlighted sustainable development has 
been incorporated into several pieces of domestic legislation. It is also an 
underlying goal of the European Union’s environmental policy. Thus it 
exists in law, albeit in what is as of yet an underdeveloped state. In order to 
examine its potential legal function we will focus on the role that it has to 
play in the area of planning and development law. In Ireland, Section 
10(2)(d) of the 2000 Planning and Development Act (as amended) provides 
that a development plan must concern itself with the “sustainable 
development of the area”. Also section 34(2)(a) provides that decisions 
taken on planning permission must be restricted to “considering the proper 
planning and sustainable development of the area”. It is thus clear that, in 
making decisions concerning development, the relevant authorities are 
statutorily obliged to at least consider the issue of sustainable development. 
Similar provisions exist within English legislation and before moving on to 
consider what I feel to be the justiciable aspects of sustainable development 
we should pause momentarily to reflect upon the fate of the concept to date 
in both the English and Irish courts.  
The reality is that it has received little in the way of sophisticated 
legal consideration in either jurisdiction. In Ireland the principle has been 
mentioned in the context of judicial review of planning decisions by the 
local authorities. It has arisen in cases where individuals have appealed 
decisions on planning permission which had been refused on the grounds 
that they were contrary to the ‘proper planning and sustainable 
development’ of the area in question. In most of these decisions it is 
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unclear whether the emphasis is placed on proper planning or on 
sustainable development or whether the two are conflated in some sense. 
However with regard to the appeals to the courts it is clear that judges 
favour passing over any serious contemplation of either principle, probably 
due to a fear that this would be to encroach upon the decision-making 
powers of expert bodies. After all the traditional view, given clearest 
expression in the case of O’Keefe v. An Bord Pleanala,61 is that judicial 
review is an appeal not on merits but on legality. I will discuss the issue of 
judicial review and its relationship to sustainable development in greater 
detail later. The case law demonstrates that Irish courts have not, to date, 
attempted to consider any definition of the concept nor have they attempted 
to question the findings of the local authorities on what might constitute a 
‘sustainable’ development.62 
It has suffered a similar fate in England and Wales. In the main it is 
passed over as a concern for the local authorities in their decision-making.63 
That said there are a couple of decisions which attempted a more ‘engaged’ 
consideration of the topic. In the interests of brevity I will limit myself to 
discussion of just one of these as similar conclusions have been reached in 
most instances. In the case of Fairlie64 a decision of the Secretary of State 
for Environment to refuse planning permission to a group of subsistence 
farmers who wished to erect tented accommodation on their land (which 
was held under trust) was appealed on several grounds. One of the grounds 
stated was that the secretary of state had, in refusing to grant permission, 
misunderstood what was meant by sustainable development. The applicants 
felt that their development was sustainable in that it would not impact on 
the ability of future generations to meet their needs. However the Secretary 
of State’s opinion was that the development would not help to secure 
higher living standards for present or future generations. In the case several 
definitions of sustainable development were proffered, mainly coming from 
governmental policy statements which employed variations of the 
Brundtland definition. It seems that the government had placed a greater 
emphasis on the economic aspects of sustainable development as opposed 
to the environmental aspects. However the court was reluctant to question 
the Secretary of State’s findings on the grounds that it was ‘his’ concept 
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and ‘so it is somewhat unlikely that he misunderstood it.’65 What we see 
here is an unwillingness to engage in a merits-based review of the decision 
similar to the unwillingness which is present in this jurisdiction.66 However 
this unwillingness is probably well founded. The patent uncertainty and 
self-contradiction that is present in a strict literary-type definition of 
sustainable development (such as the Brundtland definition) or even in a 
technical economic definition (weak sustainability vs. strong sustainability) 
makes the term far from amenable to curial interpretation and 
pronouncement. In my view the appeals of the individuals in the Fairlie 
case were, if they wished to obtain a legal review of the decision, focused 
on the wrong area sustainable development. Their concern was with the 
substantive notion of what would make a development ‘sustainable’ in the 
sense explored in section 2 of this essay. If the issue is to be considered in a 
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world and are often earmarked as the primary method for achieving 
sustainable development.68 As Hodas puts it: 
 
At its core, the EIS process requires that each government decision-
maker incorporate environmental concerns into the decision-making 
process at each stage of evaluation so that the final outcome will 
reflect an integration of all inputs: economic, environmental, 
political, and social. In theory, EIS laws that are now ubiquitous in 
national and international legal systems, will, by the gradual, but 
insistent, accretion of project decisions, inevitably advance the world 
along the road to sustainable development.69 
 
While the EIA directive only deals with certain projects,70 the provisions 
under the planning and development act seem to indicate that sustainable 
development must be taken into account in virtually all development 
decisions. It is also important to note the impact of the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Directive71 in this area; it will require a similar 
process to the EIA to be undertaken with regard to the preparation, by the 
relevant authorities, of the development plan. This is consistent with the 
notion of environmental policy integration which was mentioned earlier. 
 The notion of sustainable development as a procedural requirement 
is something which has been backed up in what is to date the major 
international judicial pronouncement on the concept. In the Case 
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam72 the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) invoked the concept of sustainable development in relation to 
a project to construct a dam between Hungary and Slovakia. The decision 
commented on the role that sustainable development had to play in 
reconciling the need for environmental protection with the need for 
economic growth. However in the eyes of the court this did not equate with 
any right to ‘sustainable’ development, after all we have seen how elusive 
the notion of sustainability can be, but rather it simply required the decision 
to go ahead with the dam to be reinvestigated and re-evaluated. In the 
words of the court this was expressed as follows: 
 
‘This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable 
development. For the purposes of the present case, this means that 
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the parties should look afresh at the effects on the environment of the 
operation.’73 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the ICJ has recommended a process that would 
essentially equate to the EIA process. This view of sustainable 
development is also backed up by commentators such as Birnie and Boyle 
who argue that despite the inability to arrive at a useful definition, “clearly 
a policy of economic growth which disregards environmental 
considerations, or vice versa, will not meet the criterion of sustainable 
development.”74  
 To continue this line of argument, planning decisions in this 
jurisdiction (and indeed other developmental decisions such as those taken 
by the EPA through granting waste licences and IPPC licences) should be 
legally challengeable for failing to live up to the ideals of sustainable 
decision-making. Mindful of the risks of becoming submerged in the 
considerable debate that exists over judicial review, I will first attempt to 
briefly contextualise the nature of judicial review.  
 Judicial review is the procedure by which the High Court can 
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To be reviewably irrational it is not sufficient that a decision maker 
goes wrong or even hopelessly and fundamentally wrong: he must 
have gone completely and inexplicably mad; taken leave of his 
senses and come to an absurd conclusion.79 
 
To put this in a more readily understandable form we may say that a 
decision is irrational when the decision-maker had no facts before him/her 
that could support their conclusion. Clearly this is a considerable hurdle to 
overcome but it would seem that if one wanted to review a decision of what 
was ‘sustainable’ in a particular context it could only be done through a 
merits-based review. 
 However if we avoid the substantive notion of ‘sustainability’ and 
focus instead on ‘sustainable development’ as an umbrella term for 
subsidiary sustainable principles to be used in decision-making then it 
should be entirely possible to obtain judicial review. As Simons argues80 
the weak form of judicial review mandated by the O’Keefe decision should 
apply purely to planning matters (questions of fact) whereas questions of 
law should be subject to full review. In his opinion a failure to allow for 
such an appeal would actually serve to undermine the rule of law.81 It 
seems clear to this author that at least some of the subsidiary principles, 
such as public participation and environmental impact assessment, could be 
reviewed purely as questions of law (e.g. a failure to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment or a failure to consult with the public 
could result in a decision of the planning authority being quashed). This is 
what is in mind when I refer to a type of sustainable decision-making. The 
other subsidiary principles will of course be relevant such as those 
endorsed at the European level (i.e., the precautionary principle, the 
polluter pays principle etc.). Indeed some of these principles, in particular 
the polluter pays principle, would be capable of more direct enforcement in 
their own right. However we must be quick to acknowledge that the 
dividing line between questions of fact and questions of law will not 
always be readily apparent. Indeed in the area of EIA (which as previously 
discussed can be seen as one of the primary vehicles for achieving 
sustainable development) the decisions of the planning authorities may 
often involve complex and mixed questions of law and fact. Nevertheless 
what is now needed is a greater willingness to engage with the concept of 
sustainable decision-making at a judicial level. If this is done it will lead to 
a greater level of certainty over what is involved in such decision-making; 
it will ensure that environmental issues are integrated into the decision-
making process; and that adequate public consultation and input in the 
                                                     
79 Ibid. 
80 Simons, ‘The Unreasonable Planning Authority: A Review of the Application of O'Keeffe v. 
An Bord Pleanála (Part I)’ (2000) 7(4) IPELJ 164.  Part II of the article is at (2001) 5 IPELJ 26. 
81 Simons (2000) ibid at 165. 
2006] Sustainable Development 137 
 
process of decision-making are provided for. In essence while the court 
will not in itself be engaging with the topic of sustainability, it will be 
providing an important safeguard in ensuring that the issue is given 
consideration at another level. This would have an important role to play in 
fostering a culture of ‘sustainable’ thinking. 
While it is my opinion that, at present, the only realistic effect of 
sustainable development will be as a procedural requirement, and that the 
notion of EIA combined with public participation and consultation best 
encapsulates how this would work, it would be wrong to presume that the 
process is the most effective means of protecting the environment. Indeed it 
is likely that, on a practical level, it is a highly ineffective means of 
securing greater environmental protection. The system outlined above only 
requires that we direct our mind towards the environmental impacts of a 
project, that we involve the public in the process and help to direct our 
attention towards consideration of our intended relationship to our 
environment. It does not, in its present form, oblige a particular course of 
action; it is purely a procedure that must be gone through and nothing 
else.82 We must ask what would be the value of such a process? What 
would it end up achieving? Discussing the results of EIS-type legislation in 
the US under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Hodas has 
the following to say: 
 
The widespread existence of NEPA-like laws has created a false 
sense of environmental security. Instead of advancing sustainability, 
EIS laws allow a project's unsustainability to be masked by a process 
that purports to promote sustainability. In the United States, NEPA 
not only fails to promote sustainable development, it allows 
decision- makers to dress up unsustainable proposals with a veneer 
of sustainability.83 
 
These are strong words indeed and serve as a stark warning to the potential 
impotence of EIS-laws and sustainable development. There is no doubt that 
the present systems of EIS are in need of considerable amendment in 
respect of the actual terms of their process and the issues they consider. As 
Fry comments the EIA-directive is purely project-based and since projects 
only have a finite lifespan they are by definition unsustainable.84 Hodas 
himself feels that NEPA is a “sheep’s clothing for economically predatory 
wolves”85 and that in order to achieve sustainability EIS-type laws should 
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create a structure whereby the adverse environmental effects can be 
internalised into every economic development decision (in this sense he 
wants what we previously discussed: a useful way of including the 
environment in cost-benefit calculations).86 While there is no doubt merit to 
these views and the calls for reform therein, there is something worrying 
about this whole approach to environmental issues more generally be it 
through EIS-type laws or sustainable development. It remains purely 
aspirational; we hope that directing our attention towards the environmental 
impacts of our decisions and involving the public more generally in our 
decision-making processes will result in a more enlightened and concerned 
approach to our environment and even that it will result in a greater level of 
environmental protection but we can never be certain of such an 
eventuality. Given the urgency that faces us in relation to several 
environmental problems more substantive laws will continue to be 
required. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to review and assess some of the debates 
surrounding the definitional, theoretical and justiciable aspects of 
‘sustainable development’. So what conclusions, if any, can be reached? In 
our exposition of the potential definitions for the concept we have seen that 
despite numerous attempts precise meanings have proved elusive. In its 
simplest sense it is a temporal construct that seeks to combine a sense of 
concern for future generations with concern for present generations but this 
is seen as insufficient from a policy perspective. Hence from its core it has 
begun to grow tentacles and it could also be seen as an umbrella term for 
various other ‘sustainability principles’.  
 In analysing the theoretical debates surrounding the concept we saw 
that several of its most intrinsic aspects, such as inter-generational equity, 
are potentially conflicting, incoherent and ill advised. It seems that the 
considerable ink that has been spilt in attempting to define sustainable 
developments leaves us with a hopelessly self-contradictory policy. 
However we also observed that while it may be imprecise and even 
contradictory from a technical and economic perspective it may fulfill the 
role required of it, as it focuses our attention on environmental protection 
and the future impacts of our present actions. We also noted that 
environmental protection is not a static concept concerned with conserving 
things the way they are now but is rather a dynamic concept concerned 
with redefining and reconsidering our relationship with the natural world.  
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 Finally, in addressing its potential impact in the legal sphere, we bore 
witness to the role it can play in reappraising decision-making. While it 
may well be that sustainable development, with its focus on public 
participation and access to information, will usher in a new and enlightened 
era in participatory politics and environmental consciousness it is also 
likely that it is an ineffective practical means of securing greater 
environmental protection. Given that it is now nearly twenty years since the 
Brundtland Commission issued its report it is timely to reflect on the merits 
of sustainable development. Has the time come, given the continuing 
uncertainty over the concept, to abandon it altogether? Do alternative and 
more definite concepts exist? Or does sustainable development, for all its 
failings, remain our only hope for reconciling economic growth with 
environmental protection? 
 
 
  
  
   
REVIEWING THE RIOTS: ANALYSING THE ROLE OF 
PARAMILITARY POLICING IN THE POLICE RIOTS OF 
1980’S BRITAIN 
 
 
CIAN C. MURPHY* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The riots in Dublin on Saturday 25th February, 2006 brought home to the 
south of Ireland something that the North and Britain already knew: when 
different cultures clash on the streets, the job of the police can be a 
difficult, if not impossible one.1 This paper seeks to examine the history of 
the 1980’s riots in Britain, and how they were policed, in an attempt to 
explain what causes protest to boil over into civil unrest. Its focus is on 
riots in marginalised communities in Britain. Bowling and Phillips say that 
paramilitary policing is “part of a vicious circle that contributes to the 
criminalisation of marginalised communities and undermines not only the 
‘confidence and trust’ in the police but also the legitimacy of the state 
itself.”2 This paper will present a critical analysis of the idea of a ‘vicious 
circle’, and the role which paramilitary policing has to play in it. First, an 
explanation will be sought for the criminalisation of marginalised 
communities. Secondly, the police response and the resulting ‘spiral of 
deterioration’ will be examined. Lea and Young describe this phenomenon 
as “a vicious circle in which moves in the direction of military policing 
undermine whatever elements of consensus policing may remain, and lay 
the conditions for further moves in the direction of military policing”.3 
Often, the eventual result of this cycle is the eruption of large-scale public 
disorder. Therefore the third stage of the analysis will examine disorder, its 
policing, and consequential questions for the legitimacy of the state. In 
concluding, the relevance of this analysis to policing today, in Britain and 
Ireland, will be highlighted. However, it is neither the purpose of this paper 
to provide a detailed account of the February riots, nor to assess them in 
terms of cause and effect, but merely to highlight the errors of the past in 
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the hope of avoiding their repetition in the future. At the outset, it is useful 
to address a number of definitional issues. 
 
Paramilitary Policing 
The two leading commentators on paramilitary policing are Tony Jefferson 
and P.A.J. ‘Tank’ Waddington. Jefferson’s definition of paramilitary 
policing is “the application of (quasi-)military training, equipment, 
philosophy and organization to questions of policing”.4 This definition 
views paramilitarism in the police as a complete doctrine, from 
Commissioner to combat gear. For Waddington, the key to ‘paramilitary’ 
policing is in organisation: “co-ordination through superior command and 
control”.5 His focus is on the control of police officers through a rigid 
military command structure. Both commentators appear to conjure their 
definition for a purpose: either to include or exclude certain features of 
policing as part of paramilitary policing. Alice Hills’ definition is the most 
exclusionary one: forces “whose training, organisation, equipment and 
control suggest they may be usable in support or in lieu of regular military 
forces”.6 While perhaps semantically most correct, it defines out of 
existence a phenomenon that she herself accepts exists.7 This paper will 
examine questions of definition as they arise, but does not seek to resolve 
that debate.  
 
Marginalised Communities 
Though paramilitary style policing has been deployed against many 
marginalised sectors of society, this essay will focus on those communities 
where membership of the marginalised strata is permanent, rather than 
temporary. In effect, this means communities defined by race, ethnicity, or 
religion. Other  strata – the young, the unemployed - lack “a clear identity 
and consciousness of being discriminated”.8 The limitation is useful as the 
communities are clearly defined and literature is abundant.  
The heart of this paper will be an analysis of policing in black 
communities in Britain in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Throughout the 
early 1980’s, outbreaks of rioting and general public disorder were 
widespread in Britain. Riots predominantly took place in marginalised 
communities. The most infamous of these was the ‘Brixton Disorders’ of 
1981, prompting an inquiry by Lord Scarman.9 In addition to events in 
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Brixton, there were also inquiries into riots in Moss Side,10 and 
Birmingham (Silverman, 1985).11 Even in ‘post-Lawrence’ Britain12, there 
is much contemporary relevance. 
 
 
Criminalising Communities 
 
Lea and Young, in their analysis of policing in the early 1980’s, claim three 
key factors lead to the deterioration of police-community relations in 
marginalised communities, and the perception that such communities were 
hotbeds of crime. Those were a rise in petty crime due to social 
deprivation, racism in the police, and the increased use of technology by 
the police.13 
 
Socio-Economic Factors 
The rate of unemployment in Britain doubled between 1979 and 1981 and 
welfare provisions were cut back to counter a perceived ‘dependency 
culture’. The Government of the day refused to acknowledge the link 
between unemployed, deprived citizens and an increase in petty crime, 
something since referred to as the “failure of Conservative criminology”.14 
Given socio-economic factors exist in all communities the question 
arises as to why it is specifically in the black community that the ‘spiral of 
deterioration’ exists.15 Each of the three reports cited highlighted 
unemployment and social deprivation as the backdrop to the riots, though 
none held socio-economic factors as the primary cause. Scraton points out 
that impoverished members of society have rarely displayed little more 
than a ‘grudging acceptance’ of the police.16 This may perhaps be 
explained by the image of the police as representing a state in which the 
community has little or no stake. 
 
Police Racism 
Much ink has been spilled in analysing police culture and its inherent 
racism. That which Lord Scarman believed to be the flaws of a few 
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individuals, Lord McPherson held to be ‘institutionalised’.17 While views 
differ on the causes and effects of racism in the police, its existence as part 
of police culture is generally agreed.18 
‘Institutional racism’ is perhaps best defined by the Home 
Secretary’s comments on the Lawrence Inquiry as “procedures, practices 
and a culture that tend to exclude or to disadvantage non-white people”.19 It 
is a particularly abusive manifestation of what Kleinig calls the ‘Us-Them’ 
divide: the police, the ‘good guys’ are ‘Us’, and criminals are ‘Them’.20 
Police racism tends to view all non-white people as ‘Them’.  
The Home Secretary’s formulation is useful because it recognises the 
role that culture plays in an institution such as the police. In a recent 
‘appreciation’ of police culture, Waddington claims that police stereotyping 
and prejudice may be explained as a means of neutralising moral dilemmas. 
He claims there is a disjunction between police culture and police action.21 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, not always the most 
vociferous critic of the police, rejects this, and finds a clear link between 
culture and action.22 Nevertheless, that police in Moss Side marched 
through the streets chanting “nigger, nigger, nigger, oi, oi, oi” is hardly 
indicative of multicultural tolerance.23 Furthermore, the absence of racial 
diversity in the police itself has long been a cause for concern.24 
Finally, culture is not monolithic, and there are differences between 
‘street culture’ and ‘management culture’.25 Despite this, racial prejudice 
has been found at the uppermost echelons of police hierarchy,26 most 
vividly demonstrated by the remarks of Sir Kenneth Newman that 
“Jamaicans… are constitutionally disposed to be anti-authority”. 27 
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Whether or not a disjunction exists between culture and the causes of 
police action, there is ample evidence that police officers of all ranks are 
prejudiced, both in their private conversations and public actions. 
 
Increased Use of Technology 
The third part of Lea and Young’s breakdown is the increasing use of 
technology by society.28 Citing John Alderson,29 former police chief of 
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, they describe police radios, patrol cars, 
and computer systems as being part of ‘military policing’. Twenty years 
later, this argument appears rather jaded. It would be unrealistic to expect 
the ‘bobby on the beat’ in 2006 to be equipped as he was in 1976: with 
truncheon and notebook. Policing should enjoy technological advances just 
as all other occupations do (not least criminals!). 
Despite this caveat, it is foolish to ignore the effect that technological 
advances have on a relationship: in this case the police-community one. 
Increased reliance on technology has lessened dependence on information 
harvested from a willing public.30 Furthermore, the opportunity to obtain 
that information was diminished by what Alderson describes as ‘reactive’ 
policing, made possible by police vehicles. By staying inside patrol cars, 
attending to the public only in response to an incident, police became 
estranged from their communities, and lost the contact that provided 
important information.31 
 
Criminalisation Explained 
The process of criminalisation is easier to explain in hindsight. The period 
in question was the height of Britain’s love affair with Thatcherism, and 
her obsession with the individualism. Those who suffered from the system 
were marginalised and defined out of citizenship. Marginalised social strata 
were not new to the 1970’s. There have always been those left for the 
police to deal with, be they Peel’s ‘criminals classes’,32 or Reiner’s ‘police 
property’ and ‘rubbish’.33 Furthermore, the police have always used 
stereotypes; racism is an abusive incarnation of that inherent tendency. 
Technological advances made it possible to rely on stereotypes, which 
affect statistics, which in turn influence further prejudicial action. 
This gave rise to a perception that public safety was at risk. 
McLaughlin cites the 1970’s as the time when society began to perceive 
young black men as a serious problem. Sensationalist media coverage 
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fuelled irrational public fear of crime.34 As Lea and Young demonstrate, 
the chattering classes had little to fear from the ‘muggers’ they despised. 
This did not prevent them from pressuring the police to ‘do something’ 
about the problem.35 
 
 
Paramilitarism and Disaffection 
 
Having labelled marginalised communities as crime-ridden, police were 
under strong pressure to deal with the problem. During the course of 
Swamp ’8136, 943 people were stopped and 118 arrested. Special Patrol 
Groups were deployed, and ‘sus laws’37 were widely used. This was, in 
former Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford’s words, ‘hard policing’. 38 Before 
considering how these actions affected police-community relations, it is 
necessary to examine if they were truly paramilitary in nature. 
Community policing, the oft cited the utopian model, is something of 
an ethereal concept which can mean many things to many people. The 
traditional British philosophy is of a small force working with public 
support – ‘consensual policing’.39 The purpose of such a police force is not 
to impose law and order on the public, but to foster self-policing by the 
public. ‘Community’ and ‘paramilitary’ models, while being difficult to 
define, are also ideal-type models.40 As Waddington points out, what is 
occurring in Britain is a ‘drift towards paramilitary policing’, and so any 
particular aspect of policing may be examined to see where it lies between 
these two extremes.  
Saturation operations attempt to deter crime by increasing the 
statistical likelihood that an offender will be caught. Strength in numbers is 
a military tactic; one that Waddington claims is often required to maintain 
public order.41 In Bowling and Foster’s typology, a ‘show of force’ is an 
aspect of the military model of policing.42 Therefore, Swamp ’81 and 
similar operations are examples of the use of paramilitary tactics. 
Special Patrol Groups43 (SPGs) are the most obviously paramilitary 
aspect of British policing. SPGs form the focus of Jefferson’s seminal 
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critique of paramilitary policing,44 and were deployed in Brixton several 
times in the late 1970’s. The Special Patrol Group, of twenty-two 
policemen in total, is deployed as a squad under superior command. 
International commentators classify them as paramilitary units without 
hesitation.45 
The effect of a squad system and quasi-military activity on police 
culture cannot be ignored. Police culture already suffers from machismo.46 
Specialist paramilitary police sub-culture exacerbates this.47 Kraska and 
Cubellis note that the military model fosters the ‘we-them’ attitude, acts as 
a barrier to community relations, and promotes a warlike attitude.48 The 
effect is that these groups, generally deployed in hostile situations, view 
themselves as imposing peace, rather than fostering it. As one Brixtonian 
noted: “there’s a lot of boys, all psyched up…they want action”.49 
Waddington argues that paramilitary structures reduce police 
discretion, by deploying a tightly knit unit, rather than individual officers.50 
This is contestable. To begin, the decision to deploy is an exercise of 
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police attempted to get to grips with what they saw as rampant drug 
culture.55 
It is clear that in each instance the police moved away from the 
model of consensual policing, towards the ‘hard’ paramilitary ideal. While 
some may not agree that the policing was paramilitary in nature, police 
actions certainly tended towards that model. Whether it was in the culture 
and operational tactics of the SPGs or in the aggression of other officers, 
police were there to ‘impose’ the law. The discretion granted by the ‘sus 
laws’ – the Vagrancy Act 1864 - provided ample scope for legal, abusive 
action. Those abuses are well documented, and lie at the heart of public 
dissatisfaction.56 
 
The Community’s Response 
It is worth recalling that in marginalised areas, police always enjoy far less 
support than in more affluent neighbourhoods.57 Lea and Young’s case is 
blind to the lack of police legitimacy before the shift toward 
paramilitarism.58 Despite this, an argument can be made that such a shift 
worsens police-community relations, and the change from acceptance, 
however grudging, to opposition is an important one. 
There is no shortage of evidence of dissatisfaction with the police 
amongst young black people. Scarman found this to be the primary cause 
of the Brixton riots.59 Silverman could not recall one member of that 
demographic who did not mention police abuse.60 Hytner described the 
beliefs of police prejudice as ‘deep rooted’ in the minds of Moss Side 
youths.61 This cannot merely be dismissed as youth rebellion against 
authority, as it was more pronounced in black youths than in youths 
generally, and focussed specifically on the police. The effect of alienation 
is most noteworthy in Handsworth, where in the space of four years, the 
police went from integrated members of the community to hate figures.62 
That this alienation was a new development is clear when one 
considers the attitudes of older members of the community. Scarman and 
Silverman both found evidence of police operations damaging their 
relationship with community leaders.63 The Special Patrol Groups in 
Brixton were particularly culpable. Because of this, youth opposition to 
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police excesses was bolstered by the community’s shared experience of 
racial discrimination in wider life.64 
Furthermore, the ‘citizen in uniform’ image is undermined by 
‘tooling up’ – the most obvious manifestation of paramilitary policing. The 
vans used by Special Patrol Groups “created an air of menace and 
symbolised an abrasive policing style that was spoken of in terms of 
fear”.65 On the other hand, plainclothes officers (used in Swamp ’81) break 
Peel’s promise of visible police officers, and represent an ‘espionage’ 
model of policing. Both tactics further undermine trust in the police. 
To return to the ‘Us-Them’ divide, just as the police begun to view 
the policed as an ‘enemy’, the public also saw police as working against 
rather than with them. Thus, the idea of the police reinforcing social 
controls evaporates, and is replaced with one of the police imposing a 
particular control. The language of the U.S. National Commission reporting 
on the 1967 riots in that country echoes well here: “police have come to 
symbolise white power, white racism, and white repression”.66 The 
perception of the police imposing a particular order, rather than 
maintaining public order, is damaging to their impartiality. 
The result of diminished trust was a drying up of information 
flowing from the public, disenfranchisement from the establishment that 
imposed the order, and collective resistance to the exercise of police power. 
When information ceased to flow to the police from the public, officers’ 
actions were even more ill informed. It is at this point that the cycle 
referred to by Bowling and Phillips,67 as envisaged by Lea and Young, 
begins to reinforce itself.68 
One must consider whether the cycle is inevitable in any event – that 
marginalised communities will oppose police presence no matter how 
benign. Evidence would suggest that is not the case. Despite the 
unrepresentative nature of the force, policing in Handsworth ‘worked’ 
under Superintendent Burton and his predecessor, David Webb.69 Specific 
police decisions damaged police-community relations: the deployment of 
SPGs in Brixton; the conduct of aggressive drugs raids in Birmingham and 
widespread ‘hard policing’ in all three locales. These actions subscribe to 
paramilitary ethos, and all contributed to the subsequent disorders. 
Furthermore, such actions cannot be justified as a ‘necessary evil’. 
Contrary to intentions, saturation police operations, and the employment of 
paramilitary police units, displaces rather than reduces crime.70 Operational 
failure only matches public anxiety with police frustration and heightens 
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tension in the community. As the situation deteriorates, tension reaches 
fever pitch, and the wheels must eventually come off. When it did in the 
1980’s, it was in the form of widespread public disorder. 
 
 
Public Disorder and State Legitimacy 
 
The riots in Brixton, Moss Side and Birmingham were each the subject of 
much debate and political discussion. Arguments about their causes were 
hampered by the Prime Minister’s view that explanation amounted to 
excuse.71 It is clear from the above analysis that the rioting was the result of 
the eventual eruption of high tension between the police and the 
communities they policed. This section seeks to explain how that tension 
boiled over and rioting broke out. 
 
The Causes of Riot 
It is difficult to ascertain why a group of otherwise orderly citizens will 
perpetrate an act of violent public disorder. Little evidence exists to provide 
a window into the thought processes of the crowd at the time of rioting. 
Furthermore, a crowd may contain rioters with multiple motivations, not all 
of them shared with other rioters. Finally, rioters are often slow in coming 
forward to explain their actions –due either to shame or a fear of 
prosecution. Nevertheless, commentators have posited several theories to 
predict when a crowd will riot, and when it will not. 
Le Bon’s theory of rioting, as developed by twentieth century 
psychologists, is that of ‘frustration-aggression’. It claims that a crowd, 
once frustrated enough, will eventually erupt into random acts of 
aggression.72 Though seemingly sensible, this theory fails to distinguish 
why some events become disorderly, and others do not. 
The ‘riff-raff’ theory – that disorder is the result of criminal classes 
causing trouble – seems rooted in the same prejudiced logic that views 
certain communities as inherently criminal. While demonstrations and 
disorder may attract some unsavoury characters, there is little evidence that 
any of those cited were instigated by outsiders.73 The ‘ballot-box’ view on 
the other hand, which says that aggrieved persons riot to remedy injustices,  
may impute too much common purpose in a disparate collection of human 
minds.74 As Silverman notes, if this was the cause of the riots, the message 
delivered may not have been the one intended.75 The difficulty with each of 
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these theories is that of over-simplification: viewing a large group of 
aggrieved people as having a singular consciousness. 
David Waddington offers the flashpoint model to explain outbreaks 
of disorder.76 His theory is based on a multi-level analysis of public 
disorder by which a context is created for high tension between a particular 
alienated group on the one hand, and the police on the other. The final 
stage is the ‘interactional level’, where the flashpoint – a particularly 
aggressive encounter – occurs. If the flashpoint is seen as symbolic of a 
shared grievance, disorder breaks out. 
This model can be applied to the 1980’s disorders. In Brixton in 
1981, the ‘flashpoint’ was the overzealous search and arrest of a taxi 
driver.77 In Birmingham, it was an ill-handled traffic incident.78 The Moss 
Side riots tell a slightly different tale. Hytner concluded that the carnival 
turned disorderly due to a common belief that “trouble was inevitable” 
(Providing some evidence for Le Bon’s theory).79 However, the outbreak of 
police-community violence occurred after a police line broke and a number 
of officers attacked the crowd.80 Riot, it would seem, is prompted time and 
time again by police action.81 
 
Policing the Disorders 
Policing protest is a dangerous business, both for the individual officers, 
and – as we shall see – for the state they represent. Mass protest plays an 
important part in democracy, deriving from the rights to free expression 
and assembly. In the case of the disorders in Brixton, the usual difficulty of 
police impartiality was exacerbated as the police themselves were the 
subject of the protest.  
A stand-off of sorts took place in Moss Side. Hytner reports that 
police made little or no attempt to disperse the crowd, and attempts by third 
parties to do so were not aided by senior officers. Eventually police 
charged the crowd and used vans driving at high speed to attack protestors. 
Somewhat unsatisfactorily, the Hytner Report does not assess operational 
efficacy, as the Committee believed themselves ill equipped to do so.82 
They did find sufficient evidence to suggest that police over-reacted to the 
situation. 
Perhaps the most damning case was that of the Birmingham riots. 
Occurring four years after the Scarman Report, one might have expected 
the Lord’s word, much lauded as it was, to have been implemented. 
Northam notes that police chiefs quoted section 5, paragraph 72 
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evangelically.83 This was the section recommending police preparations for 
public disorder. However, when the time came to police the growing unrest 
in Birmingham, the police were found to have poor training, ill-fitting 
equipment, and disastrous intelligence.84 
Jefferson and Waddington have traded many verbal blows over the 
efficacy of paramilitary policing of public order. Unfortunately, that debate 
has been hampered by the desire of both commentators to interpret facts in 
a manner that aids their argument. The flaws of the scholarship aside, the 
three disorders under scrutiny do not easily fit into the parameters of that 
debate. Police were not refereeing conflict; they were participating in it. 
Nevertheless, the policing of the Handsworth/Lozells riots highlights the 
danger of attempting to implement paramilitary policing in a liberal 
democratic state: doing it badly. 
The success of paramilitary policing, in Waddington’s eyes, lies in 
the superior training of the officers, their deployment as a unit, and their 
superior command and control.85 In reality, this may never be the case. 
Struggles between Chief Constables and police authorities may prevent the 
acquisition of equipment, or the provision of training.86 Where the Home 
Office overrules local authority, questions of democratic accountability 
come to the fore.87 
Even if it were possible to militarise the police, it would be 
operationally undesirable. Police are ill equipped to act like soldiers: they 
do not have the luxury of seeing rioters as enemies; their role is to diffuse 
violence situations, not to engage in them. Waddington recognises that no 
plan survives contact with the enemy,88 but fails to realise that police 
cannot call in artillery support if the battle goes awry. ‘Tooling-up’ 
dehumanises the police, making it easier for protestors to reconcile 
themselves with acting violently towards officers of the law. Jefferson’s 
central criticism, that paramilitary policing tends to amplify disorder, is 
borne out in the instant cases.89  
 
Police and State Legitimacy 
As Rousseau, Locke, and countless others have intoned, the 
legitimacy of the state derives from the social contract; the principle of 
government by consent.90 The state possesses a monopoly on the use of 
coercive force within particular territorial boundaries and that force is 
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largely the preserve of the police. It may be described as the core of the 
police function.91 
Public protest itself, and even public disorder, does not necessarily 
pose problems to state legitimacy, it is one of the mechanisms by which 
consent or dissatisfaction may be expressed.92 However, as it usually 
signals that the state is failing some of its citizens in some way, the policing 
of mass protest is a delicate operation if state legitimacy is to be 
maintained.93 
Jefferson, in discussing the Peterloo protest of 1822, claims that the 
involvement of the military in internal civil strife is itself indicative of 
failed democracy.94 It may be imputed then that the ‘drift towards 
paramilitarism’ in a civilian police force represents a similar failure. 
Further analysis demonstrates the full extent of the failure. 
In policing protest, the police must be careful not to deny the public 
their right to express themselves. However, this is problematic when the 
protest is violent. If the protest amounts to rebellion, then public consent to 
be policed is withdrawn. The police role becomes that of protecting the 
security of the state, and so they lose their impartiality and legitimacy as 
servants of the law.  
Despite Lord Scarman’s fears, the police in Brixton were not the thin 
blue line between state and anarchy,95 and a march on Westminster was 
unlikely.96 The difficulty in terms of legitimacy was that the public sought 
the withdrawal of police from the Brixton area.97 Refusal by the police to 
withdraw amounted to the imposition of force without consent, and so 
police presence was morally illegitimate. On the other hand, had the police 
withdrawn, the state’s control over that area of the metropolis would 
evaporate, making it a ‘no-go’ area – a ‘failed local state’. This quandary is 
made even more impossible in Birmingham, where police were criticised 
for at first adopting a ‘no-profile’, rather than ‘low-profile’ in the area in 
the hours leading up to the riot.98 The public wanted a police force, but not 
an oppressive one. 
Paramilitary policing is particularly damaging in this regard, as it 
increases the likelihood that the public will reject the police presence. The 
evidence for this may be found throughout the accounts of the disorders. 
Paramilitary structures are top-down and anti-democratic. ‘Command and 
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control’ may be a euphemism for authoritarian. The sub-culture Jefferson 
observed in Special Patrol Groups was not unlike that of a military platoon 
patrolling a colony.99 The deployment of such forces in times when 
democracy has already been undermined is haunted with the dangerous 
symbolism of totalitarianism: rows and rows of military-style police, 
seeking to suppress the community and impose order. 
 
 
What Kind of Police Force for Britain… 
 
In the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight, the commentaries that 
immediately followed the 1980’s urban riots appear flawed. Both 
academics on the ‘Left’, and Britain’s ethnic minorities themselves were 
divided as to their causes. Lea and Young’s contribution suffered from 
historic myopia, failing to appreciate the permanence of a ‘criminal Other’ 
in capitalist societies. Scraton’s critique of their work seems indicative of 
Liberals’ struggle to cope with the ideological domination of Thatcherism. 
The interdependence of the Scarman, Hytner and Silverman Reports 
is worth noting. They represent the ‘official take’ on the riots. While the 
Scarman Report was universally heralded as a doctrinal document, even the 
Lord’s oeuvre had its shortcomings. It failed to truly understand the nature 
of police racism, a failing perpetuated by the establishment until the 
Macpherson Report in 1999. Furthermore, it provided the ACPO with the 
basis to roll out their Public Order Manual – a document drawn up and 
implemented without the slightest parliamentary oversight.100  
Despite the limitations of the early literature, it is clear that Bowling 
and Phillips’ ‘vicious circle’ is all too real. The role of paramilitary 
policing in it is less clear. At no point did policing in the cases cited meet 
the standards set by Waddington to be classified as purely paramilitary. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the paramilitary tendency that was evident in 
the early 1980’s played a crucial role in precipitating the riotous events that 
followed. Hard policing – through the role of the SPG, for example – was 
part of mix of factors that led to the riots and a specific police intervention 
was the trigger to the disorders. Though the riots may not have been 
policed in a purely paramilitary fashion, they did prompt further calls for 
militarisation of public order policing. 
In the time that has elapsed since those volatile years, the march 
towards a ‘law and order’ society101 has continued apace. Blairism, it 
seems, has picked up where Thatcherism left off. Many of the problems 
that afflicted policing in 1981 still exist today. Under-representation of 
ethnic minorities in the police force is as real today as it was when Lord 
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Scarman made his plea. Despite a 50% increase in ethnic minority staff 
since 1999, the force is still largely unrepresentative of the public it 
serves.102 
DeMichele and Kraska argue that paramilitary and community 
models are being fused in a synergetic fashion.103 Their theory, if equally 
accurate in Britain, presents a frightening scenario of repressive policing. It 
requires police to do exactly that which one officer present at the 
Broadwater Farm riot found impossible: “we can’t pat kids on the head one 
day and then shoot with plastic bullets the next”.104  
That most-discussed police power, the stop and search, is once more 
at the forefront of public debate. Stop and searches of Asian persons 
increased twelve fold after the July 7th terrorism attacks.105 Even prior to 
that atrocity, black and Asian persons were more likely to be stopped under 
terrorism legislation than their white counterparts.106 Policing in 2006 
operates within the context of a “war on terrorism”. It seeks once more a 
scapegoat, an ‘Other’ upon whom blame can be loaded. What was once the 
role of the criminal classes, the Irish, and then black communities,107 now 
appears to be falling to Britain’s Asian and Middle Eastern communities.  
The words of one Metropolitan Police Authority member are all too 
familiar: “random stops deter no one and alienate … large numbers of 
people”.108 In his recent Dimbleby Lecture109, Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police described policing as too important to leave to 
police chiefs alone. He has called for public debate on British policing. 
That debate we should be mindful of the errors of the past, least it pave the 
way for the riots of the future. 
 
…and what kind of force for Ireland? 
Travelling back across the Irish Sea, one can only hope that the lessons 
being slowly learned in Britain are assimilated more quickly here. Dublin 
2006 is of different lineage to Brixton 1981 or Birmingham 1985; we 
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should be naturally hesitant in transferring truths from one socio-legal 
context to another. However, the Dublin 2006 riot should serve as a 
warning for all those interested in preserving peaceful protest as a tool of 
Irish democracy. In recent years, the Patten Report into policing north of 
the border has revolutionised the Police Service of Northern Ireland.110 In 
the south, Conway notes that the Garda Síochána Act 2005 was described 
by the Minister for Justice as  
 
[T]he first major revision of the operation of the Garda 
Síochána since the foundation of the State and will support the 
efficient and effective operation and administration of the 
Garda Síochána in the twenty first century.111 
 
If that prophesy is to be fulfilled, the Gardaí, and all of Irish society, 
should be cognisant of the mistakes made elsewhere. As Ireland develops 
in the twenty first century, the tensions between the two traditions on the 
isle, and the ever-more cosmopolitan face of our country will present fresh 
challenges to the ‘guardians of the peace’. 
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Introduction 
 
Noise is one of the great banes of technological advance. Aircraft noise is a 
prime example of this, only emerging in the last century as a major 
contributor to ambient noise pollution levels.1 Excessive noise can have 
profound negative effects on humans, physical, psychological and social. 
Balanced against these costs are the benefits of the aeroplane as a form of 
transport, which has helped to open up many global and socio-cultural 
frontiers, along with the revenue the air transport industry brings into the 
economy. The subject of aircraft noise is particularly relevant at this time 
as Dublin Airport is set to construct a new parallel runway2, which will 
increase the amount of air traffic in the area by over 100,000 movements 
by 2020. This article focuses on aircraft noise pollution and examines the 
impact of such pollution. The effects of noise on health, land values, social 
capital, education and communications are considered. The article 
examines the roles of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), the European Union, national law and national aviation authorities 
in the legal regulation of aircraft noise pollution. Finally, it assesses the 
constitutional and human rights basis for any legal challenge to excessive 
aircraft noise. 
 
 
What is Noise?  
 
Noise is any unwanted sound and thus contains a subjective element.3 The 
EC defined noise as “a number of tonal components disagreeable to man 
and intolerable to him because of discomfort, fatigue, agitation and, in 
some cases, pain it causes”.4 Sound is the auditory sensation caused by the 
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perception of waves of fluctuating pressure disturbances which propagate 
from a solid vibrating in air5. Human response to sound varies with its 
intensity, frequency and duration. Sound intensity is measured as a 
logarithmic ratio6 in decibels7 (dB), while frequency is measured in hertz 
(Hz). Low frequencies will produce little response even at moderately high 
decibels. The range of human hearing varies with age. Children and young 
adults are able to hear between 16-20,000 Hz,8 with the greatest sensitivity 
occurring at 4 kHz9 (though the ear is highly responsive to frequencies 
between 1-5 kHz)10 The range of audible sound pressure is 0-140 dB. On 
this scale, an increase of 10 dB is perceived as a doubling of the loudness 
of the sound. A soft whisper at five feet from the source is 30 dB and a jet 
at take-off at 200 feet is 125 dB11.  
Various rating scales have been derived.12 The noise rating scheme 
adopted for the grant of noise certificates under the Chicago Convention 
and in Irish law is the effective perceived noise level (expressed in units of 
EPNdB). This is an average of noise levels at certain points, but it takes 
into account hearing irritation and the tonal content of the noise. Two of the 
most frequently used aircraft noise rating scales are LAmax and LAeq(T). 
LAmax measures the maximum A-weighted sound-pressure level 
(i.e. the loudest noise occurring within a given timeframe) and is used to 
measure the maximum sound pressure of an aircraft noise event. This can 
be very appropriate in assessing the possibility of disturbance to sleep due 
to impulsive or repeated instances of noise. 
Alternatively, LAeq(T) (where T=Time) may be used. This provides 
the average of aircraft noise events during a period of time, rather than 
simply a figure for a single noise event. As observed by O’Kelly, it “offers 
the advantage that it incorporates both amplitude and time.”13 A 16-hour 
LAeq index is now favoured by most states in Europe, although it may 
generate a low value where only a few aircraft noise events have occurred. 
Both the LAeq(T) and the LAmax are recommended by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) to calculate aircraft noise. Other rating scales include 
Lden (day-evening-night level), which is prescribed by Directive 2002/49.14 
                                                     
5 Goldstein, “Fundamental Concepts in Sound Measurement” in Lipscomb ed., Noise and 
Audiology, (University Park Press, 1978), at 4. See also Adams and McManus, Noise and Noise 
Law: A Practical Aroach (Wiley Chancery Law, 1994) at 5. 
6 Level (in dB) = 10 log (P²/ Po ²) = 20 log (P/ Po ) 
7 Adams and Mc Manus, op. cit., at 12. 
8 Goldstein, loc. cit., at 6-7. 
9 Adams and McManus, op. cit., at 25. 
10 Adams and McManus, op. cit., at  25. 
11 Goldstein, loc. cit., at 17. See also McEldowney and McEldowney, op. cit., Table 13.1. See 
Dunton v. Dover District Council [1977] QB 87 per Griffiths J. 
12 See O’Kelly, “Assessment of Environmental Noise” (1994) 1 (3) Irish Planning and 
Environmental Law Journal 99. 
13 See O’Kelly, loc. cit. 
14 Article 5. 
158 Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
Aircraft Noise15 
 
There are two sources of aeroplane noise – the engines and the aircraft 
frame16. There are two main types of engine, jet and piston engines. 
Propeller-driven aircraft are much quieter than jet aircraft but the tonal 
sounds generated can be more annoying. The noise from older jet aircraft is 
caused by the violent reaction of the exhaust gases as they mix with the 
surrounding air. 
 Modern aircraft use turbofans that surround the exhaust. They 
reduce the velocity of the airflow by allowing some of the air to bypass the 
engine’s combustion chamber. The fan itself causes much noise, especially 
during take-off and landing. The bigger the fan, the more the noise of the 
reaction is reduced, but the greater the noise of the fan. Therefore, a high 
bypass ratio turbofan engine may still be as noisy as aircraft with smaller 
turbofans around their exhausts. While jet engines also produce other forms 
of ultrasonic noise, these forms are not audible, although they can have a 
number of non-auditory effects such as vibrating hairs in the air or nasal 
cavity17.  
 Noise and flight track monitoring has been introduced at Dublin 
Airport in order to facilitate the full environmental impact assessment of 
noise in the area. Such procedures have been recommended by the WHO 
and are required by the Environmental Noise Regulations 200618, which 
bring Directive 2002/49 into Irish law. The conclusion in the 
Environmental Impact Statement, submitted as part of the planning 
application for the new runway, was that the “impact on human health of 
the changes will be minimal” owing to the low population and the lack of 
vulnerable populations in the area19.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 See Kratovil, “The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990: Superfluous Hurdle for Airport 
Proprietors who have assured Federal Grants” (2004) 12 Penn St. Environmental Law Review 
499, Burns, Noise and Man, (2nd ed., John Murray, 1973) chapter 13, Powers, “Aircraft Noise 
Generation and Control: Noise Around Airports in Sáenz and Stephens eds., Noise Pollution: 
Effects and Control (John Wiley & Sons, 1986) at 343, Bronzaft, Ahern, McGinn, O’Connor 
and Savino, “Aircraft Noise: A Potential Health Hazard” (1998) 30 Environment and Behaviour 
101 and Anthrop, Noise Pollution (Lexington Books, 1973) chapter 6 and 83. 
16
 See Abeyratne, “Aircraft Engine Emissions and Noise” (1994) 24 Environmental Policy & 
Law 238 at 241. 
17 Burns, op. cit., at 344. 
18 SI 140 of 2006. 
19 Parkman, “Dublin Airport Environmental Impact Statement: Northern Parallel Runway” 
December 2004, Part 1 Non-Technical Summary, at 5. 
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The Impact of Excessive Noise 
 
(a) Health20 
According to the Fifth Environmental Action Programme of the EU: “No 
person should be exposed to noise levels which endanger health and quality 
of life.” The European Court of Human Rights has accepted that excessive 
noise exposure may give rise to an action under article 8 of the Convention, 
observing: 
 
Article 8 protects the individual’s right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and correspondence. There is no explicit right in 
the Convention to a clean and quiet environment, but where an 
individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, 
an issue may arise under Article 8.21 
 
(i) Physical Effects 
 
Hearing Loss and Damage to Ears22 
Threshold shift occurs when the ear requires more sound pressure than 
normal for a particular frequency to produce audibility. It can be either 
temporary threshold shift (TTS) or permanent threshold shift (PTS)23. TTS 
of 10 dB at 4 kHz can occur after only five minutes of exposure to noise at 
1.2-2.4 Hz with a pressure level of 105 dB.24 A TTS of 30 dB results in a 
noticeable social handicap25. Noise-induced PTS will occur where there is 
exposure to high levels of noise for long periods26. Noise in excess of 130 
dB SPL for short periods will affect the structure of the inner ear27. The 
effect of noise can be more severe on the young and the old28. It is unlikely 
that aircraft noise in those in residential areas within a 69 dB contour would 
sustain any hearing loss from the increased aircraft noise levels resulting 
from the use of the new runway. 
 
                                                     
20 See generally, London Health Commission, Noise and Health: Making the Link (LHC, 2003). 
21 Hatton and Others v United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 338; (2003) 37 EHRR 28, para.96. See 
also Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 
172, § 40). 
22 See Loeb, Noise and Human Efficiency New York (Wiley, 1986), chapter 5, Ward, “Auditory 
After-Effects of Noise” in Sáenz and Stephens, op. cit.,, at 201 and Milne, Noise Pollution – 
Impact and Countermeasures (David and Charles, 1979) .68-81. 
23 See Melnick, “Temporary and Permanent Threshold Shift” in Lipscomb, op. cit., at 83 and 
Adams and McManus, op. cit., chapter3. 
24 Adams and McManus, op. cit., at 40-41. 
25 WHO, Noise Guidelines, available at http://www.who.int/docstore/peh/noise/Comnoise3.htm 
(visited on 19 August 2006) 
26 Adams and McManus, op. cit., 42-44. 
27 See Durrant, “Anatomic and Physiologic Correlates of the Effects of Noise on Hearing” in 
Lipscomb, op. cit., at 109. 
28 See Mills, “Effects of Noise on Young and Old People” in Lipscomb, op. cit., at 229. 
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Disruption and Interference with Sleep Patterns29 
Noise negatively impacts on sleep, with night flights causing both sleep 
deprivation and sleep disturbance. It can cause sleep stage changes30 by 
reducing the amount of REM (rapid-eye-movement) sleep a person 
receives.31 It can increase sleep latency periods (the length of the interval 
between being fully awake and falling asleep)32 although it has not be 
shown conclusively that aircraft noise increases sleep onset latency (the 
length of the interval between ‘lights out’ and falling asleep).33 The 
secondary effects include reduced perceived sleep quality, increased 
fatigue, depressed mood or well-being and decreased performance34. While 
physiological habituation35 is a relevant factor, no such habituation occurs 
for internal noise levels at 60 dB(A) and higher36. In addition, while 
habituation may affect awakenings, it does not alter the effects of noise on 
the heart rate nor the after-effects, e.g. perceived sleep quality, mood and 
performance37. 
The Fifth EC Environmental Action Programme requires noise levels 
of 65 db+ outdoors at night to be phased out and no increase in noise levels 
between 55-65 dB38.The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) suggests 
that <35 dB(A) is required for newborns to sleep39. According to the WHO, 
noise levels should not exceed 30 dB(A) for continuous noise and 45 
                                                     
29 See Griefahn, “Noise Pollution During the Night – A Possible Risk Factor for Health” in 
Sáenz and Stephens, op. cit., at 265 and Loeb, op. cit., at 154-160; See also Porter, Kershaw and 
Ollerhead, Adverse Effects of Night-time Aircraft Noise, R&D Report 9964, March 2000, 
available at http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/ERCD9964.PDF (visited on 19 August 2006) 
30 Berglund and Lindvall, Community Noise, Document Prepared for the WHO, (1995) 2(1) 
Archives of the Centre for Sensory Research, Stockholm University and Karolinska Institute 
31 Carter, “Transportation Noise, Sleep and After-Effects,” (1996) 22(1) Environmental 
International 105. 
32 WHO, Guidelines for Community Noise (WHO, Geneva, 1999). 
33 Hume, Van and Watson, Effects of Aircraft Noise on Sleep: EEG-Based Measurements 
(Department of Biological Sciences, Manchester Metropolitan University, June 2003) available 
at  
http://www.cate.mmu.ac.uk/documents/Publications/CAAreport0603.pdf  (visited on 19 August 
2006) 
34 Guidelines for Community Noise, 1999, citing inter alia, Öhrström, “Research on Noise and 
Sleep since 1988: Present State” in Vallet ed., Noise as a Public Health Problem (INRETS, 
1993) vol.3 331. See also Bonnet, “Sleep Deprivation” in Kryger, Roth, Dement eds., Principles 
and Practice of Sleep Medicine, (2nd ed., WB Saunders Co., 1994) at 50-67. 
35 See Griefahn, “Long Term Exposure to Noise: Aspects of Adaption, Habituation and 
Compensation” (1977) 1 Waking Sleeping 383. 
36 Adams and Mc Manus, op. cit., at 99. 
37 Öhrström and Björkman, “Effects of Noise Disturbed Sleep – A Laboratory Study on 
Habituation and Subjective Noise Sensitivity” (1988) 122 Journal of Sound and Vibration 277. 
38 See Kiss and Shelton, Manual of European Environmental Law (2nd ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) at 466-467. 
39 American Academy of Pediatrics, “Noise: A Hazard to Fetus and Newborns” (1997) 100(4) 
Pediatrics 724, available at http://aaolicy.aaublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;100/4/724.pdf  
(visited on 19 August 2006). 
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dB(A) for intermittent noise40 indoors at night-time. From the Parkman 
analysis of the predicted noise contour levels at Dublin Airport, taking into 
account the reduction in noise from the external walls of the house with 
closed windows, it is clear that some residential areas (inc. Fosterstown 
South, Barberstown and Kingstown) will be subject to indoor night-time 
noises above this level. While sleeping with all the windows shut may 
reduce the impact of external noise by 15dB(A), the WHO has observed 
that individuals should be able to sleep with the window slightly opened. 
Thus the reduction from closed windows is not a definitive factor. 
Contradictory studies exist regarding the impact of aircraft noise on 
sleep. So while a 1994 study suggests that there is no clear connection 
between aircraft noise and sleep disturbance41, other studies have found a 
link but no major disturbance42, although a more recent study suggests that 
community exposure to aircraft noise and the health indicators of poor 
general health status (use of sleep medication, and use of medication for 
cardiovascular diseases) are linked43. Curfews on night-time flights have in 
some measure assisted with this problem and the WHO has recommended 
that night-time movements be discouraged where they negatively impact on 
residential areas. 
 
Cardiovascular and Other Physiological Effects44 
Noise can increase “heart rate, peripheral vascular resistance, cause 
changes in blood pressure, blood viscosity and blood lipids and shifts in 
electrolyte balance (Mg/Ca) and hormonal levels (epinephrine, 
norepinephrine, cortisol)”45. Noise levels exceeding 65-70 dB for LAeq 
                                                     
40 WHO, Guidelines for Community Noise, 1999. According to Vallet and Vernet, intermittent 
noise levels should not be in excess of 45 dB LAmax more than 10-15 times per night, in “Night 
Aircraft Noise Index and Sleep Research Results” in Laurence ed., The Cost of Noise (Noise 
Control Foundation, Poughkeepsie, 1991) Volume 1, at 207-210. 
41 Horne, “A Field Study of Sleep Disturbance: Effects of Aircraft Noise and Other Factors on 
5,742 Nights of Actimetrically Monitored Sleep in a Large Subject Sample” (1994) 17 Sleep 
146-159. 
42 Flindell, Bullmore, Robertson, Wright, Turner, Birch, Jiggins, Berry, Davison and Dix, 
Aircraft Noise and Sleep – 1999 UK Trial Methodology Study, (Institute of Sound and Vibration 
Research Consultancy, 27th November 2000) at 33; DOT, Report of a Field Study of Aircraft 
Noise and Sleep Disturbance: A Study Commissioned by the Department of Transport, from the 
Department of Safety, Environment and Engineering (Civil Aviation Authority, December 
1992); Hume, Van and Watson, Supra; Porter and Rhodes, Aircraft Noise in London: Past, 
Present and Future (Environmental Research Consultancy Department, May 2001) available at  
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/68/Noise_London.pdf  (visited 19 August 2006). 
43 Franssen, Van Wiechen, Nagelkerke and Lebret, “Aircraft Noise Around a Large 
International Airport and its Impact on General Health and Medication Use” (2004) 61 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine 405. See also Muzet and Erhart, “Habituation of 
Heart-Rate and Finger Pulse Responses to Noise in Sleep” in Tobias et al ed.), Noise as a 
Public Health Problem (Rockville, Maryland, ASHA Report No.10, 1980). 
44 Babisch, “Epidemiological Studies of the Cardiovascular Effects of Occupational Noise – A 
Critical Aroach” (1998) 1 Noise & Health 24. 
45 WHO, Guidelines for Community Noise, 1999. 
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(06–22) can increase ischaemic heart disease, though other factors must be 
taken into account, such as the length of exposure and window-opening 
habits46. Gastrointestinal motility may also be elevated. Noise can increase 
fatigue, which has a negative impact on productivity, absenteeism and 
accidents in the workplace47. The AAP has concluded that exposure to 
excessive noise during pregnancy can result in the loss of high-frequency 
hearing in newborn infants and “may be associated with prematurity and 
intrauterine growth retardation”.48 A study by Ando found that increased 
rates of birth weights of <3kilogrammes occurred where mothers were 
exposed to increasing levels of noise from jet aircraft.49 
 
(ii) Psychological Effects50 
 
Mental Health51 
While there is no evidence to suggest that noise can directly cause mental 
illness, it can exacerbate a latent mental-health problem. The WHO has 
listed the symptoms of noise-induced mental states, including “anxiety; 
emotional stress; nervous complaints; nausea; headaches; instability; 
argumentativeness; sexual impotency; changes in mood; increase in social 
conflicts”52. While an early study showed a link between aircraft noise and 
mental-hospital admissions53, methodological flaws in it mar its 
reliability54. A later study seemingly confirming the original findings was 
made55 but the results could not be duplicated56. There is a great deal of 
academic debate in the area but there is nothing to confirm conclusively 
such a link.57.  
                                                     
46 WHO, Guidelines for Community Noise, 1999. 
47 Kjellberg, Muhr and Sköldström, “Fatigue After Work in Noise” (1998) 1 Noise and Health 
47-55. 
48 American Academy of Pediatrics, “Noise: A Hazard to the Fetus and Newborn” (1997) 
100(4) Committee on Environmental Health Pediatrics 724, available at 
http://aaolicy.aaublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;100/4/724.pdf (visited 19 August 2006). 
49 Ando, “Effects of Daily Noise on Fetuses and Cerebral Hemisphere Specialization in 
Children” (1988) 127 Journal of Sound and Vibration 411. 
50 See Jansen and Gres, “Non Auditory Effects of Noise: Physiological and Psychological 
Effects” in Sáenz and Stephens, op. cit., at .285. 
51 See Stansfield, Noise, Noise Sensitivity and Psychiatric Disorder: Epidemiological and 
Psychophysiological Studies Psychological Medicine. Monograph Su. (CCUP, 1992). 
52 WHO, Guidelines for Community Noise, 1999. 
53 Abey-Wickrama, A’Brook, Gattoni and Herridge, “Mental Hospital Admissions and Aircraft 
Noise” (1969) 633 Lancet 1275-1277. 
54 Chowns, “Mental Hospital Admissions and Aircraft Noise”, (1970) Lancet 1467. 
55 Jenkins, Tarnopolsky, Hand and Barker, “Comparison of Three Studies of Aircraft Noise and 
Psychiatric Hospital Admissions Conducted in the same Area” (1979) 9 Psychological Medicine 
681. 
56 Jenkins, Tarnopolsky and Hand, “Psychiatric Admissions and Aircraft Nose from London 
Airport” (1981) 11 Psychological Medicine 765. 
57Kryter, “Aircraft Noise and Social Factors in Psychiatric Hospital Admission Rates: a re-
examination of some data” (1990) 20 Psychological Medicine 395-411. 
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Stress and Annoyance58 
The WHO defines annoyance as “a feeling of displeasure evoked by 
noise”. Notwithstanding the difficulty in assessing annoyance, outdoor 
noise levels rising above LAeq 65 dB(A) cause considerable annoyance59. 
Research has shown that aircraft noise is more annoying than road-traffic 
noise even where the Ldn dB(A) (day-night equivalent noise level) was less 
than that of road traffic60. The Parkman analysis of 2004 asserts that those 
living between 63 dB(A) and 57dB(A) are aware but not significantly 
annoyed by aircraft noise61. The Committee on the Problem of Noise in 
1963 found that at noise levels of 57 dB(A) (35NNI), 35% of people were 
annoyed due to the interference with other sounds, 25% were kept from 
sleeping and 46% were woken up by noise at that level62. The EIS on the 
Northern Parallel Runway assessed annoyance at three levels: low 
annoyance (57 dB), moderate annoyance (63 dB) and high annoyance at 
(69 dB).63 The German Federal Environmental Agency (FEA) concluded 
that aircraft noise levels of 55 dB(A) during the day and 45 dB(A) at night 
reach the limits of ‘considerable annoyance’64. In its report, the FEA found 
that 35% of people were “significantly annoyed” by aircraft noise over 60 
dB (Leq). This rose to 85% of people surveyed at 65 dB (Leq), with over 
30% “unbearably annoyed”65. Annoyance levels are increased where the 
noise interferes with communication or television66. There is an argument 
that this is because of the sensitivity of individuals tested and not because 
of the level of exposure. However, research conducted by Van Kamp et al 
on the subject comes to a different conclusion: 
 
                                                     
58 See Bjorkman, Ahrlin and Rylander, “Aircraft Noise Annoyance and Average vs Maximum 
Noise Levels” (1992) 47(5) Archives of Environmental Health 326 and Bronzaft, Ahern, 
McGinn, O’Connor and Savino, “Aircraft Noise: A Potential Health Hazard” (1998) 30 
Environment and Behaviour 101. 
59 Nelson ed., “Summary Effects of Noise on Man” in Transportation Noise Reference Book 
(Butterworths, 1987). 
60 Report of the Noise Review Working Party (DOE, HMSO, London, 1990) and Hall, Birnie, 
Taylor and Palmer, “Direct Comparison of Community Reaction to Road Traffic Noise and to 
Aircraft Noise” (1981) 70 Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 1690. 
61 See the Fingal County Council, South Fingal Planning Study, Final Report (Sept. 2004), para. 
8.1.4. 
62 Findings cited by Burns, op. cit., at 314. 
63 See the Draft Dublin Airport Masterplan: Strategic Environmental Assessment, Figure 6.6 at 
55 for the 2003 Parkman noise annoyance contour map. 
64 Federal Environmental Agency, Fluglärmwirkungen (Effects of Aircraft Noise), (FEA, 2001) 
available for download at http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info-daten/daten/fluglaerm.htm 
(visited on 19 August 2006). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Gunn, Shigehisa and Shepherd “Annoyance responses to Spectrally Modified Recorded 
Aircraft Noise during Television Viewing” (1977) 17 Journal of Auditory Research 241-249. 
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The results of analysis support the hypothesis that noise sensitivity 
increases annoyance independently from, and above, level of noise 
exposure, after adjustment for relevant confounders. It can be 
concluded that noise and sensitivity are important and independent 
predictors of annoyance in all three studies across a range of cultures 
and climates…These findings were consistent across three studies, 
broadly suggesting that neither the cultural differences nor the 
different measures involved in these studies influenced the observed 
role of sensitivity.67 
 
Annoyance can also be caused in outdoor recreational areas from aircraft 
noise68 though a number of variables must be taken into account in 
assessing the impact, such as strength and duration of exposure. This will 
be of particular significance to users of golf courses, playgrounds and parks 
in the area surrounding Dublin Airport. Forest Little golf course, for 
instance, will lie within the 69 dB contour and is situated just north of the 
proposed runway. 
 
(b) Economic Costs 
There are two primary economic costs to aircraft noise: the diminution in 
land values surrounding airports as a consequence of the additional noise 
pollution and the cost to the national health system of those suffering from 
chronic aircraft noise exposure. In the US, an estimated 600,000 homes are 
affected severely by aircraft noise69. In Greensboro, for example, the 
average tax reduction in the tax value of homes in multiple flight paths 
compared to those in single flight paths is $2,140.53 per house.70 Balanced 
against these are the economic returns from a high level of air transport 
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economy73. However, Lief submits that this cost-benefit analysis is 
misplaced where Lockean rights theory is concerned74.  
 
(c) Social Capital75 
Social capital can be eroded where people are compelled to relocate owing 
to aircraft noise, such as the applicants in the Hatton v. UK case, and the 
development and growth of social capital in the areas worst affected by 
aircraft noise can be impeded. As Lief observes: 
 
[W]hen residential noise causes people to move, it can create a 
transient atmosphere that decreases the value of an entire 
neighbourhood.76 
 
 On the other hand, anecdotal evidence exists of residents in America 
choosing to remain in areas of high aircraft noise where high social capital 
does exist.77 So while aircraft noise may reduce social capital, areas with 
high levels of social capital may be able to encourage people to remain 
notwithstanding the noise. 
 
(d) Education and Communications 
Noise interferes with the effectiveness and intelligibility of speech.78 This 
can in itself lead to a number of stress reactions.79 It can be particularly 
detrimental to children.80 Wachs, Uzgiris and Hunt’s 1971 study of 102 
infants from 7-22 months found that noise levels impacted negatively on 
the development of speech and language.81 Exposure to traffic noise 
negatively affected speech discrimination and reading skills of children.82 
Such results have been confirmed in relation to aircraft noise by a more 
                                                     
73 Air Transport Association, “Annual Revenue and Earnings” available at 
http://www.airlines.org/econ/d.aspx?nid=1034 (visited 19 August 2006). 
74 Lief, “Insuring Domestic Tranquility with through Quieter Products: A Proposed Product 
Nuisance Tort” (1994-1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 595 at  604. 
75 See Wall, “Social Capital: To What Extent Can it be a Means to Achieve Sustainable 
Development in Planning and Development?” [2004] 7 Trinity College Law Review 80. 
76 Note: See Lief, loc. cit., at 603. 
77 Campbell, “Airport Noise: Aggravation and Acclimation” (1975) Psychology Today 118. 
78 See Webster, “Speech Interference Aspects of Noise” in Lipscomb ed., op. cit., at 193 and 
Tarnóczy, “Noise Interference with Oral Communication” in Sáenz and Stephens eds., op. cit., 
at 249. 
79 Lazarus, “Noise and Communication: The Present State” in Carter and Job (eds.). Noise as a 
Public Health Problem, (Noise Effects 1998, PTY Ltd., Sydney, 1998) volume 1 at 157-162. 
80 Mills, loc. cit., at 233. 
81 “Cognitive Development in Infants of Differential Age Levels and from Different 
Backgrounds” (1971) 17 Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behaviour and Development 288, 
findings cited by Mills, loc. cit.,  at 234. 
82 Cohen, Glass and Singer, “Apartment Noise, Auditory Discrimination and Reading Ability in 
Children” (1973) 9 Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology at 407, findings cited by 
Mills, loc. cit., at 234. See also Green, Pastenak and Shore, “Effects of Aircraft Noise on the 
Reading Ability of School-Age Children (1982) 1 Archives of Environmental Health 24. 
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recent study on children aged between 8 and 11 living around London 
(Heathrow) Airport subject to aircraft-noise exposure at levels of either 
(16:00 outdoor) Leq>66 dB(A) or (16:00 outdoor) Leq>57 dB(A). This 
study links chronic aircraft noise exposure to impaired reading 
comprehension, which “could not be accounted for by the mediating role of 
annoyance, confounding by social class, deprivation, main language or 
acute noise exposure”.83 Noise impacts negatively on concentration, 
memory retention and problem solving skills. In Cohen’s study in 1988, 
schoolchildren exposed to aircraft noise in Los Angeles had difficulty in 
proofreading and engaging in puzzles.84 House façades with closed 
windows reduce external noise by approximately 15 dB, so the ambient 
external sound level should be no greater than 55-60 dB(A).  
 
 
Regulation of Aircraft Noise 
 
(a) The Role of the International Civil Aviation Authority85 
This was established under the Convention for International Civil Aviation 
1944 (the Chicago Convention) in 1947.86 ICAO has issued a number of 
resolutions governing the international regulation of permissible aircraft 
noise levels. At the 33rd ICAO assembly, Resolution A33/7 was adopted, 
introducing the concept of a “balanced approach” to aircraft-noise 
management. The permissible levels of aeroplane noise are in Annex 16 of 
the Chicago Convention. Annex 16 originally set out three groups of 
aircraft – in chapters 1, 2 and 387. In June 2001, ICAO established more 
stringent standards for modern aeroplanes in Chapter 4 of the annex. 
Chapter 1 aircraft, such as the B 707 and DC-8, are the noisiest; they have 
been banned. Chapter 2 aircraft (e.g. Boeing 727, 737 and 747; DC-9 and 
DC-10) have been phased out in the EU and Canada and from 1st Apri1, 
2002 no longer operate at Community airports. All modern aircraft must 
meet Chapter 4 requirements. Chapter 3 aircraft are to be phased out over 
the next ten years. Annex 1688 is brought into effect in the Irish Aviation 
Authority (Noise Certification and Limitation) Orders 1984 to 1999.89 
                                                     
83 Haines, Stansfield, Berglund, Job and Head, “Chronic Aircraft Noise Exposure, Stress 
Responses, Mental Health and Cognitive Performance in School Children” (2001) 31 
Psychological Medicine 265. 
84 Cohen, Evans, Krantz and Stokols, “Psychological, Motivational, and Cognitive Effects of 
Aircraft Noise on Children” (1980) 35 American Psychologist 231 
85 See ICAO Secretariat, “Aircraft Noise: ICAO’s Existing Policies” (Proceedings of the 
Colloquium on Environmental Aspects of Aviation, Montreal 9-11 April 2001). 
86 See De Murias, The Economic Regulation of International Air Transport, (McFarland and Co. 
Inc., 1989) 44 -51. 
87 The Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) of the US use the term ‘stage’ in place of ‘chapter’. 
88 ICAO Volume 1, third edition, 1993. 
89 The Air Navigation (Noise Certification and Limitation) Order 1984 (SI No.13 of 1984) as 
amended by Irish Aviation Authority (Noise Certification and Limitation) (Amendment) Order 
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(b) The Role of the EU90 
The EU has a number of directives governing the noise levels of subsonic 
jet aircraft. These adopt the standards set down by ICAO and apply them 
internally, as in Council Directive 92/14/EEC91. The most recent measure, 
Directive 2002/30/EC, aims “to lay down rules for the community to 
facilitate the introduction of operating restrictions to limit or reduce the 
number of people significantly affected by the harmful effects of noise”. It 
incorporates the ‘balanced approach’ to noise management within 
Community law92. 
This is defined in Article 2(g) as “an approach under which Member 
States shall consider the available measures to address the noise problem at 
an airport in their territory, namely the foreseeable effect of a reduction of 
aircraft noise at source, land-use planning and management, noise 
abatement operational procedures and operating restrictions”. 
Directive 2002/30 has been implemented in Ireland.93 It defines 
marginally compliant aircraft (MCA) as those which meet the standards of 
chapter 3. Under article 6, rules are set down aimed at the withdrawal of 
MCA where the assessment of all available measures so require. Operators 
may then be required to reduce the movements of MCA at an annual rate of 
not more than 20% of the initial total of movements. Noise-sensitive city 
airports94 are free to impose stricter noise standards than are prescribed by 
the directive95, though the aircraft of developing nations can be exempt for 
up to ten years96. The directive introduces the American problem into EU 
airspace, whereby individual noise-sensitive airports can impose separate 
regulations, increasing the difficulties of airline operators. Krämer suggests 
that such airports are unlikely to introduce such regulations if the operators 
threaten to give their custom to another airport97.  
Another directive of interest in this area is Directive 2002/49 EC of 
June 25, 200298 as brought into law in the Environmental Noise 
                                                                                                                                                           
1999 (SI No.421 of 1999) 
90 See Davies and Goh, “EC Law on Aircraft Noise: Recent Developments” [1993] 2 European 
Environmental Law Review 229; Goh, “Problems of Transnational Regulation: A Case Study of 
Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Community” (1995) 23 Transportation Law Journal 
277; Scannell, Environmental and Land Use Law (Thomson Round Hall, 2005) at 895 and 
Ercmann, “Pollution Control in the European Community”, (Kluwer Law International, 1996). 
91 As amended. Brought into effect in Ireland in the European Communities (Restrictions of 
Civil Subsonic Jet Aeroplane Operations) Regulations 2003 
92 See article 4. 
93 SI No. 645 of 2003. 
94 Berlin-Tempelhof, Stockholm Bromma, London City and Belfast City airports. 
95 See article 6(2). 
96 Article 8. 
97 Ibid. 
98 OJ L 189, 18/07/2002 P 0012-0026. 
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Regulations 2006.99 This requires Member States to conduct strategic noise 
mapping100 showing, inter alia, major airports, which can enable a global 
assessment of noise exposure. This mapping must be reviewed and revised, 
if necessary, every five years and must comply with the requirements set 
down in annex VI of the directive. These procedures are voluntary in the 
US.101 Action plans must also be drawn up for major airports and both this 
and the noise maps are to be forwarded to the Commission. Proposals have 
also been made for a new directive to establish a framework for noise 
classification of civil subsonic aircraft in order to calculate noise charges.102  
 
(c) The Role of National Law 
Irish national law has incorporated Annex 16 and most of the relevant EU 
directives. However, environmental and planning areas of law also have an 
impact on airports. Appropriate zoning and application of the Planning and 
Development Act 2000 (PDA 2000) can reduce the number of houses 
subject to high levels of aircraft-noise exposure. So, for instance, under the 
Development Plan 2005-2011, the FCC’s objectives for Dublin Airport 
include the promotion of appropriate land-use patterns in the vicinity of the 
flight paths serving the airport, but at the same time to realise the optimal 
use of lands around the airport. Possible land uses around airports include 
uses as warehouses and as cemeteries. The latter has been done at 
Dardistown, on the old airport road, where Veronica Guerin was buried. 
The low-lying nature of installations on the land does not pose a risk to 
approaching aircraft, and there are no complaints about the noise. The 
Council plans to create a designated airport area and to zone lands in that 
area for uses integral and ancillary to the airport as such. One of the 
objectives of the plan is “to restrict residential development in areas likely 
to be affected by levels of aircraft noise inappropriate to residential use”.103  
Under s34(2)(a)(i) of the PDA 2000, the planning authority must have 
regard to the provisions of the Development Plan and the emission of any 
noise and vibration from any site comprised in the proposed development 
which might give reasonable cause for annoyance either to persons in any 
premises in the neighbourhood or any persons lawfully using a public place 
in the neighbourhood104 in considering the grant of planning permission. 
“To have regard to” means that the planning authority and An Bord 
                                                     
99 SI 140 of 2006. 
100 This is “the presentation of data on an existing or predicted noise situation in terms of a noise 
indicator, indicating breaches of any relevant limit value in force, the number of people affected 
in a certain area, or the number of dwellings exposed to certain values of a noise indicator in a 
certain area”. (Art. 3(1) Environmental Noise Regulations 2006 S.I. 140 of 2006). 
101 Part 150 Federal Aviation Regulations. 
102 COM (2001) 74 OJ C103 E of 30.04.2002. See also the European Commission, Green Paper 
on Future Noise Policy (COM 96 540). 
103 Objective TO 20, p.106. 
104 Section 34(2)(a)(v) and 34(4)(c)(i) of the PDA 2000. 
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Pleanála on appeal are obliged to inform themselves fully of and give 
reasonable consideration to the issues above.105  
Conditions can be attached to the grant of planning permission to reduce 
or prevent the emission of noise and vibration under s. 34(4(i). Under 
section 9, schedule 4 of the Act, no compensation is payable where the 
planning authority/An Bord Pleanála gives as a reason for the refusal of 
planning permission that the proposed development would cause serious 
noise pollution or vibration, that the proposed development is in an area 
where it is necessary to limit the risk of there being any serious danger to 
human health in the environment, or that the proposed development would 
materially contravene an objective of the Development Plan. 
While the EPA has jurisdiction under the Environmental Protection Acts 
1992-2003 to consider the impact of noise in an area, aircraft noise is 
specifically excluded under the noise nuisance provisions in section 108 of 
the 1992 Act.106 Aircraft noise is also specifically exempted under the EPA 
(Noise) Regulations 1994.107 However, this is not the case in Norway, 
where aircraft noise is not explicitly excluded from the operation of s.2 of 
the Neighbour Act 1961/Naboloven 1961.108 Thus, it may give rise to 
compensation where it is ‘unreasonable or unnecessary’, and awards of 
compensation have been made in relation to noise created by the operation 
of military aircraft.109 In Ireland, complaints regarding noise should be 
made directly to the Irish Aviation Authority. In 2004, two aircraft noise 
complaints were received by the FCC from the Balbriggan Swords Area, 
the same as 2003, a reduction from three in 2002.110 
 
(d)The Role of National Aviation Authorities 
In Ireland, the Irish Civil Aviation Authority, as established under the Irish 
Aviation Authority Act 1993111, is responsible for testing and issuing 
aircraft-worthiness112 and air-operator certificates.113 One of the objects of 
the IAA is “to undertake research and development respecting the 
                                                     
105 McEvoy v. Meath County Council [2003] 1 ILRM 431; Griffin v. Galway City and County 
Manager, Unreported, High Court, 31 October 1990, Blayney J. See Simons, Planning and 
Development Law (Thomson Round Hall, 2003) at 8. 
106 See Scannell, op. cit., at 884 -5. 
107 Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 (Noise) Regulations 1994 (SI 179 of 1994). 
108 LOV 1961-06-16 nr 15: Lov om rettshøve mellom grannar (grannelova). My thanks to Ms. 
Asbjørg Selvli for her assistance in researching Norwegian law. 
109 See the Bardufoss Case (1965) 3 Arkiv for Luftrett No.1. But see also the Rygge Cases (based 
on the 1887 Neighbour Act) where the aircraft noise was found to be within toleration: (1960) 
Norsk Retstidende 62 and (1961) 1 Arkiv for Luftrett 343. See Lødrup, P., “Decisions on 
National Laws: Aircraft Noise” in [1965] Yearbook of Air and Space Law 325. 
110 Fingal County Council, Minutes for 14th April 2004, Balbriggan Swords Area, “Noise 
Complaints Received in 2002/2003/2004 and 2005”, BSA/131/05, 
http://www.fingalcoco.ie/minutes/2005/BSA/0414/BSA20050131.htm (visited 19 August 2006) 
111 No.29 of 1993, as amended. 
112 Irish Aviation Authority (Airworthiness of Aircraft) Orders 1997 to 2003. 
113 Irish Aviation Authority (Air Operator Certificates) Order 1999 (SI no. 420 of 1999) 
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environment”.114 It has the power to order that any of the provisions of the 
Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, whether or not those provisions are 
limited to aircraft of any special description or engaged in any special kind 
of navigation, apply to any aircraft in or over the State. The IAA is a 
competent authority to enforce the balanced approach. 
 
 
Resolving the Problem of Aircraft Noise115 
 
Proactive 
 
(a) Improved Technology and Design 
As technology advances and aeroplane design improves, the noise levels of 
such crafts are significantly reduced. Improved fan design and jet nozzles, 
increased nacelle lining, modifications to the trailing flap outboard edge, 
alterations to the landing gears, scooped inlets and winglets (which reduce 
noise by 0.5-0.7 EPNdB at cutback) have contributed to a reduction of 
engine noise.116 However, Adams and McManus suggest that “a stage is 
being reached where the scope for further noise reduction, by improved 
engine design, is decreasing”117. At present, older craft just meet the noise 
threshold requirements set down by ICAO in Chapter 3, and only after the 
engines have been refitted with hush kits118. It is because such craft still 
meet ICAO guidelines that led to the hush kits dispute between the EU and 
the US (examined below), which is illustrative of the difficulties attendant 
with the legal regulation of different generation planes. Flight operations 
can also reduce noise at airports, such as use of thrust cutback on take-off, 
two-segment approaches to landing and noise preferential routes119 
(environmental noise corridors)120. Curfews or other restrictions on night-
time movements limit the impact on the sleep patterns of those living near 
                                                     
114 PII, section 14, Irish Aviation Act 1993. 
115 Harper, “Regulation of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports: Past, Present and Future (1988) 17 
Transportation Law Journal 117. 
116 See Porter and Rhodes,  Aircraft Noise in London: Past, Present and Future, Environmental 
Research Consultancy Department,  May 2001 available at 
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/68/Noise_London.pdf (visited 19 August 2006).  
117 Ibid. 
118 These are devices that are fitted into jet engines that reduce the noise level. 
119 See Powers, loc. cit., at 353-355 and Adams and Mc Manus, op. cit., at 120-121. 
120 These corridors “define the airspace in the runway aroaches or departure where most aircraft 
are required to operate… and extend in a straight line from the end of each runway out to 
distances ranging from five or six nautical miles depending on the runway”. See “Aircraft 
Disturbance Complaints Procedure” in (2006) 2 Your Airport 4 
http://www.dublinairport.com/images/your_airport_issue2a.pdf (visited 22 August 2006). 
However not all aircraft are required to fly within the corridor. 
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airports.121 The construction of parallel runways, rather than perpendicular 
or cross-secting runways can also reduce the size of the affected area.  
 
The Hush-Kits Saga122 
On the 29th April 2001, the Council of Ministers passed the controversial 
‘Hushkits Regulation’ that set out higher and stricter standards for 
aeroplanes that were modified to comply with Chapter 3 standards.123 Such 
craft were effectively to be denied access to European airspace owing to 
their noise levels. The higher standards were prescribed solely by reference 
to the bypass ratios124 of the planes and made no reference to airframe-
noise levels. The regulation was a response to the failure to reach 
agreement within ICAO at that time on the updating of the standards in 
Annex 16, due in part to the resistance by the US. It would have a profound 
effect on US carriers, with many Chapter 3 aircraft, e.g. the B747, 
operating on transatlantic routes.  
The US alleged that it would cost some $2.3billion to comply with 
the measure. It would also impact negatively on less developed countries 
still using Chapter 3 aeroplanes. The US filed a complaint with ICAO 
under article 84 of the Chicago Convention 1944. The regulation was also 
directly challenged by Irish company Omega Air and the Irish Aviation 
Authority before the Courts of the EC125. Shortly after the court of first 
instance agreed to send forward the challenge on two out of the five 
grounds of challenge, the regulation was repealed by Directive 2002/30 in 
the wake of US pressure following the attacks on the World Trade 
Center126. The new directive still lowers the noise thresholds for Chapter 3 
aeroplanes but it will take up to ten years to operate to some aircraft, by 
which time most of the existing Chapter 3 aeroplanes will have exhausted 
their 25-year lifespan or will be close to doing so. 
                                                     
121 Some of the quota systems adopted by relevant State authorities to this end have in 
themselves been challenged. In, for example, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. 
Richmond upon Thames LBC (No.2) [1994] 1 WLR 74; [1995] Env. L. R. 390, a challenge to an 
altered schedule increasing new night-time noise restrictions by the local borough council was 
successful on the basis that the consultation exercise had been misleading. 
122 See Claes, “Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The Hushkit Problem” (2000) 
65 J. Air Law and Com. 329 and Brown, Comment: “The ICAO is the Aropriate Jurisdiction to 
Settle Hushkit Dispute Between the United States and the European Union (2002) 20(2) Penn 
State International Law Review 465. 
123 Regulation 925/1999 on the registration and operation within the Community of certain types 
of civil subsonic jet aircraft which have been modified and recertified as meeting the standards 
of volume 1, part II, chapter 3 of Annex 16 (the Hushkits Regulation) 
124 The ratio of the volume of air entering the jet engine that bypasses the combustion chamber 
to the volume that goes through it. 
125 The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte: Omega Air Ltd and Omega 
Air Ltd., Aero Engines Ireland Ltd., Omega Aviation Services Ltd. v. Irish Aviation Authority 
Joined Cases C-27/100 and C-122/100, Judgment of the Court 12 March 2002. 
126 Directive 2002/30/EC of 26 March 2002 [OJ L 85 of 28.03.2002]. 
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The new directive has been criticised for failing to ensure 
harmonious regulation at all airports in the Union127
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As far back as 1978, it was envisaged that proper planning would reduce 
the impact of air-traffic noise at future airports133. Both zoning and noise-
abatement procedures are required as part of “the balanced approach”. 
Under s. 14 of the Air Navigation and Transport Act 1950, the Minister for 
Transport can restrict the use of land in the vicinity of an aerodrome to 
prevent interference with aircraft navigation by declaring a particular area 
to be a protected area. Persons with interest in land who are subsequently 
denied a permit to build or granted a permit subject to onerous conditions 
can seek compensation134. Such protected areas exist around the vicinity of 
Dublin Airport135, Shannon Airport136 and Connaught Regional 
Aerodrome137. 
 It is unlikely that s.14 would be found unconstitutional. In Liddy v. 
The Minister for Public Enterprise138, Finnegan P held that the objective of 
limiting development for the safety of aircraft or their safe or sufficient 
navigation was based on the common good and was an appropriate matter 
to be balanced against constitutional property rights. There was no 
infringement there where a developer had been refused planning 
permission for land zoned residential because it fell within a red zone, 
within which residential development is prohibited. While the objective 
behind these provisions is clearly not to protect the hearing of the land user, 
the limitation on land use can operate to restrict the aircraft-noise exposure 
of people within the protected area.  
 It is also unlikely that s.14 is contrary to Art.6 of the ECHR. In 
Matos e Silva, Ltd. and Others v. Portugal,139 the Court accepted the 
legitimacy of measures pursued through town and country planning for a 
public purpose (in this case, to protect the environment) as justifying 
restrictions on property rights. Nor is it likely that it is contrary to Art1 of 
the first protocol given the provision for compensation. 
In Denmark, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency 
establishes zones according to noise levels with 55 dB(A) (DENL) being 
the maximum for residential areas140. In France, similar zoning restrictions 
apply, limiting residential development according to four different noise 
bands, measured by the indice psophique (IP)141. Residential development 
in areas where aircraft noise levels exceed 75 dB(A) is not permitted in 
                                                     
133 Jensen, Supra, p.246. 
134 But not if denied planning permission by a planning authority or An Bord Pleanála: section 
10(e) schedule 4 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, no compensation is payable. 
135 Air Navigation (Protection Area) Order 1988. 
136 Air Navigation (Protected Area) Order 1993. 
137 Air Navigation (Protection Area) Order 1989. 
138 [2003] ITLR 10.3.2003. See Menzies, “Major Accident Hazards and Land-Use Planning” 
(2003) 10(4) IPELJ 128, available at http://www.arup.ie/publications/IPELJArticle.pdf  at .11-
12 (visited 19 August 2006). 
139 1996-IV ECHR, Judgment of 16 September 1996; (1997) 24 EHRR 573. 
140 See Law No. 388 of 6th June 1991. Copenhagen International Airport exceeds these limits. 
141 Noise Abatement Law of 31 December 1992. 
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Germany, though it is permissible at 67 dB(A) where adequate measures 
are taken for the provision of soundproofing. Housing around airports in 
the Netherlands is permitted in areas not exceeding 45 Kosten Units (Ke). 
In the US, land zoning and land banking142 are also used to restrict 
residential development on land and exposure to aircraft noise143. Noise 
zones have also been established by Fingal County Council around Dublin 
Airport. In Ireland, the Parkman analysis144 recommended that no new 
residential development be permitted within the 63 dB(A) contour. Under 
FCC’s Development Plan 2005-2011, an outer zone (restricted 
development permitted) and inner noise zone (resisting new residential 
development)145 are established. These zones will be subject to ongoing 
review in light of EU Directive 2002/49 on environmental-noise 
assessment and management146.  
 
 
Retroactive 
 
(a) Constitutional Rights 
 
(i) The Right to Property147 
The original common law position with regard to the ownership of airspace 
over land was summed up by the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad 
coelum, ‘whosoever has the soil, also owns to the heavens above and to the 
centre beneath’,148 a position shared by the Roman law concept of vertical 
property.149 As observed by Seare et al.: 
 
The principle derived undoubtedly from a circumstance, or, rather 
from the absence of a circumstance, the possibility of the utilisation of 
space.150 
                                                     
142 In Griggs v. Allegheny County 369 US 84, 82 S Ct 531. 
143 Creswell, “Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for Accountability, Planning and 
Leadership” (1990) 19 Transp. L.J. 1. 
144 Parkman Consultants, Study of Dublin Airport Noise Contours, Aer Rianta, Dublin, 2004. 
145 DAP11, Development Plan, p45. 
146 Development Plan 2005-2011, DAO8, p.45. 
147 See Central Dublin Development Association v. AG (1975) 109 ILTR 69 and Hogan and 
Whyte, J.M. Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed., Butterworths, 2003) at 1969-2028; Forde, 
Constitutional Law, (2nd ed., First Law, 2004) at 727-764 and Casey, Constitutional Law in 
Ireland, (3rd ed., Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 662-684. 
148 As first alied in Bury v Pope Cro. Eliz 118, 78 Eng Rep. 375 (Ex. 1587). See Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Chapter 2 and  19; Cahoon, “Low Altitude Airspace: A 
Property Rights No-Man’s Land” (1990) Journal of Air Law & Commerce 157 at 161. But see 
People of Colorado v Emmert 597 P.2d 1025 (1979). 
149 On the origin of the maxim, see Klein, “Cujus Est Ejus Est… Quousque Tandem?” (1959) 26 
Journal of Air Law & Commerce 237 and Wright, The Law of Airspace, (Bobbs-Merill Co. Inc., 
1968), chapter 2, and 11-30. 
150 Seara Vásquez, Modesto (Translated by Malley, Elaine), Cosmic International Law, (Wayne 
State University Press, 1965) at 28. 
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With the emergence of the aviation industry, the principle was rightly 
rejected as having ‘no place in the modern world’151. However, this does 
not mean that a landowner is devoid of any interest in the superadjacent 
airspace above his or her land. In United States v Causby, 152 the US 
Supreme Court assessed the balance to be struck between the government’s 
interest in the free use of airspace and the landowner’s interest in the use 
and enjoyment of his or her property and in doing so concluded that a 
landowner has a reasonable, although not absolute, interest in his/her 
superadjacent airspace.  
 
[The] use of land presupposes the use of some of the airspace above it 
otherwise no home could be built, no tree planted, no fence 
constructed, no chimney erected…153 
 
In that case, the noise of heavy bombers and small fighter planes from a 
nearby military airbase overflying the plaintiff’s property caused the 
plaintiff’s chickens to panic and fly into the wall of their coups. At the time 
of the action, the plaintiff had lost approximately 150 chickens and the land 
could no longer be used for chicken farming. The Court also found that the 
owner’s rest at night had been disturbed. The plaintiff claimed that the 
overflights amounted to the taking of an easement under the Fifth 
Amendment. The Court rejected outright the application of the usque ad 
coelum rule as it held that navigable airspace had been placed in the public 
domain by Congress. Private claims to airspace would seriously interfere 
with control and development of air routes. The guide, for determining 
where the limit of that public domain lay, was the minimum altitude for 
safe flight, which then stood at 500 feet154. However, the Government 
conceded that where overflights rendered property uninhabitable, a taking 
would have occurred. In any case, the overflights in the case had been 
below 500 feet. The Court held: 
 
                                                     
151 US v Causby 328 US 256 (1946) at 260. 
152 (1946) 328 US 256. See also Griggs v. Allegheny County 369 US 84 (1962); Matson v. US 
171 F. Su 283 (Ct Cl 1959); Aaron v. US 311 F. 2d 798 (Ct Cl 1963); A.J. Hodges Indus. Inc. v. 
US 355 F.2d 592 (Ct Cl 1966); Lacey v. US 595 F 2d 614 (Ct Cl 1979) and Falzone, Supra, 
p.778. 
153 Ibid at 264. 
154 See Rule 3 Irish Aviation Authority (Rules of the Air) Order 2004 (SI 72 of 2004), which 
provides that aircraft are not to be flown at altitudes of less than 450m/1,500feet above ground 
or water and not less than 300m/1,000feet above the highest obstacle within a 600m radius of 
the aircraft over congested areas, towns or cities and also Art. 37., Operators of commercial 
transport aircraft must comply with the alicable joint aviation requirements in respect of 
minimum flight altitude for any flight: Art.24 Irish Aviation Authority (Operations) Order 2006, 
SI 61 of 2006. 
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Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so 
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference155 with the 
enjoyment and use of the land.156 
 
It accepted that low overflights amounting to continuous invasions of the 
superadjacent airspace could affect the use of the surface. The character of 
this invasion and not the amount of the resulting damage, providing the 
damage was substantial, was the definitive factor in determining whether a 
taking had occurred. Here, the plaintiff had shown a diminution in the 
value of his property caused by the overflights. This constituted a servitude 
that amounted to the taking of an easement. The comment of the Court 
above and its subsequent comments in Griggs v Allegheny County157 have 
been interpreted as setting out the four requirements to determine whether 
an overflight taking has occurred, viz: 
 
1. a flight directly over the claimant’s land; 
2. flights which were low and frequent; 
3. the flights directly and immediately interfered with the 
claimant’s use and enjoyment of land and 
4. the interference with the use and enjoyment of land was 
substantial158 
 
Thus two overflights a day will not be sufficient159. The test is applied in 
the second stage of a takings claim. That is, in determining whether the 
government’s action constitutes a taking, the claimant must still show a 
compensable property right under the Fifth Amendment.160 The Federal 
Aviation Act 1958 expanded the limits of navigable airspace to flights 
below the 500-feet level where necessary for take-off and landing, and this 
was subsequently examined in Griggs where the Court held that the path of 
the glide or flight for landing or taking off was not the downward reach of 
the ‘navigable airspace’. The limit remained the minimum altitude of safe 
flight as had been included in Congress’s definition of airspace. The 500-
feet limit was originally construed as a bright-line rule, with the Court in 
Aaron161 stating that claims for Fifth Amendment takings by federal 
                                                     
155 See Speir v. US 485 F 2d 643 (1973) and Adaman Mutual Water Co. et al v. United States 
(1958) (US Ct Claims; 143 Ct Cl 921, 181 F Su 658). 
156 United States v. Causby (1946) 328 US 256, p.264. 
157 369 US 84 (1962). 
158 See King, “The Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of Air Force Aircraft Overflights and 
the Air Installation Compatible Use Programme” (1997) 43 Air Force Law Rev 197, at 206. See 
Brown v. US 73 F 3d 1100 (Fed Cir, 1996); Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission 
[Alevizos I], Minn. 1974 298 Minn. 471, 216 NW 2d 651 and Jensen v. US 305 F 2d 444 (Ct Cl 
1962) (700 flights per day was sufficient) 
159 Aaron v. US 311 F 2d 798 (Ct Cl 3). 
160 M&J Coal Co. v United States 30 Fed Cl 360 (1994). 
161 Aaron v. US 311 F 2d 798 (Ct Cl 3) at p.801. 
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government arising from aeroplane flights at 501 feet would be struck 
out162. But in Branning v. US163 the Court held that a flight over 500 feet 
(independent of landing or taking off) could constitute a taking where it 
was “peculiarly burdensome”164. Nonetheless, Branning did not reject 
Aaron outright and the opinion in the former carefully circumscribed it to 
its specific facts. 
 The US approach provides guidance in determining how Irish 
constitutional law could approach a property owner’s challenge to 
excessive aircraft noise where grounded in article 43.1.1º. Given the nature 
of the Irish incarnation of the right to property as a natural right, 
‘antecedent to all positive law’, permitting the claims that meet the four 
requirements above would be preferable than an absolute exclusion of any 
such action in the name of the common good. However, no such case has 
yet been made and it remains to be seen if Causby will be followed. The 
acceptance of the minimum altitude of safe flight as the basic linear 
determinant for demonstrating an invasion is admittedly only one method 
of delineating the public domain of navigable airspace from private 
airspace, but a spatialist approach would be preferable in providing 
certainty in the application of the law. In addition, the Branning exception 
provides the courts with a degree of flexibility. But this approach is not 
without its flaws. Using property rights to eliminate noise nuisance from 
planes under the Causby approach is limited by the need for overflight. The 
violation of the right arises from the character of the invasion. Thus, noise 
and vibration from planes resulting in material damage where the noise 
source is adjacent to a plaintiff’s property will not ground a Causby 
action165. Furthermore, in order to gain compensation, the plaintiff must 
show a compensable property right. The Causby approach is not adequate 
to deal fully with aircraft-noise nuisance. 
  
(ii) The Right to Peaceable Enjoyment of Property 
It is arguable that a case could be made that excess noise constitutes a 
violation of the right to the peaceable enjoyment of property166. Such an 
approach overcomes some of the initial difficulties of the Causby approach. 
Compensation for infringement of this right does not require overflights. 
Noise may be adjacent, and the plaintiff need not be in a red zone. An 
exception to the Causby 500-feet rule was carved on this basis in 
Thornburg v. Port of Portland167 and Martin v. Port of Seattle168, where the 
                                                     
162 See King, loc. cit., at 201-204. 
163 654 F 2d 88 (Ct Cl 1981). 
164 See also Argent v. US 124 F 3d 1277 (Fed Cir 1997). 
165 Batten v. US 306 F 2d 580 (10th Cir, 1962); Freeman v. US 167 F Su 541 (WD Okla 1958); 
Pope v. US 173 F Su 36 (ND Tex 1959). 
166 For example: Hero Lands Company v. United States (1983) (US Ct Claims 554 F Su 1262). 
See also Powell and Raynor v United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 345. 
167 233 Or 178, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (Or. 1962) 
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Supreme Courts of Oregon and Washington respectively found that where 
the flights interfered with the practical enjoyment of land and where there 
is a diminution of the property value, an action by a property owner for 
compensation against the government entity responsible could succeed, 
even where the flight took place over 500 feet169. This reasoning was 
justified by reference to Causby as the Courts found that altitude was only 
one method of determining the minimum level of safe flight. Given the 
impact of noise levels and the risks it posed for the safety of those on the 
ground, altitude alone could not govern the level of safe flight. This 
approach also recommends itself to Irish constitutional-law property rights. 
 
(iii) The Right to Bodily Integrity170 
It is arguable that a case could be made where injury had resulted from 
aircraft noise and vibration, and causation could be shown, that the State or 
airport operator had violated the applicant’s right to bodily integrity. In 
Ryan v AG171, O’Dalaigh C.J.: 
 
The State has the duty of protecting the citizens from dangers to health 
in a manner not incompatible or inconsistent with the rights of those 
citizens as human persons. 
 
The right has been “broadened… into a more general right not to have 
one’s health endangered by the actions of the State.”172 It has been ranked 
as second in priority to the right to life.173 In accordance with the definition 
of health as provided by the WHO, it is clear that mental health is within 
the scope of the article. This appears supported by the case law dealing the 
treatment of prisoners. It has horizontal effect, opening up the possibility of 
individuals taking actions against non-State entities responsible for aircraft 
noise. The particular benefit of relying on such a right is that a plaintiff 
would not need to have and demonstrate the existence of any 
constitutionally cognisable property right in order to bring an action. But as 
the Court observed in The State (C.) v Frawley174: 
 
I see no reason why the principle [of bodily integrity] should not also 
operate to prevent an act or omission of the Executive which, without 
justification, would expose the health of the person to risk or danger. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
168 64 Wash. 2d 309 (S Ct WA, 1964). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport 
Authority, Tenn., 1996 922 S W 2d 860. 
169 See Soenksen, Supra, at p.335. 
170 Ryan v. AG [1965] IR 294, McGee v. Attorney General  [1973] IESC 2; [1974] IR 284. 
171 [1965] IR 294. 
172 Hogan and Whyte, op. cit., at 1420, para.7.3.72. 
173 Heaney v Dublin Corporation SC, 17 August 1998 per O’Flaherty J. 
174 [1976] IR 365 at 372, emphasis added. 
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In the case of exposure to aircraft noise within tolerable limits, it is clear 
that the State does operate with justification, or at the very least, with good 
excuse. 
 
(iv) Countervailing Considerations: The Common Good and Security of the 
State 
No personal right is unlimited. Article 40.3.1º itself requires the State to 
defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen ‘as far as 
practicable’. Article 43.2.21º permits the State to “delimit by law the 
exercise of [property rights] with a view to reconciling their exercise with 
the exigencies of the common good”175. The courts are disposed to give the 
Executive a wide margin in matters involving security and defence. It is 
likely that a case against excessive aircraft noise could succeed on peaceful 
enjoyment of property and on property rights in general. This is also the 
case for an action taken on the grounds of the right to the protection of 
one’s health. While the free navigation of the air is a valid public interest, 
meriting preservation, it does not justify imposing the financial cost of such 
preservation, in the diminution of property values due to excessive noise, 
consistently on landowners. 
The aim behind a circumscription of rights may be justifiable but their 
absolute denial in the field of aeroplane noise does not appear to be 
proportionate to the aim. Some measure of compensation should be 
allowed to landowners where there is a diminution in land value owing to 
aircraft noise, where the practical enjoyment of land is interfered with 
unreasonably or where the Causby grounds are met. The creation of a 
statutory noise-insulation scheme, as exists in England, France and 
Denmark, for those most affected would appear to be a necessary 
counterbalancing measure. But it is highly unlikely that an injunction 
would be granted as the balance on convenience prima facie lies with the 
State in allowing the free navigation of its air space. Even in the US, where 
constitutional challenges do succeed injunctions are rare176. However, 
compensation for a taking may be made. 
 
 
(b) Tort Law: Nuisance177 and Trespass 
Section 55 of the Air Transport and Navigation Act 1936178 provides that 
no actions can lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance, by reason 
                                                     
175 See also Buckley v AG [1950] IR 67; Murray v. Ireland [1991] ILRM 465. 
176 Brooks v. Patterson 159 Fla 263 (1947); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines Inc. 
61 Cal. 2d 582; 394 P. 2d 548 (1964) and Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe 344 F Su 573 (ED Va 
1972). But see the exception in Anderson v. Souza (1952) 38 Cal 2d 825, 243 P 2d 497. 
177 See Hanrahan v. Merck Sharp and Dohme (Ireland) Ltd. [1988] ILRM 629 and Molumby v. 
Kearns [1999] IEHC 86, Baxter v. Harland and Wolff PLC [1990] IRLR 516, McMahon and 
Binchy, The Law of Torts, (3rd ed., Butterworths, 2000) and Turner and Morrow, Northern 
Ireland Environmental Law (Gill and Macmillan, 1997) chapter 9. 
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only of the flight of aircraft over any property at a height above the ground, 
which, having regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the case 
is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of the flight, so long as the 
provisions of part II of the Act and any order or regulations made are duly 
complied with179. Though liability can lie for material damage or loss 
caused to any persons or property on land or water by any person in or any 
article or person falling from an aircraft while in flight, taking off or 
landing.180 Section 56 creates the offence of dangerous flying where an 
aircraft is flown in such a manner as to be the cause of unnecessary danger 
to any person or property on land or water. It is unlikely that the potential 
and gradual loss of hearing would constitute an unnecessary danger, though 
the application of noise can constitute an assault under section 2 of the 
Non-Fatal Offences of the Person Act 1997. The Air Navigation and 
Transport Act 1988 provides that aircraft operators will have liability for 
loss or damage caused to any person or property on or over land or water in 
the State caused or occasioned or contributed to by the aircraft in flight, 
taking off or landing181. An almost identical provision to section 55 exists 
in the UK: s.76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. That section provides that 
no actions for nuisance or trespass caused by aircraft shall lie. This 
exclusion was challenged before the domestic courts under the Human 
Rights Act (UK) 1998 and before the European Court of Human Rights for 
interfering with the applicant’s right of access to the courts. The claim did 
not succeed.182 Whether s.55 would be considered to violate the 
Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights and the first 
protocol/the Human Rights Act 2003 is considered below.  
 
Is Section 55 of the Air Transport and Navigation Act 1936 Constitutional? 
No case has been taken challenging the constitutionality of section 55. The 
denial of any claim to be made in nuisance or in tort by statute could be 
unconstitutional for violating the right of access to the courts and property 
rights and for amounting to a failure by the State to vindicate the rights of 
its citizens under article 40 or contrary to Art.6 of the ECHR. The right to 
property is set down in articles 40.3 and 43. However, this must be read 
with article 43.2, which provides: 
2° The State, accordingly, may as occasion requires delimit by law the 
exercise of the said rights with a view to reconciling their exercise 
with the exigencies of the common good. 
                                                                                                                                                           
178 As amended by s.47 of the Air Navigation and Transport Act 1988. See Forde, Supra, p.757. 
179 See Article 1 Rome Convention 1952 on the Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third 
parties on the Surface (UNTS 1958, vol. 310 no. 4493, p.182) 
180 Section 21 Air Navigation and Transport Act 1936. 
181 Section 17 (b) (ii). 
182 Baggs v. The UK. (1985) 44 DR 13. 
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This article would prima facie justify the exemption from liability in 
section 55, notwithstanding the strong position of property rights under 
43.1.1°. Under article 40.3.2°, the State has a duty by its laws to protect as 
best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate 
the property rights of every citizen. This law may be viewed as a breach of 
this duty by failing to protect the rights set out above. However, this 
provision must also be harmoniously interpreted with article 43.2.2°. It 
could also be viewed as a violation of the right of access to the courts and 
to litigate claims183. The citizen is indirectly denied the freedom of having 
the issue determined by a competent tribunal, though similar challenges to 
restrictions placed by the Statute of Limitations 1957 have met with mixed 
reactions184.The Courts will balance the rights issues with the common 
good and the security of the state. Here, the importance of the common 
good, in this case the importance of free navigation in State airspace, 
combined with the need for its free use by the Air Force for the security 
and defence of the State, may be sufficient to overcome the challenge. 
Furthermore, section 55 does not absolutely limit any particular right. It is 
internally limited to where there is compliance with the Act itself and any 
regulations or orders made under it. Actions for overflights will still lie 
where the overflight is unreasonable in all the circumstances, where the 
overflight is combined with some other factor such as material damage 
from an object falling from the plane or where the plane is not engaged in 
flight (e.g. engine testing). The case will then turn on the Courts’ 
interpretation of what is factually unreasonable in any given case. As such, 
the limitation on the right of access is itself limited and subject to a 
reasonableness requirement. Section 55 does not limit constitutional actions 
nor actions taken under the Human Rights Act 2003. Section 55 has a 
legitimate aim and would appear to be proportionate to that aim. 
(b) Human Rights Law 
Unlike the Protocol of San Salvador to the American Convention185, there 
is no right to a healthy environment guaranteed in the European 
Convention on Human Rights or its protocols. However, as noted above, 
excessive noise may give rise to an action under article 8.186 Other articles 
of relevance are article 6.1 (civil right determination), article 13 (the right 
to an effective domestic remedy) and article 1 of the first protocol (the right 
to the peaceable enjoyment of possessions). 
                                                     
183 Recognised in Macauley v. Minister for Posts and Telegraphs [1966] IR 345 and Tuohy v. 
Courtney [1994] 3 IR 1. See Casey  op. cit., at  413-420. 
184 Tuohy v. Courtney [1994] 3 IR 1; O’Brien v. Keogh [1972] IR 144; Ó Domhnaill v. Merrick 
[1984] IR 151. 
185 Article 11.  
186 See Shelton, “Human Rights, Health and Environment: A Background Paper for the World 
Health Organization” Health and Human Rights Working Paper Series No.1, 2002, available at  
http://www.who.int/hhr/information/en/Series_1%20%20Human_Rights_Health_Environmenta
l%20Protection_Shelton.pdf (visited on 19 August 2006). 
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Article 8187 
In Powell and Rayner v. UK188, the applicants claimed that the noise caused 
by aircraft movement at Heathrow airport violated their rights under article 
8 of the Convention by interfering with their quality of life and their 
enjoyment of the amenities of their homes. The Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction to rule on article 8, independent of article 13. This contradicted 
the dicta of the Commission in S v. France189, where it accepted that noise 
could affect well-being and prevent enjoyment of amenities. Article 8 was 
found applicable in both Arrondelle v. the UK190 and Baggs v. the UK191. In 
both of these aircraft-noise cases, the applicants’ arguments on article 8 
were found admissible but friendly settlements were reached before the 
matter was tried. In Vearncombe, Herbst, Clemens and Speil Lager v. the 
United Kingdom and Germany192, the Commission noted that individuals 
that were or expect to be exposed to “an intolerable and exceptional noise 
nuisance of such a level and frequency could amount to an interference 
with the right to protection of private life or peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions”. In the recent case of Moreno Gómez v. Spain193, complaints 
relating to noise (from a nightclub granted a licence in an area of noise 
sensitivity) based on article 8 were upheld as a violation of the state’s 
positive duties. 
The applicants in Hatton v. the UK194 claimed the respondent had 
violated their article-8 and article-13 rights. They challenged a new 
schedule based on a quota system for night flights at Heathrow under 
which noisier aircraft were given a higher quota count than quieter craft. 
Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber found the complaints 
admissible. The Chamber did find a violation of article 8 by a 5:2 majority, 
but the applicants were unsuccessful on article 8 before the Grand Chamber 
(12:5)195. The Chamber had found that the government had failed in its 
positive duty under article 8 by neglecting to conduct independent research 
on the impact of night flights on the sleep patterns of residents196. But the 
Grand Chamber had found that the domestic irregularity that was a feature 
                                                     
187 See Ovey and White eds., Jacobs and White: The European Convention on Human Rights, 
(3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2002) 251-251; Harris, O’Boyle, and Warbrick, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, (Butterworths, London, 1995) 302-355. 
188 (1990) 12 EHRR 345. See Sunkin, Ong and Wight, Sourcebook on Environmental Law, (2nd 
ed., Cavendish Publishing, 2002) 866-869. 
189 (1990), 65 DR 250. 
190 (1980), 55 DR 19 p.186; (1982) 26 DR 5. 
191 (1985) 44 DR 13; (1987) 52 DR 29. 
192 A. No. 12816/87, 59 Eur Comm’n HR DR 186 (1989) p.196. 
193 [2004] ECHR 633. 
194 [2003] ECHR 338; (2003) 37 EHRR 28. See Hobe, Stephan and Giesecke, Christian, „Zur 
Vereinbarkeit von nächtlichem Fluglärm mit Artikel 8 EMRK,“ (2003) LII(4) ZLW 501. 
195 (2002) 34 EHRR 1. 
196 See Smith, “Hatton v. the UK” (2002) AJIL 697 on the Chamber decision. 
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of both Lopez Ostra197 and Guerra198 was absent here199. It was legitimate 
for the respondent to take into account economic interests in the shaping of 
policy. While the Grand Chamber accepted that the State had failed to 
strike a fair balance between the interests of the applicants and those of the 
community, it rejected the applicants’ argument that sleep disturbance was 
such an aspect of private life as required an especially narrow margin of 
appreciation, as was applicable in the case of sexual orientation200. The 
night-flight schedule did not overstep the discretion allowed to states in 
failing to strike a fair balance.201  
There is the authority of Dennis v. Ministry of Defence202, where the 
plaintiffs relied on, inter alia, article 8, that was brought in response to the 
noise from Harrier Jets at RAF Wittering, which succeeded before the 
English High Court. While the Court accepted that the base was important 
for the defence of the realm and this was in the public interest in that case, 
it held that the individual should not have to carry the burden of the public 
interest. Buckley J. in this instance found that a nuisance existed but, as the 
public interest demanded the training of pilots, a declaration requiring the 
MOD to halt their activities would not be made. The extent of the 
interference and the significant reduction in property values justified a 
finding of violation of article 8 and article 1. However, this case must be 
put in context as a case from noise arising from a single national military 
airbase using particularly noisy craft that were flown low over the 
properties in question at full throttle. Complaints had been made against the 
base for some time but no affirmative measures were taken to address the 
noise nuisance. Buckley J. admitted that the facts of the case were extreme.  
This contrasts with the situation of aeroplane noise arising from 
commercial international airports with strong economic reasons for their 
existence and a plethora of measures to limit noise nuisance for the aircraft. 
It is submitted that there are sufficient grounds for distinguishing between 
Dennis and the precedents of the ECHR. It is unlikely that a case against 
Ireland challenging aircraft noise would succeed on article 8, unless there 
was some proven domestic irregularity. 
 
Article 6.1203 
                                                     
197 Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277. 
198 Guerra v. Italy [1998] ECHR 7; 26 EHRR 357. 
199 Para. 120 Hatton v. The United Kingdom, [2003] ECHR 338; (2003) 37 EHRR 28. 
200 See Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149, series A no. 45 at p.21. 
201 The dissenting opinion of Costa, Reiss Tümer, Zupančič and Steiner is informative and 
highlights some of the difficulties with the reasoning of the majority.  
202 [2003] EWHC 793 (QB); [2003] EWHC 793; [2003] Env LR 34; [2003] EHLR 17; [2003] 2 
EGLR 121; [2006] RVR 45; [2003] JPL 1577; [2003] 19 EGCS 118; (2003) 153 NLJ 634; 
[2003] NPC 55. 
203 See Ovey and White, op. cit., 139-170 and Janis, Kay and Bradley, European Human Rights 
Law: Text and Materials, (2nd ed, OUP, 2000) 406-466. 
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Under this article, an applicant is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law in the determination of his or her civil rights and obligations. The 
applicant must show that the procedure was decisive in the determination 
of the right204 and that the right in question is recognised by domestic 
law.205 In Zander v Sweden,206 the Commission found that, as the right 
related to the environmental conditions of tu8( t)-77pl8.3(ndicanvi)-8.2(ronme’8.2(tipto)-8.4(49(d)-t)-77p-8.3(er2(ronmey)118(l)-1(ght)--t)-77d t)-8.2(o)0.3( )-i
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Convention rights212. Article 13 was raised with article 8 and 6.1 in Powell 
and Rayner, discussed above. The Court noted the importance of striking a 
fair balance between the interests of the applicant and those of the 
community. The operation of an international airport was accepted by the 
applicants and the Court as a legitimate aim and it found that the State had 
not gone beyond the scope of the margin of appreciation given the 
existence of policies and regulatory measures to deal with noise nuisance in 
the area. The Court found that it was neither for it nor for the Commission 
to substitute another assessment of policy for that chosen by the 
government in relation to the operation of night flights. It unanimously held 
that there was no violation of article 13. 
Article 13 was again raised in Hatton, where the UK was found in 
violation. The Court held that the availability of judicial review, as limited 
by English public-law concepts of unlawfulness and unreasonableness, did 
not allow for consideration of whether the schedule in question represented 
a limitation on article 8 rights guaranteed under the Human Rights Act 
1998. The availability of judicial review of the decision213 by a planning 
authority to allow a new runway will be relevant in deciding the impact of 
article 13. However, where the domestic courts define policy so broadly 
that it is not possible to make Convention points, it may fail to meet the 
requirements of article 13. 
This means that the application of the O’Keeffe214 test of 
unreasonableness in Irish judicial review may lead to the conclusion that 
although review is available, it is not an effective remedy. It is also possible 
that even if a successful challenge was taken based on the Human Rights 
Act 2003, the section 5 declaration of incompatibility as provided for in the 
Act would not be viewed as an effective remedy either. 
 
 
 
 
Article 1 of the First Protocol215  
This provides: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions…. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any 
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it seems 
                                                     
212 Klass v. FRG (1979) 2 EHRR 214; Soering v. UK 11 EHRR 439 (para.120); Vilvarajah and 
Others v. the United Kingdom, [1991] ECHR 47; [1991] IIHRL 49 .38-40; (1991) 14 EHRR 
248. 
213 See also AGOSI v. UK (1987) 9 EHRR 1and Denev v. Sweden (1989) 59 DR 127. 
214 O’Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39; [1992] ILRM 237. 
215 See Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, op. cit., 300-319; Ovey and White, op. cit., 139-170; 
Kenna, “Property, Housing and Environment” in Kilkiely ed., The European Convention on 
Human Rights and Irish Law, (Jordans, 2004) chapter10. 
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necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties. 
 
The term ‘possessions’ (‘biens’ in the French text) has an autonomous 
meaning independent of national law216 and it has been given a broad 
definition217. It includes property rights218. States have been accorded a 
wide margin of appreciation on account of the extensive limitation in the 
second sentence219. The availability of a better means of achieving the 
state’s goal does not mean that the chosen measure per se infringes 
proportionality220. The Commission in its opinion in Powell observed that 
art.1 is “mainly concerned with the arbitrary confiscation of property and 
does not in principle guarantee a right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions in a pleasant environment.” However, it went on to note that: 
 
Noise nuisance which is particularly severe in both intensity and 
frequency may seriously affect the value of real property or even 
render it unsaleable or unusable and thus amount to a partial 
expropriation. 
 
However, the Court held that it would only find a breach of this article in 
exceptional circumstances. This view was supported in S. v. France221, 
which suggests that where the property of the applicant declines in value as 
a result of noise nuisance, such an exceptional circumstance could arise. 
The Commission in that case also observed: 
 
Where an authority carries on an undertaking in the interest of the 
community as a whole it may have to pay compensation to individuals 
whose rights are infringed by that undertaking in order to achieve a 
fair balance between the interests of the individual and the 
community.222 
  
                                                     
216 Beyeler v. Italy [2000] ECHR 1, (2001) 33 EHRR 52 at paras 98 and 100; [2002] ECHR 466 
(Grand Chamber). 
217 See Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland [1991] 14 EHRR 319; [1991] ECHR 55; [1993] 
ECHR 2. 
218 Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik Gmbh v. Netherlands, [1995] ECHR 7; (1995) 20 EHRR 
403, para.53. 
219 Fredin v Sweden (No.1) [1991] ECHR 2; [1991] 13 EHRR 784; Fisher and Anor v. English 
Nature [2001] EWHC 1599; [2004] 1 WLR 503 (aeal denied [2004] EWCA Civ 663). 
220 James v The UK [1986] ECHR 2; [1986] 8 EHRR 123; Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden 
[1989] ECHR 15; [1991] 13 EHRR 309. 
221 (1990) 65 DR 250 
222 Id. at para. 117 
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This position is supported by the Court, albeit not in an aircraft-noise 
context, in Spörrong and Lönroth v. Sweden223, where it held that “an 
individual and excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate 
only if they had the possibility of … claiming compensation”. This 
suggests that the limitation on land use provided for in section 14 of the Air 
Navigation and Transport Act 1950 is not in breach of article 1. This 
ground was not raised in Hatton. The applicants in Dennis successfully 
raised this ground, as Buckley J. found that a fair balance had not been 
struck between the rights of the applicants and the interests of the State in 
the absence of compensation. It was not proportionate to pursue or give 
effect to the public interest without such compensation.224 Any taking that 
amounts to a violation of national law will also amount to a breach of 
article 1225, so where the superior courts find a violation of constitutional 
property rights, a violation of article 1 would follow. States are entitled to 
control land use but a balancing test is used to see if the limitation is 
permissible226. The limitation must be a measure in the character of law, in 
the general interest and be deemed necessary by the state227. The restriction 
made must be proportionate to the aim to be achieved. The aim must be 
legitimate and in the public interest.228 Section 14 of the 1950 Act would 
meet this test. Where compensation is available under domestic law, a fair 
balance may be found to have been struck229.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that there is a significant link between the effects of noise and 
human health. While more research in the field is needed, especially with 
regard to the direct impact of aircraft noise on mental health, the existing 
research suggests that the hazards of aircraft noise should not be discounted 
lightly. The problems of aircraft noise have not gone unrecognised, and 
regulation at international, Community and national levels already exits. 
The introduction of the balanced approach is a welcome addition to 
Community law but it is submitted that Irish and Community law be 
updated to reflect the new standards set down in chapter 4 of ICAO Annex 
16. In addition, while planning law and noise-abatement procedures have in 
some measure limited the impact of aircraft noise, other proactive solutions 
should be adopted. To this end, the Building Regulations 1997 should be 
                                                     
223 [1982] ECHR 5; 5 EHRR 35, para 29-30. 
224 See [2003] Env L R 34, para.63. 
225 Iatridis v. Greece [1999] ECHR 14; [2000] ECHR 502; (2000) 30 EHRR 1997. 
226 Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319. 
227 Spadea & Scalabrino v. Italy [1995] ECHR 35; (1996) 21 EHRR 481. 
228 Lindsay v. CCE [2002] 1 WLR 1766; R. (POW Trust & Anor.) v. Chief Executive and 
Registrar of Companies [2002] EWHC 2783. 
229 Holy Monasteries v. Greece, (1995) 20 EHRR 1. 
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amended, and standards should be established to provide for acoustic 
insulation from external sound. As to the retroactive solutions, it is 
arguable that a constitutional case could be made out for compensation for 
a taking of an air easement and for the interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions on the basis of US authorities. It remains to be 
seen if those authorities will be followed by the Courts here should such a 
case arise. Though tort and nuisance actions are limited by s.55 of the Air 
Transport and Navigation Act 1950, it is submitted that this would be found 
constitutional. As to claims to be made under the ECHR, it is unlikely that 
a case for excessive aircraft noise under article 8 against Ireland would 
succeed due to the measures that have been taken by the State. The 
authority of Hatton suggests that s.55 combined with the limited nature of 
judicial review may result in a successful challenge under the ECHR for a 
violation of article13, though the cases before the Court on the subject, 
including Hatton, are fact-specific. It is unlikely that s.55 would be found 
to violate article 6 given the existing case law, though it may be a 
possibility in the future were the Court to revise its interpretation of “civil 
rights”. Where property is found to have diminished in value due to aircraft 
noise, there is also an arguable case for a breach of article 1 of the First 
Protocol. Any case made under the Convention will have to meet the 
balancing test. 
 
  
  
   
PRE-EMPTIVE COSTS ORDERS: EVOLUTION AND 
POTENTIAL IN IRISH LAW 
 
 
JAMES MULCAHY 
 
 
 
There is little point in opening the doors to courts if litigants cannot afford 
to come in. The general rule in litigation that ‘costs follow the event’ is in 
point. The fear, if unsuccessful, of having to pay the costs of the other side 
(often a government instrumentality…), with devastating consequences to 
the individual or… group bringing the action, must inhibit the taking of a 
case to court. In any event, it will be a factor that looms large in any 
consideration to initiate litigation.1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The above words of Justice Toohey, formerly of the High Court of 
Australia, are no less relevant in the Irish context than the Australian. 
Public interest law and litigation are underdeveloped in this jurisdiction due 
to a number of barriers. Our civil law system has its roots in the 
conventional “bilateral private dispute model”2 of litigation, and the 
procedural law has been shaped to a large extent by this model. The old 
assumptions regarding economic incentives to litigate do not apply,3 
therefore the procedures are not suited to public interest litigation.4 The 
rules governing the vital issue of costs must be examined and, for the 
purposes of this discussion, reform of the rules relating to pre-emptive 
costs orders is urged.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
*  BCL (NUI), LL.M. (Public Law) Candidate, National University of Ireland, Galway. 
1 Toohey, “Environmental Law – Its Place in the System” in Proceedings of the 1st National 
Environmental Law Association/LawAsia Conference on Environmental Law (14-18 June 
1989, Sydney). 
2 Chakrabarti, Stephens and Gallagher, “Whose Cost the Public Interest” (2003) Public Law 
697. 
3 Friedlander, “Costs and Public Interest Litigation” (1995) 40 McGill Law Journal 56, at 103. 
4 For a detailed discussion on the differences between conventional litigation and public interest 
litigation, see Whyte, Social Inclusion and the Legal System - Public Interest Law in Ireland 
(IPA, 2002), at 58. 
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Public Interest Litigation / Judicial Review 
 
Any person seeking to promote litigation taken to vindicate the public 
interest will necessarily have to address questions about the scope of public 
interest law – what is the public interest it seeks to vindicate? The term 
‘public interest law’ originally related to attempts to use the law on behalf 
of disadvantaged and marginalised groups,5 and this remit is discernible in 
recent Irish literature.6 A judicial review of a decision may also be in the 
public interest where governmental accountability is a driving motive 
behind the review, and this understanding of public interest litigation is 
visible in recent English cases.7 
 It may also refer to cases taken by, for example, environmental 
groups, and it is in this area that some reform of the costs rules has taken 
place in Ireland8 and other common law jurisdictions. Much development 
in public interest judicial review has taken place in the context of 
environmental and planning law, and there are several reasons for this. 
First, environmental and planning decisions generally affect large numbers 
of individuals or groups.9 Second, the environmental field is one in which 
the public is often faced with the consequences of maladministration or 
unlawful actions of public authorities.10 Third, as McIntyre points out, Irish 
planning and environmental law relies heavily on judicial review 
procedures for facilitating challenges to regulatory decisions. As a result, it 
is perhaps not surprising that many of the cases regarding costs and the 
public interest involve this area of law.11 Finally, the importance of public 
interest litigation in the environmental/planning sphere is reflected in the 
rules of standing. The Irish judiciary have tended to treat judicial review of 
environmental and planning issues in a special way. In Lancefort v. An 
Bord Pleanala,12 Denham J. provided an insight into the judiciary's 
attitude13 when she stated:  
                                                     
5 Ibid., at 1. 
6 Litigation on behalf of the disadvantaged is the subject of Whyte, Ibid.; Cousins, “Public 
Interest Law and Litigation in Ireland” presented to the Free Legal Advice Centres Conference 
“Public Interest Law in Ireland - the Reality and the Potential” (6 October 2005, Dublin). 
7 See, R v. The Prime Minister ex parte CND [2002] EWHC 2712 (Admin); R (Corner House 
Research) v. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 1 WLR 2600. 
8 Australian Law Reform Commission, Costs Shifting – Who Pays for Litigation (1995) ALRC 
75. 
9 Stein and Beagent, “Case Law Analysis: R (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry” (2005) Journal of Environmental Law 413 at 436. 
10
 Ibid. 
11 McIntyre, “The Role of Pre-emptive/Protective Costs Orders in Environmental Judicial 
Review”: address to the 4th Annual Conference for Environmental Professionals, University 
College Cork, 27 April 2006; available at 
http://www.ucc.ie/en/lawsite/eventsandnews/previousevents/environapr2006/DocumentFile,161
92,en.doc (visited 11 August 2006). 
12 [1997] 2 ILRM 508. 
13 McIntyre, loc.cit., at 3. 
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[T]he public interest element must carry some weight in 
considering the circumstances of environmental law cases 
and the locus standi of its parties. 
 
Denham J. also remarked that the sufficient interest required by the Rules 
of the Superior Court and the planning legislation should be interpreted in 
light of the unique position of and problems presented by litigation on the 
environment in that “often the issues affect a whole community as a 
community rather than an individual per se.” Regard for the public interest 
element is discernible in the later case of Murphy v. Wicklow County 
Council,14 in which an applicant, who had no interest in the matter aside 
from a concern for the impact of the decision on the environment and the 
related interest of the public, was declared to have locus standi. Outside of 
the environmental sphere, the Irish courts have been reluctant to grant locus 
standi to non-governmental organisations, but in the recent judgment of 
Gilligan J. in the High Court,15 the Irish Penal Reform Trust was held to 
have locus standi to represent mentally ill prisoners in legal proceedings 
against the State.  
 
 
Pre-Emptive / Protective Costs Orders 
 
Introduction 
While the relaxation of the standing rules may provide some 
encouragement to the public interest litigant, the remaining issue of costs 
continues to exclude many from the judicial review mechanism. The cost 
of taking a legal action was cited as the primary and most significant 
barrier to public interest litigation in a recent report on public interest law 
in Ireland.16 This barrier is multi-faceted, but primarily consists of the 
inability to pay lawyers' fees and also the fear that one may have to pay the 
costs of the other side if unsuccessful. Ireland follows the ‘English rule’17 
or the ‘costs follow the event’ rule of cost allocation which requires the 
losing party to pay the costs of both sides. The prohibitive or chilling effect 
of costs on litigation is a problem that has been increasingly recognised 
over the past two decades.  
                                                     
14 Unreported, High Court, 19 March 1999, O’Sullivan J. 
15
 The Irish Times, 3 September 2005. 
16 Cousins, loc.cit., at 21. 
17 The ‘English rule’ differs from the ‘American rule’ insofar as the latter requires each party to 
pay their own costs regardless of the outcome of the case. For more on the historical 
development of the American rule, see McDermott and Rothschild, “The Private Attorney 
General Rule and Public Interest Litigation in California” [1978] 66 California Law Review 
138. 
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 The sentiments of Justice Toohey mentioned at the outset have been 
echoed by many judges and commentators. In R (Corner House Research) 
v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,18 Phillips L.J. of the Court of 
Appeal refers to: 
  
[A] growing feeling in some quarters, both in [England] and 
in other common law countries abroad which have adopted 
the 'costs follow the event' regime, that access to justice is 
sometimes unjustly impeded if there is a slavish adherence 
to the normal private law costs regime.19  
 
Indeed, the prohibitive nature of costs may help explain the extremely 
small number of public interest cases brought before the Irish courts. In 
2003 and 2004, 3.5% of all cases brought in the High and Supreme Courts 
were public interest cases.20 
 It is important at this juncture to set out the rules that govern the 
making of costs orders in Ireland. The Irish courts have a general discretion 
in costs matters, granted to them by order 99, rule 1(1) of the Rules of the 
Superior Courts, 1986. The general rule stated in subsections (3) and (4) of 
Rule 1 is that unless otherwise ordered, costs follow the event. Rule 5 
provides that costs may be dealt with at any stage of the proceedings and an 
order for the payment of costs may require that costs be paid 
notwithstanding that the proceedings may not have concluded. The Irish 
judiciary, like their English counterparts, have held that jurisdiction exists 
for the making of pre-emptive costs orders (PCOs). This jurisdiction arises 
from the general discretion exercised by judges in costs matters, and a 
decision on costs made prior to the trial of the substantive issues is a 
permissible exception to the general rule that costs follow the event. As is 
readily appreciable, a PCO may prove to be a highly effective response to 
the prohibitive effects of the English rule. A discussion on the development 
of the PCO in Ireland will be preceded by a discussion on the English law 
in this area.  
 
England and Wales 
The courts in England and Wales have, over the past five decades, 
increasingly expanded the importance of judicial review proceedings in 
regulating the relationship between the citizen and the state.21 According to 
McIntyre, the origins of PCOs in England and Wales can be traced back to 
                                                     
18 [2005] 1 WLR 2600. 
19
 Ibid., at 2613. 
20 Cousins, loc.cit., at 43. The definition used in the Cousins report, which relates solely to the 
interests of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, is narrower than the definition used in this 
discussion. However, as the report notes, a slightly broader definition would not significantly 
increase this level. 
21 Stein and Beagent, loc.cit., at 435. 
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the progressively more liberal approach taken by the courts to the rules on 
standing in judicial review proceedings. This approach has, as Stein and 
Beagent note, led to the development of the role of the Administrative 
Court22 as a “forum in which members of the public can challenge the 
actions of public authorities in the wider public interest.”23  
 The House of Lords decision of IRC v. National Federation of Self-
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd24 liberalised the rules of standing in 
England, and the modern approach to locus standi was justified by Diplock 
LJ in the following terms: 
 
It would … be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if 
a pressure group … or even a public-spirited taxpayer … 
were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi 
from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to 
vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct 
stopped.25 
 
In the landmark case of R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Child Poverty 
Action Group,26 the Court of Appeal held that the jurisdiction make PCOs 
existed,27 but an order was not granted to the applicants. Child Poverty 
Action Group (CPAG), a non-governmental organisation, sought to 
judicially review the manner in which the Lord Chancellor exercised his 
power regarding legal the extension of legal aid to cover cases before social 
security tribunals and commissioners. Dyson J. heard its application for a 
PCO, along with a similar application by Amnesty International with 
respect to a different matter. The Court held that this discretion can only be 
exercised in the most exceptional cases and established the criteria that 
must be satisfied before an order would be granted: 
 
(i) the court must be satisfied that the issues raised are 
truly ones of general public interest; 
                                                     
22 The Administrative Court's jurisdiction is varied, consisting of the administrative law 
jurisdiction of England and Wales as well as a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts and 
tribunals. See http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/admin.htm (visited 11 August  2006). 
23 Stein and Beagent, loc.cit., at 435. 
24 [1982] AC 617. 
25
 Ibid., at 644. 
26 [1999] 1 WLR 347. 
27 The jurisdiction is based on the Supreme Court Act 1981, section 51, which provides at 
subsection (1): “Subject to the provisions of this and other Act and to the rules of court, the 
costs of and incidental to all proceedings … shall be in the discretion of the court, and the court 
shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs should be paid.” 
Dyson J., in Child Poverty Action Group, noted that the House of Lords had previously 
confirmed the very wide remit of this discretion in Aiden Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Interbulk Ltd. 
[1986] AC 965. 
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(ii)  the court must be satisfied, following short argument, 
that it has sufficient appreciation of the merits of the claim 
that it can be concluded that it is in the public interest to 
make an order; 
(iii)  the court must have regard to the financial resources of 
the applicant and respondent, and the amount of costs likely 
to be in issue; and 
(iv) the court will be more likely to make an order where 
the respondent clearly has a superior capacity to bear the 
costs of the proceedings than the applicant, and where it is 
satisfied that, unless the order is made, the applicant will 
probably discontinue the proceedings, and will be acting 
reasonably in doing so.28 
 
Dyson J. doubted whether the CPAG satisfied the first two criteria above, 
and also held that Amnesty International could not meet any of the criteria. 
The above criteria regarding the grant of a PCO in a public interest 
challenge should be read in light of Dyson J.'s explanation of what 
constitutes a public interest challenge. It is worth reproducing his 
explanation in full: 
 
The essential characteristics of a public law challenge are 
that it raises public law issues that are of general 
importance, where the applicant has no private interest in 
the outcome of the case. It is obvious that many, indeed 
most, judicial review challenges do not fall into the category 
of public interest challenges so defined. This is because, 
even if they do raise issues of general importance, they are 
cases in which the applicant is seeking to protect some 
private interest of his or her own.29 
 
This explanation may be seen as a preliminary criterion which must be 
satisfied before satisfaction of the four criteria will be considered. This is 
not explicitly stated in the case, but is implied, as a PCO will only be 
granted where the application relates to a public law challenge. This 
prohibition on private interests will be discussed in greater detail below.  
 The rules set out by Dyson J. in CPAG were subsequently applied in 
R v. Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, ex parte CPRE30 and R v. Prime 
Minister, ex parte Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.31 The applicants in 
the latter case were the first to receive a PCO, the terms of which limited 
                                                     
28 The CPAG criteria as set out in Corner House Research [2005] 1 WLR 2600, at 2617-8.  
29 [1999] 1 WLR 347, at 353. 
30 CAT, 26 October 1999, (CO/4050/99). 
31 [2002] EWHC Admin 2712. 
2006] Pre-Emptive Cost Orders 195 
 
their liability to costs to £25,000. The first full PCO was granted in R 
(Refugee Legal Centre) v. Home Secretary;32 a case in which the applicant 
was eventually successful. The Court of Appeal in the later case of Corner 
House Research commented upon the important public purpose behind the 
Refugee Legal Centre. In Corner House Research,33 the applicant, an NGO 
which campaigns against corruption in international trade, sought to 
judicially review a decision of the Department of Trade and Industry not to 
consult the applicant in advance of amendments made to anti-bribery and 
corruption procedures. It applied for a PCO as it had been established that 
it would not be in a position to proceed without one. The High Court 
applied the rules of Dyson J. and refused to make the order, but the Court 
of Appeal overturned this decision and, in doing so, altered the CPAG 
criteria so as to make the PCO regime less cumbersome and more 
accessible. The first ‘guiding principle’ in Corner House Research lowers 
the merits threshold from the court being required to have “sufficient 
appreciation of the merits of the claim” to the court having to satisfy itself 
that the applicant has “real prospect of success” or a “properly arguable” 
case.34 The Court stated that the higher threshold established by Dyson J. 
contributed substantially to the cumbersome nature in which the PCO 
regime had operated. It has been said35 that Corner House Research 
introduced the requirement that an applicant must not have a private 
interest in the litigation. However, this is not strictly accurate because 
Dyson J.'s conception of a public interest challenge stated that a litigant 
should have no private interest in the matter. The Corner House Research 
principles also state that the issues in the case must be “of general public 
importance”36 but that the public interest must “require that those issues … 
be resolved.”37 Stein and Beagent note that this latter requirement may be 
analogous to the costs benefit test in public funding.38  
 The subsequent case of Goodson v. HM Coroner of Bedfordshire and 
Luton39 elaborated upon certain aspects of the Corner House Research 
case, in particular the prohibition on private interests. In Goodson, counsel 
for the applicants argued that it is not necessary that the applicant should 
have no private interest of any kind in the outcome of the proceedings 
before a PCO can be justified and that it is sufficient that the public interest 
in having the issue decided transcends or wholly outweighs the interest of 
the particular litigant. The Court, in response, held that: 
 
                                                     
32 [2004] EWCA Civ 1296. 
33 [2005] 1 WLR 2600. 
34
 Ibid., at 2625. 
35 Stein and Beagent, loc.cit., at 437; McIntyre, loc.cit., at 10 
36 [2005] 1 WLR 2600. 
37
 Ibid. 
38 Stein and Beagent, loc.cit., at 438. 
39 [2005] EWCA Civ 1172. 
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[T]he requirement that the applicant must have no private 
interest in the outcome of the case is expressed in 
unqualified terms, although the court could easily have 
formulated  this part of the guidelines in more 
qualified terms corresponding to [the applicant's] 
submission if it had thought it appropriate to do so. 
 
To support this position, the Court referred to the exceptional nature with 
which Dyson J. in CPAG held that the PCO regime should operate. It is 
clear that this view on private interests will limit substantially the ability of 
an applicant to obtain a PCO. The reasoning in this case will be discussed 
below. First, it is necessary to introduce the position of PCOs in Irish law.  
 
Ireland 
The judiciary affirmed their jurisdiction to make “pre-emptive costs orders” 
(PCOs) in the High Court decision of Village Residents v. An Bord 
Pleanala40 and held that such orders should only be granted in exceptional 
circumstances. Laffoy J. laid down the criteria for obtaining a PCO and 
relied heavily on those enunciated by Dyson J. in the CPAG judgment. In 
Village Residents the applicant sought, inter alia, a pre-emptive costs order. 
This order was not granted because the challenge was not a “public law 
challenge in the sense that that concept was explained by Dyson J. [in 
CPAG]”41 as the members of the company bringing the challenge were held 
to have a private interest in the outcome of the application. Unfortunately, 
the Court did not explain what is meant by a private interest. In addition, 
Laffoy J. said that as she did not have a sufficient appreciation of the merits 
of the application, she could not conclude that it would be in the public 
interest to make a PCO. This is in accordance with the CPAG criterion that 
the Court must be satisfied that it has sufficient appreciation of the merits 
of the claim that it can be concluded that it is in the public interest to make 
an order. McIntyre42 believes that Laffoy J. may have taken a more flexible 
approach to PCOs than Dyson J. as she expressly anticipates that “it maybe 
that in a particular type of case other factors may come into play,”43 e.g. 
policy considerations reflected in environmental or heritage protection 
legislation. Laffoy J. preferred not to make “any generalisation as to the 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to make a pre-emptive 
costs order”44 as a multiplicity of factors that might arise in any given case.  
 The position in Ireland is considerably less clear than in England 
regarding PCOs as there have been no relevant judgments post-Village 
                                                     
40 [2000] 4 IR 321. 
41
 Ibid., at 330, per Laffoy J. 
42 McIntyre, loc.cit., at 16.  
43 [2000] 4 IR 321, at 330. 
44
 Ibid. 
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Residents. However some guidance may be extrapolated from decisions 
handed down by the courts subsequently. These cases relate to applications 
for favourable costs orders by public interest litigants after the trial of the 
substantive issues. In particular, these cases may provide an insight into the 
judiciary's understanding of a public interest challenge and the effect of a 
privately held interest of a litigant on the application. In McEvoy v Meath 
County Council,45 following the hearing of submissions on the question of 
costs, Quirke J. in the High Court ordered the respondents to pay 50% of 
the applicant's costs of the proceedings and the full costs of the daily 
transcript. The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent in 
making and adopting the development plan for County Meath failed to 
have due regard to the “strategic planning guidelines for the greater Dublin 
area.” Although they were unsuccessful, a favourable costs order was 
granted to them because the applicants “acted solely by the way of 
furtherance of a valid public interest in the environment and in particular in 
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to make PCOs very difficult to obtain. These barriers are disproportionate 
and conceptually unsound, as will be demonstrated below. They also 
perpetuate the exclusivity with which the judicial review mechanisms 
operate. While it may be argued that the courts are an inappropriate forum 
in which to challenge legislation or policies of the executive, Ireland has a 
rigorous judicial review regime and it would seem unjust to exclude 
individuals or groups from its operation on economic grounds. The 
separation of powers inherent in our constitutional order necessarily 
mandates a system of checks and balances between the organs of State48 
and judicial review is the exercise of, inter alia, control by the courts over 
public power.49 The contention that use of the courts to vindicate the public 
interest is illegitimate is an extension of the argument that judicial review, 
generally, is anti-democratic. This argument is, however, based upon the 
misconception that crude majoritarianism and democracy are synonymous. 
In a liberal democracy such as Ireland's, the will of the majority, 
represented in the legislature and the executive, is subject to the rule of law 
and moderated by a constitution which emphasises the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of individuals and minorities. Thus, recourse to the 
courts for review of legislation, policies and practices is valid and does not 
constitute a usurpation of the democratic process.50  
 The prohibitive effect of the current regime may lead to a situation in 
which there is an “under-supply of precedents.”51 McIntyre believes that 
reform of the costs rules may encourage the “emergence of clear precedent 
to inform the application of complex areas of the law ... [and] ... render the 
application of the law more predictable, thereby encouraging parties to 
settle disputes and reducing non-compliance.”52 
 In addition, on the point of access to justice, it may be argued that a 
restrictive approach to PCOs may run contrary to the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’).53 Article 9 of 
the convention, to which Ireland is a signatory but has not yet ratified, 
contains the provisions regarding access to justice in environmental matters 
                                                     
48 Cousins, loc.cit., at 9. 
49
 See De Blacam, Judicial Review (Butterworths, 2001), Chapter 1. 
50 A detailed discussion on the legitimacy of judicial review is outside the scope of this article. 
See Tremblay, “General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of 
Constitutional Law” [2003] 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 525; Monahan, “Judicial 
Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review” (1987) 21 University of British 
Columbia Law Review 87; Ely, Democracy & Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 
University Press, 1980). 
51 Office of Regulation Review (Australia), The use of cost litigation rules to improve the 
efficiency of the legal system: submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission review of 
the litigation cost rules (March 1995), at 8. 
52 McIntyre, loc.cit., at 4. 
53 (1999) 38 ILM 517 (Aarhus, 25 June 1998). 
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and requires signatories to ensure access to justice for the public and 
establish procedures which shall: 
 
provide adequate and effective remedies ... and be fair, 
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. 
 
In addition, signatory states must “consider the establishment of 
appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other 
barriers to access to justice.” In England, the Court of Appeal in R (Burkett) 
v. LB Hammersmith & Fulham54 specifically recognised the problem of 
access to justice for sections of the wider public and Brooke L.J. noted the 
concern of many respondents to a survey, carried out as part of a study on 
environmental justice, that the costs regime in place in England precluded 
compliance with the Aarhus Convention. Stein and Beagent conclude that it 
was in recognition of this and other factors that the Court of Appeal in 
Corner House Research proceeded to reform the PCO regime. 
 One may wonder whether the Irish courts will be similarly 
influenced by the provisions regarding access to justice contained in article 
9. As mentioned above, Ireland is a signatory but has not ratified the 
convention, so it is not part of Irish law. The European Union has been a 
party to the convention since May 2005 and has enacted two directives 
which deal with public access to environmental information (2003/4/EC)55 
and public participation in certain environmental decision-making 
procedures (2003/35/EC).56 According to the Department for Environment 
and Local Government, “[r]atification of the Convention will take place 
after these Directives have been transposed into Irish Law.”57  
 
The Prohibition on Private Interests 
The prohibition on private interests is a wholly disproportionate response to 
the threat of a “litigation explosion.”58 While Village Residents did accept 
that the litigation need not involve issues as grandiose as a “heritage 
protection issue or an environmental issue”59 to be worthy of protection, the 
Court did hold that its jurisdiction would only be exercised in favour of 
litigants acting in a “selfless, disinterested spirit.”60 This prohibition 
                                                     
54 [2004] EWCA Civ 1342. 
55 Implementation into the national law of member states was required by 14 February 2005. 
56 Implementation into the national law of member states was required by 25 February 2005. 
57 “List of questions submitted by members of the Public for Europe Day and corresponding 
answers from Departments/Organisations” (10 May 2006), at 27, available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees29thdail/europeanaffairsreports/Europe_day.do
c (visited 2 August 2006). 
58 Friedlander, loc.cit., at 92. 
59 Costello, “Costs Principles and Environmental Judicial Review” (2000) 35 Irish Jurist 121, at 
135. 
60
 Ibid. 
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supposes that the public interest character is wholly tarnished by the 
presence of a private interest on the part of the applicant. The problem with 
this approach is that it buys into the false dichotomy which accepts that 
public and private interests operate distinctly and to the exclusion of the 
other.61 This is tantamount to saying that the presence of a private or 
personal interest is necessarily improper, and the exercise by the courts of 
its jurisdiction to grant PCOs will only be possible when some “altruistic 
stranger”62 decides to bring a case. Chakrabarti et al. suggest this 
prohibition is “nonsensical” and “deeply flawed” and call for its 
abandonment.63 
 There is a considerable lack of clarity in the present arrangement. 
Does a company incorporated to initiate litigation on behalf of some cause 
necessarily have a private interest in the litigation and must, therefore, be 
refused an order? Stein and Beagent commented post-Corner House 
Research but pre-Goodson that the private interest prohibition was 
intended:  
 
to emphasise that claimants with a primarily personal or 
financial interest in bringing a claim should not be able to 
shield themselves behind the public interest when this had 
not been at least part of the motive for bringing the claim.64 
 
This interpretation of the law appears premature in light of the Goodson 
decision, in which the English Court of Appeal held that the private 
interests prohibition operates strictly and that any private interest in the 
litigation will prevent an applicant from obtaining a PCO. The Goodson 
case also has the effect of restricting PCOs to NGOs and public interest 
groups rather than individuals.65 It is hoped that the Irish courts will not 
follow the decision of Goodson in relation to its strict interpretation of 
“private interests”, in particular its restriction of PCOs to interest/pressure 
groups. McIntyre warns that such a restriction further concentrates the 
ability to initiate judicial review proceedings in the hands of a few interest 
groups66 and Stein and Beagent express concern that such interest groups, 
in the environmental field, may not have the capacity to take the number of 
environmental challenges warranted at a particular time.67 
 The approach of the Irish courts regarding the private interests 
prohibition is, as the law stands now, more liberal than the approach of the 
English Court of Appeal in Goodson. In Ireland, individuals have been 
                                                     
61 Thomas, “Costs in Public Interest Cases” (2001) October Legal Action 21. 
62 Chakrabarti, Stephens and Gallagher, loc.cit., at 712. 
63
 Ibid. 
64 Stein and Beagent, loc.cit., at 439. 
65 McIntyre, loc.cit., at 10-11. 
66 Ibid., at 11. 
67 Stein & Beagent, loc.cit., at 439. 
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deemed not to have a private interest in recent environmental judicial 
review cases, e.g. McEvoy and Dunne. Despite this, the private interest 
prohibition is flawed and places too great an emphasis on the motives of 
the applicant and not enough on the actual subject matter of the application. 
Whyte notes that in Ireland, pre-emptive costs orders will “probably be 
restricted to Crotty-type litigants raising issues that effect all citizens 
equally.”68  
 
The Merits Threshold 
In Village Residents, Laffoy J. held that she could not grant a PCO to the 
applicants because, inter alia, she did not have a sufficient appreciation of 
the merits of the case. This argument, which the author refers to as the ‘pre-
maturity argument’, is more difficult to refute as one can appreciate the 
difficulty a judge may have in determining whether litigation is actually in 
the public interest before the trial. This is a result of the alleged inability of 
judges in cases to separate the assessment of the public interest status of a 
case from the determination of the merits of the challenge, and this has 
been described at the most unfortunate aspect of the CPAG decision69. The 
merits of bringing a claim can be assessed at the interlocutory stage and the 
courts regularly make the distinction in relation to interlocutory 
injunctions. To grant an interlocutory injunction, the courts do not have to 
satisfy themselves that the claimant has a prima facie case or is likely to 
succeed at a full trial of the action.70 The court must only be satisfied that 
the plaintiff's case is not frivolous or vexatious and that there is a serious 
question to be tried. It may be contended that the nature of an interlocutory 
injunction is distinct from that of a PCO because the latter involves a 
judgment that carries financial implications for the other side. The judicial 
hesitation regarding PCOs is to a large degree related to the fear that such 
an order may be revealed to have been inappropriate in light of the facts of 
the case. According to Costello, “only in exceptional cases will the courts 
be able to make the decision the legal issue is one of such importance that 
no order in costs would be made against the applicant.”71 However, 
interlocutory injunctions can carry financial implications for the other side, 
for example, where the injuncted party must cease trading until the 
                                                     
68 Whyte, op.cit., at 92. The term “Crotty-type litigants” relates the case of Crotty v. An 
Taoiseach [1987] ILRM 400, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 on the grounds that this Act sought to 
incorporate the amendments to the original treaties contained in Title II of the Single European 
Act.  
69 Chakrabarti, Stephens and Gallagher, loc.cit., at 704. 
70 The “prima facie” standard was rejected by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v. 
Ethicon Ltd.[1975] AC 396 and by the Irish Supreme Court in Campus Oil v. Minister for 
Industry and Commerce [1983] IR 88. See Delany, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland (3rd 
Edition, Round Hall, 2003), Chapter 13. 
71 Costello, loc.cit., at 136. 
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conclusion of the trial. Furthermore, the courts, through the employment of 
the Mareva injunction,72 have been willing to freeze the assets of a 
defendant in order to prevent them from dissipating or removing assets 
prior to trial. The standard of proof required for a Mareva injunction is the 
same as that for an interlocutory injunction, i.e. a substantial question to be 
tried, rather than the requirement to show a prima facie case.73 Add to this 
the fact that Mareva injunctions are generally granted ex parte, and one 
begins to realise that the judiciary can and do differentiate between the 
merits of bringing a case and the actual merits of that case.  
 In England, the Court of Appeal in Corner House Research removed 
Dyson J.'s requirement that the court should have “sufficient appreciation 
of the merits of the claim that it can be concluded that that it is in the public 
interest to make the order.” The Court believed that this requirement 
substantially contributed to the cumbersome nature with which the CPAG 
regime has operated: 
 
It commonly happens when a court has to take an important 
decision at an early stage of proceedings that it must do no 
more than conclude that the applicant's case has a real (as 
opposed to a fanciful) prospect of success, or that its case is 
“properly arguable”. To place the threshold any higher is to 
invite heavy and time-consuming ancillary litigation of the 
type that disfigured the conduct of civil litigation 25 years 
ago.74 
  
The lowering of the threshold in Corner House Research is to be 
welcomed, and it is hoped that the Irish courts will follow their English 
counterparts' lead. 
 
 
Reform and Other Jurisdictions 
 
Suggested Reforms throughout the Common Law World 
Reform regarding costs orders and the public interest has been discussed or 
has taken place across the common law world. The Irish Law Reform 
Commission dealt briefly with the issue of pre-emptive costs orders75 and 
recommended that the courts continue to exercise their jurisdiction to make 
them only in exceptional circumstances. The Commission's cautiousness 
mirrors that of certain commentators.76 However, it recommends that courts 
                                                     
72 Taking its name from Mareva Campania Naveria v. International Bulkcarriers [1975] 2 
Lloyds Rep 509. 
73
 Countyglen v. Carway [1995] 1 IR 481; O'Mahony v. Horgan [1995] 2 IR 411. 
74 [2005] 1 WLR 2600, at 2625. 
75 Law Reform Commission, Report on Judicial Review Procedure, (LRC71-2004), at 64.  
76 Costello, loc.cit., at 136. 
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should, in certain circumstances, “indicate at an initial stage of proceedings 
the likely outcome in relation to costs while not committing itself 
absolutely on the issue.”77 Costello says of this approach:  
 
while the applicant will have a legitimate expectation 
which, although reversible, must be afforded sufficient 
weight when the court exercises its ultimate costs 
jurisdiction.78 
 
This approach is desirable in circumstances where the determination of the 
public interest status of a challenge can only be made in light of some 
evidence to be presented in the trial. However, in most cases, the public 
interest status of a challenge will be obvious.  
 The Australian Law Reform Commission has been more progressive 
in relation to costs orders and has proposed the introduction of Public 
Interest Costs Orders, which could be granted by any court or tribunal 
provided it is satisfied that: 
 
(i) the proceedings will determine, enforce or clarify an 
important right or obligation affecting the community or a 
significant sector of the community; 
(ii) the proceedings will affect the development of the law 
generally and may reduce the need for further litigation; 
(iii) the proceedings otherwise have the character of public 
interest or test case proceedings;  
(iv) A court or tribunal may make a public interest costs 
order notwithstanding that one or more of the parties to the 
proceedings has a personal interest in the matter.79 
 
The appeal of such orders is that they can be awarded pre-emptively and do 
not prevent relief where a litigant has a private interest. The commission 
also recognised the potential benefit of indicative costs orders where the 
court could not determine the status of a challenge at the interlocutory 
stage.80 The recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
have not yet been implemented. The Australian judiciary have been 
reluctant to liberalise the rule regarding the availability of PCOs despite the 
decision in Oshlack v. Richmond River Council,81 which had been 
characterised by commentators as authority for allowing the court to advert 
to a concept of public interest litigation in making a determination as to 
                                                     
77 Law Reform Commission,loc.cit., at 67. 
78 Costello, loc.cit., at 136. 
79 Australian Law Reform Commission, loc.cit., at Chapter 13. Emphasis added. 
80
 Ibid., at para 2.34. 
81 [1998] HCA 11, HC (Aus). 
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costs. Kirby J, in the High Court of Australia, rejected the Council's 
contention that the floodgates would be opened if litigants could bring 
cases without a costs penalty where such litigation proved unsuccessful. He 
agreed with the trial judge, Stein J., who believed that experience showed 
that what could reasonably be expected was “little more than a modest flow 
barely wetting the wellies.”82 While the Oshlack principles were intended 
to enjoy a broad application, subsequent decisions have rejected the public 
interest litigation consideration.83 
 In South Africa, the basic principles of costs allocation are similar to 
Ireland; however, the exceptions to the general rule that costs follow the 
event are quite different. The courts in numerous cases have not awarded 
costs against an unsuccessful litigant who raises questions of constitutional 
law in cases against the state. To do otherwise would have a “chilling 
effect”84 on other potential litigants. In the case of Die Oranje Vrystaate vir 
Staatsondersteinde Skole v. Premier van die Provinsie Vrystaate,85 the 
court employed a two-part test: first, whether the complaint was frivolous 
or vexatious; and second, whether the applicants had any improper motives 
in bringing the proceedings. The definition of “frivolous and vexatious” is 
narrowly interpreted which has resulted in no costs orders being made 
against unsuccessful applicants even when they were unlikely to succeed.86 
Despite this, the courts have warned against the bringing of spurious 
challenges. Whether the litigant has a private/personal interest is not an 
issue. Chakrabarti et al. have praised the South African model; however, 
they do recognise a problem relating to the difficulty of making a 
distinction between a spurious challenge and a “worthy failed human 
rights” argument after the trial.87 They suggest that this determination 
should be made at the permission stage and pre-emptive costs orders would 
provide an opportunity to make the distinction.88 Clearly, if certainty of risk 
is to be promoted in order to prevent a “chilling effect”, the litigant should 
be aware of the status of his case before the trial.  
 A thoughtful and detailed law reform proposal has been presented by 
Chakrabarti et al., who submit that the granting of PCOs should be 
governed by a two-fold test, with the two requirements being cumulative: 
“(i) is this a public interest case89 ... and (ii) does the defendant's superiority 
                                                     
82 (1994) 82 LGERA 236 at 245. 
83
 See Edwards, “Costs and Public Interest Litigation after Oshlack v Richmond River Council” 
[1999] Sydney Law Review 27. 
84
 Motsepe v. CIR, CCT 35/96, Constitutional Court (1997), at 30. 
85 (1998) 3 SA 692. 
86 Chakrabarti, Stephens and Gallagher, loc.cit., at 709. 
87
 Ibid. 
88
 Ibid. 
89 A dual working definition of a public interest case is used, each being sufficient 
independently: “(a) it involves a real (as opposed to manufactured or academic) human rights 
complaint; (b) it involves a real (as opposed to manufactured or academic) challenge to 
legislation, policy or practice of wide or potentially wide application or consequence, or 
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in terms of its financial capacity to bear the costs of the litigation create an 
inequality of arms?” This approach not only avoids the private interest 
prohibition and the pre-maturity argument, but also focuses on the nature of 
the case taken rather the characteristics of the litigant. This is the 
appropriate level at which to screen cases, and the above proposal ensures 
that marginal or frivolous challenges will not receive an order. 
 
Potential Framework 
The above discussion demonstrates that there are numerous ways of 
reforming the current law on costs and public interest litigation and judicial 
review. It should be noted that law reform regarding costs and public 
interest litigation is not solely the concern of the judiciary. The civil legal 
aid system in Ireland90 should be expanded to cover cases taken in the 
public interest as has been done in the United Kingdom.91  
 The courts, when exercising their discretion, should continue to 
follow the general rule that costs follow the event. They should depart from 
this general rule when the case is taken in the public interest, i.e. where it 
involves a genuine challenge to legislation, policy or practice of a public 
authority which is of wide or potentially wide application or consequence. 
This definition necessarily excludes redundant and frivolous challenges. 
While a favourable costs order to an unsuccessful public interest litigant 
granted after the trial is welcomed, pre-emptive costs orders are more 
effective in enabling public interest litigation. The presence of a private/ 
personal interest should not impact upon the public interest character of a 
challenge. When making a pre-emptive costs order, the courts should not 
have regard to the substantive merits of the claim or whether the litigant is 
likely to succeed. They should base their decision on the merits of bringing 
the claim, i.e. whether there is an arguable case. Where the determination 
of the status of a challenge is dependent upon some evidence to be 
produced at trial, the court should indicate that a favourable costs order will 
be granted to the litigant, unless the evidence does not confirm its public 
interest status. The failure of a litigant to receive a PCO should not 
prejudice their application for a favourable costs order after the trial. The 
granting of pre-emptive costs orders should be contingent on the ability of 
the defendant to pay the costs bill and the courts should have regard to the 
effect the payment of costs would have on the plaintiff if unsuccessful. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
exciting wide controversy.” 
90
 See generally on the problems with the civil legal aid scheme, Free Legal Advice Centres, 
Access to Justice: A Right or a Privilege? (Dublin, 2005). 
91
 See Smith, “The UK experience of test cases and the Human Rights Act 1998”, a speech 
given at “Public Interest Law in Ireland” Conference; Dublin, 6 October 2005; available at 
http://www.flac.ie (last visited 11 August, 2006). 
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Conclusion  
 
The purpose of judicial review is, according to Monahan, “to ensure that 
the political process is open to those of all viewpoints on something 
approaching an equal basis.”92 We have, through our Constitution and the 
adoption of a liberal democratic form of government, entrusted the courts 
with the authority to adjudicate the legality and propriety of legislation of 
parliament and the actions of bodies exercising public power. It would 
therefore appear that the prohibitive effect of costs on judicial review 
should be taken very seriously, especially where a challenge relates to 
some issue of public interest or of consequence to the public or group in 
society. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the potential of pre-
emptive costs orders be realised. 
 
 
                                                     
92 Monahan, “Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review” (1987) 21 
University of British Columbia Law Review, at p.89. 
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LESSONS ON LESSER EVILS: ISRAEL AND THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE 
 
 
THERESE LYNE * 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I challenge you – answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of 
human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, 
giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and 
inevitable to torture to death, only one tiny creature – that little child 
beating its breast with its fist, for instance – and to found that edifice 
on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on 
those conditions? Tell me and tell the truth.1  
 
Following the tragic events of September 11th and the resulting ‘War on 
Terror’ the question of the legitimacy of torture has been raised repeatedly 
in both scholarly writings and the popular press. These considerations tend 
to focus on two interrelated issues: the factual question of whether torture 
is currently being used as a counter-terrorism strategy by the United States 
government and its allies and the theoretical question of whether torture 
represents a justifiable policy in certain situations.2 Since the publication of 
the Abu Ghraib photographs and the leaked US legal memos the debate on 
whether the US has used torture has abated to a certain extent.3 These 
                                                     
* BCL LL.M. (Criminal Justice) 
1 Dostoevski, The Brothers Karamazov quoted in Dorfman, “The Tyranny of Torture; Is Torture 
Inevitable in our Century and Beyond?”, Levinson, ed., Torture A Collection, (Oxford 
University Press 2004) at 15. 
2 For more on this point see generally Rothenberg, “What we have seen has been terrible: Public 
Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror”, (2003) 67 Albany Law 
Review at 465. 
3 On 26th December 2002 the Washington Post published an article detailing how captured al-
Qaeda operatives and Taliban commanders held at US occupied Bagram airbase in Afghanistan 
were subjected to physical and psychological “Stress and Duress” techniques including being 
held blindfolded, hooded, bound in awkward painful positions and deprived of sleep for 
prolonged periods. In the aftermath of that article, numerous photographs were discovered 
which depicted in graphic detail the abuse suffered by detainees in the War on Terror at the 
hands of certain members of the US military. Following the publication of these photographs, 
legal correspondence between the White House, the US Department of Justice and the US 
Attorney General’s office were leaked to the press expressing opinions on the types of 
‘pressure’ which could be applied to detainees which clearly contradicted generally accepted 
principles of US and international law prohibiting torture and ill treatment. A collection of these 
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photographs and memos constituted irrefutable evidence that the US had 
violated the international prohibition of torture by using torture-like 
techniques on detainees during the War on Terror. Hence, the current 
debate is primarily focused on whether the US was justified in using such 
techniques and, if so, whether the absolute prohibition against torture is 
now an outdated ideal which cannot be strictly adhered to.  
This article seeks to address the question of whether torture can ever 
be legally permitted for the extraction of information. Many Human Rights 
are subject to limitation or exception. International instruments frequently 
contain provisions stating that the exercise and enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms otherwise protected by the instrument can be limited or restricted 
by States on specific grounds.4 Generally, these grounds relate to times of 
external aggression or internal political difficulties. Despite this, the 
international community has recognised that even in times of emergency 
there is a need for non-derogation from certain rights particularly the right 
to be free from torture.5 Therefore the prohibition against torture is an 
absolute prohibition and there can be never be a legal justification for its 
violation.6  While there is no question that torture is morally reprehensible I 
would contend that from a legal perspective we can no longer ignore the 
fact that torture is currently being used as a counter terrorist strategy and 
has been so used over the last twenty years. If the law is maintained in its 
current form and the practice of torture continues around the world without 
reproach, the prohibition will eventually lose all legitimacy and become 
obsolete. Under these circumstances I would respectfully contend that the 
introduction of a post facto necessity defence which will only be available 
when strict conditions are met represents the ‘lesser of two evils’.  
The debate on the introduction of an exception to the absolute nature 
of the prohibition of torture tends to reveal a marked division between 
those who accept Human Rights standards as universally binding and those 
with less sacrosanct vision of international law. Arguments for the possible 
use of torture highlight the differences between what Daniel Rothenberg 
                                                                                                                                                           
memos and opinions has since been published under the title Greenberg and Dratel, eds., The 
Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, (Cambridge University Press 2005).  
4 For example Article 15 ECHR states: “In time of war or other public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law.” 
5 For more on this see generally Boulesbaa, “The Nature of the Obligations incurred by States 
under Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture”, (1990) 12 (1) Human Rights Quarterly 
at 53.  
6 Article 2(2) United Nations Convention Against Torture (hereafter UNCAT) states: “No 
exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Article 
2(3) states: “An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a 
justification for torture.” 
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calls Human Rights formalists and advocates of realpolitik. Human Rights 
formalists understand the array of legal obligations associated with 
Conventions and other sources of international law as genuine demands – 
to be understood as binding and to be followed as rules that define 
acceptable behaviour on the part of States. This is particularly true for 
obligations on torture. Advocates of realpolitik express a different vision of 
international legal obligations, understanding these commitments as 
idealistic general principles that need not be followed when they run 
counter to the needs of a State or obscure the complexity of actual political 
conditions. From this perspective, the Universalist claim of the Human 
Rights system can be understood as either lofty ideals of moral value or 
empty promises of limited significance, particularly in light of pressing 
concerns such as national security.7  
This article will look briefly at the historical background of the 
practice of torture, its legal prohibition and absolute nature. It will consider 
the definition of torture under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture discussing which elements of this definition appear throughout 
international and domestic law and can be regarded as the essential 
ingredients of an act of torture. This will make it possible to demonstrate 
that the current interrogation practices of the US in its “War on Terror” and 
the interrogation techniques utilised for decades by the Israeli General 
Security Service8 contain those ingredients, violate international law and 
hence undermine the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture.  
The article will then focus on the various attempts made by the US 
authorities since 2001 to circumvent the absolute nature of the prohibition 
of torture by re-interpreting international law to defend its conduct in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In relation to Israel I discuss the approach which 
Israel has taken to the use of force by its security services specifically in 
the context of the Landau Rules and the 1999 decision of the Israeli 
Supreme Court in Public Committee Against Torture.9 I consider how the 
situation in Israel has influenced the current debate on torture and whether 
the Israeli necessity defence presents a viable solution to recent proposals 
that torture be used as a legitimate anti-terrorist interrogation technique. 
Finally I will consider whether a State investigator can ever be 
relieved of criminal responsibility if he inflicts torture on another human 
being in order to obtain vital information regarding an imminent terrorist 
attack. This imminent terrorist attack is often referred to as the ‘ticking 
bomb’ paradigm. In its starkest form the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ is when a 
bomb has been set to explode in a metropolitan area that will kill thousands 
of people should it go off. A detained person is known to have information 
                                                     
7 Rothenberg loc. cit. at 465. 
8 Hereafter referred to as the GSS.  
9 HC 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel 53(4) PD 817, 
38 ILM 1471. 
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on where the bomb is and how to defuse it. In order for the interrogator to 
get the information he requires to save the innocent, torturing the terrorist is 
heralded as the lesser of two evils.10 I look at the torture warrant proposal 
put forward by Professor Alan Dershowitz and explain why I disagree with 
advance approval of torture through the use of warrants.11 I also examine 
the possibility of using a necessity defence, loosely based on Oren Gross’ 
model for official disobedience, to excuse acts of torture where the case 
meets very strict criteria.12  
 
Background Information 
Torture is as old as human history itself; it is a scandalous heritage handed 
down to modern civilisation from prehistoric times of savage ignorance. 
Throughout the ages it has been used as a tool in the discovery of truth, as a 
process of moral and spiritual cleansing and as a legally sanctioned 
punishment. For half a millennium the law courts of Europe tortured 
suspected persons to obtain evidence. They acted openly and according to 
law. Investigation under torture was a routine part of criminal procedure in 
late medieval and early modern times. The jurists and judges who 
elaborated and administered this system were aware of the dangers of 
coerced evidence and accordingly they developed safeguards designed to 
render tortured confessions reliable. Across the centuries it became clear 
that the safeguards were far from safe. In the end, it was conceded that the 
long experiment with torture was a failure, and across the eighteenth 
century the use of torture was banned from European legal systems.  
 
Legal Prohibition 
The real death knell came for legally sanctioned torture in the wake of 
World War Two. Thousands of people, both civilian and military had 
endured horrendous torture at the hands of the Third Reich. In 1948, the 
General Assembly of the UN took the first steps to ensuring that such 
atrocities would never happen again. They inserted a prohibition against 
torture into the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights13, which 
                                                     
10 It was Jeremy Bentham who first put forward the ticking bomb scenario. Two Bentham 
scholars, W.L. Twining and P.E. Twining have argued that torture is impermissible even when 
restricted to a limited situation. They argue that there should be a distinction between justifying 
an isolated act of torture in an extreme emergency (like the ticking bomb scenario) and 
justifying the institutionalisation of torture as a regular practice (even in limited circumstances) 
because no government in the world can be trusted not to abuse this power. For more on this 
point see generally Silker, “Terrorists, Interrogation and Torture: Where do we draw the line?”, 
[2004] 31 Journal of Legislation at 191.  
11 For more on this point see generally Dershowitz, “Tortured Reasoning”, Levinson, ed., op. 
cit., at 258 and Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Undertaking the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge, Yale University Press 2002 at 138.  
12 For more on this point see Gross, “Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism 
and Official Disobedience”, (2004) 88 Minnesota Law Review at 1481.  
13 Hereafter referred to as the UDHR. 
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is now regarded as the foundational document of international Human 
Rights discourse and practice. Article 5 states: “No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.14 
This ban on torture was subsequently incorporated in Article 7 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.15 In 1984 the UN 
displayed its commitment to the prohibition of torture by enacting the 
Convention against Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Under Article 4 UNCAT every State Party is 
obliged to ensure that all acts of torture are criminal offences under 
domestic legislation. State parties are also obliged to prosecute anyone who 
commits torture or extradite them for prosecution if they are unwilling to 
do so themselves.16 The UNCAT has been ratified by over 134 nations17 
and serves to unify international understanding of the crime, institutionalise 
global condemnation and encourage the punishment of perpetrators.18  
However, the prohibition of torture did not take on universal 
standing until it was accepted as a peremptory norm of customary 
international law.19 As a peremptory norm of jus cogens the prohibition of 
torture supersedes all other treaties and customary laws except laws that are 
also jus cogens.  
                                                     
14 Article 5 UDHR. 
15 Hereafter referred to as the ICCPR. 
16 Article 5 UNCAT. 
17 Rosenberg, loc. cit. at 465. 
18 These include Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950, hereafter referred to as the ECHR. This article prohibits torture, . 
Article 5 of The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 and Article 5 of 
The American Convention on Human Rights 1969 all prohibit torture. The prohibition on 
Torture is also fundamental to humanitarian law, also known as the Laws of War. These laws 
govern the conduct of parties during armed conflict. Under international humanitarian law there 
is a duty to protect the life, health and safety of civilians and other non-combatants including 
soldiers who are captured or who have laid down their arms. Torture or inhuman treatment of 
Prisoners of War or protected persons are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and are 
considered war crimes. War crimes create an obligation on any State to prosecute the alleged 
perpetrators or turn them over to another State for prosecution. This obligation applies 
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator, the nationality of the victim or the place where 
the act of torture or inhuman treatment was committed. Even persons who are not entitled to the 
protection of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, such as some detainees from third world countries, 
are protected by the “fundamental guarantees” of Article 75 of Protocol 1 of 1977 of the Geneva 
Conventions. The US has long considered Article 75 to be a part of customary international law 
as it prohibits murder, torture of all kinds whether physical or mental, corporal punishment and 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment and any form 
of indecent assault.”    
19 While in existence in customary international law before 1998, the case of International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Prosecutor v Furundzija IT-95-17/I-T(December 
10th 1999) clearly marked the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens norm of customary 
international law. The Trial Chamber characterised the prohibition of torture as a peremptory 
norm of international law, which is owed toward all nations as an erga omnes obligation. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is hereinafter referred to as the 
ICTY. 
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Giving the prohibition such status has had effects at both inter-state 
and individual levels. At the inter-state level, it serves to internationally 
delegitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorising 
torture. At an individual level it would seem that one of the consequences 
of the jus cogens character of the prohibition is that every State is entitled 
to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of 
torture who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.20 Hence “the 
torturer has become – like the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis 
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”21 
 
Post 9/11 treatment of the absolute prohibition of torture 
 
“There was a before - 9/11 and an after –9/11.  
 After 9/11 the gloves came off.”22 
 
The terrible events of September 11th 2001 highlighted the dangers of 
terrorism with painful clarity. They sparked a declaration of war on 
terrorists and the conditions that allow them to flourish. Though the fight 
against terrorism is not new, it has turned into a proactive international 
effort without precedent. However, despite the noble goal behind these 
international efforts, the War on Terror has not been conducted in a noble 
manner.23  
                                                     
20 De Wet, “The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its 
Implications for National and Customary Law” (2004) European Journal of International Law 
at 97.  
21 As stated in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1980.630.F.2d 876, 
where the US Court ruled in favour of a victims’ claim against his torturer, for more on this 
point see generally Rothenberg, loc. cit. This view of the torturer was restated by Circuit Court 
Judge Irving R Faufman sitting in a US Court of Appeals: “Among the rights universally 
proclaimed by all nations is the right to be free of physical torture and that for the purposes of 
civil liability the torturer has become the enemy of all mankind” as quoted in David Hope, 
“Torture” (2004) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53.4 at 807. 
22 Cofer Black, Former Director of the C.I.A.’s counter terrorist unit, in testimony to Congress 
quoted in “C.I.A. policy to evade International Law”, www.hrw.org, last accessed 02/03/2005. 
23 Because of the murderous machinations of al-Qaeda styled terrorism the US government has 
crafted a variety of robust anti-terrorism responses designed to disrupt the terrorist network and 
prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring. These measures include passage of the US 
Patriot Act; creation of  the cabinet level post of Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Department of Homeland Security; and the establishment of the United States Northern 
Command in Colorado. The US has also engaged in more controversial actions, such as the use 
of pre-emptive military force against rogue states and the indefinite detention of suspected 
illegal alien terrorists and enemy combatants. It is also alleged that they have use torture and 
CID treatment on detainees to procure information about possible future terrorist attacks, all the 
time claiming that their actions have not infringed international law - For more on this point see 
generally Addicott, “Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States engage in the use of Torture 
or other Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?” (2003/2004) 92 Kentucky Law Journal 
at 849. There are also allegations that the US has returned suspected terrorists to countries 
where they are at risk of torture in breach of Article 3 UNCAT. Furthermore, in a proposal that 
will further undermine the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture the 9/11 
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Post 9/11 the US has repeatedly undermined the absolute nature of 
the prohibition against torture re-interpreting international law to 
accommodate its practices in both Afghanistan and Iraq,   
 
Reports of Torture in the War on Terror 
The 1999 Initial Report of the United States to the UN Committee Against 
Torture stated that:  
 
[T]he use of torture is categorically denounced as a matter of policy 
and as a tool of state authority…. No official of the government, 
federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorised to commit or 
to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official 
condone or tolerate it in any form…. Every act of torture within the 
meaning of the Convention Against Torture is illegal under existing 
federal and state law and any individual who commits such an act is 
subject to penal sanctions as specified in criminal statutes.”24 
 
It is hard to believe that just three years after this declaration was made by 
the US denouncing the use of torture, a story would be published in the 
Washington Post which alleged that the US themselves had used torture in 
the War on Terror. On the 26th of December 2002 the Washington Post 
published an article detailing how captured al-Qaeda operatives and 
Taliban commanders held at the US occupied Bagram airbase in 
Afghanistan were subjected to physical and psychological “Stress and 
Duress” techniques including being held blindfolded, hooded, bound in 
awkward painful positions and deprived of sleep for prolonged periods.25 
While supporters of the Bush administration dismissed these allegations as 
unfounded and wholly untrue, the veracity of the Washington Post’s article 
could not be denied once the Abu Ghraib photographs were discovered. 
The now notorious photographs depict cruel and depraved scenes from 
within one of many US military locations. The pictures provide a vivid 
account of how detainees were physically and psychologically abused, 
sexually humiliated and degraded at the hands of the US military.  
In a February 2004 report, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross found that “methods of physical and psychological coercion were 
                                                                                                                                                           
Recommendations Implementation Act 2004 would make it official US policy to send or return 
individuals to countries where they would be of grave risk of torture. The provision would 
violate US law and policy and is completely inconsistent with decades of efforts by Republicans 
and Democrats alike to make America a world leader in the fight against torture and for Human 
Rights.  
24 1999 Initial Report of the United States to the UN Committee Against Torture. 
25 One unnamed US official quoted in the Washington Post stated: “If you don’t violate 
someone’s human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job” - “Legal 
Prohibition Against Torture”, June 1st 2004, www.hrw.org, last accessed 02/03/2005. 
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being used by the military intelligence in a systematic way to gain 
confessions and to extract information.”26 
The methods cited include: detainees being forced to remain for 
prolonged periods in painful stress positions, detainees being attached 
repeatedly over several days, for several hours each time to the bars of cell 
doors naked or in positions causing physical pain, as well as sleep, food 
and water deprivation. As set out above, such techniques, especially when 
used in combination, constitute torture. The classified investigative military 
report of Major General Antonio Taguba confirmed these findings.27 
Taguba reported that “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and wanton 
criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systematic and 
illegal abuse was intentionally perpetrated….”28  
Despite evidence to the contrary, since the publication of the Abu 
Ghraib photographs the US government has repeatedly sought to portray 
the abuse in that facility as an isolated incident – the work of a few “bad 
apples” acting without orders. On May 4th 2004, the US Secretary of 
Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld in a formulation that would be used over and 
over again by US officials, described the abuses at Abu Ghraib as “an 
exceptional isolated” case. In a nationally televised address on May 24th 
2004 President George W. Bush spoke of “disgraceful conduct by a few 
                                                     
26 “Iraq: Applying Counter-Terrorism Tactics during a Military Occupation”, www.hrw.org, last 
accessed 02/03/2005.  
27 The Taguba Report March 2004 reproduced in full in Greenberg and Dratel, Eds “The Torture 
Papers; The Road to Abu Ghraib”,(Cambridge University Press 2005) at 405. This report was 
compiled when on January 19th 2004, Lieutenant General Ricardo S Sanchez, Commander, 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central Command, 
appoint an investigating officer in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the 
conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade.  
28 Ibid.,He went on to state that:  
Several US Army soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of 
international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key senior 
leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with 
established regulations, policies and command directives in preventing detainee abuse 
at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February 
2004.  
This abuse occurred in violation of both American domestic law and international law. 
Automatically the US is bound by customary international law whereby torture is prohibited as 
a peremptory norm of jus cogens. However,  the US is also bound by the UNCAT which it 
ratified in 1990 and transposed into domestic law via the Torture Convention Implementation 
Act which attempts to bring the US Criminal Code into Conformity with the Convention 
Directives. Simultaneously, Section 2340A of US Federal Law makes it a federal offence for an 
American national to commit or attempt to commit torture outside the US. Added to this is the 
US Army’s Field Manual 34-52 which echoes international proscriptions categorically 
providing that the “use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant or 
inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorised or condoned by 
the US government.” - Quoted in Robert K. Goldman, “Trivialising Torture: The Office of 
Legal Counsel’s 2002 Opinion Letter and International Law Against Torture”, (2004) 12 
Human Rights Brief at 1.  
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American troops who dishonoured our country and disregarded our 
values.”29 
Given the fervour with which the Bush Administration publicly 
denounced the abuses at Abu Ghraib, many people still believed that what 
had occurred in Iraq had been an isolated incident, never endorsed by the 
US government and certainly never to be repeated. But over the weeks that 
followed a rich source of leaked legal memos and opinions30 clarified 
official US policy on the issue of torture and clearly demonstrated that 
what had occurred at Abu Ghraib had not only been allowed to occur by 
the US military but had actually been approved by the US government.31  
The US have attacked the prohibition of torture on three fronts. They 
have argued that the majority of detainees captured during the War on 
Terror are not entitled to the protection of international law when subject to 
interrogation. Secondly, they contend that even if certain detainees are 
protected by international law the coercive interrogation practices used by 
the US do not come within the ambit of the US definition of torture and are 
therefore not prohibited. Thirdly, the US asserts that even if their 
techniques amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment32 the international prohibition on CID treatment does not apply 
to non-nationals detained by the US abroad.  
Since the War on Terror began, the US has detained hundreds of 
individuals that can be grouped into one of four categories: 
 
1. Those suspected of having links to al-Qaeda and other terror 
movements; 
2. Those designated as enemy combatants;  
3. Those detained as Prisoners of War in the Iraq military campaign and  
4. Those who have been apprehended since the close of major combat 
operations in Iraq and designated as “security detainees”. 
  
When the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld labelled certain 
detainees as “enemy combatants” they were automatically denied the status 
of Prisoners of War33 under international humanitarian law.34 According to 
                                                     
29 Quotes taken from the Introduction to Human Rights Watch Publications on Torture 
www.hrw.org last accessed 02/03/2005. 
30 These memos are reproduced in full in Greenberg and Dratel, Eds op. cit. 
31 For more on this point see generally Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and 
Breaking of Global Rules from FDR’s Atlantic Charter to George W. Bush’s Illegal War, 
(Penguin Group USA 2005) 
32 Hereinafter referred to as CID treatment. 
33 Hereinafter referred to as POWs. 
34 The third Geneva Convention concerns Prisoners of War while the fourth Geneva Convention 
safeguards “protected persons” - detained civilians. Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions bans “violence of life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment”. The use of force to obtain information is specifically prohibited in 
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Article 4A of the third Geneva Convention POW status is conferred on 
individuals who are “members of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict” as well as “members of other militias and members of other 
volunteer corps, including those organised resistance movements belonging 
to a Party”,35 provided such groups fulfil four specific conditions. These 
conditions include: 
 
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;  
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; 
(c) That of carrying arms openly and 
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.36 
 
All of the combatants captured during the Afghan conflict have been 
denied POW status by the US. Before the current Karzai government was 
put in place in Afghanistan, the US was engaged in an international armed 
conflict with Afghanistan, which was governed by the Taliban.37 However, 
the Taliban militia, who were acting on behalf of the established 
government were found by Judge Ellis in United States v Lindh38 not to 
qualify for lawful combatant status. After the establishment of the Karzai 
government the conflict in Afghanistan became an internal one with the US 
present in Afghanistan with the consent of the Karzai government to assist 
in maintaining order. The third Geneva Convention on POW status only 
applies in situations of international armed conflict and therefore ceased to 
apply once the Afghan conflict became an internal one.39 In relation to al-
Qaeda operatives, the US has declared that they are not recognised 
members of an armed force meeting the four criteria set out above and 
                                                                                                                                                           
Article 31 of the fourth Geneva Convention: “No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised 
against protected persons in particular to obtain information from them of from third parties.”  
Article 99 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
prohibits torture and ill treatment of Prisoners of War. 
35 Article 4A of the third Geneva Convention. 
36 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12th 1949, 6 UST. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 Article 4A. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm – generally 
referred to as the third Geneva Convention. 
37 The US did not officially recognise the Taliban government. 
38 United States v. Lindh 212 F. Supp. 2d. 541.The Taliban fighters were held not to qualify as 
POWs because they did not wear distinctive military insignia i.e. uniforms, which would make 
them distinguishable from the civilian population at a distance. The Bush Administration took 
this argument further stating that the Taliban had forfeited any claim to POW status because 
they had “adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist objectives of al-Qaeda.” – For 
more on this point see Addicott, loc. cit., at 849. 
39 For more on this point see generally The Committee on International Human Rights and the 
Committee on Military Affairs and Justice, “Human Rights Standards Applicable to the United 
States Interrogation of Detainees” (2004) The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York at 183. 
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hence do not qualify as POWs.40 All detainees captured during the Iraqi 
conflict have been accorded POW status. 
 I would respectfully contend that restricting the categories of 
detainee that come within the definition of a POW was an covert attempt 
by the US to undermine international law and avoid the limits which the 
absolute prohibition of torture places on interrogation practices. All 
detainees held in an international armed conflict, even if they do not qualify 
for POW status, benefit from the protection of Common Article 3 which 
protects them from “humiliating and degrading treatment” and “mutilation 
and cruel treatment and torture”,41 but only POWs can rely on Article 17. 
Article 17 of the third Geneva Convention provides that Prisoners of War 
are only required to give their surname, first name and rank, date of birth, 
and army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information. 
Article 17 goes on to provide that “no physical or mental torture, nor any 
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on Prisoners of War to secure from 
them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of War who refuse to 
answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”42 By labelling detainees as “enemy 
combatants” they do not benefit from Article 17 protection meaning they 
can be questioned on issues beyond those detailed above so long as they are 
not subjected to torture. However, what the US regards as torture is in 
reality quite different to the internationally accepted definition of torture. 
 
 
The Definition of Torture 
 
Almost all official interrogation is coercive, yet not all coercive 
interrogation would be called ‘torture’ by any competent user of the 
English language, so that what is involved in using the word is 
picking out the point along a continuum at which the observer’s 
queasiness turns to revulsion.43   
 
The correct definition of torture has always been the subject of 
considerable debate. There are a substantial number of varying definitions 
within international law and, at domestic level what amounts to torture 
inevitably reflects the values and experiences of that particular culture. 
Furthermore, in the wake of almost universal prohibition of abusive 
interrogation practices, interrogators have developed sophisticated 
psychologically oriented interrogation techniques designed to convince 
suspects it is in their best interests to make truthful statements to 
                                                     
40For more on this point see Addicott, loc. cit.  
41 The third Geneva Convention Article 3(1). 
42 The third Geneva Convention Article 17. 
43 Quote taken from Posner, “Torture, Terrorism and Interrogation” in Levinson, Ed. Torture A 
Collection, (Oxford University Press 2004) at 291. 
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interrogators.44 With the development of these techniques and the failure of 
international instruments to reach a concord on the definition of torture it 
has become increasingly difficult to determine what amounts to torture, 
what constitutes legitimate interrogation or what will be classified as ill 
treatment which does not reach the threshold of torture. Certain countries 
the United States have taken advantage of this deficiency in international 
law and used what Oren Gross calls “definitional wizardry” to classify their 
interrogation techniques as less than torture and therefore not prohibited by 
international law.45  
Everyone knows, in general terms at least, what the word torture 
means. The first international instrument to provide a legal definition of 
torture was the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from being 
Subject to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1974. Under this early definition, torture constituted an 
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.46  
This definition has since evolved so that varied definitions are now 
found in both regional and international instruments.47 However, there is a 
tendency to regard the definition of torture contained in the UNCAT as 
reflecting a consensus “representative of customary international law”.48 
Article 1(1) of the UNCAT states that:  
 
                                                     
44 See generally Parry and White, “Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture be an 
Option?” (2002) 63 University of Pittsburgh Law Review at 743. 
45 Gross, “The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law”, in Levinson Ed. op. cit.,at 
232. 
46 According to Hope, op. cit. 
47 The American Convention on Human Rights Article 1 defines torture as any act intentionally 
performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of 
criminal investigation as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventative 
measure, as a penalty or for any other purpose. Torture under this Convention also includes the 
use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish 
his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish. The 
concept of torture does not include physical or mental pain solely as the consequence of lawful 
measures.In categorising torture as a Crime Against Humanity the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter the ICC) defines torture as “the intentional infliction of severe pain 
or suffering whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the 
accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions.” Article 3 ECHR declares that “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” While the ECHR does not in itself 
contain a definition of torture, the European Court of Human Rights provided one in The Greek 
Case Report of 5th November 1969 (1969) 12 Yearbook 186-510. The Court held that “the 
word ‘torture’ is often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the 
obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an 
aggravated form of inhuman treatment.” 
48 Quoted in Vander Vyver, “Torture as a Crime under International Law” (2003) 67 Albany 
Law Review at  427. 
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Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental,49 is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.50  
 
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in Furundzija,51 the definition contained in Art 1(1) UNCAT 
has acquired customary status.  
Accepting that the UNCAT definition is the most widely agreed 
upon definition of torture in international law, it is possible to extract the 
essential ingredients of torture from the wording of Article 1. I would 
respectfully submit that this definition contains three essential components: 
the relative intensity of the pain inflicted, the purpose for which it was 
inflicted and the status of the perpetrator. 
If these three elements are present in a crime then it amounts to 
torture. If one or more of these elements are missing, the crime in question 
will constitute something less than torture. Such a crime is generally known 
as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.52 The UNCAT 
does not define CID treatment, but the United Nation’s Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials says that the phrase “should be interpreted 
so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses whether 
                                                     
49 The reference to mental torture makes it clear that it is as much torture to inflict severe mental 
distress on the victim by psychological means as it is to subject him to physical violence.  
50 Hence despite the fact that in Iran Article 119 of the Law of Hodoud and Qesas prescribes 
stoning to death as the penalty for adultery, it is not prohibited by the UNCAT as in Iran it is a 
lawful sanction and the UNCAT must take account of issues of cultural relativism. For more on 
this point see generally Vander Vyver, loc. cit.  
51 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Prosecutor v. Furundzija IT -95-
17/I-T (December 10th 1999). 
52 Hereinafter referred to as CID. For the purposes of this article CID treatment is an umbrella 
heading for a three tiered hierarchy of objectionable treatment where degrading treatment or 
punishment generally encompasses treatment or punishment that humiliates or demeans a 
person in a way that shows a lack of respect for his or her dignity and personhood. It is also 
characterised by the feelings it arouses in the victim. The difference in defining treatment as 
inhuman rather than degrading or as torture could be said to derive primarily from the intensity 
of the suffering experienced by the individual. For more on this point see generally Ni Aolain, 
“The European Convention on Human Rights and Its Prohibition on Torture”, in Levinson, Ed. 
op.cit., at 213. 
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physical or mental.”53  While it may appear that distinguishing between 
torture and CID treatment is straightforward, it has proved a much greater 
challenge, a challenge evident in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights.54 
In Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom,55 the Court had to consider 
whether five interrogation techniques56 used on IRA suspects by the British 
Security Forces in Northern Ireland constituted torture or CID treatment. 
The Court, rather to the surprise of many, concluded that the techniques in 
question did not amount to torture, though they did constitute CID 
treatment. The case has become the locus classicus in defining the terms 
used in Article 3 ECHR57 and in distinguishing between torture and CID 
treatment in general. While the majority limited the finding to CID 
treatment, several judges in the minority concluded that the five techniques 
amounted to torture. The formal language of the decision suggests that it 
was the degree of suffering experienced by the detainees, in terms of its 
cruelty and intensity, that constituted the basis for the Court’s finding of the 
lesser violation. In other words, the first essential ingredient of the 
definition of torture as set out above – the relative intensity of the pain 
suffered by the victim(s) – did not meet the threshold of torture.58  
The distinction between torture and CID treatment is of paramount 
importance in the current debate re-evaluating the absolute nature of the 
prohibition on torture. Under the UNCAT, while States are under an 
obligation to prevent acts amounting to CID treatment, certain provisions 
of the UNCAT can only apply where the acts in question are categorised as 
torture. The obligations not to return a person to a country where they 
                                                     
53 Quoted in Parry, “Escalation and Necessity; Defining Torture at Home and Abroad”, in 
Levinson, Ed. Op.cit., at 147. 
54 Despite the ratification and operationalisation of the UNCAT the European Convention 
system continues to play a leading role in defining the legal terms of the international debate on 
standards prohibiting and defining acts of torture. The case law of the European Court is 
particularly helpful given that The Human Rights Committee, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and the Inter-American Commission have generally avoided 
distinguishing torture from CID treatment.  See generally Rehman, International Human Rights 
Law; A Practical Approach, (Pearson Education Limited 2003) at 413. 
55 Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom Judgment of the 18th January 1978, Series A, No. 25; 
(1979-1980) 2 EHRR 25. 
56 Ibid., The five techniques consisted of being forced to stand for long periods in a stress 
position against a wall, being kept hooded, being subjected to continuous noise, deprivation of 
sleep and deprivation of food and drink. These techniques had been found to constitute torture 
when the Republic of Ireland case was before the European Commission. 
57 Article 3 ECHR states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” 
58 However it must be borne in mind that in the last 25 years since the Republic of Ireland case 
the European Court’s standards have shifted. The case must also be read in the context of its 
time as a highly sensitive political case – a leading Western democracy being accused of 
systematic torture, in the context of a fraught internal conflict in Northern Ireland to which the 
British government had committed its military forces. In such a context, the decision needs to be 
read as much in terms of its political weight as the practices being examined. 
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would be at risk of torture,59 to criminalise all acts of torture,60 to establish 
jurisdiction over the offences of torture,61 to take into custody alleged 
torturers,62 to extradite or try alleged offenders63 and to provide remedies to 
torture victims,64 are all limited to torture and do not apply where the 
practice in question is mere CID treatment. Moreover, Article 2(2) UNCAT 
which defines the prohibition as absolute in nature only applies to torture.65 
Article 16 UNCAT66 which applies to CID treatment does not state that the 
prohibition of CID treatment is absolute. Therefore, an “exceptional 
circumstances” justification could be available if a State Party can prove 
that their interrogation techniques amounted to CID treatment, which did 
not meet the threshold of torture. 
 
The US Definition of Torture 
In a memo of August 1st 200267 Jay Bybee, an assistant Attorney General, 
dispensed with the established definition of torture contained in Article 1 
UNCAT68 and concluded that torture covers only the most extreme acts and 
is limited to severe pain which is difficult for the victim to endure. He 
writes that where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that 
                                                     
59 Article 3 UNCAT. 
60 Article 4 UNCAT. 
61 Article 5 UNCAT. 
62 Article 6 UNCAT. 
63 Article 7 UNCAT. 
64 Article 14 UNCAT. 
65 Article 2(2) UNCAT states:  
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture: 
66 Article 16(1) UNCAT states:  
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other 
acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to 
torture as defined in Article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity…. 
67 Newsweek reported that the August 1st 2002 memo was prompted by CIA questions about 
what to do with those captives alleged to be top ranking al-Qaeda terrorists such as as-Shaykh 
al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah. See Sands, op. cit.  
68 The US has accepted the binding value of Article 1 UNCAT to the extent that it is interpreted 
consistently with US law, which under 18 USC Section 2340 requires a “specific intent” to 
inflict severe physical or mental pain. Specific intent implies that one may be accused of torture 
only if his specific intent was to cause pain or suffering. If the defendant acted knowing that 
severe pain or suffering was reasonably likely to result from his actions but no more, he would 
have acted only with general intent. In the context of the Abu Ghraib scandal General Taguba 
found that the “systematic and illegal abuse was intentionally perpetrated….” Greenberg and 
Dratel Eds., Op. Cit. Hence, this indicates that the specific intent element of the US definition of 
torture was present and hence the abuses which took place in Afghanistan and Iraq not only 
qualify as torture within the meaning of the UNCAT but also within the more restricted 
definition in US domestic law. See generally Cassesse, “Are International Human Rights 
Treaties and Customary Rules on Torture Binding upon US Troops in Iraq?” (2004) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2.3 at 872. 
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which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure.69 
The memo went on to list 7 practices that the US Courts consider torture 
including: 
 
1. Burning, especially burning with cigarettes; 
2. Severe beatings using instruments such as iron barks, truncheons and 
clubs; 
3. Threats of imminent death, such as mock executions; 
4. Threats of removing extremities; 
5. Electric shocks to genitalia or threats to do so; 
6. Rape or sexual assault and 
7. Forcing a prisoner to watch the torture of another person. 
 
The memo advised that “interrogation techniques would have to be similar 
to these in their extreme nature and in the type of harm caused to violate 
the law” which would infer that anything less than these forms of abuse 
was acceptable.70  
When the US ratified the UNCAT, it entered a reservation as to the 
meaning of mental torture, whereby it would be defined in accordance with 
US domestic law 18 USC. Section 2340. This statute defines “severe 
mental pain or suffering” as the prolonged mental harm caused by or 
resulting from:  
 
1. The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain 
or suffering; 
2. The administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
3. The threat of imminent death; or 
4. The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, 
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of 
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses or the personality.71 
  
Therefore the US definition of mental torture was established as narrower 
than that under international law even before the War on Terror began. The 
August 2002 memo, however, attempted to restrict the scope of the words 
“mental torture” even further. The memo opined that what constitutes 
mental torture must cause long-term mental harm resulting in “suffering 
not just at the moment of infliction but it also requires lasting psychological 
                                                     
69 To read this memo see Greenberg and Dratel, Eds op. cit. at p.172. 
70 Ibid., at 193. 
71 Ibid., at 177. 
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harm such as seen in mental disorders like post traumatic stress disorder.”72 
Therefore mental torture was restricted to clinically diagnosed mental 
conditions with psychological effects lasting a significant duration i.e. 
months or years. 
From these memos it is clear that the US government was attempting 
to ensure that should the interrogation methods used by the US military 
during the War on Terror ever be called into question, plausible legal 
arguments were available to contend that the conduct concerned did not 
meet the threshold of torture either physically or psychologically.  
A number of consequences attach to a finding of torture.73 First, US 
military officials would be open to prosecution in other States if their 
actions came within the definition of torture as torture is a crime subject to 
universal jurisdiction.74 Secondly, the UNCAT bars torture absolutely. 
Article 2(2) of the UNCAT states that:  
 
No exceptional circumstances, whatsoever, whether a state of war or 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.75  
 
According to the restricted definition of torture adopted by the US what 
occurred in Abu Ghraib and other US facilities during the War on Terror 
would amount at most to CID treatment. As stated above, States that ratify 
the UNCAT, like the US, must only “undertake to prevent”76 CID 
treatment but the “no exceptional circumstances” provision does not 
apply.77 Finally, Article 16 UNCAT governs the law on CID treatment. It 
does not require the exclusion of statements obtained from ill treatment as 
evidence at a criminal trial.78 Hence, evidence procured by coercive 
practices which do not meet the threshold of torture under the US 
restrictive definition of torture will be admissible in the criminal 
prosecution of the victim or other suspected terrorists.  
It is interesting to note that after the US had manipulated 
international law to exclude their coercive interrogation practices from the 
                                                     
72 Ibid. 
73A number of Articles of the UNCAT only apply when torture takes place. The three 
consequences of a finding of torture described here are just a limited selection.  
74 When a crime like torture is subject to universal jurisdiction it means that the State involved 
in under a duty to try the alleged torturer or extradite him/her to a country that will try them. 
The rationale behind rendering certain crimes subject to universal jurisdiction is that there is a 
common interest in all States prosecuting such crimes.  
75 Article 2(2) UNCAT. 
76 Article 16(1) UNCAT.  
77 This distinction was noted by the Committee on International Human Rights loc.cit., at 240. 
78 Article 15 UNCAT provides:  
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made 
as a result of torture shall not be invoked ion evidence in any proceedings, except 
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made. 
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ambit of the definition of torture, they put forward the argument that these 
techniques did not even meet the threshold of CID treatment. When the US 
Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the UNCAT in 1994 it 
included a reservation under which the US defined the prohibited “cruel 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” to mean ill treatment 
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US 
Constitution. The US reservation was intended to clarify the kinds of 
conduct that would be prohibited. Yet White House Counsel and Attorney 
General nominee Alberto Gonzales has contended that these reservations 
limit the geographic reach of the treaty. He asserts because the Constitution 
does not apply to non-US citizens outside the US, neither does the 
Convention’s prohibition of ill treatment. This interpretation would mean 
the US officials interrogating and detaining non-US citizens abroad would 
be free to engage in cruel and inhuman treatment short of torture without 
violating the Convention.79 
I would respectfully submit that throughout the War on Terror the 
US has significantly undermined the absolute nature of the prohibition on 
torture. They ensured that many coercive interrogation practices would not 
reach the level of seriousness required to amount to torture i.e. loss of a 
limb, organ failure or death. They then tried to restrict the prohibition of 
CID treatment to US domestic territory and US citizens. In relation to 
excluding detainees from POW status, the US essentially reinterpreted the 
Geneva Conventions to suit the Administration’s purposes. I would 
respectfully contend that when the US began the current War on Terror 
they ought to have been reminded that “victory alone is not the singular 
goal. How one achieves victory is also important.”80 The effect of the 
actions of the US has been to gravely undermine the prohibition of torture 
and to raise serious questions about the continued existence of the 
prohibition in its absolute form. However, these attempts to circumvent the 
prohibition are not novel. While the tragic events of September 11th have 
inflamed the debate on the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture, it 
was perhaps the actions of Israel that first ignited the debate twenty years 
ago. I would respectfully submit that Israel’s experience in dealing with the 
question of state-sponsored torture is instructive; their legal system has to 
create a framework that will recognise claims to basic Human Rights while 
also giving due regard to the needs of the government in its effort to foil 
terrorists who have established as their goal Israel’s annihilation.81  
 
 
 
                                                     
79 For more on this point see Human Rights Watch’s Paper “US: Justifying Abuse of 
Detainees”, New York Conference January 25th 2005, www.hrw.org last accessed 02/03/2005. 
80 Bethke Elshtain, “Reflection on the Problem of Dirty Hands” in Levinson Ed. Op.cit., at 80. 
81 See generally Parry and White, loc.cit., at 743. 
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Lessons in Lesser Evils: Israel and the Prohibition against Torture 
 
Since its birth, the State of Israel has been the target of significant threats to 
its existence, which have been manifested in a number of ways. The 
citizens of Israel have had to live for many years with the reality of suicide 
terrorism, where bombers blow themselves up in city centres, with an 
intensity and frequency unprecedented elsewhere around the world. Up 
until the late 1980’s the official position of the government of Israel was its 
GSS interrogators did not use torture or CID treatment during terrorist 
interrogations.82 Despite this assertion, rumour abounded about the 
“coercive” methods of Israel’s GSS. In order to investigate these claims 
and their veracity, a commission, chaired by Moshe Landau,83 was set up in 
1987 to examine the interrogation techniques of the GSS.84 In November 
1987 the Landau Commission issued its report, recognising the terrorist 
threat to the nation and the attendant necessity for the GSS to engage in 
what it termed euphemistically as “a moderate measure of physical 
pressure” during interrogation of suspected terrorists. In a separate secret 
part of the Report, the Landau Commission set out limits to the types of 
physical pressure that the GSS might employ. In the publicly released 
section of the Report, the Commission advised that GSS agents should 
combine “non-violent psychological pressure of a vigorous and extensive 
interrogation …with…a moderate amount of physical pressure.”85  
The Commission concluded that Israel’s codified version of the 
necessity defence authorises in advance the use of moderate physical 
pressure on suspects allegedly involved in security offences, so long as the 
interrogator reasonably believes that the use of force is necessary to get 
information that would prevent the greater evil of the loss of innocent 
lives.86 In addition, there was no need to require imminence for the defence 
to apply; necessity could be used to authorise torture where the suspected 
attack was not to occur for days, weeks or even months.87  
There are a number of issues arising from the adoption of these so-
called Landau Rules. Firstly, the Commission in describing the actions of 
the GSS never used the word “torture”. I would contend that in reality the 
techniques approved by the Commission did amount to torture or at the 
very least to CID treatment, given the fact that in subsequent years 
comparable techniques have been singled out by the UN Committee on 
                                                     
82 The General Security Service (GSS) are also known as the Shin Bet. The GSS is responsible 
for safeguarding the security of the State of Israel. For more on this point see generally  
Addicott, loc. cit., at 849.  
83 Former President of the Supreme Court of Israel. 
84 The Commission was appointed by the government under the Commission of Inquiry Statute 
1968.  
85 For more on this point see generally Addicott, loc.cit. 
86 Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Interrogation Practices of the GSS with 
Respect to the Hostile Terrorist Activities headed by Justice (ret.) M. Landau 1987. 
87 According to Silker, loc. cit., at 191. 
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Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Torture as acts that come within the 
definition of torture under international law.88 Hence, the Commission, by 
omitting the word “torture” from its report was attempting to manipulate 
the definition of torture under international law to accommodate the 
interrogation techniques of the GSS. This manipulation of language to 
avoid the prohibition against torture is directly comparable to the 
“definitional wizardry” utilised by the US in the War on Terror. By 
redefining the physical pressure applied by the GSS to suspects subject to 
interrogation as something less than “torture”, I would contend that the 
Israelis were not only avoiding their obligations under international law to 
refrain from using torture but were undermining the prohibition in its 
absolute form; Israel ratified the UNCAT in 1991 yet had in operation, with 
few successful challenges by other States party to the UNCAT or the 
Committee Against Torture,89 an interrogation system which clearly 
utilised techniques amounting at the very least to CID treatment and more 
probably to torture.  
Secondly, the use of the necessity defence to justify “coercive” 
interrogation practices was an attempt to introduce an exception to the 
absolute prohibition against torture. As stated above, many rights 
recognised by international Human Rights treaties are subject to limitation 
or restriction on specific grounds. Despite this, the international community 
has recognised that regardless of circumstance certain rights are so 
fundamental to the preservation of civilised society and basic standards of 
human decency that they can never be subject to exception. These rights 
include the right to be free from slavery, the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and more particularly the right to be free from 
torture. By using “necessity” as a defence to the practice of torture the 
Israeli’s were ignoring the absolute nature of the ban on torture and, 
interestingly, while in most jurisdictions necessity would be a defence after 
the fact - in other words once someone has been criminally indicted - in 
Israel necessity was used to authorise the use of torture in advance.90 This 
                                                     
88 These Rules condoned in advance allowing suspects and prisoners to be shackled, deprived of 
sleep and food, shaken violently and kept for prolonged periods in isolation. In its Concluding 
Observations Concerning the Republic of Korea (1996) UN DOC. No A/52/44 at paragraph 56 
the UN Committee concluded that in severe cases sleep deprivation amounts to torture. In its 
concluding observations concerning New Zealand (1998) UN DOC. No A/53/44 at paragraph 
175 the UN Committee found that depriving someone of food and/or water amounts to CID 
treatment under the UNCAT. In its Concluding Observations concerning Israel (1997) UN 
DOC. No A/52/44 at paragraph 257 the UN Committee found that violent shaking amounts to 
torture under the UNCAT. In relation to shackling the UN Committee found in its Concluding 
Observations concerning Israel (1997) UN DOC. No A/52/44 at paragraph 257 that being 
restrained in very painful positions amounts to torture. In the context of being held in isolation 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has held that total isolation and sensory deprivation 
constitutes torture. For more on this point see generally Addicott, loc. cit.  
89 Monitoring Body for the UNCAT. 
90 See generally Silker, loc. cit. 
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meant that necessity could be pled in every case of moderate physical 
pressure and Israeli Courts were extremely reluctant to question whether 
the interrogator was actually justified in using the techniques in question. 
Also, in waiving the need for immediacy from the necessity defence, the 
Landau Commission ignored the unique nature of the defence as an 
emergency measure aimed at preventing concrete and actual damage.91  
The Commission’s report established the bureaucratic framework for 
the practice of torture in Israel, which was to exist for over a decade. These 
practices continued despite Israel’s ratification in 1991 of the UNCAT as 
the Israelis maintained that these techniques did not amount to torture 
within the definition contained in the UNCAT.92  
In 1997 the Committee Against Torture declared that the methods 
approved by the Landau Commission did breach Article 16 and Article 1 of 
the UNCAT.93 They declared that this conclusion was especially true where 
such methods of interrogation are used in combination, which appeared at 
the time to be the standard case. The Committee recognised that Israel had 
to strike a balance between security and human rights but that they were 
failing to do so: 
 
The Committee acknowledges the terrible dilemma that Israel 
confronts in dealing with terrorist threats to its security, but as a state 
party to the Convention Israel is precluded from raising before this 
committee exceptional circumstances as justification for prohibited 
acts.94  
 
Yuval Ginbar, a spokesman for Israel’s leading Human Rights group 
B’Tselem, stated that all the Landau Commission did was confirm that 
“torture is routine, it is used against at least 800 Palestinians every year and 
worse it is legitimised and legalised by the government, by the parliament 
and by the courts.”95 
 
The Public Committee Decision96 
The Landau Rules remained in force for 12 years and were not subject to 
substantial challenge until 1996 when the Israeli Supreme Court97 revoked 
                                                     
91 According to Gur-Arye, “Can the War Against Terror justify the use of Force in 
Interrogations? Reflections in Light of the Israeli Experience”, in Levinson, Ed. Op. Cit.,at 185.  
92 Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Israel, 09/05/1997 A/52/44 
paragraphs 253-260, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 1997. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 “Israel Defends Interrogation Methods”, Friday May 15th 1998 www.bbc.co.uk last accessed 
01/06/2005. 
96 HC 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel 53(4) PD 817, 
38 ILM 1471. 
97 In these cases the Israeli Supreme Court assumed the form of the High Court of Justice. The 
High Court of Justice reviews the activities of public authorities, including the security forces, 
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an order preventing the use of force in a particular interrogation when the 
GSS claimed that it was interrogating the suspect to obtain information that 
could prevent future terrorist attacks.98 The suspect’s attorney said that “the 
court’s decision reflected its usual practice of granting injunctions only 
when the State made no objections and allowing the use of physical 
pressure when the State sought it.”99 This decision led to a UN 
investigation of the use of force in Israeli interrogations and in 1999 an 
unprecedented investigation into the detention of Palestinian prisoners.  
This investigation gave rise to the case of Public Committee Against 
Torture v The State of Israel.100 The question before the Court in this case 
was whether it was possible to infer the authority in advance, to establish 
permanent directives setting out the physical interrogation means that may 
be used under conditions of “necessity”. The forms of physical 
interrogation involved included repeated and forceful shaking, sleep 
deprivation and being kept in positions of extreme discomfort for 
prolonged periods.101 According to the defendants the use of such 
techniques was subject to internal regulation which required obtaining 
permission from various ranks in the GSS hierarchy depending on the 
technique sought to be used, the status of the suspect and the information 
thought to be in his possession.102 The arguments in favour of these 
techniques presented to the Landau Commission were also brought before 
the Supreme Court – primarily that given the ticking time bomb threat from 
Palestinian rebels and suicide bombers the GSS was authorised in advance 
to use such interrogation methods as were necessary including physical and 
psychological pressure. According to Gidan Ezra, the Head of the GSS, 
Israel’s security services “are fighting terror which doesn’t care about 
                                                                                                                                                           
to ensure that they are in line with the law. This judicial review is exercised as the first instance 
Court. This means that the High Court of Justice is the first Court to address the case and is not 
a Court of Appeal. It is also the last instance. There is no appeal on its rulings since it is the 
Supreme Court, the highest in the land.  
98 According to Silker, loc. cit. 
99 Quoted in Silker, loc. cit. 
100 53(4) PD 817, 38 ILM 1471 
101 One of these positions was the “shabach” position whereby a suspect is interrogated with his 
hands tied behind his back. He is seated on a small low chair whose seat is tilted forward. One 
hand is tied behind the suspect and placed inside the gap between the chair’s seat and back 
support. The suspect’s second hand is tied behind the chair against the back support. A sack that 
falls down to his shoulders covers the suspect’s head and loud music is played in the room. It 
should be noted that the judgment did not directly address the question of whether the 
interrogation methods were reasonable or not. Instead, the Court examined whether the GSS 
was authorised to use these methods. The Court did so in light of the fundamental legal 
principle of administrative legality, according to which the activities of an administrative 
authority must be authorised by statute or by virtue of statute. The Court did not find such 
authorisation.  
102 However, the GSS did not always adhere to these regulations and there is evidence that the 
GSS tortured as many as 85% of detained Palestinians. Between 1987 and 1994, between 
sixteen and twenty-five Palestinians died during or shortly after interrogation.  See Silker, 
loc.cit. 
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children, women or old people, we have to defend people”. Ezra contends 
that in order to successfully defend the people the GSS must be allowed to 
use moderate physical pressure.103 
The applicants in the case contended that the physical means 
employed by GSS investigators not only infringed upon the human dignity 
of the suspect undergoing interrogation, but in fact constituted criminal 
offences in violation of international law prohibiting torture. They also 
alleged that the use of these interrogation methods violated Israel’s Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.104 By sharp contrast, the State of Israel 
argued that the methods utilised by the GSS did not violate international 
law, could not qualify as torture or CID treatment and did not cause pain 
and suffering to the person being interrogated. The State went on to argue 
that these interrogation methods were also valid under domestic law as a 
result of the defence of necessity. 
The Supreme Court held that any form of interrogation must be 
measured against a strong presumption of individual liberty and dignity. 
Chief Justice Barak held that an interrogation by its very nature places a 
suspect in a difficult position. The “criminal’s interrogation is not a 
negotiation process between two open and honest merchants, conducting 
their affairs in mutual trust.”105 An interrogation is a “competition of 
minds” in which the investigator attempts to penetrate the suspects mind 
and elicit the information that the investigator seeks to obtain. Quite 
accurately it was noted that “any interrogation, be it the fairest and most 
reasonable of all, inevitably places the suspect in embarrassing situations, 
burdens him, penetrates the deepest crevices of his soul, while creating 
serious emotional pressure.”106  
Based on this reasoning, the majority107 of the Court held that a 
reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture, free of cruel, 
inhuman treatment and free of any degrading conduct whatsoever. 
Unfortunately the Court failed to classify these interrogation methods as 
torture or even CID treatment. Further, while it acknowledged that under 
various international law treaties, to which Israel is a signatory, “a 
reasonable investigation is one free of torture”, it failed to address whether 
the interrogation methods under scrutiny in that case violated those treaties. 
Instead, the court concluded that the methods utilised by the GSS were 
                                                     
103 “Israeli Court to Rule on Torture Law,” Wednesday May 20th 1998 www.bbc.co.uk last 
accessed 01/06/2005. 
104 According to www.knesset.gov.il, the Israeli legislature’s website, the purpose of the Basic 
Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of 
the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.  
105 CR.A 216/74 Cohen v. The State of Israel at 352. 
106 Kedmi, On “Evidence” (1991) quoted in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The 
State of Israel 53(4) PD 817, 38 I.L.M 1471. 
107  In his minority opinion, Justice Y Kedmi agreed with the judgment but determined that its 
implementation should be postponed in order to allow the security services to prepare.  
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degrading, infringed upon an individual’s human dignity and were not 
inherent in an interrogation and could therefore not be subject to prior 
authorisation under Israeli domestic law.108 
For many this decision represented a positive step towards 
reinforcing the absolute nature of the prohibition on torture which the 
Landau Commission had severely undermined 22 years earlier. Veteran 
Israeli human rights lawyer Leah Tsemel stated: 
 
It took 30 years of human rights abuse to get to this. It will stop 
torture and make Israel abide by international law.109   
 
I disagree with this view of the Supreme Court’s judgment. While the 
Court appeared to outlaw certain interrogation techniques, it never stated 
that these practices were absolutely prohibited but in fact sought to create 
an exception to the absolute prohibition on torture under international law. 
In rendering its decision the Court cited Israeli penal law regarding 
necessity110 – engaging in illegal conduct in order to promote a greater 
good – and recognised that “in the appropriate circumstances, GSS 
investigators may avail themselves of the ‘necessity defence’ if criminally 
indicted.”111  
 Mirroring the Landau Rules, the Court went on to hold that “the 
‘necessity defence’ can arise in instances of ‘ticking bombs’, and that the 
phrase ‘immediate need’ in the statute112 refers to the imminent nature of 
                                                     
108 For more on this point see generally Hope, “Torture” (2004) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 53.4 at 807.  
109 “Israeli Torture Methods Illegal” Monday September 6th 1999 www.bbc.co.uk last accessed 
01/06/2005. 
110 Section 34(1) of the Israeli Penal Law Statute provides:  
A person will not bear criminal liability for committing any act immediately necessary 
for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his 
fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, in response to particular 
circumstances during a specific time, and absent alternative means for avoiding the 
harm. 
 The defence of necessity is essentially a “state of nature” plea. If one finds oneself in an 
impossible position requiring one to choose between violating the law and preventing a greater 
harm, such as the taking of innocent life – and one has no time to seek recourse from the proper 
authorities – society authorises one to act as if there were no law. In other words, since society 
has broken its part of the social contract with you, namely to protect you, it follows that you are 
not obligated to keep your part of the social contract, namely to obey the law. Thus it has been 
said, “necessity knows no law.” – For more on this point see generally Dershowitz loc. cit., at 
260. 
111 Chief Justice Barak in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel at 
paragraph 35. Given that the Israeli Court left open the possibility of the necessity defence it is 
interesting to note that in the late 1980s Dershowitz proposed the idea of torture warrants in the 
Hebrew University in Israel. The Israeli government and judiciary rejected his proposal. The 
response, especially of Israeli judges, was horror at the prospect that they – the robed 
embodiment of the rule of law – might have to dirty their hands by approving so barbaric a 
practice in advance and in specific cases – For more on this point see Dershowitz, loc. cit.  
112 Referring to Section 34(1) of the Israeli Penal Law – Quoted in Dershowitz, ibid. 
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the act rather than that of the danger. Hence, the imminence criterion is 
satisfied even if the bomb is set to explode in a few days, or even a few 
weeks, provided the danger is certain to materialise and there is no 
alternative means of preventing it.” 
 The Court did reject the use of necessity as an ex ante justification 
for torture, holding that the nature of the defence was inconsistent with that 
approach. It was a defence dealing with a person’s reaction to a given set of 
facts, not the source of general administrative power.113  Therefore, while 
the Court rejected the Landau Commission’s formulation of the necessity 
defence, it introduced its own exception to the absolute nature of the 
prohibition of torture – a post facto necessity defence available to a State 
investigator accused of torture. While this was still illegal given the 
absolute nature of the prohibition, it was, for many, an acceptable 
compromise to the prohibition in order to deal with the ticking bomb threat. 
However, in practice, since 1999, this post facto defence has been 
transformed into an ex ante justification for torture. The Israeli Courts have 
chosen not to prosecute interrogators accused of torture once they claim 
that exigent circumstances existed and that they are intending to plead 
necessity. According to Human Rights Watch, as of January 2004, some 
5,900 Palestinians were still being held on security-related grounds.114   
Reports of ill treatment were widespread including kicking, beating, 
squalid conditions and deprivation of food and drink. Israeli Human Rights 
organisations documented cases of torture with some 631 persons being 
held on the basis of secret evidence as administrative detainees without 
effective judicial review.115 Hence, while the Supreme Court decision on its 
face reinforces the prohibition of torture, in practice, it subtly undermines 
it. A post facto necessity defence is a good idea in theory provided you can 
ensure criminal prosecution of the suspected torturer in every case. It 
should not be available to prevent prosecution from the beginning. 
 Twenty years ago the State of Israel lay the foundations for the 
current debate surrounding the use of torture in America’s War on Terror. 
The international community left Israeli security practices unchecked for 
far too long with the Landau Rules operating for 12 years in clear breach of 
international law. While the Supreme Court decision was welcome as a 
public declaration that GSS interrogation techniques were illegal, it left the 
door ajar for the GSS to continue to torture Palestinians with the security of 
knowing that, should the State ever attempt to prosecute them, they would 
                                                     
113 The UN Committee Against Torture 2001 welcomed the judgment and change in policy but 
insisted that no defence should be allowed to justify torture.  
114 Despite this it did appear for a short time that the Public Committee decision had had an 
impact on GSS interrogation practices. Following the judgment, the Knesset, otherwise known 
as the Israeli legislature, enacted the General Security Services Law 2002, which regulated the 
operations of this security agency for the first time. For more on this point see Allain Ed. 
Unlocking the Middle East; the writings of Richard Falk (Olive Branch Press 2003). 
115  “Israel/Occupied Territories” January 2004 www.hrw.org last accessed 01/06/2005. 
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have a practically unbeatable defence in the form of necessity. In Israel the 
exceptional defence of necessity has quickly become the norm – every 
suspect is a ticking time bomb threat, every prisoner has information that 
could save lives, every Palestinian can be tortured so as to protect the State 
from an ever-present and frequently imagined terrorist threat.  
 Cicero once said: “inter arma silent leges”,116 which means in battle 
laws are silent. It appears that in the so-called battle between Israel and 
Palestinian rebels, international laws prohibiting torture to which Israel is a 
party have been irreparably silenced and irreparably damaged. Given 
Israel’s high level of dependence on US foreign aid –especially considering 
the high cost associated with subsidising Israeli settlements in the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank – the question must be asked as to why the US 
government failed to challenge the silencing of such well established 
international laws.117 I would respectfully submit that their failure to 
criticise Israeli treatment of Palestinians has ensured that they will be not 
been seen as hypocrites in relation to the interrogation methods employed 
by US security personal.  
 In the Public Committee decision Chief Justice Barak stated that “at 
times the price of truth is so high that a democratic society is not prepared 
to pay.”118 In this current War on Terror it seems that no price is too high 
for revenge and retribution post September 11th. On that day the world 
changed, as did the status of the prohibition of torture. Israel was alone for 
many years in its open use of “coercive” interrogation techniques and had 
been heavily criticised for it; now their techniques are being lauded by the 
world’s last remaining super power. Therefore, not only has Israel’s policy 
on torture undermined the absolute nature of the prohibition, but it has also 
encouraged other countries to circumvent international laws on torture 
slowly leading to the erosion of the prohibition of torture in its absolute 
form. 
 
 
Solutions - Where do we go from here? 
 
In the aftermath of September 11th 2001, many academic commentators 
made proposals as to how the US and the world in general should deal with 
the al-Qaeda terrorist threat. It is Harvard Law School Professor Alan 
Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal that has attracted the most 
attention.119 Dershowitz’s argument proceeds in 3 steps. First, he believes 
                                                     
116 Cicero Pro Milano Chapter 11, quoted in Chambers Dictionary of Quotations (Chambers 
Harrap, Edinburgh 2005) at 218. 
117 See generally Allain, op. cit. 
118 53(4) PD 817, 38 I.L.M 1471. 
119 While the torture warrant proposal has only attracted attention since the War on Terror, 
Dershowitz actually made this proposal back in the 1980s – see above and generally. 
Dershowitz loc. cit., in Levinson Ed. at 258. It is also interesting to note that there once existed 
2006] Torture 233 
 
that the record shows that “torture sometimes does work and can 
sometimes prevent major disasters”120 that can be averted in no other 
fashion. Second, in light of this, he believes that public opinion would 
condemn a refusal to use torture to prevent terrorist attacks and that US 
officials would in fact engage in torture in certain situations. From these 
premises Professor Dershowitz concludes that:  
 
[T]he real issue, therefore, is not whether some torture would or 
would not be used in the ticking bomb case – it would. The question 
is whether it would be done openly, pursuant to a previously 
established legal procedure, or whether it would be done secretly, in 
violation of existing law.121  
 
As between the two options, he maintains that the use of open and 
established procedures is likely to result in less torture. He contends that a 
judge would not issue a torture warrant unless fully convinced that it is the 
most appropriate cause of action and the only real choice left under the 
circumstances. Dershowitz promotes the fact that a torture warrant would 
leave an official record; both judges and executive officials would be held 
accountable should they allow torture to occur when it was not 
necessary.122 He goes on to argue that this warrant requirement would also 
serve to protect the rights of the suspect: 
 
He would be granted immunity, told that he was now compelled to 
testify, threatened with imprisonment if he refused to do so and 
given the option of providing the requested information.123  
 
If the suspect refused to provide the information after being immunised, he 
would then be threatened with torture. Dershowitz argues that the suspect 
might be more willing to provide the information if he knows that the use 
of torture has been authorised by law.124 
 Dershowitz is not in favour of torture per se. Rather, he regards 
himself as a realist. He believes that one way or another torture is going to 
be used and he would rather that it be subject to official authorisation and 
accountability. He contends that: 
                                                                                                                                                           
a bona fide torture warrant system specifically used by the English Privy Council from about 
1540 to 1640. For more on this point see Hope loc. cit., at 807.  
120 Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, 
(Yale University Press 2002) at 138. 
121 Quote taken from Dershowitz, op. cit. at 151. 
122  For more on this point see generally Kreimer, “Too close to the Rack and Screw: 
Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror” (2003) 6 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law at  278. 
123 Quote taken from Silker loc. cit., at 191. 
124 For more on this point see Silker, ibid. 
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[I]f we ever confronted an actual case of imminent mass terrorism 
that could be prevented by the infliction of torture, we would use 
torture (even lethal torture) and the public would favour its use…. It 
is not so much about the substantive issue of torture as it is about 
accountability, visibility and candour in a democracy that is 
confronting a choice of evils.125 
 
Leaving aside the legal minefield of trying to put torture on the statute 
books126 I would contend that there are a number of other persuasive 
reasons why Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal should not be adopted. 
First, the torture warrant system legitimises the use of torture and I would 
contend that legitimisation of torture runs the risk of normalising its use. 
Dershowitz himself acknowledges this flaw in his proposal stating that “the 
major downside of any warrant procedure would be its legitimisation of a 
horrible practice.”127  
Once torture becomes a legitimate option it is open to abuse. 
Dershowitz contends that torture would only be used in the most exigent 
circumstances – that of the ticking bomb terrorist – yet what qualifies as 
exigent is open to debate. I would respectfully submit that the system 
established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978128 is 
directly comparable to Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal. FISA was 
created by the US government as a corollary to the public legal system in 
order to discreetly process search warrants against suspected terrorists and 
spies. As initially enacted, FISA allowed specially designated judges to 
                                                     
125 Quote taken from Dershowitz, loc. cit., at 266. 
126 In order to put torture warrants on the US statute books, the legislature would have to 
circumvent the 4th, 5th, 8th  and 14th Amendments to the US Constitution as well as the 
UNCAT. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable search or 
seizure, which encompasses the right not to be abused by the police. The Fifth Amendment 
guarantees the right against self-incrimination, which encompasses the right to remain silent 
during interrogations. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee due process ensuring 
fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system. The Eighth Amendment guarantees the right 
to be free of cruel or unusual punishment. Dershowitz begins by taking the position that as long 
as the information obtained, by using torture authorised by a torture warrant, is not used in a 
criminal prosecution, the protections of the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment’s prohibition 
on compelled self incrimination are not transgressed. Further, he argues, in addressing the 
constraints on deployment of force in pursuit of prevention – as opposed to retribution – the 
Eighth Amendment’s constraints on cruel and unusual punishment are inapplicable. The only 
relevant constitutional limitations, in Dershowitz’s view, are the unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the general commands of the due process clause. As the relevant Fourth 
Amendment norm is one of reasonableness the same principles that allow the involuntary 
insertion of a needle to obtain blood alcohol tests in order to prosecute drunk drivers, would 
approve the insertion of a needle bearing “truth serums” to prevent terrorism. This would allow 
proportionately more serious breaches of public order, culminating in torture where absolutely 
essential to preserve life. For more on this point see Kreimer loc.cit., at 278. 
127 Dershowitz, loc. cit., at  271.  
128 Hereinafter referred to as FISA.  
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authorise surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information under 
certain circumstances, in a Court known as the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Committee.129 Unfortunately the FISC model130  has proved an 
embodiment of the critics’ worst fears with the annual reports to Congress 
for the calendar year 2002 showing that 1,226 of 1,228 applications for 
search warrants had been approved by FISC.131 The remaining two were 
approved by the supplementary appeals council to the FISC, the FISCR.132 
It is obvious that a system that always approves torture warrant applications 
would bluntly defeat the purpose of the system particularly as Dershowitz 
was trying to reduce the occurrence of torture by bringing it above board. I 
would respectfully contend that if the US were to create a torture warrant 
Court such a Court has the potential to become a rubber stamping 
mechanism, as has occurred with the FISC. 
 The second problem with Dershowitz’s proposal is the fact that it is 
unlikely to achieve the visibility and accountability it was designed for. 
Taking the FISA model once more as an example, the records and files of 
cases involving FISC search warrants are sealed and may only be revealed 
to an extremely limited degree. Dershowitz contends that torture warrants 
would only be used in the most extreme of circumstances, which would 
imply that they would be reserved for cases of national security. The 
practical reality is that issues of national security will always involve ex 
parte in camera proceedings and the sealing of all associated documents 
thereby placing the “official” use of torture completely off the radar screen. 
Hence, such a warrant procedure would in fact defeat the goals of 
transparency and accountability and the whole premise behind 
Dershowitz’s proposal may be called into question.  
  I would respectfully submit that the third flaw in Dershowitz’s 
argument is the impracticality of the warrant system. In the ticking bomb 
situation, every minute counts. I would contend if such a situation arose 
today, there would be no time for law enforcement officials to present 
evidence to a judge in order to obtain a warrant. Under the current legal 
system operating in the US law enforcement officials are entitled to carry 
out warrantless searches of property where it is impractical to take the time 
to obtain a warrant from a judge having regard to the serious circumstances 
                                                     
129 Hereinafter referred to as FISC. The seven-judge Court set up under the FISA was expanded 
to 11 judges under the 2001 USA Patriot Act. The model is adaptable to the torture warrant 
proposal, insofar as an 11 judge panel might be effective at quickly expediting decisions on 
torture warrants and making tough decisions regarding ticking bomb terrorists. 
130 As amended by the USA Patriot Act 2001 and other legislation. 
131 According to Scarry the FISC has declined only one requested warrant in 25 years and the 
estimated number of warrant requests is 25,000. See Scarry, “Five Errors in the Reasoning of 
Alan Dershowitz”, Levinson Ed. op. cit, at 286. 
132 See generally Moher, “The Lesser of Two Evils?: An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned 
Torture in a Post 9/11 World”, (2004) 26 Thomas Jefferson Law Review at 469.  
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of the case in question.133 It is a complete contradiction therefore to say that 
in the extreme circumstance of a ticking bomb terrorist an officer would 
have the time or opportunity to get to a judge, present his evidence, argue 
his case that a torture warrant is required and wait for a judicial decision. 
 Fourthly, if one looks again to the traditional warrant system for 
search and seizure, every country in the modern world has had to deal with 
the fact that, in situations where the stakes are considerably lower than the 
use of torture, law enforcement officials have embellished the truth in their 
efforts to serve the perceived ends of law enforcement. This is a flaw that 
has yet to be remedied in the current warrant system and one that I would 
contend that Dershowitz’s torture warrant system cannot safeguard against. 
Dershowitz argues against post facto ratification of an interrogator’s 
decision to torture an alleged terrorist as this places intense pressure on a 
torturer to make the right decision for fear of being sent to prison. I would 
contend that a judge is just as fallible as an interrogator and just as capable 
of ordering the torture of an innocent person. The difference is that a judge 
is much more removed from the situation. If the decision rests with the 
interrogator, he134 has to be so certain that torture is necessary that he is 
willing to sacrifice his own freedom. What consequences exist for a judge 
who gets it wrong?  
The final flaw in Dershowitz’s reasoning is the effect such 
legalisation would have on the world as a whole. The civilised world has 
considered torture illegitimate for over a century. Legitimisation of torture 
by the US, even reserved for extraordinary situations, would subject the 
world to an incredible setback in the campaign for Human Rights and 
would provide justification for the use of torture across the world. If we 
were to change course now, depart from our international obligations and 
seek to create a legal structure for authorising officials to use torture – even 
if only in the face of the most urgent threat and in the most extreme 
circumstances – our principled opposition to its use would be lost. The 
moral authority that enables us to seek to persuade others to abandon the 
practice would be extinguished. In this context it is important to remember 
that: 
 
What distinguishes the war of the State from the war of its enemies is 
that the State fights while upholding the law, whereas its enemies 
fight while violating the law. The moral strength and objective 
justness of the Government’s war depend entirely on upholding the 
laws of the State: by conceding this strength and this justness, the 
Government serves the purposes of the enemy. Moral weapons are 
                                                     
133 See generally  Gross, “Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official 
Disobedience” loc. cit., at 1481. 
134 “He” is used to refer to both male and female torturers. 
2006] Torture 237 
 
no less important than any other weapon, and perhaps more 
important. There is no weapon more moral than the rule of law.135  
 
Writing in The New Republic in 2002, Richard Posner, a judge on the US 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, expressed reservations about 
Dershowitz’s proposal but he argued that “if the stakes are high enough, 
torture is permissible. No one who doubts that this is the case should be in 
a position of responsibility.”136 With this in mind I propose an alternative to 
Dershowitz’s torture warrants – a post facto necessity defence. 
 
 
Israel’s Legacy: A New Necessity Defence 
 
The defence of necessity is essentially a “state of nature” plea. If one finds 
oneself in an impossible position requiring one to choose between violating 
the law and preventing a greater harm, such as the taking of innocent life – 
and one has no time to seek recourse from the proper authorities – society 
authorises one to act as if there were no law. In other words, since society 
has broken its part of the social contract with you, namely to protect you, it 
follows that you are not obligated to keep your part of the social contract, 
namely to obey the law. Thus it has been said, “necessity knows no law.”137 
I would contend that such a defence is clearly appropriate in the ticking 
bomb paradigm – i.e. a defence for an interrogator who tortures a suspected 
terrorist supposedly in possession of the information necessary to defuse 
the ticking time bomb and save countless innocent lives. However, a clear 
condition of such a defence would be that it is only appropriate where all 
the constituent elements of the ticking bomb scenario are present. Hence, in 
order to qualify as a ticking bomb case it is essential:   
 
1. That the investigator had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
suspect had direct knowledge which could be used to prevent the 
weapon from detonating; 
2. That the weapon posed an imminent danger to human life; 
3. That there existed no alternative means of preventing the weapon 
from    exploding and  
4. That the investigator was acting to save human life.138  
 
In the ticking bomb scenario it is proposed that torture be used against a 
suspected terrorist who is responsible for or complicit in the planting of the 
bomb. The traditional necessity defence concerns force being used against 
                                                     
135 HC 320/80 Kwasama v. Minister for Defence 593 PD 113 at p. 132.  
136 Posner “The Best Offense” in The New Republic 02/09/2002. 
137 See generally Dershowitz, loc. cit., at 260. 
138 Addicott, loc. cit., at 849.  
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innocent people in order to prevent a greater harm. I do not believe that 
anyone would regard a ticking bomb terrorist as innocent. Hence the 
current necessity defence is in need of amendment in this regard. I would 
contend that in the ticking bomb paradigm, this element of the necessity 
defence should be amended to reflect our current self-defence law. Unlike 
necessity, preventing the danger in cases of self-defence does not involve 
the sacrifice of innocent people’s interests. The use of force is not directed 
at the defenceless but rather at the person who has unlawfully created the 
danger and is able to avoid the need to sacrifice her interests by ceasing the 
attack.139 The second shortfall of the current necessity defence is that it is 
generally understood as a defence that responds to circumstances 
emanating from forces of nature and not from people. When the pressure is 
from human beings the defence, if applicable, is duress not necessity. 
However this limitation on the application of the necessity defence can be 
overcome. According to Addicott the distinction between pressure coming 
from nature or human beings has disappeared in most modern legal systems 
and the two defences are capable of merging into a single necessity 
defence.140 Hence in terms of the ticking bomb scenario and the possible 
use of torture I would contend that the defence is applicable regardless of 
whether the threat comes from human beings or from nature. 
Thus, the defence will only be available when all the elements of a 
ticking bomb threat are present and it is not restricted to the torture of the 
innocent but is instead a defence to the torture of the guilty in the name of 
the greater good. There are a number of other conditions which I would 
submit should attach to such a defence.141 First, the prohibition of torture is 
to be maintained in its absolute form under international law. Torture 
should always be regarded as a crime when committed. From a practical 
point of view there is independent value in preserving the absolute ban on 
torture. The more entrenched a norm is – and the prohibition on torture is 
among the most entrenched norms – the harder it will be for government to 
convince the public that violating the norm is necessary.142  
                                                     
139 See generally Gur-Arye, loc. cit., at 194.  
140 See generally Addicott, loc. cit. 
141 The conditions, which I believe should attach to a necessity defence, are to some degree 
similar to those laid down in The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code. This Code 
recognises a “Choice of Evils” defence. Under this defence the conduct of a person acting to 
avoid a harm or evil to himself or another is justifiable if: the harm or evil sought to be avoided 
by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offence 
charged and neither the code nor other law defining the offence provides exceptions or defences 
dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification 
claimed does not other wise plainly appear. According to the Code an interrogator who is 
subject to criminal liability for the torture of a terrorist in a ticking bomb situation would be able 
to raise this “Choice of Evils” defence. For more on this point see generally Silker, loc cit. 
142 For more on this point see generally Gross, “Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic 
Absolutism and Official Disobedience”, loc. cit., at 1481. 
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 The second condition which should attach to the defence of necessity 
is that it only operate as a post facto defence. There should never be prior 
authorisation of the use of torture, regardless of the circumstances. Such ex 
ante approval of torture proved disastrous for Israel in the 1980s and as set 
out above, I contend that such authorisation would be open to substantial 
abuse if introduced today either in the form of torture warrants or any other 
pre-approved procedure for the torture of human beings. The necessity 
defence should only be available after the torture has been committed and 
the interrogator is standing trial for breach of international law. 
 Certainty of criminal prosecution of alleged torturers should be the 
third condition of this necessity defence. I endorse Oren Gross’s official 
disobedience model143 in this regard. When an interrogator tortures a 
suspected terrorist he is committing an act of official disobedience. He has 
no prior permission to use torture as the practice of torture cannot be 
authorised in advance and he knows he is stepping outside the legal 
framework, breaching not only domestic but international law, in using 
torture but he does so in the belief that torture is the last remaining viable 
option to protect the greater good. According to the official disobedience 
model, if an official determines that a particular case necessitates the use of 
torture, he may choose to depart from the absolute prohibition. The 
personal consequences of violating the law must be determined by a jury of 
his peers. Hence, society retains the role of making the final determination 
as to whether the interrogator ought to be punished and rebuked or 
rewarded and commended for his actions.144   If a Court determines that the 
interrogator was justified in his actions then they may relieve him of 
criminal liability. I would contend that the criminal prosecution of every 
alleged torturer is the most essential condition in such a necessity defence. 
Otherwise we risk creating a defence analogous to the one operating in 
Israel whereby the post facto defence is so strong that it deters the Court 
from ever bringing criminal prosecutions, transforming their post facto 
necessity defence into ex ante approval of torture.  
 This type of necessity defence has already gained support from 
certain quarters. The ICC Statute145 expressly provides that the defence of 
necessity is available to persons accused of one of the crimes falling under 
the jurisdiction of the Court. These crimes include torture as a War Crime 
and a Crime against Humanity. Article 31(1)(d) requires that the action 
taken in the face of an imminent threat or danger to the life or limb of the 
person concerned or of a third person be “a necessary and reasonable 
reaction to avoid this threat” or danger. The terms necessary and reasonable 
describe actions that: 
 
                                                     
143 See generally Gross, Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Article 31(1)(d) of the Statute for the International Criminal Court. 
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1. Must be appropriate an capable of averting the danger; 
2. Cause harm which is limited to that absolutely necessary to forestall 
the threat and; 
3. Do not cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.146 
 
Taking this endorsement by the ICC into account I would contend that the 
introduction of a necessity defence to acts of torture perpetrated in the most 
exigent of circumstances would be a reasonable reform of the law on 
torture. It accommodates the possibility of the ticking bomb case while 
maintaining the prohibition of torture to the greatest extent possible.  
 The actions of Israel and the US have sent a very clear message to 
the world that the absolute prohibition of torture in its current form is 
incapable of dealing with the reality of modern warfare. Ticking bomb 
scenarios are no longer mere hypothetical situations conjured up in 
academic ivory towers and States are searching for every possible weapon 
to deal with such situations. For many, interrogational torture now 
represents an extremely powerful weapon for the State in the ticking bomb 
paradigm. I would offer some words of caution in this regard: while the 
ticking bomb threat is very real, it is also very rare. Hence, when we set out 
to chart a general policy on the issue of torture, we must ask ourselves 
whether our general policy ought to be shaped around the contours of these 
rare exceptions or whether there is some value in maintaining the 
prohibition in its absolute form and providing a post facto mechanism to 
deal with the ticking bomb scenario should it ever arise. I would argue that 
the pertinence of the defence of necessity has to do with the fact that it is 
specifically designed to cater for those rare and extreme situations that are 
difficult for the law to encompass specifically since they are, by their rarity, 
so unforeseeable.  
Once we authorise State agents to use interrogational torture in one 
set of cases, it is unlikely that we will be able to contain such use to that 
limited subset of cases. Rather, such power and authority are likely to 
expand far beyond their original intended use. It is primarily for this reason 
that I reject Dershowitz’s torture warrants. Just because I believe in 
maintaining an absolute prohibition does not mean I am naïve about the 
frequency with which torture is used. I would contend that introducing a 
necessity defence as set out above ensures that any use of torture will come 
before the public in a criminal trial, the public will decide if such torture 
was warranted and those involved will be held accountable. I accept that 
this form of exception does not present an ideal solution. The possibility 
remains that even if a situation appears to qualify as a ticking bomb 
situation the suspect in question may be innocent. Determining whether a 
                                                     
146 See generally Gaeta, “May Necessity be Available as a Defence for Torture in the 
Interrogation of Suspected Terrorists” (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 2.3 at 
785. 
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situation amounts to a ticking bomb scenario thereby necessitating the use 
of torture inevitably involves some level of subjectivity; an investigator 
must have “reasonable grounds” to believe that the suspect has direct 
knowledge which could be used to prevent a bomb from detonating. With 
subjectivity comes fallibility and the possibility that an innocent may be 
subjected to torture. It is at this point that the question if lesser evils 
becomes paramount. Without reform the danger exists that the prohibition 
against torture will continue to be ignored and eventually become obsolete. 
In this scenario countries which at present refrain from using physical 
pressure in interrogations because of the international prohibition could 
depart from this position. While many may argue that this is a dramatic 
leap in logic I would disagree. Since September 11th many countries have 
reacted in a panicked and somewhat extreme manner to the possibility of a 
similar terrorist attack. For them torture or CID treatment could represent a 
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within the definition of torture and so were not absolutely prohibited. They 
also contended that even if these techniques were illegal, they were 
justified by a necessity defence, which operated to excuse the actions of 
Israeli security forces even before the torture was carried out. They then 
refined this defence so that it only operated after the act in question had 
taken place, i.e. it could only be used as a defence in a criminal prosecution 
for torture. However, the defence was so strong that few prosecutions were 
ever taken, ensuring that torture and ill treatment could occur without 
consequences for those who practised it. The US likewise manipulated the 
definition of torture to exclude painful practices from its remit. They also 
restricted the application of the Geneva Conventions by deciding that many 
detainees captured during the War on Terror did not qualify for POW 
status. This reinterpretation of international law allowed severe physical 
and psychological abuse to be perpetrated against detainees by US forces 
during the War on Terror. Once again, no consequences attached to these 
gross violations of international law.  
 Therefore these States not only attempted to circumvent the law on 
torture but they succeeded in doing so. While their actions have received 
international condemnation, there have been no real consequences 
attaching to these violations. UN bodies like the Human Rights 
Committee149 and the Committee Against Torture150 which monitor the 
application of certain international treaties prohibiting torture do not have 
the means to force compliance with those treaties. In the past it has always 
fallen to other contracting States to call upon countries violating the law to 
abide by the relevant international standards.151 The sad reality is that it has 
often been countries like the US which has used its power on the 
international stage to ensure other countries honour their commitments 
under international law. Now it is the US itself that refuses to abide by 
international law. Given this situation, there is a very real danger that the 
prohibition of torture in its current form will continue to be ignored.  
                                                     
149 Monitoring Body for the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCPR.  
150Monitoring Body for the UNCAT.  
151 Often ignored in the celebrations of the UNCAT is the fact that while it is quite strong in 
substance, it is remarkably weak in enforcement. The central enforcement procedure in the 
Treaty is a requirement that States submit reports to the Committee Against Torture, an 
international body created by the Treaty to oversee the Convention. But failure to abide by even 
this minimal commitment is frequently ignored. Stronger enforcement procedures are available 
but wholly optional: countries can agree to allow States and individuals to file complaints 
against them with the Committee Against Torture but they are not required to do so in order to 
join the Treaty. Consequently only about 30% of those who have joined the Convention have 
accepted these additional procedures. According to the sceptical view of international law, these 
weak enforcement provisions mean that States will never change their behaviour to obey the 
Convention. Where international institutions do not put in place effective enforcement 
mechanisms, there is, of necessity, greater reliance on other methods of maintaining 
compliance, such as domestic enforcement and reputational incentives. For more on this point 
see generally Hathaway, “The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture” in 
Levinson d. op. cit. at 205. 
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Consequently these recent violations of the absolute prohibition of 
torture not only make a mockery of international law but they send a signal 
to the rest of the world that certain States may violate the law with 
impunity. With this in mind the words of Abraham Lincoln offer an 
interesting solution: “In times of war it is sometimes necessary to suspend 
our liberties to protect our liberties.”152 While I am not advocating the 
suspension of the prohibition of torture, I am seeking a compromise 
whereby the absolute nature of the prohibition is maintained on the statute 
books but provision is made for the concerns of countries like Israel and the 
US through the introduction of a necessity defence for the very rare, real 
ticking bomb cases. While this may appear to many as selling out, as giving 
in to the insubordination of a small number of countries I would disagree. 
This minor alteration to our civil liberties law will ultimately protect our 
civil liberties as there is a very real possibility that without amendment the 
prohibition of torture will become obsolete as States disregard international 
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torture should only ever be used as a last resort. With this in mind it is my 
respectful contention that while a necessity defence is not the ideal solution 
it does ensure that the prohibition of torture is maintained as far as 
practicable, while simultaneously acknowledging the fact that the absolute 
prohibition of torture has been successfully undermined in the last two 
decades by a number of independent, democratic and powerful nations. 
 
  
  
   
CASENOTES  
 
 
COLLATERAL CHALLENGES TO A DECLARATION 
OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: A v. GOVERNOR OF 
ARBOUR HILL PRISON1 
 
 
SINÉAD RING* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this case, the Supreme Court considered the retrospective effect of a 
declaration of unconstitutionality on cases already decided under the 
statutory provision. In A, the Supreme Court was faced with a dilemma in 
resolving on the one hand, the fact that the provision under which A was 
convicted and sentenced was unconstitutional, and on the other, the desire 
and duty of the Court to promote the common good. 
There were 2 considerations at the heart of this case: 
 
1. A declaration of invalidity has retrospective effect to the party 
who brought the constitutional challenge; 
2. (a) The issue of a collateral attack on a prison sentence based 
on another person’s successful attack on the statute under which it 
was imposed; 
(b) The related question of whether someone who brings a 
collateral attack will be entitled to redress based on the subsequent 
finding of invalidity. 
 
The case is a significant departure from the common law rule that the 
duty of a court is not to “pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound 
the old one”2 and exemplifies the practical implications of the distinction 
between the Constitution and judicial enforcement of its commands. 
 
                                                     
* BCL (Law and German), LLM, Legal Researcher, Law Reform Commission. The views 
expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Law 
Reform Commission. The author would like to thank Mr Raymond Byrne BL for his helpful 
comments. Any errors or omissions are those of the author.  
1 [2006] IESC 45. 
2 1 Blackstone Commentaries, 69 (15th ed 1809), cited in Linkletter v. Walker 381 US 618 
(1965). 
246 Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
History  
 
In 2004 the applicant (A) was convicted on a plea of guilty of the offence 
of unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 15 (also known as 
defilement of a girl under the age of 15) contrary to section 1(1) of the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935 and was sentenced to 3 years 
imprisonment to date from 8th November 2004.3 
In May 2006, in CC v. Ireland (No 2),4 the Supreme Court declared 
that section 1(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935 was 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. The principle ground 
for this was that section 1(1) afforded no defence of honest belief as to the 
age of the girl once the actus reus of intercourse was established.5 The 
provision was contrary to the State’s obligations under Article 40 of the 
Constitution.6 
Three days after the Supreme Court decision in CC (No 2), A applied 
pursuant to Article 40.4.2º of the Constitution for an order directing his 
release from custody on the grounds that his detention following his 
conviction under section 1(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935 
was unlawful. The High Court (Laffoy J.) considered that since section 1(1) 
was null and void, A’s conviction and sentence were nullities. She thus 
upheld the habeas corpus application and ordered A’s release. 
The State immediately appealed against the High Court’s order. In an 
ex tempore judgment, delivered 3 days after the High Court decision, the 
Supreme Court allowed the appeal, and a warrant was issued for the arrest 
of A. He was arrested that evening and returned to custody. The Court 
delivered its reasons for allowing the appeal on 10th July 2006. 
 
 
Case Law 
 
In order to understand the High and Supreme Court judgments, it is 
necessary to first briefly sketch the relevant case law.  
                                                     
3 On the date of the offence, A was 38 and the victim was 12. A’s daughter was a friend and a 
classmate of the victim. It was accepted that A knew the girl was under 15 years of age. Before 
A had sex with the victim, he gave her alcohol. Hardiman J. stated “It is scarcely possible to 
think of a less meritorious applicant. I would not grant relief unless obliged to do so.” 
4CC v. Ireland, The Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] IESC 33; 
[2006] 2 ILRM 161; Hardiman J.; Murray C.J., Geoghegan, Fennelly and McCracken JJ. 
concurring: ‘the CC case’. 
5 The decision followed that of CC v. Ireland (No 1) [2005] IESC 47 where the Supreme Court 
upheld Smith J.’ s finding that a defence of honest mistake as to age was not available under the 
section.  
6 In response to the legislative vacuum created in the wake of CC (No.2), the Oireachtas enacted 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. Subsequently, a Joint Committee on Child 
Protection was established to review the substantive criminal law of sexual offences against 
children and associated issues, including the age of consent in sexual offences. 
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In McMahon v. Attorney General7 a majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the provisions of the Electoral Act 1923 were unconstitutional as 
they did not ensure the secrecy of the ballot. However, the Court avoided 
the issue of the validity of Dáil elections which had been held since 1923, 
since no such argument was made. In de Búrca v. Attorney General8 a 
unanimous Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the provisions 
of the Juries Act 1927 which confined juries to rated occupiers and 
excluded women unless they specifically applied. Again, the Court did not 
address the retrospective implications of this, though O’Higgins C.J. 
considered that the “overriding requirements of an ordered society” would 
defeat any argument as to the invalidity of all criminal trials held under the 
impugned provisions.9 Following on from de Búrca, the Supreme Court in 
The State (Byrne) v. Frawley10 held that the applicant was estopped from 
claiming his trial had been unconstitutional, since he had raised no 
objection at the time of his trial, which was in progress at the time of the 
decision in de Búrca, or at any appeal. 
The question of the retrospective potential of a finding of 
unconstitutionality was finally considered in Murphy v. Attorney General.11 
In Murphy, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act 1967 were unconstitutional.12 Following on from the 
declaration of unconstitutionality, the plaintiffs sought to have all the 
overpaid tax refunded to them. This raised the question of the status of 
other married couples who had similarly overpaid tax. Henchy J. delivered 
the leading judgment on this point,13 and held that the 1967 provisions had 
been always been a nullity.14 Furthermore, Henchy J. stated that a pre-1937 
law subsequently found inconsistent with the Constitution ceased to operate 
with the coming into force of the Constitution: 
 
                                                     
7 [1972] IR 69. 
8 [1976] IR 38. 
9 [1976] IR 38, at 63. 
10 [1978] IR 326. 
11 Murphy v. Attorney General [1982] IR 241, O’Higgins C.J., Henchy, Griffin, Kenny and 
Parke JJ. 
12 The provisions had the effect of taxing the plaintiffs, a married couple, more heavily than an 
unmarried couple. 
13 O’Higgins C.J. dissented on this point. He considered that since Article 25.4.1° of the 
Constitution prescribed that every Bill was to become law upon signature by the President, 
invalidity subsequently established could not relate back to the moment of enactment; validity 
only took effect at the date of the declaration of invalidity. 
14 The majority (O’Higgins C.J. and Kenny J. dissenting) held that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
be repaid from the first day of the financial year immediately succeeding that in which they had 
challenged the provisions. Up until that year the State was entitled to act on the assumption that 
the taxes imposed were validly imposed and had altered its position by spending those taxes. 
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Such a declaration under Article 50, s.1, amounts to a judicial 
death certificate, with the date of death stated as the date when 
the Constitution came into operation.15 
 
Crucially, Henchy J. drew a distinction between the finding of 
inconsistency and the effects of such a finding, setting out ‘the primary 
rule’ of redress. He considered that any person affected by transactions 
done under an invalid statutory provision would normally be entitled to 
appropriate redress.16  
However, Henchy J. qualified this general rule. There may be certain 
“transcendent considerations which would make [the provision of redress] 
undesirable, impractical or impossible.” These included “the irreversible 
progressions and by-products of time, the compulsion of public order and 
of the common good”.17 Redress would not be forthcoming in certain 
situations: for example “because of a person’s conduct, or because of the 
irreversible course events have taken”.18 In Murphy, the State was entitled 
to defeat the vast majority of claims by reason of the common law defence 
of change in position and its reliance in good faith on the validity of the 
sections. 
 
 
The Decision of the High Court in A19 
 
In the High Court, A submitted that following the decision in CC (No2), his 
conviction and sentence were nullities and of no effect, and that as a 
consequence, his detention was not in accordance with law.   
Laffoy J. observed that there was no decided case on the effect of a 
declaration that a pre-Constitution statute is unconstitutional. She adopted 
Henchy J.’s obiter comments in Murphy to the effect that the provisions 
were void from the coming into operation of the Constitution. The only 
relevant consequence of the declaration of unconstitutionality was whether 
the detention of the applicant was in accordance with law. Laffoy J. noted 
that: 
… it is of significance that in [the CC (No2) case] the Supreme Court 
declared section 1(1) to be inconsistent with the Constitution in toto, 
rejecting an argument made on behalf of the State parties that a 
declaration of inconsistency should be couched in terms that s.1(1) 
‘cease to have force and effect to the extent that it precluded an 
accused from advancing a defence of reasonable mistake.20  
                                                     
15 [1982] IR 241, at 307. 
16 [1982] IR 241, at 313. 
17 [1982] IR 241, at 314.  
18 [1982] IR 241, at  307. 
19 [2006] IEHC 169, Laffoy J. 
20 CC v. Ireland (No 2) [2006] 2 ILRM 161, at 181. 
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Having considered another judgment of Henchy J. in The State (Royle) v. 
Kelly,21 this time regarding the test to be applied by a Court when deciding 
whether to grant an application for habeas corpus, Laffoy J. held: 
 
The defect here could not be more basic. It is that the purported 
conviction relates to something which is not an offence in 
criminal law. In my view the conviction is a nullity, as is the 
sentence.  
 
Accordingly, Laffoy J. ordered the applicant’s release from custody.22 
 
The Decision of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that it is a principle of 
constitutional law that cases which had been finally decided and 
determined on foot of a statute which is later found to be unconstitutional 
must invariably be set aside as null and of no effect.23  
The Court observed that while the practice has been not to accord 
retrospective effect to declarations of unconstitutionality, the issue had not 
been the subject of an express decision of the Supreme Court. The Court 
also noted that this was the first time a collateral challenge to a final 
decision of a court had been brought before the courts based on a 
subsequent judicial decision. 
In the leading judgment, Murray C.J. analysed Henchy J.’s dicta in 
Murphy that a finding of invalidity “normally” involves redress, by 
focussing on the concept of the administration of justice. The abstract 
notion of absolute retroactivity was incompatible with the administration of 
justice envisaged by the Constitution; it would render a legal system 
uncertain, incoherent and dysfunctional and would cause widespread 
injustices. 
Murray C.J. quoted extensively from the judgment of Henchy J. in 
Murphy in support of this principle of limited retrospectivity, observing 
                                                     
21 “Where … the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced by a court established by law under 
the Constitution, and the jurisdiction of that court to try the offence and impose the sentence has 
not been challenged, it would be necessary to show that the procedure has been so flawed by 
basic defect as to make the conviction a nullity before it could be held that the detention was not 
in accordance with law.”: The State (Royle) v. Kelly [1974] IR 259, at 269.  
22 Laffoy J. rejected the argument that applicant would have lacked locus standi to challenge the 
constitutionality of section 1(1) (he admitted knowing the girl was under 15 at the time of the 
offence). Any appearance of a “windfall bonus” did not affect the fact that his detention was 
rendered unlawful by the decision in the CC (No2) case. Likewise, the possibility of opening up 
an “appalling vista” was also irrelevant. 
23  For the sake of convenience reference to acts being declared void ab initio included reference 
to a pre-1937 Act not having force and effect from the coming into operation of the 
Constitution. 
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that the Court in that case limited the right to recover for public policy 
reasons.24 The Chief Justice continued:  
 
The law is too old and too wise to be applied according to a rigid 
abstract logic or a beguiling symmetry.  As Henchy J. pointed out 
[in Murphy] for centuries the law has known general principles 
and transcendent considerations, such as the public interest, 
which is another way of saying the common good, restricting 
retrospectivity, especially the setting aside of judicial decisions 
already finally decided, even though the law on which they are 
founded is later held to be invalid. 
 
Fundamental interests of public policy required limitations on the 
retrospective effect of judicial decisions. The legal order and the 
administration of justice is not one of perfect symmetry.25 The Court had to 
address the competing interests of the claim of A and the interest of justice, 
including the victim, having regard to the Constitution generally, the public 
interest, the common good and social order. The loathsome nature of the 
crime was only relevant in so far as it engaged the competing constitutional 
considerations, specifically the need to vindicate the victim.26 A central 
aspect of this balancing task was the changing nature of concepts such as 
the common good or social policy, particularly since the Constitution is a 
living document.27 Absolute retrospectivity based on the notion of an Act 
being void ab initio would be absurd and would “have dysfunctional effects 
on the administration of justice.”  Furthermore, one of the fundamental 
objectives of the administration of justice-finality and certainty in 
justiciable disputes-would be undermined.28 Denham J. stated: 
                                                     
24
 See also the frank acknowledgments in Muckley v. Attorney General [1985] IR 472, at 482 
and O’Rourke v. Revenue Commissioners [1996] 2 IR 1, at 17 that the potential chaos caused by 
the number of persons making claims for relief following a finding of unconstitutionality had 
influenced the Court’s reasoning in Murphy. See further Hogan and Whyte, J.M. Kelly, The 
Irish Constitution, (4th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2003) at 902-906. 
25 Murray C.J. The Chief Justice referred to the position in the United States, Canada, the 
European Union, the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of India to show that the absolute retrospectivity is “inherently incompatible 
with the broader notions of legal certainty and justice in an ordered society.” 
26 Hardiman J. 
27 Murray C.J. referred to his judgment in Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] 2 IR 545 
where he said the Constitution is a living document, and that concepts such as ‘common good’ 
and ‘social justice’ have a changing, dynamic quality. Denham J. also observed that the power 
of the courts to declare a valid law null and void “is exercised in the context that neither the law 
nor the Constitution is frozen in 1937.” 
28 Hardiman J. considered that absolute retroactivity would have a chilling effect on the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence, while Geoghegan J. pointed to the “grave danger 
that that judges considering the constitutionality or otherwise of enactments would be 
consciously or unconsciously affected by the consequences”. This concern was also voiced by 
Walsh J. and O’Higgins C.J. in The State (Byrne) v. Frawley [1978] IR 326. 
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Where a law has been treated as valid law for decades, it is impossible, 
unjust, and contrary to the common good, to reverse the many situations 
which have arisen and been affected in all their myriad forms over the 
decades. 
 
A declaration of unconstitutionality applies in the litigation in which the 
issue arises, and prospectively, but there is no general retrospective 
application of such an order. 
The Court did not however develop a principle of absolute non-
retrospectivity: it was prepared to envisage exceptions to the general rule in 
wholly exceptional circumstances where it would be “manifestly unjust or 
oppressive to uphold a completed proceeding having regard to a declaration 
of unconstitutionality.”29 An Article 40 order might be appropriate in such 
a situation, but this would be exceptional. 
The Court did not consider that there were any grounds for regarding 
A’s case as exceptional, therefore the general principle applied: 
 
Mr. A., like all persons who pleaded guilty to or were convicted of 
an offence contrary to s.1.1 of the Act of 1935 had available a full 
range of remedies under the law. They could have sought to prohibit 
the prosecution on several grounds including that the section was 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Not having done so they were 
tried and either convicted or acquitted under due process of law. 
Once finality is reached in those circumstances the general principle 
should apply.30 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
The question of whether the phrase ‘unconstitutional law’ is a misnomer 
throws into sharp relief the limits on judicial power. In A the Supreme 
Court is acknowledging that its judgment in CC (No. 2) was the statement 
of a constitutional norm, but that that norm was stated in an adjudicatory 
context. In doing so, the Court has avoided the extremes of both natural law 
and positivist analysis.  
The Supreme Court interpreted Henchy J.’s judgment in Murphy 
differently to Laffoy J. Laffoy J. took the view that public policy and equity 
could not justify an exception to Henchy J.’s rule of primary redress in the 
case of a person detained under an unconstitutional provision. The Supreme 
                                                     
29 Geoghegan J. 
30 Murray C.J. 
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Court considered that Laffoy J. did not give sufficient consideration to the 
exceptions to the general rule of redress. In not doing so, Murray C.J. 
correctly considered that she had conflated the questions of a declaration of 
inconsistency and the effect of such a declaration.31 
It is necessary to compare the statements of principle in Murphy and 
A. In Murphy, Henchy J. set out his primary rule of redress as follows: 
 
 
Once it has been judicially established that a statutory provision 
enacted by the Oireachtas is repugnant to the Constitution, and 
that it therefore incurred invalidity from the date of its enactment, 
the condemned provision will normally provide no legal 
justification for any acts done or left undone or for transactions 
undertaken in pursuance of it; and the person damnified by the 
operation of the invalid provision will normally be accorded by 
the Courts all permitted and necessary redress.”32 
 
 
Murray C.J. set out the general principle in A thus: 
 
In a criminal prosecution where the State relies in good faith on a 
statute in force at the time and the accused does not seek to 
impugn the bringing or conduct of the prosecution, on any 
grounds that may in law be open to him or her, including the 
constitutionality of the statute, before the case reaches finality, on 
appeal or otherwise, then the final decision in the case must be 
deemed to be and to remain lawful notwithstanding any 
subsequent ruling that the statute, or a provision of it, is 
unconstitutional. 
 
In Murphy, the Court was dealing with an action which concerned a direct 
attack on a statute by a person with locus standi to bring the challenge. On 
the other hand, in A the Court was considering a collateral attack brought 
by a person subsequent to the successful direct attack by CC, and 
furthermore, by a person who would never have had standing to bring a 
direct challenge in any event. Perhaps this is why Murray C.J.’s principle is 
                                                     
31 Perhaps one reason why Laffoy J. conflated the 2 issues was because of her reading of the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in CC (No2), in particular the Court’s declaration that section 1(1) 
was unconstitutional in toto- see above. 
32 [1982] IR 241, at 313. Emphasis added.  Henchy J. cited In re Haughey [1971] IR 217 where 
the Court declared provisions of the Committee of Public Accounts of Dáil Éireann (Privilege 
and Procedure Act, 1970 to be unconstitutional, and quashed a conviction and sentence imposed 
in pursuance of the impugned provisions.  
2006] Casenotes 253 
 
more pragmatic in tone than that of Henchy J.33 The Court in A is imposing 
checks on the exercise of judicial power. It is refusing to apply a cold logic 
to the finding of invalidity and instead places more emphasis on the Court’s 
role in administering justice and promoting the common good. This 
approach is reminiscent of O’Higgins C.J.’s judgment in Murphy.34 Indeed, 
while the general principle enunciated by Murray C.J. is consistent with 
that of Henchy J., it is suggested that the current Supreme Court has 
adopted a stance that goes further in limiting the retrospective effect of 
declarations of invalidity. Instead of bringing A within Henchy J.’s 
transcendent considerations, the Court preferred to state the general 
principle from the perspective of a person wishing to bring a collateral 
attack to his detention following a subsequent declaration of invalidity. It is 
unfortunate that the Court did not explicitly state its position on Henchy 
J.’s approach in Murphy, particularly in light of the Glavin case.35 In 
Glavin, also an Article 40.4 inquiry, the applicant had undergone a 
preliminary examination and been sent forward for trial to the Circuit 
Court, where he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment.36 The preliminary examination was conducted by a judge 
who had reached retirement age and had not been continued in office. The 
High Court held that since the preliminary examination was null and void, 
the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to try him and ordered his immediate 
release. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with Hamilton P, and went 
on to hold that, once the applicant’s conviction was found to be invalid, the 
High Court must immediately order his release and that it was not within its 
competence to consider whether the case should be returned to the District 
Court. Laffoy J.’s judgment in A would seem to be in keeping with that of 
the Supreme Court in Glavin. Of course, it could be argued that Glavin and 
Shelly were not collateral attacks such as in A, and therefore were not 
directly in point. However, the same could be said of Murphy,37 and given 
that Glavin would seem to be at variance with both that case and The State 
(Byrne) v Frawley,38 it is unfortunate that the Court in A did not make 
reference to Glavin.   
Furthermore, in A, Denham J. seemed to indicate a more restrictive 
approach when she mentioned the possibility that “a Court may consider it 
appropriate in certain extreme circumstances to suspend a declaration that a 
law is unconstitutional so that the Oireachtas might address the issue if it 
                                                     
33 However, it could be argued that in Murphy the prospect of an avalanche of claims by 
affected third parties was an influential factor -see footnote 24, above. 
34 Murphy v. Attorney General [1982] IR 241, at 292. 
35 Glavin v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1991] 2 IR 421. See also the Shelly case, which 
preceded Glavin: Shelly v Mahon [1990] 1 IR 36. Both cases concerned the same District Court 
judge, and both applicants had locus standi. 
36 This was reduced to 6 years on appeal. 
37 [1982] IR 241. 
38 [1978] IR 326. 
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wished.” It remains to be seen whether the Court will choose to make this 
possibility a reality.39 
                                                     
39 The authors of Kelly, The Irish Constitution suggest that the courts should draw the line rather 
at the point where really serious embarrassment to the State would be the result of accepting 
claims from the operation of an unconstitutional statute. See Hogan and Whyte, JM Kelly, The 
Irish Constitution (4th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2003) at 906.  
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Introduction 
 
In this case note, the authors consider the Supreme Court’s recent judgment 
in Curtin v. Clerk of Dáil Éireann. In its ruling, the Supreme Court 
examined whether the process put in place by the Oireachtas to facilitate 
the investigation of a Circuit Judge, prior to his possible impeachment by 
both Houses of Oireachtas, was constitutional. Significantly, it outlined the 
limits of the Oireachtas power in this regard. The authors will then discuss 
the proposed changes in judicial conduct and ethics generally in this 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
Facts: 
 
The applicant was appointed as a judge of the Circuit Court in November 
2001. In 2004, he was acquitted of possession of child pornography, an 
offence under section 6 of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 
1998.  In the Circuit Court, the trial judge, Judge Moran, ruled that a search 
warrant authorising the search of the applicant’s house and seizure of a 
personal computer was spent at the time of its execution. As a result, the 
seizure was unconstitutional and evidence obtained from the personal 
computer was inadmissible. He directed the jury to find the applicant not 
guilty. Once the applicant was acquitted by the Circuit Court, the 
government began steps necessary to bring about the possible impeachment 
of the applicant.  
 
 
 
                                                     
* LLB (Dubl), LLM (Lond), Barrister-at-Law, Legal Researcher Law Reform Commission. The 
views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the Law 
Reform Commission.   
** BA, MA (Bruges), Barrister-at-Law. The authors wish to thank Mr. Raymond Byrne BL for 
his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. All errors or omissions that appear are 
the sole responsibility of the authors.  
1 [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 ILRM 99. 
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Main issues before the Supreme Court: 
 
Since the applicant is a Circuit Court Judge, he is cloaked with special 
protection from removal from office.  Part of the protection of judicial 
independence is that the Constitution provides added defence to judges, and 
they cannot be removed from office except for ‘stated misbehaviour’. 
 Article 35.4.1° of the Constitution states that a judge of the Supreme 
or High Court shall not be removed from office except for ‘stated 
misbehaviour or incapacity’ and only then upon resolutions passed by the 
Dáil and Seanad calling for such removal. Although Circuit Court Judges 
are not expressly covered by Article 35.4.1°, legislative provisions have the 
effect of embuing them with Article 35.4.1° protection.  Section 39 of the 
Courts of Justice Act 1924 (as carried forward by section 48 of the Courts 
(Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961) provides that Circuit Court judges 
hold office by the same tenure as the Judges of the High Court and the 
Supreme Court. On that basis, Article 35.4. 1° applies with equal effect to 
Circuit Court judges. 
As part of the scheme to enable the Oireachtas to deal with the case 
of the applicant, the Government proposed, and the Oireachtas passed, two 
pieces of amending legislation which came into force in June 2004, and 
also amended Oireachtas Standing Orders. The Oireachtas response 
entailed three separate steps to facilitate the investigation of the applicant: 
clearly those steps had constitutional resonance, treading the fine line 
separating the functions, powers and investigative remit of the 
Government, legislature and judiciary.   First, the Committees of the 
Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of 
Witnesses) Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’) was amended by Committees of the 
Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of 
Witnesses) Act 2004, to render judges compellable witnesses in 
investigations into their behaviour.2 Secondly, an amendment was made to 
the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, by the Child Trafficking 
and Pornography (Amendment) Act 2004 to exempt both the applicant and 
the Oireachtas Committee from any criminality by the reason of the 
possession or distribution of child pornography, actions pursuant to the 
investigation conducted by the Oireachtas Committee. Possession or 
                                                     
2 Section 3(4) of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges 
and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 provides in general that judges are immune from being 
called before a Committee of the House of the Oireachtas pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1997 
Act. Section 3A(a) of the 1997 Act, as inserted by the 2004 Act, now provides: 
“Section 3, in so far as it relates to a committee established for the purposes of, or in 
connection with, a matter arising under section 4 of Article 35 of the Constitution or 
pursuant to section 39 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 or section 20 of the Courts of 
Justice (District Court) Act 1946, shall, notwithstanding subsection (4) of section 3, 
apply to a judge of a court that is specified in that subsection and to which judge the 
matter relates.” 
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distribution of child pornography is an offence under the 1998 Act. Thirdly, 
standing orders were adopted for the appointment of a Joint Committee to 
investigate a judge’s behaviour or capacity for the purposes of Article 
35.4.1°. These standing orders (63A in the case of the Dáil and 60A in the 
Seanad) stated that due process and fair procedures would be afforded to 
Judge Curtin in the Committee’s investigation and provided for the 
procedures governing a motion for the removal of a judge pursuant to 
Article 35.4.1°. The purpose of the Committee was to formulate a motion 
on whether the judge should be removed for stated misbehaviour or 
incapacity while avoiding making any finding of fact from the adduced 
evidence. 
On foot of these actions, the Oireachtas committee requested the 
applicant to explain the circumstances of how the original search warrant 
had come about, and to submit any materials relating to that warrant to the 
Committee including the personal computer. The personal computer had in 
fact remained in the possession of the Gardaí.  This direction, under 
Section 3A of the amended 1997 Act, as amended by the 2004 Act, was 
challenged on judicial review brought by the applicant, who also 
challenged the constitutionality of that section and the procedures of the 
Joint Committee, including the standing orders.  The applicant’s claim was 
dismissed in the High Court (Smyth J) and on appeal by the Supreme Court 
(Murray C.J., Denham, McGuinness, Hardiman, Geoghegan, Fennelly and 
McCracken JJ). 
Delivering the principal judgment in the Supreme Court, Murray C.J. 
noted the legal significance of the Curtin case as it “was one of the few 
occasions in the annals of legal history that such a proposal [removal of 
judge] has been considered by a court and the first time since foundation of 
the State”.3 
 
 
Lack of procedure in Article 35 and the Twenty-Second Amendment of 
the Constitution Bill 
 
The lack of procedure in relation the removal process pursuant to Article 
35.4.1° was identified by Hogan and Whyte.  They noted that unlike the 
impeachment of the President under Article 12.10, Article 35.4.1° “does 
not set out any procedures in respect of matters such as notice to the Judge 
concerned or the right of the accused party to appear before the Houses of 
the Oireachtas and to be represented at the hearing of the charge.”4 A 
similar view was expressed by the Constitutional Review Group and they 
also recommended that the simple majority vote in the Houses of the 
                                                     
3 [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 ILRM 99, at 106. 
4 Hogan and Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, (4th ed, Lexis Nexis, Butterworths, 2003) 
at 1010.  
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Oireachtas be replaced with a two third majority identical to that for the 
removal of the President under Article 12.10.5 This recommendation was 
considered by the Government and it agreed that this recommendation was 
a sensible one. In 2001, the Government published a Twenty-Second 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2001. 
This Bill provided for the amendment of Article 35 of the 
Constitution in order that a judge is afforded the right to appear and be 
represented at the hearing of a charge made against him. Further, it 
provided that a two-third majority of the Houses of the Oireachtas would 
be required to remove the judge in question. Finally, the Bill proposed for 
the establishment of a body (majority of members would have been judges) 
to investigate whether a judge engaged in conduct constituting 
‘misbehaviour’ or were affected by incapacity. This Bill was withdrawn 
when it failed to obtain opposition support, as they were of the opinion that 
the Bill would compromise judicial independence. 
 
 
Previous removal of Judge: 
 
Murray C.J. made reference to the only previous removal of judge in this 
jurisdiction.6 This case involved Judge Jonah Barrington who presided over 
the Irish Admiralty Court. In 1828, a select committee found him guilty of 
misconduct in office. Specifically, he was found guilty of financial 
impropriety in relation to funds in his court. The funds in question which 
the proceeds of the sale of two derelicts. Hearings were held before both 
the House of Lords and Commons and each passed resolution for his 
removal. These were presented to King and, on foot of these, Judge 
Barrington was removed from office in 1830.7  
 
 
The High Court judgment:8 
 
Mr. Justice Smyth in the High Court rejected the applicant’s argument that 
as he had been acquitted of all charges in a criminal trial, he could not be 
tried by the Houses of the Oireachtas for effectively the same offence. 
Smyth J. found that the investigation of alleged stated misbehaviour was a 
constitutional function of the Oireachtas and the procedure under Article 
35.4.1° was in place to protect public confidence in the judiciary.  
                                                     
5 The Constitutional Review Group, Report of the Constitutional Review Group, (Stationary 
Office, 1996), at 182. 
6 [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 IRLM 99, at 131. 
7 Osborough “The Irish Legal System” in Costello ed., The Four Courts: 200 years: Essays to 
commemorate the Bicentenary of the Four Courts (Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for 
Ireland 1996) at 55. 
8 See [2005] IEHC 163; [2006] 2 ILRM 99, at 116-119. 
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Main findings of the Supreme Court: 
 
First, the Supreme Court was satisfied that it was within the powers of the 
Houses of Oireachtas to adopt Standing Order 63A and 60A respectively 
and to give the Joint Oireachtas Committee the power to report without 
making findings of fact. The Court was also satisfied that Committee and 
Houses would allow the applicant his full constitutional rights. 
Secondly, the Supreme Court had to consider the applicant’s argument 
that section 3A of the 1997 Act is repugnant to the Constitution as it was an 
impermissible encroachment on the independence of the Judiciary, in that it 
compelled Judges to give evidence/produce articles on the basis of mere 
allegation. The Supreme Court found there was no improper or 
unconstitutional invasion of rights. On the contrary, it found that the power 
(Article 35.4) is included in the constitution for the purpose of ensuring the 
fitness and integrity of the Judiciary.  
The third issue before the Supreme Court was the lawfulness of 
direction made by the Committee under section 3 of the 1997 Act requiring 
him to produce to the Committee computer materials, which were 
unlawfully seized by Gardaí under defective warrant. This argument was 
based on three grounds: 
(a) The direction was an invasion of his privilege against self 
incrimination; 
(b) the materials were not in law or fact in his possession or 
power; 
(c) the direction was infringement of constitutional rights as it 
represented the fruits of unconstitutional search.  
 
The Court found that the right not incriminate oneself does not extend to 
compulsory powers requiring person to produce item. It is merely 
concerned with respect for the will of the accused to remain silent. The 
Court found consequent to the coming into force of section 13 of the Child 
Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, inserted by act of 2004, the 
computer materials were within his power or possession as it was lawful 
for him to take possession of the computer for the purpose of complying 
with direction of Committee. This section was introduced to exempt any 
proceedings of the Oireachtas from criminality by reason of the possession 
or distribution of child pornography. These actions are offences under the 
1998 Act.  The Supreme Court also found that the Committee’s direction to 
produce was a legitimate means of ensuring that the committee fulfil their 
constitutional functions where those functions are legitimately concerned 
with such an issue.   
Finally, the applicant also claimed that the investigation of the 
allegations by the Oireachtas Committee amounted to double jeopardy. The 
Supreme Court found that the committee was considering an entirely 
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different matter wholly different to trial on criminal charge before a court. 
This was whether the accused had conducted himself in respect of matters 
to the extent that this constitutes stated misbehaviour. 
 
 
Judgement of the Supreme Court in more detail: 
 
The Standing Orders 
The applicant argued that the Houses of the Oireachtas did not have the 
power to appoint a committee as contained in Standing Orders 63A of the 
Dáil9 and 60A of the Seanad, as the Select Committee were specifically 
prohibited from making findings of fact or recommendations, or express 
any opinion on either of these.10 He argued that the power of removal of a 
judge, pursuant to Article 35.4.1° could only occur where an allegation 
made against a judge has been proved by process of adjudication or trial, 
whether this is internal or external to the House. He further argued that the 
procedure in place in the Standing Orders was deficient as it placed too 
little emphasis on the concept of judicial independence, as the Committee 
was not vested with fact finding powers. According to the applicant, all the 
Committee could do was collect evidence. The Committee was not 
empowered to consider the evidence, rule on the admissibility of evidence 
or give weight to the creditability of witnesses. These arguments were 
based on a strict or literal reading of the Standing Orders. The applicant 
was of the opinion that all of the evidence once gathered by the Committee 
would merely be handed over to the Houses of the Oireachtas in an 
undigested form. This, argued the applicant, would amount to an unfair 
hearing before either House. 
Briefly, these standing orders contained the procedures governing a 
motion for the removal of a judge pursuant to Article 35.4.1°.  They 
contained matters such as what details are to be contained in the motion for 
the removal of a judge for stated misbehaviour; the principle that the select 
committee shall at all times have due regard for the constitutional 
                                                     
9 Dáil Standing Order 63A sets out what is to be included in any motion for removal of a judge 
pursuant to Article 35.4.1°. Any such motion must include: 
“state such matters upon which it is contended by the proposer of the said motion that 
the Judge who is the subject matter of the motion should be removed for stated 
misbehaviour or that he or she is incapacitated.” 
10 Standing Order 63A(2) of the Dáil and Standing Order 60A (2) of the Seanad, are identical 
and provide as follows: 
(2) Where such an Article 35.4.1 motion is put on the Order Paper for any day, the 
Dáil/Seanad may either reject the said motion, or on a motion made to adjourn the 
debate may by motion appoint a Select Committee to take evidence in respect of the 
aforesaid Article 35.4.1 motion, provided that the Select Committee shall make no 
findings of fact nor make any recommendations in respect of same or express any 
opinions in respect of same.” 
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principles of basis fairness of procedures; and the procedure for the 
Committee to send its Report to the Dáil and the Judge. 
In dealing with the applicant’s argument, first, the Court 
acknowledged the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to Dáil and 
Seanad Standing Orders. The main case cited by the Court in favour of this 
proposition was Pigs Marketing Board v. Donnelly (Dublin) Ltd11, where 
the Court set the principle that “it must, be accepted as an axiom that a law 
passed by the Oireachtas, the elected representatives of the people, is 
presumed to be constitutional unless and until the contrary is proven”.12  In 
the Curtin case, the Supreme Court, in what amounts to evidence of 
judicial restraint and deference, justified its reasoning on the basis that the 
Constitution expressly and exclusively designates and assigns the power to 
pass resolutions for the removal of judges to the Houses of the Oireachtas. 
Therefore the court was not minded to intervene. 
The Court found no difficulty with either of the Standing Orders, 
mainly because the terms of the Standing Orders expressly guaranteed to 
have due regard for the natural and constitutional rights of the applicant. 
The Court came to this conclusion by considering whether the procedures 
could allow the Committee, as a designated organ of government, to act in 
‘clear disregard’ of the applicant’s constitutional rights. They also 
examined the text of Article 35.4.1° and from this could see that the Article 
did not prevent a Committee to be set up devoid of fact finding or 
recommendation power.  
The Court also rejected the applicant’s contention that he would not 
have the right to give or call witnesses before the Houses. The Court stated 
that there was nothing in the Standing Orders that prevented the Houses 
hearing evidence, despite this being a rare event. The court did 
acknowledge that this it may be necessary to have this take place, given the 
restrictive powers given to the Committee. Later on in its judgement, the 
Court took the view that powers of the Committee were not as restrictive as 
that suggested by the Applicant. The Court opinion that the Committee 
could provide the Houses with a report which included reference to areas 
where there are conflicts of evidence or where issues have arisen. It is clear 
from the judgment of the Court that the powers vested in the Oireachtas 
Committee are not as limited as the applicant argued. The Court based its 
reasoning on the text of the Standing Orders which themselves precluded 
the Committee from making findings of fact or any recommendations or 
opinions arising from those facts. It is worth setting out the Court’s opinion 
in this regard: 
 
                                                     
11 [1939] IR 413. 
12 [1939] IR 413, at 417. 
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It should be added that the powers of the committee need not be 
interpreted as restrictively as the appellant suggests…There is a 
distinction between the report and the associated raw evidence which 
will be in the form of transcripts and audio material. The paragraph 
[(8) of the Standing Order 63A] proceeds to require that “Committee 
shall first send its report to the Clerk of the Dáil, who shall arrange in 
the first instance for the report to be circulated to the members of the 
Dáil and to the Judge…”. None of this prevents the committee nor 
could it ever have been intended, from organising the evidence 
gathered into a manageable form. It may and probably must prepare 
indices and summaries of the evidence. Those summaries may be 
related to distinct issues of fact raised in the resolution including the 
introductory paragraphs of the resolution…While the committee may 
express no opinions, it is not prevented from pointing out issues or 
conflicts in the evidence. In short, the committee is required to 
produce a report which will act as a useful guide to the members for 
their consideration, when debating the resolution, and the appellant 
and his advisors in representing him.13 
 
The issue then considered by the Court was to what extent could the 
Oireachtas investigate and deliberate on questions of fact regarding the 
activities non-Oireachtas members, normally the preserve of the Courts. 
The Court acknowledged that it would have been more beneficial to have a 
committee empowered to deliver to the Dáil a considered report and 
opinion, rather than the undigested evidence as contained in the Standing 
Orders. It is this portion of the judgment, is it submitted, that makes the 
most interesting reading. The Court gave guidance to the Oireachtas on 
what powers could be given to future Committees dealing with this 
constitutional provision. The Court stated that  
  
A committee empowered to hear evidence, rule on admissibility, 
resolve conflicts of evidence and report on its findings to the Houses 
of the Oireachtas would have obvious advantages. The committee 
would have been in a position to schedule hearings, hear and 
evaluate the evidence of witnesses, eliminate irrelevant material, 
concentrate on the principal points at issue and furnish a coherent 
and cogent report to the Houses. In the opinion of the court it would 
have been open to the Houses to have chosen such a committee, but 
they have not done so.14 
 
                                                     
13 [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 ILRM 99, at 145-6. 
14 [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 ILRM 99, at 145. 
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The Court opined that the tame powers entrusted to the Committee by the 
Oireachtas were probably a result of its judgment in Maguire v. Ardagh.15 
In that case, the Supreme Court had deemed the scope of that committee’s 
work outside the powers of the Oireachtas as, among other things, it 
involved fact-finding of a non-Oireachtas member which encroached into 
the judicial sphere, given that it purported to assess culpability for an 
unlawful killing. The Supreme Court in Curtin distinguished this case as 
the current case involved the Oireachtas acting in accordance with a power 
expressly place on it by the Constitution. In Maguire, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the power of the committee established to investigate a 
fatal shooting and to make findings of fact and conclusions on the personal 
culpability of individuals who were ordinary citizens was repugnant to the 
Constitution. The Court in Maguire was of the view that as there was no 
power contained in the Constitution, either express or implied, to conduct 
such inquiries, the committee’s powers were not constitutional. 
  Finally, the Court acknowledged the principle contained in Article 
15.10 of the Constitution that it is within the power of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas to regulate their own procedure. The Court was very aware of 
264 Irish Student Law Review [Vol. 14 
 
this business benefits from the presumption of constitutionality.  These 
powers however must be wielded with regard to constitutional justice and 
fair procedures, a requirement adhered to by section 3A of the 1997 Act.  
Having balanced constitutional justice with the Oireachtas’ designated role 
to remove a judge, it had fulfilled its role in a constitutionally acceptable 
manner. 
 
The Court does not consider that the power to call a judge as a 
witness or to produce articles as evidence involves any improper or 
unconstitutional invasion of judicial power or judicial independence.  
On the contrary, the power is included in the Constitution for the 
purpose of ensuring the fitness and integrity of the judiciary.18   
 
In general terms, the Supreme Court noted that Article 35.4.1° did not 
represent a complete scheme contemplating how a judge could be removed 
by the Oireachtas and thus other Constitutional provisions had to be relied 
on.  Obiter it was remarked that constitutional history showed 
parliamentary constraint in encroaching on judicial independence, and “in 
the event of irrational or irresponsible abuse of power, as by the proposal of 
a resolution in response to an unpopular judicial decision, or otherwise 
maliciously or in bad faith, it is not to be doubted that the courts would be 
prepared to exercise an appropriate level of judicial review”.19  
 
The Lawfulness of the section 3A direction 
(a) Direction was an invasion of his privilege against self incrimination; 
This argument was not pursued in the Supreme Court, however the Court 
distinguished potentially incriminatory practices, such as a compelled 
making of a statement, from an instruction to produce documents for 
inspection.  The latter practice included police rights to search a house with 
a warrant or DNA or breath sample or livestock be produced for inspection.  
As such, they did not violate the right to silence, and fell within ECHR 
delimitations set out in Saunders v. United Kingdom20.   
 
(b) The materials were not in law or fact in his possession or power; 
The Applicant argued that a direction under section 3(1)(c) of the 1997 Act 
applies only to a thing in his “possession or power”.  Physically, the Gardaí 
held the computer materials and having now learnt that the computer 
contained child pornography as proscribed by the Child Trafficking and 
Pornography Act 1998, it was no longer in his power to take possession of 
the materials.  
                                                     
18  Ibid., at 141. 
19  Ibid., at 142. 
20 (1997) 23 EHRR 313.        
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The Court accepted that a power equated to an “enforceable legal 
right” as set out in Bula Ltd v Tara Mines Ltd21.  However, this right had 
not been set to nought neither by its factual police possession nor by the 
potential that it contained illegal images.  The Court drew attention to 
amendment of the 1998 Act by section 1 of the Child Trafficking and 
Pornography (Amendment) Act 2004 which allows for compliance with a 
direction of the Oireachtas, without necessarily giving the evidence 
directly.22  Thus, the whereas Court found the applicant’s argument 
unconvincing at first instance by virtue of its circularity, it further found 
that even if any problem of illegality of the materials were to hinder the 
applicant handing them over, he could still comply with the direction.    
 
(c)Direction was infringement of constitutional rights as it represented the 
fruits of unconstitutional search.   
The applicant relied on Walsh J’s dictum in People v. O’Brien23 in his 
contention that the Court must vindicate his constitutional rights by 
refusing to allow evidence, which had previously been deemed 
unconstitutionally gained for the purposes of a criminal trial, to be 
available to the Committee. The applicant characterised the direction to 
him, rather than to the Gardaí who in fact held the computer materials in 
question, as a device to side-step the applicant’s rights in this regard.  The 
defendants sought to de-couple the existence of the computer from the 
unconstitutional taint by arguing that it, and the knowledge that it housed 
child pornography, had existed independently of the unconstitutionally 
executed warrant, and thus there was an entitlement to seek it.   
The Court removed the facts of the present case from the general 
ambit of the exclusionary rule, citing its particular facts.  The current 
location of the computer (with the Gardaí) stemmed from the applicant’s 
refusal to take it back encumbered with illegal material, rather than as the 
direct result of its unconstitutional collection by virtue of the spent warrant.  
In the event of its return to the Applicant, the computer would not be 
forever beyond the scope of investigation:  
 
                                                     
21  [1994] 1 ILRM 111. 
22 Section 13 of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, 1998  now provides that:  
Nothing in this Act prevents— 
(a) the giving of or compliance with a direction under section 3 of the Committees of the Houses 
of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997,……” 
23 [1965] I.R. 142 at 170: “The defence and vindication of the constitutional rights of the citizen 
is a duty superior to that of trying such citizen for a criminal offence.  The Courts in exercising 
the judicial powers of government of the State must recognise the paramount position of 
constitutional rights and must uphold the objection of an accused person to the admissibility at 
his trial of evidence obtained or procured by the State or its servants or agents as a result of a 
deliberate and conscious violation of the constitutional rights of the accused person where no 
extraordinary excusing circumstances exist, such as the imminent destruction of vital evidence 
or the need to rescue a victim in peril.”  
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If the computer could have been and had been returned to his 
possession it could not be said that the exclusionary rule means it 
was forever immune, in all circumstances, from a lawful seizure 
or order for production. In the present case the order for 
production might be regarded as legitimately triggered, apart 
from any other consideration, by the applicant's express and 
public reliance, in the course of the Article 35 process, on the 
assertion that his computer material was affected by the placing 
on it of unlawful material albeit which he did not want and had 
not sought.24   
 
Thus the Court found that by none of the three challenges levelled at the 
direction was it successfully impugned.   
 
Double jeopardy 
The Applicant also argued that the Oireachtas committee could not be tried 
by the Oireachtas committee as he had been acquitted by a criminal court. 
He considered that the actions of the Oireachtas committee amounted to a 
further trial of the issues, and as he had been acquitted by a criminal court, 
the actions of the Oireachtas committee amounted to double jeopardy. The 
court did not consider this issue in huge depth, but nonetheless did make 
worthwhile comments. The Court found that the committee was 
considering an entirely different matter wholly different to trial on criminal 
charge before a court. This was whether the accused had conducted himself 
in respect of matters to the extent that this constitutes stated misbehaviour. 
 
 
Reform in conduct of judges generally: 
 
The applicant in the Curtin case is not the first Judge to have been at the 
centre of controversy in recent years. The Sheedy affair and the consequent 
resignation of a Supreme Court Judge and a High Court Judge are within 
the recent memory of most. Both of these incidents have caused the 
question of how to adequately deal with the conduct of judges generally to 
be considered. 
The current procedure for removal of a Judge of the Supreme, High 
or Circuit Courts is unduly cumbersome for conduct falling short of serious 
judicial misconduct. District Judges benefit from three additional statutory 
protections, which allow for a more informal approach to be taken.25 To 
date, in relation to Circuit, High and Supreme Court Judges, the only 
                                                     
24 [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 ILRM 99, at 151-152. 
25 Section 21 of Courts of Justice (District Court) Act 1946, Section 10(4) of the Courts 
(Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 and section 36(2)(a) and (b) of Courts (Supplemental 
Provisions) Act 1961. Once the Judicial Council Act is in force, these will be repealed. 
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procedure available for the removal such judges is the impeachment 
process provided by Article 35 of the Constitution.  
Reform in this area has long been called for.26 A number of reports 
called for the self-disciplining of judges. The first of these to note the need 
for reform in the area of regulation of the judiciary generally was that of 
the Constitutional Review Group. The Group recommended that the 
conduct of judges in general terms should be by the judiciary themselves 
within the framework of a Judicial Council. The Group recommended that 
an amendment of Article 35 was required to facilitate this. The Working 
Group on a Courts Commission also concluded that it would be beneficial 
to establish a Judicial Council. They recommended that the Chief Justice 
establish a committee to examine their report, consult with relevant bodies 
and to advise if it is appropriate for such a body to be established.27 Such a 
committee was established as the Committee on Judicial Conduct and 
Ethics (‘the Keane committee’) and was chaired by the Chief Justice of the 
time, Mr. Justice Keane.  
The Keane committee recommended that a judicial council be 
established on a statutory basis and all judges be automatic members of the 
Council. However, the Committee did not advise that there be lay 
representation on the Council.  The Keane Committee recommended that 
the judicial council act in a filtering capacity with complaints received 
about judges and if the committee was satisfied that the compliant was of a 
sufficiently serious nature to necessitate further investigation, to refer the 
complaint to Panel of Inquiry.  The Keane Committee expressed the view 
that lay participation on the panel of inquiry would important to ensure 
transparency and public confidence in the system. Accordingly they 
recommended one lay representative be on the panel of inquiry and this lay 
member be one of three lay representatives appointed to the pool of 
representatives to the panel of inquiry. The panel would conduct its 
hearings in public and then report back to the judicial conduct and ethics 
committee. The judicial conduct and ethics committee would then 
recommend actions, if required, to be taken. These would range from a 
private or public reprimand through to recommending that the matter be 
handed over to the Oireachtas for impeachment proceedings.  
 
 
                                                     
26 See The Constitutional Review Group, Report of the Constitutional Review Group, 
(Stationary Office, 1996), Working Group on a Courts Commission, Sixth Report of the 
Working Group on a Courts Commission, (Stationary Office, 1998); Committee on Judicial 
Conduct and Ethics, Report of the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, (Stationary 
Office, Pn 9449,2000), The All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Fourth 
Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee,: The Courts and the Judiciary 
(Stationary Office, Pn 7831,1999) 
27 Working Group on a Courts Commission Sixth Report of the Working Group on a Courts 
Commission Report with Summary (1998, Stationary Office, Pn 6533) at 175. 
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The Judicial Council Bill: 
 
The legislation introducing judicial ethics legislation is not expected to be 
published until 2007.28 The main reason for the delay is to allow 
consideration of the issue generally and time to digest the Curtin decision. 
The Judicial and Ethics Bill was first promised in 2001.29  
It is expected that the judicial council will be modelled on Keane 
Report (the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Ethics) and will provide 
for a judicial council which would represent the entire judiciary. It will 
have a disciplinary committee with lay representation as members. Further 
it will be able to hear complaints and impose a wide range of sanctions 
including a recommendation that the conduct of the judge complained of be 
referred to the Oireachtas for impeachment.30  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Curtin judgment effectively gives guidance both to the Oireachtas in 
the framing of the Judicial Council Bill and to the Committee examining 
the current scenario. It empowers the Committee in the current case, and 
the Oireachtas in devising a framework for the future committees, to call 
witnesses, analyse evidence and report back to the Oireachtas. The 
Supreme Court took an expansive view of the current committee, despite 
the limitations imposed by its establishing Standing Orders. The current 
committee may highlight conflicts of evidence to present that evidence in a 
cogent manner to the Houses. The powers suggested by the Supreme Court 
for future committees go considerably further. The fact that they may 
schedule hearings, eliminate irrelevant material having heard and evaluate 
evidence amounts to the influential editing of evidence for the 
consideration of the Houses, coupled with the ability to comment on which 
evidence is contradictory or for whatever reason unsound. This sails very 
close to a power to make findings of fact, that final element being reserved 
for the House of the Oireachtas themselves.  
  
                                                     
28 O’Hallaran, Minister defends delay in judicial ethics Bill, The Irish Times, 28 April 2006. 
29 Ibid.  
30 See Coulter, “Grievance body for court users needed”,  The Irish Times, 18 October 2005. 
  
  
   
BOOK REVIEW 
 
LIES IN A MIRROR: AN ESSAY ON EVIL AND 
DECEIT BY PETER CHARLETON* 
(Blackhall Publishing, 2006, €25) 
 
Peter Charleton is well known in the Irish legal community for his co-
authorship of the key text on Irish criminal law, among other 
publications. In Lies in a Mirror, Charleton departs from a discussion 
of substantive criminal law and undertakes an examination of the 
nature of evil. He sets out with the avowed objective of showing how 
deceit is the engine of evil and how, by extension, “there is a lie 
behind every crime”. Wisely, however, this book is not contextualised 
within the sphere of criminal law, but rather attempts to unearth the 
primordial causes of human destructiveness. Indeed, a question posed 
early in the book asks whether a recurrent pattern of violence can be 
explained by logic or rather, does apparent logic and reason belie a 
more fundamental impulse toward destruction, which can correspond 
to or be catalysed by myth and self-deception. The role of the myth is 
curiously a chief consideration of Charleton, as he seeks to ascertain 
how individuals and groups come to hate others and eventually seek to 
destroy them – his manifold illustrations of this phenomenon retell 
folkloric stories of perceived good and evil, but in contrived and 
sinister circumstances occurring throughout the course of human 
history, which saw an inversion of an individual’s or group’s 
compulsion to destroy. This is most palpable, says Charleton, when 
intrinsic evil impulses harboured by an individual or collective group 
personality are projected on to intended victims of destruction. 
Examples used to illustrate this device include the demonisation by 
the Hutu ascendancy of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda and the abject 
fictionalisation of internal dissent and rebellion by those at the top of 
the communist party hierarchy in Stalinist Russia.  
What is left largely unanswered by this discussion, however, is the 
notion that those orchestrating such a projection of evil do so because they 
recognise the need to discharge their moral incumbency, whether that be 
before the scrutinous eyes of a state’s populace or the international 
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community. While Charleton rightly points out that a myth of victimhood 
is typically created by those that seek to do evil, he does not fully address 
the realpolitik dimension to the creation of such a myth, that as well as 
being the driver of evil, that same myth may be merely a pragmatic 
response to prevailing pressures amounting to moral influence and suasion. 
Therefore, such a myth can be said to come on foot of or anticipate 
reactions by external forces to preordained conduct in order to satisfy those 
forces of the conduct’s righteousness. Or, to borrow from Charleton’s own 
analogy, the myth is less the engine of destruction than the vehicle being 
powered by that engine, which itself represents the public face of the 
underlying substantive purpose. In any event, by way of examples drawn 
from Ireland’s own brand of criminality, such as the violent robbery of 
elderly isolated farmers and IRA terrorism, and other examples plucked 
from humanity’s ignominious history, Charleton effectively conveys the 
saliency of his key proposition: that deceit and evil are in lockstep in the 
manifestation of human destructiveness. 
Charleton’s method of developing and expressing his hypothesis 
relies heavily on his own experience as an accomplished criminal lawyer 
and on surmising as to the underlying factors that drove key historical acts 
of evildoing. This is framed by a selective use of psychological doctrine, 
which very usefully sets out the notional wellspring of evil latent in each 
individual, such as Freud’s Narcissus and Jung’s unconscious shadow. 
Discussing the latter in particular, Charleton incisively identifies that the 
theory of there being a congenital instinct toward an archetype and its 
concomitant patterns of behaviour, inherited over millennia, is relevant to 
the wider discussion of the imagery of destruction which individuals can 
feel compelled to breathe life into. The stimuli which serve to excite this 
shadow, or indeed provoke an evil and violent response from Freud’s 
Narcissus are illustrated by examples from Charleton’s own career, such as 
the self-inflated, dominating boyfriend, who loses control and murders his 
habitually supplicant girlfriend when she ends the relationship. Received 
wisdom calls this manner of offence a crime of passion, and it is 
understood to represent the uncontrollable urge of an individual subjected 
to immense pressure and acute anxiety on a massive scale. This 
corresponds with the aforementioned doctrines, and to a certain extent is 
explained by them, but there is an important distinction between this 
manner of act and an organised act or series of acts characterised by reason 
and logic such as, using Charleton’s example, the drawing up of lists by the 
Rwandan genocidaires of those they intended to kill first. This distinction 
is not considered in great detail; however, it appears to bear heavily on the 
question that I referred to earlier relating to the possibility that a reasoned 
and logical pattern of destruction is a sophisticated manifestation of the 
unconscious or indeed subconscious vindication of the myth, and thereby 
springs from the same progenitor that gives rise to crimes of passion. It is 
2006] Book Review 271 
 
unclear whether the respective provenances of emotional explosions of 
violence and systematic prosecution of a destructive and violent course are 
being posited as one and the same. That said, Charleton’s attempt to 
identify the parentage of the two forms of evil, while not comprehensive, 
provides considerable insight into the non-conscious machinations of the 
psyche in knitting together disparate concepts of impulse, instinct and 
intention. 
In addition to discussing the origination of evil, Lies in a Mirror also 
addresses some of the same issues that proved so turbulent for Raskolnikov 
in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Indeed, one of the central themes 
of that novel – the purgative power of redemption upon banishment of self-
deceit – is given a comprehensive treatment in the opening chapter of 
Charleton’s book. This discussion, above all others, represents the most 
accessible and indeed truest account of the nature of deceit. Charleton 
sagely recounts anecdotes from his own experience and draws on evidently 
wide research into the nature of guilt to chart the apocalyptic effect on an 
individual when a deception of the self is forcibly revealed, the apparatus 
of deceit is removed and all vestiges of the lie give way to truthfulness and 
admission. His compassionate treatment of this process of catharsis stands 
in stark contrast to the subsequent austerity of his examination of the 
overwhelming power and potential for destructiveness of evil and deceit. 
Over the course of the book this examination feeds into an erudite account 
of the common insignia which have characterised the emergence, 
development, conduct and occasional demise of regimes of evil, whether 
personal or collective. Charleton parses this continuum by examining in 
detail its component parts, in particular the initial tracing of evil intent to 
self-deception, the dehumanisation and demonisation of others, common 
patterns of destruction, the cult of personality, the inculcation of a pliant 
people, aberrations in impulses toward evil and the wholesale abrogation of 
responsibility for evildoing. 
While he covers a lot of ground in this interesting work, Charleton 
acknowledges the impossibility of answering many of the questions he 
poses; but in attempting to do so, he brings to bear a valuable and insightful 
analysis on the malignant and inexorable characteristics of the existential 
human condition. The text is a valuable addition to a sparse corpus of work 
in this area. It will serve to remind those who read it of the fragile nature of 
a secure and peaceful society and the relative ease with which destruction 
can be wrought and evil can be fomented. 
 
*Reviewed by Patrick Mair, BCL (NUI), BL, LLM Candidate, NYU.   
 
